Posts Tagged ‘asymmetry’

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series VI”

April 8, 2026

“Geometric Allegory” digital painting ©2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

This installment concludes Chapter XII, “The Fourth Sign.”    It presents §§ 26–34 under the heading The Asymmetry of Sanctions, examining the unequal application and effects of external economic and political measures in the broader context established by the preceding sections on Autocracy and Venezuela.

Ricardo F. Morín, December 29, 2026, Oakland Park, Fl

The Asymmetry of Sanctions

26

Sanctions are often employed as a diplomatic tool to weaken autocratic regimes.   Yet, their use reveals a deeper asymmetry in the struggle between democratic accountability and authoritarian resilience.   According to data from the V-Dem Institute, nearly 72% of the world’s population now lives under autocratic rule—the highest proportion since 1978.   This reality reframes sanctions not as exceptional measures against isolated regimes, but as policies deployed within a global order where autocracy has become the prevailing form of governance.

27

On one hand, sanctions aim to isolate autocracies economically and politically.   On the other hand, regimes like Nicolás Maduro’s have demonstrated remarkable adaptability in the face of such measures.   Such regimes’ endurance exposes the limitations of tools designed for a world in which democracy was presumed dominant.

27a

Subsequent developments, including the removal of Nicolás Maduro from power, alter the immediate object toward which sanctions were directed but do not resolve the structural conditions examined here.  The networks of authority, the institutional arrangements, and the external alliances that sustained his rule have not been dissolved by his departure.  What is observed in this case is not the endurance of a single figure, but the persistence of a governing structure capable of adaptation beyond him.

28

Maduro has formed adversarial alliances to circumvent external pressure and maintain his rule.   By invoking themes of sovereignty and resistance against Western influence, he has turned isolation into a narrative of defiance.

29

This narrative serves as a foundation for partnerships with other autocratic States, including Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, and Turkey. [43][44][45][46][47]   Driven by pragmatic interests rather than strict ideological alignment, these alliances enable Venezuela to mitigate the intended effects of sanctions.

30

The result is a paradox:   while sanctions aim to weaken autocracies, they unintentionally contribute to their resilience.   Reliance on alternative alliances allows regimes like Maduro’s to access resources, military aid, and political support, which in turn shields them from severe economic disruption and international scrutiny.   In a world where the majority of the world’s population now lives under autocratic rule, the logic of isolation loses its potency; it becomes a misreading of the global balance itself.

31

In this way, sanctions contribute to the persistence of autocracy.    Regimes like Maduro’s exploit their isolation to present themselves as defenders of national sovereignty and resistance to global hegemony. [48]   This dynamic amplifies the concept of a multipolar world order.   As global power shifts away from unipolar dominance, regimes like Maduro’s find new avenues to thrive.

32

By framing their cooperation as resistance to Western dominance, authoritarian regimes justify their alliances under the banner of multipolarity.    This strategic repositioning does more than circumvent sanctions—it actively reshapes the global order.   As these regimes expand their influence, they undermine democratic norms by replacing them with a system in which power is consolidated without external accountability.

33

This shift is not confined to regimes like Maduro’s: it reflects a broader trend in which authoritarianism gains ground by exploiting ideological fractures within democratic societies.   Across Europe and Asia, nationalist and right-wing movements increasingly echo Kremlin-aligned narratives to amplify skepticism toward Western institutions.   The rise of such forces in countries like Hungary, Italy, and India is not merely a domestic shift—it signals an alignment with a global framework where sovereignty is invoked not to empower citizens, but to insulate leaders from accountability.

34

Contrary to the argument that authoritarianism is solely a reaction to U.S. hegemony, its expansion demonstrates an independent momentum, one that persists regardless of American intervention.    China and Russia do not seek to challenge the U.S. in pursuit of a more equitable world order; they aim to consolidate their power free from external constraints.   In this landscape, the traditional ideological divide between left and right becomes secondary to a more fundamental struggle—the contest between concentrated power and democratic resilience.   Whether under the guise of populism or nationalism, the objective remains the same:   to undermine institutional checks and to consolidate power without sufficient accountability. [49]

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EndnotesChapter XII: Part 3

§ 29

  • [43]    In 2019, Russia’s State-owned Rosneft handled 70% of Venezuela’s crude oil exports and circumvented U.S. sanctions.  Russia also supplied military equipment and training to bolster Maduro’s control over the armed forces.
  • [44]    China’s involvement includes joint oil ventures in the Orinoco Belt, infrastructure projects like the Tinaco-Anaco railway project, and housing initiatives (Great Housing Mission).  Despite operational challenges, these investments highlight China’s strategic interest in Venezuela’s energy sector.
  • [45]  According to the Brookings Institution, Cuba and Venezuela have maintained close political and strategic ties, particularly during the Chávez and Maduro administrations.    This relationship has extended beyond diplomatic and economic cooperation to include security and intelligence collaboration.    Cuban institutions have provided training, advisory support, and technical expertise to Venezuelan military and security forces:    1). Dirección de Inteligencia(DI, a.k.a G2) [1961]:    The Intelligence Directorate, also known as G2, has been involved in providing intelligence training and support to Venezuelan security forces, particularly in surveillance and national security operations.   2). Comité de Defensa de la Revolución(CDR) [1960]:   The Committee for the Defense of the Revolution, created in Cuba, focused on grassroots mobilization and surveillance.   Its activities extended to Venezuela, where it contributed to internal security and the promotion of political ideology.   3). Brigada Especial Nacional(BEN) del Ministerio del Interior (a.k.a.Avispas Negras orBoinas Negras”) [1986]:   The National Special Brigade, known as Black Wasps or Black Berets, has been involved in specialized military and security training; it has provided high-level tactical training to Venezuelan military and security personnel.
  • [46]   Iran has aided Venezuela through energy and military cooperation, providing refined fuel and technical support for Venezuela’s oil industry.  Barter agreements and drone technology exchanges underscore their deepening alliance.
  • [47]  Turkey facilitated Venezuela’s gold trade, enabling Maduro to bypass sanctions.  This trade, involving $900 million in 2018, has drawn criticism for its opacity and links to illegal mining in the Arco Minero region.

§ 31

  • [48]   Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Scott Mainwaring, Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America:   Emergence, Survival, and Fall (Cambridge:   Cambridge University Press, 2014), 183-87, 199-202.

§ 34

  • [49]   Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York:   Crown, 2018), 212-15.

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“The Crypto Ladder”

April 1, 2026

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Ricardo Morín
Still Twenty-three: The Crypto Ladder
Oil on linen & board
12″ x 15″ x 1/2″
2012

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Cryptocurrency claims independence from financial authority.  In practice,  tokens are bought,  sold,  and stored on centralized exchanges that control custody,  execute trades,  and process withdrawals.  When participants leave their assets on these platforms,  the exchange holds the private keys and manages access to funds.  Control therefore shifts from regulated banks,  which operate under capital requirements,  liquidity rules,  and continuous supervisory oversight,  to private trading platforms that are incorporated in different jurisdictions and are subject to differing disclosure rules,  reserve standards,  and enforcement practices.  The protections available to participants depend on the rules that apply in the jurisdiction where the platform operates.

Before public trading begins,  access to newly issued tokens is limited to founders,  private investors,  or participants in early distribution rounds.  Transactions during this stage occur within that restricted group,  and prices reflect exchanges among those who received tokens prior to public trading.

When public trading opens,  additional buyers gain access through exchanges.  They compete to purchase the existing supply from those who received or acquired tokens prior to public trading.  Because supply does not immediately expand,  buyers increase their bids against one another.  As bids rise,  the market price increases.

When participants who acquired tokens earlier sell at the elevated market price created by competitive bidding,  later buyers transfer capital through those purchases,  and that capital becomes the profit realized by earlier sellers.  The exchange of tokens at increasing prices depends on the expectation that other participants will continue to enter the market and accept those prices.  This expectation is not produced by the transaction itself; it precedes it and is shared among participants.  Under these conditions, value depends on the continued participation of others, and information about that participation is not distributed evenly among participants.   Participants who obtain information about expected demand earlier than others are able to act before prices adjust, and this difference in timing affects how gains and losses are distributed.

Token systems can distribute supply broadly at issuance through public offerings or community allocations.  Once trading begins,  however,  participants with greater capital can accumulate larger positions by purchasing from those with smaller positions.  Over time,  this accumulation concentrates supply within a smaller group.  Participants who acquire positions earlier, or who can continue purchasing during periods of lower demand, come to control larger portions of supply than those who enter later or must sell under pressure.

If demand continues to exceed available supply, buyers increase their bids and prices rise.  If demand declines and fewer buyers submit bids, the increase in price stops.  When participants with large positions attempt to sell into a declining market, they submit large sell orders to the exchange.  Those orders must match with buyers willing to purchase at the current price.  If buyers submit bids at lower prices, sellers accept those lower bids in order to complete the trade.  Each completed trade at a lower price becomes the new market price.  As the quoted price falls, additional participants with open positions decide to sell in order to limit further loss.  Those later sales occur at lower prices than earlier trades.  Each completed sale alters the price available to others.  Participants who exit earlier do so under different conditions than those who remain.  The sequence of action changes the conditions of action for those who follow.

When requests for withdrawals exceed the cash or liquid assets an exchange holds,  the platform restricts withdrawals or halts trading in order to slow the outflow.  At that point, price formation no longer governs the system; access to liquidity does.  When prices reverse and many customers attempt to withdraw funds at the same time,  exchanges that lack sufficient immediately available assets cannot satisfy all requests simultaneously.  Participants must wait,  and access to funds depends on the exchange’s internal capacity rather than on individual account balances alone.  Account balances continue to record claims, but the ability to act on those claims depends on the platform’s capacity to honor them.

Even when tokens are initially distributed across many wallets, trading activity can lead to uneven accumulation.  Participants with larger capital reserves can buy during downturns and retain their positions through volatility.  Participants with smaller positions may sell under financial pressure.  Over repeated cycles, ownership can become concentrated despite dispersed beginnings.

Under these conditions,  order of entry shapes distribution.  Early participants accept uncertainty about whether demand will materialize.  Later participants accept higher acquisition costs once demand has already raised prices.  Gains and losses follow the sequence in which participants assume risk and provide capital.

Traditional banks and regulated stock exchanges operate under supervisory rules enforced by public authorities.  Banks must maintain capital reserves to absorb losses and liquidity buffers to meet withdrawals.  Public companies must disclose financial information so that investors can evaluate risk.  In many jurisdictions, deposit insurance protects individual depositors up to defined limits.  When institutions face systemic stress, central banks provide liquidity to prevent destabilization of the financial system.

Cryptocurrency markets do not uniformly operate under comparable requirements.  Some exchanges publish limited financial information.  Reserve practices are not standardized across platforms.  Deposit insurance does not apply to token holdings.  When an exchange becomes insolvent or mismanages assets,  customers become unsecured creditors and bear losses directly.  Their claims are not protected at the moment of stress, and recovery depends on liquidation processes that occur after access to funds has already been lost.

Participants who seek to avoid dependence on traditional financial institutions rely instead on trading platforms that combine custody,  execution,  and leverage services.  When such platforms suspend withdrawals or fail,  users have limited recourse.  The location of authority changes,  but reliance on intermediaries remains.

Order of entry continues to influence who gains and who loses.  In regulated markets, capital requirements, clearing mechanisms, and deposit insurance absorb part of trading losses before they reach individual participants.  In cryptocurrency markets, those stabilizing requirements do not uniformly apply.  When prices fall, losses move directly from declining trade prices to individual account balances without an intermediary layer that cushions the decline.

Cryptocurrency technology continues to develop.  Applications beyond speculative trading expand when protocols are adopted for payment processing,  settlement,  or other non speculative functions.  However,  as long as token prices depend on continued buyer participation and as long as ownership becomes concentrated through repeated trading cycles,  sequence of entry influences distribution of gains and losses.  Any reform that seeks broader participation would need to address how tokens are allocated at issuance,  how exchanges manage custody and liquidity,  and what protections apply when platforms fail.

Under these conditions, cryptocurrency does not constitute a substitute for banking or for stock markets in a strict institutional sense. The functions of custody, execution, and liquidity provision persist, but they are carried out under different conditions and without uniform frameworks of protection.

The structure described here does not remove authority from the system of exchange.  It relocates authority.  Banks operate under capital requirements,  liquidity rules,  and continuous public oversight.  Trading platforms do not operate under comparable constraints.  In regulated institutions, authority is exercised through rules that constrain institutional behavior before failure occurs; on trading platforms, authority is exercised through control over access, execution, and withdrawal at the moment participants seek to act.  The location of authority changes,  but authority remains.

The language of decentralization coexists with continued reliance on centralized exchanges for custody,  liquidity,  and rule enforcement.  Participants deposit funds,  accept platform terms,  and depend on exchange decisions even as they describe the system as independent of institutional authority.  Independence is asserted at the level of description, while dependence persists at the level of operation.

Ricardo F. Morín, February 27, 2026, Oakland Park, Florida.