Posts Tagged ‘State power’

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series IV”

March 4, 2026

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“Geometric Allegory” digital painting ©2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

Ricardo F. Morin

December 29, 2026

Oakland Park, Fl

This installment of Unmasking Disappointment presents the first part of Chapter XII, “The Fourth Sign.”   It covers §§ 1–9 under the heading Autocracy, laying out the conceptual and institutional framework necessary for the sections that follow.   The chapter continues in subsequent installments, which address Venezuela (§§ 10–25) and The Asymmetry of Sanctions (§§ 26–34).

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The Fourth Sign

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Autocracy

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The justification for a discussion of autocracy and democracy arose from ideas that emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries, which provided insights into the foundations of contemporary governance.   John Locke, in his Two Treatises of Government [1689] argued that legitimate political authority derived from the consent of the governed.   Locke’s emphasis on natural rights (life, liberty, and property) and his concept of a social contract—in which government’s primary role is the protection of those rights—laid the groundwork for modern democratic governance.   He offered a contrast with autocracy in his advocacy of the rule of law.    Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract [1762] contributed to democratic theory with his concept of the general will, in which he posited that sovereignty resided with the people and that governments should be accountable to their general will, understood as civic responsibility.    By contrast, Rousseau analyzed autocracy as a kind of tyranny that violated the principles of popular sovereignty.   Thus, he anticipated the move from monarchical rule to participatory democracy.

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Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws [1748] asserted that democratic governments were based on popular sovereignty, whereas autocratic governments were founded on fear and obedience.    Montesquieu introduced the idea of the separation of powers, which became a foundational principle of democracy.    Montesquieu’s emphasis on checks and balances, within a tripartite structure (executive, legislative, and judicial), contrasted with autocratic regimes in which power was concentrated in a single ruler or institution.    His work influenced later constitutional designs, particularly in the United States and France.

3

The 19th century was marked by political revolutions, the rise of nationalism, and the spread of constitutional monarchies.   While important developments occurred, such as the expansion of suffrage and the evolution of representative government, the philosophical groundwork had largely been set in the previous century.   The 19th century was more focused on the application of these principles rather than their theoretical development.   Thinkers like Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx have provided critical insights, but their focus on practical analysis (democracy in America or class struggle in general) has been built on earlier theories rather than proposing a new understanding of governance.

4

It has been said that in some instances benevolent despots serve the common good, though John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty [1859] (Chapter 1, Introductory, 4-5) has clarified for us that it was only true in the context of civil liberties when benevolence was in favor of participatory democracy:

By Liberty was meant protection against the tyranny of political rulers. . . .   Their power was regarded as necessary but also as highly dangerous. . . .   The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty.

Mill argued that from antiquity civic liberty has been defended to prevent the tyranny of the majority, or the abuse of power.   Thus, he believed that autocracy was flawed because of its concentrated power without responsibility.

5

In the 20th century, Robert A. Dahl’s Polyarchy [1971] introduced the concept of polyarchy to describe systems of government that, though imperfect, have provided higher levels of citizen participation.    For Dahl, democracy was not just the presence of elections; it also required pluralism that allows citizens to participate.    This feature distinguishes democracy from authoritarianism.    Dahl’s analysis examines the functioning of democracies and introduces measurable elements that distinguish democratic governance from autocracy.

6

In the 21st century, Juan J. Linz and Larry Diamond have continued this lineage by exploring the conditions under which democracies fail and autocracies rise.    Linz’s work, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes [2000], has focused on the breakdown of democratic regimes and the concept of “authoritarianism.”    He has explained how this antagonism is fundamental in understanding the fragility of democracies and how democracy can devolve into autocratic rule under a single leader.   Similarly, Larry Diamond’s The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World [2008] and In Search of Democracy [2015] have focused on “democratic backsliding,” where democracies have been in decline and given rise to authoritarianism.    Both Linz and Diamond emphasized the importance of institutions, civil society, and the rule of law in maintaining democracy.

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Another thinker, Timothy Snyder, has emphasized the role of trust and transparency in the functioning of democracy.   In The Road to Unfreedom [2018] and On Tyranny [2017], Snyder has argued that the waning of institutional trust, both in the judiciary and the media, is a tactic common in authoritarianism.   He explains how autocratic leaders manipulate societal institutions by turning them into instruments of propaganda with merely a façade of governance.

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The relationship between an autocratic ruler and the people can be described as transactional:    The autocrat provides security and stability in exchange for the people’s loyalty and their freedoms.   Citizens become merely instruments to maintain the leader’s power.    The autocrat strives to construct an idealized image of himself in order to foster devotion and loyalty.    Although this approach may provide reassurance during times of uncertainty, the autocrat has undermined accountability.

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A democracy remains viable only when the State is capable of constraining itself from taking advantage of its own power and privilege.    This brings us to the topic at hand, which is the challenge faced by countries like Venezuela, whose leaders have diminished the power of law by exempting themselves from its strictures.


“The Constitution Within”

August 10, 2025

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Ricardo Morin
The Constitution Within
GCI
2025

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Politics (from the Greek politikós, “of, by, or relating to citizens”) is the practice and theory of influencing people at the civic or individual level.

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By Ricardo Morin

August 10, 2025.

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From their earliest formulations, constitutional frameworks have been more than foundational legal agreements; they have stood as declarations of political philosophy, and defined how power should be organized, how it should be restrained, and to whom it must be answerable. Contemporary governance, to a large extent, continues those experiments, shaped over centuries of trial and adaptation. Yet these forms can endure in appearance while being emptied of substance. In more than a few States today, constitutions proclaim liberty while they narrow its scope, define rights in ways that exclude, and preserve the interests of a governing elite. Partisanship exploits the perceived limitations and vulnerabilities of others as grounds for exclusion; self-righteousness becomes a tool for domination, silences opposition, and suppresses dissent. The worth of a constitutional framework, therefore, is measured not only by its letter but by the ethical integrity of those who sustain it. Without ethics, politics loses its meaning; without civic virtue, the law ceases to serve peace and becomes an instrument of dominion.

The separation of powers, vigorously defended by Montesquieu, rests on the conviction that liberty survives when power is compelled to check power. This principle is distorted when institutions are subordinated to partisan or personal interests. In recent years, several States have formally preserved an independent judiciary while, in practice, subjected it to appointment processes controlled by the Executive or the ruling party. Such hollowing-out is not merely a technical failure; it reflects a political culture in which ambition, fear, or indifference among citizens permits the disfigurement of the very mechanisms designed to protect them. It also reveals how institutional strength and civic responsibility are bound together in ways that cannot be separated.

Historical constitutions continue to shape how political communities imagine authority. They bequeath principles that, at their best, offer adaptable frameworks for meeting new challenges without renouncing their essential core: that the legitimacy of a Government rests not on the strength of its rulers but on the solidity of the structures that limit them.

Yet these structures endure only when citizens reject duplicity and sectarianism. Divisions of ideology must not harden into exclusive loyalty to one’s own group at the expense of a shared civic framework. They endure only when citizens resist the idolatry of power, because authority loses its legitimacy once it is treated as sacred or unquestionable. And they endure only when citizens repudiate the cult of personality, in which a leader is raised above criticism through image-making, propaganda, and personal loyalty.

The durability of constitutional order, then, does not lie solely in written texts or institutional arrangements. It rests equally on the civic ethic of those who inhabit them. When ambition, fear, or indifference allow citizens to tolerate duplicity or surrender to sectarian loyalty, the limits on power become fragile. Conversely, when vigilance and responsibility prevail, constitutions retain their strength as both shield and compass—guarding against arbitrary rule while orienting political life toward justice and restraint.

True reform is not solely institutional but also internal: a revolution in the individual and collective sphere, in which each person accepts the responsibility to act with integrity, openness, and commitment to the common good, in harmony with oneself and with others. Only through the alignment of institutional structures with civic responsibility can any Constitution preserve its meaning and endure as a safeguard against arbitrary power.

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Annotated Bibliography

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  • Ginsburg, Tom, and Aziz Z. Huq.; How to Save a Constitutional Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019. (Ginsburg and Aziz examine the legal and institutional pathways through which democracies weaken, from court-packing to the erosion of independent oversight. They draw on comparative examples from the United States, Hungary, and elsewhere to show how constitutional mechanisms can be used to consolidate power while preserving a façade of legality.)
  • Landau, David: “Abusive Constitutionalism.” UC Davis Law Review 47 (1), 2013: 189–260. (Landau develops the concept of “abusive constitutionalism” to describe how incumbents exploit constitutional change to entrench their rule. Uses Latin American and other global cases to illustrate how amendments and reinterpretations weaken checks and balances, alter electoral systems, and undermine judicial independence.)
  • Levitsky, Steven, and Way, Lucan A.: Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. (Levitsky and Way analyze regimes that preserve the formal institutions of democracy but manipulate them to ensure ruling-party dominance. They introduce the concept of “competitive authoritarianism” as a framework for understanding how constitutional norms are hollowed out while democratic forms are maintained.)
  • Levitsky, Steven, and Ziblatt, Daniel: How Democracies Die. New York: Crown, 2018. (Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that modern democracies often decline through the gradual decline of norms rather than coups. The book shows how leaders exploit constitutional ambiguities, stack courts, and weaponize law to suppress opposition, eroding both civic trust and institutional integrity.)

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