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Ricardo F. Morín
December 29, 2026
Oakland Park, Fl
Author’s Note:
This installment concludes Chapter XII, “The Fourth Sign.” It presents §§ 26–34 under the heading The Asymmetry of Sanctions, examining the unequal application and effects of external economic and political measures in the broader context established by the preceding sections on Autocracy and Venezuela.
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Chapter XII: Part 3
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The Asymmetry of Sanctions
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26
Sanctions are often employed as a diplomatic tool to weaken autocratic regimes. Yet, their use reveals a deeper asymmetry in the struggle between democratic accountability and authoritarian resilience. According to data from the V-Dem Institute, nearly 72% of the world’s population now lives under autocratic rule—the highest proportion since 1978. This reality reframes sanctions not as exceptional measures against isolated regimes, but as policies deployed within a global order where autocracy has become the prevailing form of governance.
27
On one hand, sanctions aim to isolate autocracies economically and politically. On the other hand, regimes like Nicolás Maduro’s have demonstrated remarkable adaptability in the face of such measures. Such regimes’ endurance exposes the limitations of tools designed for a world in which democracy was presumed dominant.
27a
Subsequent developments, including the removal of Nicolás Maduro from power, alter the immediate object toward which sanctions were directed but do not resolve the structural conditions examined here. The networks of authority, the institutional arrangements, and the external alliances that sustained his rule have not been dissolved by his departure. What is observed in this case is not the endurance of a single figure, but the persistence of a governing structure capable of adaptation beyond him.
28
Maduro has formed adversarial alliances to circumvent external pressure and maintain his rule. By invoking themes of sovereignty and resistance against Western influence, he has turned isolation into a narrative of defiance.
29
This narrative serves as a foundation for partnerships with other autocratic States, including Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, and Turkey. [43][44][45][46][47] Driven by pragmatic interests rather than strict ideological alignment, these alliances enable Venezuela to mitigate the intended effects of sanctions.
30
The result is a paradox: while sanctions aim to weaken autocracies, they unintentionally contribute to their resilience. Reliance on alternative alliances allows regimes like Maduro’s to access resources, military aid, and political support, which in turn shields them from severe economic disruption and international scrutiny. In a world where the majority of the world’s population now lives under autocratic rule, the logic of isolation loses its potency; it becomes a misreading of the global balance itself.
31
In this way, sanctions contribute to the persistence of autocracy. Regimes like Maduro’s exploit their isolation to present themselves as defenders of national sovereignty and resistance to global hegemony. [48] This dynamic amplifies the concept of a multipolar world order. As global power shifts away from unipolar dominance, regimes like Maduro’s find new avenues to thrive.
32
By framing their cooperation as resistance to Western dominance, authoritarian regimes justify their alliances under the banner of multipolarity. This strategic repositioning does more than circumvent sanctions—it actively reshapes the global order. As these regimes expand their influence, they undermine democratic norms by replacing them with a system in which power is consolidated without external accountability.
33
This shift is not confined to regimes like Maduro’s: it reflects a broader trend in which authoritarianism gains ground by exploiting ideological fractures within democratic societies. Across Europe and Asia, nationalist and right-wing movements increasingly echo Kremlin-aligned narratives to amplify skepticism toward Western institutions. The rise of such forces in countries like Hungary, Italy, and India is not merely a domestic shift—it signals an alignment with a global framework where sovereignty is invoked not to empower citizens, but to insulate leaders from accountability.
34
Contrary to the argument that authoritarianism is solely a reaction to U.S. hegemony, its expansion demonstrates an independent momentum, one that persists regardless of American intervention. China and Russia do not seek to challenge the U.S. in pursuit of a more equitable world order; they aim to consolidate their power free from external constraints. In this landscape, the traditional ideological divide between left and right becomes secondary to a more fundamental struggle—the contest between concentrated power and democratic resilience. Whether under the guise of populism or nationalism, the objective remains the same: to undermine institutional checks and to consolidate power without sufficient accountability. [49]
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Endnotes—Chapter XII: Part 3
§ 29
- [43] In 2019, Russia’s State-owned Rosneft handled 70% of Venezuela’s crude oil exports and circumvented U.S. sanctions. Russia also supplied military equipment and training to bolster Maduro’s control over the armed forces.
- [44] China’s involvement includes joint oil ventures in the Orinoco Belt, infrastructure projects like the Tinaco-Anaco railway project, and housing initiatives (Great Housing Mission). Despite operational challenges, these investments highlight China’s strategic interest in Venezuela’s energy sector.
- [45] According to the Brookings Institution, Cuba and Venezuela have maintained close political and strategic ties, particularly during the Chávez and Maduro administrations. This relationship has extended beyond diplomatic and economic cooperation to include security and intelligence collaboration. Cuban institutions have provided training, advisory support, and technical expertise to Venezuelan military and security forces: 1). Dirección de Inteligencia(DI, a.k.a G2) [1961]: The Intelligence Directorate, also known as G2, has been involved in providing intelligence training and support to Venezuelan security forces, particularly in surveillance and national security operations. 2). Comité de Defensa de la Revolución(CDR) [1960]: The Committee for the Defense of the Revolution, created in Cuba, focused on grassroots mobilization and surveillance. Its activities extended to Venezuela, where it contributed to internal security and the promotion of political ideology. 3). Brigada Especial Nacional(BEN) del Ministerio del Interior (a.k.a.Avispas Negras or“Boinas Negras”) [1986]: The National Special Brigade, known as Black Wasps or Black Berets, has been involved in specialized military and security training; it has provided high-level tactical training to Venezuelan military and security personnel.
- [46] Iran has aided Venezuela through energy and military cooperation, providing refined fuel and technical support for Venezuela’s oil industry. Barter agreements and drone technology exchanges underscore their deepening alliance.
- [47] Turkey facilitated Venezuela’s gold trade, enabling Maduro to bypass sanctions. This trade, involving $900 million in 2018, has drawn criticism for its opacity and links to illegal mining in the Arco Minero region.
§ 31
- [48] Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Scott Mainwaring, Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 183-87, 199-202.
§ 34
- [49] Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018), 212-15.
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Observations On Perception 