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Ricardo F. Morin
December 29, 2026
Oakland Park, Fl
Author’s Note
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This installment of Unmasking Disappointment presents the first part of Chapter XII, “The Fourth Sign.” It covers §§ 1–9 under the heading Autocracy and lays out the conceptual and institutional framework necessary for the sections that follow. The chapter continues in subsequent installments, which address Venezuela (§§ 10–25) and The Asymmetry of Sanctions (§§ 26–34).
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Chapter XII-Part 1
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The Fourth Sign
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Autocracy
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1
The justification for a discussion of autocracy and democracy arose from ideas that emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries, which provided insights into the foundations of contemporary governance. John Locke, in his Two Treatises of Government [1689] argued that legitimate political authority derived from the consent of the governed. Locke’s emphasis on natural rights (life, liberty, and property) and his concept of a social contract—in which government’s primary role is the protection of those rights—laid the groundwork for modern democratic governance. He offered a contrast with autocracy in his advocacy of the rule of law. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract [1762] contributed to democratic theory with his concept of the general will, in which he posited that sovereignty resided with the people and that governments should be accountable to their general will, understood as civic responsibility. By contrast, Rousseau analyzed autocracy as a kind of tyranny that violated the principles of popular sovereignty. Thus, he anticipated the move from monarchical rule to participatory democracy.
2
Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws [1748] asserted that democratic governments were based on popular sovereignty, whereas autocratic governments were founded on fear and obedience. Montesquieu introduced the idea of the separation of powers, which became a foundational principle of democracy. Montesquieu’s emphasis on checks and balances, within a tripartite structure (executive, legislative, and judicial), contrasted with autocratic regimes in which power was concentrated in a single ruler or institution. His work influenced later constitutional designs, particularly in the United States and France.
3
The 19th century was marked by political revolutions, the rise of nationalism, and the spread of constitutional monarchies. While important developments occurred, such as the expansion of suffrage and the evolution of representative government, the philosophical groundwork had largely been set in the previous century. The 19th century was more focused on the application of these principles rather than their theoretical development. Thinkers like Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx have provided critical insights, but their focus on practical analysis (democracy in America or class struggle in general) has been built on earlier theories rather than proposing a new understanding of governance.
4
It has been said that in some instances benevolent despots serve the common good, though John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty [1859] (Chapter 1, Introductory, 4-5) has clarified for us that it was only true in the context of civil liberties when benevolence was in favor of participatory democracy:
By Liberty was meant protection against the tyranny of political rulers. . . . Their power was regarded as necessary but also as highly dangerous. . . . The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty.
Mill argued that from antiquity civic liberty has been defended to prevent the tyranny of the majority, or the abuse of power. Thus, he believed that autocracy was flawed because of its concentrated power without responsibility.
5
In the 20th century, Robert A. Dahl’s Polyarchy [1971] introduced the concept of polyarchy to describe systems of government that, though imperfect, have provided higher levels of citizen participation. For Dahl, democracy was not just the presence of elections; it also required pluralism that allows citizens to participate. This feature distinguishes democracy from authoritarianism. Dahl’s analysis examines the functioning of democracies and introduces measurable elements that distinguish democratic governance from autocracy.
6
In the 21st century, Juan J. Linz and Larry Diamond have continued this lineage by exploring the conditions under which democracies fail and autocracies rise. Linz’s work, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes [2000], has focused on the breakdown of democratic regimes and the concept of “authoritarianism.” He has explained how this antagonism is fundamental in understanding the fragility of democracies and how democracy can devolve into autocratic rule under a single leader. Similarly, Larry Diamond’s The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World [2008] and In Search of Democracy [2015] have focused on “democratic backsliding,” where democracies have been in decline and given rise to authoritarianism. Both Linz and Diamond emphasized the importance of institutions, civil society, and the rule of law in maintaining democracy.
The constitutional principles outlined in the preceding discussion establish a framework in which authority is distributed, constrained, and made accountable. Yet the operation of that framework introduces a different question: how systems designed to limit power adapt when confronted with conditions that require decisive action. The transition from monarchical rule to representative government did not eliminate the need for decision. It relocated that necessity within a structure intended to contain it. The tension between rule and decision therefore persists, not as a defect, but as a condition inherent to governance itself.
This tension becomes visible in moments of crisis, when the pace of events exceeds the capacity of procedure. In Venezuela, states of emergency and economic exception have been repeatedly invoked in response to political and economic instability, granting the executive expanded authority to act without ordinary legislative mediation. These measures have been justified by reference to external threats, internal disorder, and the preservation of national stability. In such instances, decisiveness does not stand outside the constitutional order; it operates within it, but under altered conditions. The exception begins as a response to necessity.
What begins as a response to necessity can, through repetition, assume a different character. Measures introduced under conditions of urgency do not always recede when those conditions stabilize. In Venezuela, the repeated use of enabling laws and emergency decrees has allowed governance to proceed through executive decision in the absence of sustained legislative agreement. Over time, the exception has shifted from a temporary response to an available instrument. The language of necessity extends beyond its original scope, and the exception becomes a method through which governance proceeds.
This shift does not require the formal suspension of law. Institutions remain in place, and procedures continue to operate. Yet their function begins to change. Administrative and judicial bodies participate in this reorientation, as interpretations of constitutional authority permit the continuation of exceptional measures beyond their initial scope. The law persists, but its application becomes increasingly contingent on executive direction. What emerges is not the disappearance of legality, but its reconfiguration, in which the distinction between formal authority and practical implementation grows less stable.
The extension of the exception as a governing method introduces a limit that arises through use. The distinction between the ordinary and the exceptional gives the exception its meaning. When the language of necessity is invoked repeatedly across domains, that distinction begins to lose its clarity. Measures once justified as temporary responses appear with increasing frequency, and their recurrence alters the framework within which they are understood. What was introduced to address interruption becomes part of regular practice. Discretion expands, but its criteria become less discernible. The exception diminishes through extension, as the condition it was meant to identify becomes indistinguishable from ordinary governance.
This internal limit carries implications that extend beyond institutional design. When the exception ceases to be temporary, the constraints that once governed its use begin to weaken. Decisions justified in the language of necessity no longer refer back to a stable framework capable of evaluating them. In such conditions, practices introduced under claims of urgency—such as the restriction of civil society, the expansion of security measures, or the concentration of administrative authority—can persist without clear criteria for limitation. What follows is not an immediate transformation, but a gradual reorientation in which the concentration of decision becomes easier to justify and more difficult to resist.
7
Another thinker, Timothy Snyder, has emphasized the role of trust and transparency in the functioning of democracy. In The Road to Unfreedom [2018] and On Tyranny [2017], Snyder has argued that the waning of institutional trust, both in the judiciary and the media, is a tactic common in authoritarianism. He explains how autocratic leaders manipulate societal institutions by turning them into instruments of propaganda with merely a façade of governance.
8
The relationship between an autocratic ruler and the people can be described as transactional: the autocrat provides security and stability in exchange for the people’s loyalty and their freedoms. Citizens become instruments for the maintenance of power. The leader cultivates an image that invites devotion and reinforces dependence, often in the language of protection and national necessity. What begins as reassurance in moments of uncertainty gradually diminishes accountability, as the concentration of decision is accepted as the condition for order.
9
A democracy remains viable only when the State is capable of constraining itself from taking advantage of its own power and privilege. This brings us to the topic at hand, which is the challenge faced by countries such as Venezuela, where political leaders have diminished the authority of the law by exempting themselves from its strictures. The framework designed to contain power is not formally abandoned. It is gradually reinterpreted, until the distinction between rule and exception no longer operates as a limit, but as a justification.
Tags: autocracy, civic responsibility, democratic erosion, institutional restraint, rule of law, State power
Observations On Perception 
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