“What Marriage Preserves”


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The Limit of Welcome.  Ricardo F. Morín.  CGI, 2026.

November 16, 2026

Oakland Park, Florida

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At Britain Yearly Meeting in York in 2009, speakers described committed relationships that Quaker meetings had supported but acknowledged unevenly.  Opposite-sex couples had a clear route to recognition; same-sex couples faced options that varied between meetings.  The minute describes Friends who considered their relationships ordinary and private but had to act as visible pioneers to secure acknowledgment and recording.  The testimony contributed to the meeting’s developing judgment, twenty-two years after the prospect was first raised at Meeting for Sufferings.  The meeting affirmed equal treatment of same-sex committed relationships and opposite-sex marriages, reaffirming its understanding of marriage as God’s work, to which the community bore witness.1

The testimony placed relationships already supported by the community beside the unequal recognition available to those relationships.  The couples seeking acknowledgment participated in the community’s judgment about what acknowledgment meant.  Their presence gave the discrepancy a human referent:  people whose commitments the meetings supported encountered a distinction that the meetings continued to maintain.

Recognition also gives commitments a definite form within a community.  In 2012, the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of Conservative Judaism approved marriage and dissolution models developed by Rabbis Elliot Dorff, Daniel Nevins, and Avram Reisner for same-sex couples.  Their proposal used a covenant distinct from traditional kiddushin while identifying the resulting union as a Jewish marriage.  The covenant established obligations of fidelity and financial responsibility for each partner’s welfare; accompanying provisions addressed the dissolution of the union.2  The inclusion of an acknowledged ending placed responsibility within the relationship and within the process of leaving it.

In the Quaker deliberation, testimony affected a community’s judgment about relationships it already supported.  In the Jewish covenant, religious interpretation supplied a form through which additional couples could assume defined obligations.  These developments involved the exercise of authority within the communities themselves.  The people seeking recognition entered practices through which their communities expressed religious commitment.

The relation between a couple’s capacities and the definition of marriage is different where sexual difference carries a meaning that those capacities do not exhaust.  The Catholic catechism defines marriage as a covenant between a man and a woman, directed toward the spouses’ good and the procreation and education of children.  It also affirms that spouses without children can lead a married life of human and Christian significance through charity, hospitality, and sacrifice.34

The acknowledgment of value in a childless marriage does not remove sexual difference from Catholic teaching.  An argument excluding same-sex couples solely because the couple cannot procreate together differs from the theological claim that the union of a man and a woman has a particular meaning in itself.  The first concerns a reproductive function.  The second concerns what the religious definition identifies as constitutive of marriage.  Evidence that marriage has value without children bears directly on the first claim.  That evidence does not, by itself, resolve the second.

Catholic pastoral practice also distinguishes a blessing from recognition of a marriage.  The 2023 declaration Fiducia Supplicans permits spontaneous, nonliturgical blessings of same-sex couples without validating their status or altering the Church’s teaching on marriage.  The accompanying restrictions exclude forms that could confuse the blessing with a wedding.  A January 2024 clarification distinguishes blessing the couple from blessing the union.5  The partners can approach together and receive a pastoral response while their relationship remains outside the Church’s definition of marriage.  The acknowledgment offered and the marital recognition withheld concern different aspects of the same shared life.

Qur’an 30:21 associates the creation of spouses with tranquility, affection, and mercy.6  Article 4 of Morocco’s 2004 Family Code gives marriage a statutory definition:  a union founded on mutual consent between a man and a woman, with purposes that include fidelity and a stable family under the direction of both spouses.7  The statutory provision combines an account of the life spouses are to maintain with a definition of who can constitute the couple.

Where sexual difference is understood as constitutive, a couple’s capacity for affection and reciprocal responsibility does not satisfy the definition by itself.  An exclusion on that ground need not allege that the excluded couple is incapable of care.  The condition concerns the meaning assigned to the union independently of the couple’s conduct.  A disagreement about that meaning remains even when the parties agree about the value of care.  The capacities of a couple and the authority of a definition occupy different places in the dispute.

An inherited form can also receive an interpretation through which conduct is judged to fulfill an obligation despite departing from its usual observance.  In the Mencius, the absence of posterity is treated as a grave failure of filial duty.  Shun marries without informing his parents to avoid having no descendants.  Cultivated people regard his action as equivalent to having informed them.8  The judgment retains continuity of the family line as its governing concern and understands Shun’s conduct as fulfillment of the obligation.  The omitted formality is treated as satisfied through that interpretation.

The authority to interpret is part of what is at issue in disputes over continuity.  In the Mencius passage, the judgment establishes an equivalence within the obligations of filial life.  In the Jewish marriage models, the rabbis identify a covenant differing from inherited kiddushin as a Jewish marriage.  The religious or ethical standing of the resulting act depends on an account of fulfillment supplied within the tradition.  Agreement about a human purpose alone does not determine which interpretations a community accepts.

For couples seeking acknowledgment within a religious community, recognition concerns their participation in a shared religious life.  A couple may seek a ceremony because the partners understand their love and their responsibilities through a shared faith.  Where their fidelity and care put particular teachings of their faith into practice, their life together contributes to sustaining values the community asks its members to uphold.  Refusal to recognize their union as a marriage can wound the sense of belonging the partners already experience within that community.  Their contribution does not, by itself, settle a religious disagreement about the definition of marriage.  But the definition does not exhaust what is at stake in withholding recognition from people who help sustain those professed values.  Civil recognition cannot supply the acknowledgment these couples seek within their faith.

Civil recognition operates through the authority of the state.  Where a state affirms equal citizenship, its rules of admission to marriage coexist with a commitment to the equal civil standing of the people subject to those rules.  A distinction between eligible and excluded couples then raises a question about the grounds for unequal treatment.  The explanation concerns the state’s exercise of authority over citizens, including citizens who share no religious account of marriage.

Taiwan’s constitutional Interpretation No. 748 of 2017 addressed a functional justification for exclusion.  The court observed that the capacity to procreate was not a condition for opposite-sex marriage and that inability or unwillingness to have children did not itself invalidate such a marriage.  It rejected inability to reproduce as a rational basis for excluding same-sex couples.  The court also reasoned that extending marital rights and obligations to those couples would not disrupt the basic ethical order of existing marriage.9

The discrepancy lay between the reason offered for exclusion and the conditions applied to couples already admitted.  Reproduction was invoked as indispensable for one group while marriages without reproduction retained recognition in the other.  The civil distinction could not be accounted for by the reproductive requirement as stated.  The finding concerned the consistency of that justification for unequal treatment; it did not settle the theological meaning assigned to sexual difference.

A different issue arises when the reason offered for civil exclusion is a religious definition of marriage.  Within a community of belief, that definition may explain why a union cannot receive religious recognition even when the partners sustain commitments the community values.  When the state applies the same condition to civil marriage, the condition governs citizens regardless of whether they accept the belief.  The reach of the restriction exceeds the community within which its religious authority is acknowledged.

In an order committed to equal citizenship, the religious explanation and the civil justification answer different questions.  One identifies the requirements of a particular religious understanding.  The other accounts for unequal treatment by a common authority.  A civil justification can concern interests beyond care, but the statement of a religious requirement does not itself establish how those interests are served.  Where the state supplies only that statement, the reason for the condition within the faith is given while the reason for its application to citizens outside the faith remains unprovided.

The distinction between these authorities also separates the consequences of recognition.  Where religious solemnization and civil status are treated as distinct matters, civil marriage does not determine the religious meaning of the union.  A religious judgment concerning the union does not, on its own, determine the couple’s civil standing.  Disagreement about sacred meaning can continue alongside a common civil status.  The religious disagreement and the distribution of that status remain separate matters even when both affect the same couple.

The capacity to consent and the freedom to refuse concern whether the people entering a marriage can undertake its commitments as their own.  A condition protecting those capacities bears directly on the voluntary character of the undertaking.  A classification based on whether the partners are of the same sex addresses a different feature of the couple.  The justification for protecting consent does not, by that fact, account for exclusion of same-sex couples.

Civil marriage gives public form to voluntary commitments between spouses through the state’s recognition of reciprocal rights and responsibilities.  Where additional couples can undertake those commitments, their admission extends participation in that civil arrangement.  Admission to civil marriage does not determine whether a religious community finds the union consistent with its understanding of marriage.

Equal civil standing and the quality of a particular marriage remain distinct questions.  If excluded couples are required to demonstrate exceptional virtue while other couples receive recognition without that test, admission depends on different standards for the two groups.  The quality of any particular relationship does not explain why one class of couples faces an additional test.

Recognition does not establish the quality of conduct within a marriage.  Where one partner uses dependence to control the other, the existence of a civil marriage does not demonstrate reciprocal care.  Where a couple is denied civil marriage, the absence of that status does not establish an absence of care, consent, or responsibility.  The partners’ conduct and the institution’s classification of the partners provide different kinds of information.

The practical consequences remain with the couples.  Partners may build a home, care for one another through illness, and make decisions about work and aging around the life they intend to share.  They seek marriage to give the responsibilities of that shared life a publicly acknowledged form, under the same civil terms available to other couples.  Their wish to marry expresses the value they place on freely undertaking those responsibilities and having their commitment to one another count within their common society.  Where civil marriage is withheld, the partners can continue to sustain that life together while being denied the marital standing through which the state acknowledges other couples’ commitments.  The exclusion reaches into a future they are already making together:  their continuing care for one another cannot secure the recognition withheld from them.

Where a state defends an exclusion through a functional requirement that it does not apply to couples already admitted, the unequal treatment remains unaccounted for by that requirement.  Where the state relies solely on a religious definition, the condition of recognition extends to citizens whose civil standing does not otherwise depend on professing that belief.  Under either condition, continued enforcement of the boundary can substitute for an account of its civil grounds.  The line of admission is preserved, while the people outside it remain subject to an exclusion that the stated justification has not explained.

Sources

  1. Britain Yearly Meeting, 2009 minute, reproduced in Quaker Faith & Practice, §16.08.
  2. Elliot Dorff, Daniel Nevins, and Avram Reisner, “Rituals and Documents of Marriage and Divorce for Same-Sex Couples,” approved May 31, 2012, especially pp. 2–6.
  3. Catechism of the Catholic Church, §1601, “The Sacrament of Matrimony.”
  4. Catechism of the Catholic Church, §1654, “The Goods and Requirements of Conjugal Love.”
  5. Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Fiducia Supplicans, December 18, 2023, presentation and §§31, 38–40; “Press release concerning the reception of Fiducia supplicans,” January 4, 2024, §§2, 5–6.
  6. Qur’an 30:21, parallel English translations, Quranic Arabic Corpus.
  7. Morocco, 2004 Family Code, Article 4, reproduced in the ministry’s “Mariage” guidance.
  8. Mencius, 4A.26 (Li Lou I), James Legge translation, The Chinese Classics, Volume 2.
  9. Taiwan, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748, May 24, 2017; official Judicial Weekly summary, May 26, 2017, especially reasoning section IV.  English text.

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