Posts Tagged ‘Ukraine’

“Clarity Is Not Optional”

January 3, 2026

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Ricardo F Morin
Points of Equidistance
CGI
2026

Ricardo F. Morin

January 3, 2026

Oakland Park, Fl.

Power, Sovereignty, and the Cost of Duplicity

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Venezuela’s transition and Ukraine’s survival now constitute a single test:  whether power can be constrained without illusion,  and whether the United States can act coherently even when its president cannot perceive coherence himself.

This text does not argue for a policy or predict an outcome.  It marks the threshold at which coherence ceases to be discretionary and becomes a condition of survival.

The United States cannot act in one theater in a way that invalidates the principles it claims to defend in another.  If sovereignty,  territorial integrity,  institutional continuity,  and legal accountability are treated as binding in Ukraine,  they cannot become flexible,  provisional,  or strategically inconvenient in Venezuela.  And the reverse must also hold:  if those principles are treated as binding in Venezuela,  they cannot be relaxed,  reinterpreted,  or selectively applied in Ukraine.  Once that line is crossed in either direction,  coherence collapses—not only rhetorically,  but structurally.  Power ceases to stabilize outcomes and instead begins to manage decay.

This is not a moral claim;  it is a functional one.  Modern power does not fail because it lacks force,  but because it loses internal consistency.  When the same instruments—sanctions,  indictments,  military pressure,  diplomatic recognition—are applied according to circumstance rather than principle,  they no longer constrain adversaries.  They instruct them.  Russia and China do not need to prevail militarily if they can demonstrate that legality itself is selective,  contingent,  and subject to reinterpretation by whoever holds advantage in the moment.

For this reason,  no transition can rest on personalization.  Trust between leaders is not a substitute for verification,  nor can rapport replace institutions.  This vulnerability is well known in personality-driven diplomacy and has been particularly visible under Donald Trump in his repeated misreading of Vladimir Putin.  Yet the deeper danger is not psychological;  it is procedural.  Policy that depends on who speaks to whom cannot survive stress.  Only policy that remains legible when personalities are removed can endure.

Nor can outcomes be declared before institutions exist to carry them.  Territorial control without civilian authority is not stability.  Elections conducted without enforceable security guarantees are not legitimacy.  Resource access without escrow,  audit,  and legal review is not recovery,  but extraction under a different name.  When the United States accepts results without structures,  it postpones collapse rather than preventing it.

Equally corrosive is legal improvisation.  Law applied after action—indictments justified retroactively,  sanctions reshaped to accommodate faits accomplis—does not constrain power;  it performs it.  Once legality becomes explanatory rather than directive,  it loses its disciplining force.  Adversaries learn that rules are narrative instruments,  not boundaries.

Finally,  there can be no tolerance for proxy preservation.  A transition that leaves intact militias,  shadow financiers,  or coercive intermediaries is not a transition at all.  It is a redistribution of risk that guarantees future rupture.  External backers may be delayed,  constrained,  or audited,  but they cannot be placated through ambiguity without undermining the entire process.

The test is stark and unforgiving.   If an action taken in either Venezuela or Ukraine could not be defended, word for word, if taken in the other—or if a compromise tolerated in one would be condemned if replicated in the other—then the axiom has already been broken.

What must therefore remain true,  in both places at once,  is this:  power must submit to the same standard it invokes—without exception,  without personalization,  and without retreat into expediency disguised as realism.


Authority Where Legitimacy Has Not Yet Converged

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This section does not assess democratic legitimacy or political merit.  It observes how authority is presently constituted and enforced when coherence is under stress.

A question posed during a press conference—regarding the opposition coalition led by María Corina Machado and the electoral victory of Edmundo González Urrutia—elicited a dismissive response from President Donald Trump.  Asked why a transitional leadership would not center on that coalition,  he replied that there was “no respect for her,”  implying an absence of authority within the country.

Taken at face value,  the remark appears personal.  Read diagnostically,  it exposes a more consequential distinction:  legitimacy does not presently translate into authority inside Venezuela.  The same distinction—between legitimacy and enforceable authority—has shaped Ukraine’s resistance to Russian invasion, where legitimacy was established internally but had to be defended materially against external aggression.

Electoral victory, international recognition, and moral credibility confer legitimacy.   They do not, by themselves, confer enforceable power.  Authority, as it exists on the ground, flows from the capacity to compel compliance—whether through control of coercive institutions, resource chokepoints, or the operational machinery of the state.  In Ukraine, that authority is exercised defensively to preserve an already legitimate sovereign order against external aggression.  In Venezuela, it persists independently of electoral outcome, sustained by institutions and mechanisms detached from legitimacy.

In this sense,  the question raised by Trump’s remark is not whether Machado’s coalition is legitimate,  but what presently lends authority within the country—and who is capable of enforcing decisions,  preventing fragmentation,  or compelling compliance.   The answer is neither rhetorical nor normative.  It is about how authority is currently constituted and exercised under present conditions.

Recent commentary surrounding U.S. engagement with Venezuelan actors has made this distinction operational rather than abstract.  The marginalization of María Corina Machado has not turned on questions of democratic legitimacy, electoral mandate, or international recognition.   It has turned on her unwillingness to participate in transactional arrangements with the existing technocratic and financial strata that currently exercise control within the State.  In contrast, figures such as the Vice President Delcy Rodríguez are treated as viable interlocutors precisely because they command enforceable authority through continuity with those mechanisms—coercive, financial, and administrative—that persist independent of legitimacy.  Criminality, in this logic, is not disqualifying.  It is evidence of control.  What is being selected for is not moral credibility, but negotiability under pressure.

This distinction matters because transitions that confuse legitimacy with authority tend to collapse into disorder or entrenchment.   Authority negotiated without legitimacy produces repression.   Legitimacy asserted without authority produces paralysis.  Durable transition requires that the two converge—but they do not begin from the same place, nor do they converge through the same means.

In Ukraine, legitimacy and authority are aligned but strained by external aggression; in Venezuela, authority persists in the absence of legitimacy.  Treating these conditions as morally or procedurally equivalent obscures the obligations they impose.  When support is conditioned more heavily where legitimacy is intact than where it is absent, coherence gives way to ethical imbalance.

Trump’s comment does not clarify U.S. strategy.  It does, however, expose the fault line along which policy now risks fracturing:  whether authority is assessed and transformed in relation to legitimacy, or accommodated independently of it in the name of order.   The choice is not neutral.  It determines whether power reinforces or undermines the principles it invokes.

The distinction between legitimacy and authority does not negate the requirement of coherence.  It sharpens it.  When coherence is abandoned selectively, collapse is no longer an accident of transition but a consequence of duplicity.


“Lens of Procedural Incoherence”

November 30, 2025

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Ricardo Morín
Triangulation 8: Lens of Procedural Incoherence
22″ x 30″
Watercolor and wax pencil on paper
2007

Ricardo Morín

November 2025

Oakland Park, Florida

This essay examines procedural incoherence in U.S. foreign policy by tracing how the criteria governing the use of force, the classification of conflict, and the articulation of self-defense diverge from their stated principles across three distinct contexts: the Trinidad maritime strike, the war involving Ukraine and Russia, and the conflict involving Israel, Palestine, and adjacent states. Rather than comparing outcomes or moral claims, the analysis isolates how procedural standards shift across comparable situations, producing reclassification after the fact, reversals in applied criteria, and asymmetrical recognition of sovereignty. Read together, these cases reveal how procedural language adapts to political contingency, weakening the stability of legal meaning and diminishing interpretive clarity in international affairs.


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The Washington Post report titled “‘Kill them all’: Hegseth’s battlefield rhetoric shaped Trump-era strike” (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/11/28/hegseth-kill-them-all-survivors-boat-strike/) describes a U.S. military operation near Trinidad in which a small vessel believed to be transporting narcotics was struck after being misidentified.   Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth issued a spoken directive “to kill everybody,” and the strike killed most individuals on board.   When surveillance identified two survivors clinging to debris, a second strike was ordered that killed them as well.   Subsequent explanations to Congress presented the follow-on strike as an effort to remove a navigational hazard, even though the presence of survivors had already been confirmed.   The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), whose opinion later justified the actions as part of an armed conflict with designated narcoterrorist groups, introduced a legal classification that departed from the facts presented in the initial reports.   These elements create a single set of materials from which procedural coherence can be examined.

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The procedural irregularity becomes visible once the chain of actions is placed in order:   an unverified assumption about the vessel’s identity, a directive that treated all occupants as combatants, a second strike executed after survivors were identified, and a later legal justification grounded in a classification that recast the operation as part of an armed conflict.   Each step relied on a different principle—assumption, directive, reinterpretation, and reclassification.   The divergence among these principles reveals how procedure shifted to accommodate the desired framing rather than guiding the action itself.   This shift does not imply motive; it demonstrates how administrative language can detach from the criteria that normally govern the use of force.

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A similar procedural disjunction appears when U.S. positions regarding Ukraine and Russia are placed alongside the Trinidad case.  The United States publicly condemns Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian civilians and cites violations of distinction, proportionality, and accountability under the laws of armed conflict.   Yet discussions about scaling back support for Ukraine have introduced a reversal in which the procedural commitments used to justify condemnation of Russia are not consistently applied when considering the implications of reducing assistance to a State defending its sovereignty.  The shift from emphasizing legal norms to weighing political costs illustrates how procedures can be reshaped by circumstances, even when the stated principles remain unchanged.  The inconsistency does not rest in the declarations themselves but in the procedural reversals that appear when support for Ukraine becomes entangled with broader strategic calculations.

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The conflict involving Israel, Palestine, and neighboring states such as Iran, Lebanon, and Yemen reveals another form of procedural divergence.   The United States affirms Israel’s right to self-defense and stops short of recognizing Palestine’s claim to self-determination in equal procedural terms.  The same criteria invoked to justify one party’s actions do not extend to the other party’s pursuit of sovereignty, even though both claims arise within a single territorial and political circumstance.   This asymmetry becomes more pronounced when regional attacks are considered:  the procedures invoked to justify Israeli strikes in response to threats from Iran, Lebanon, or Yemen differ from those applied to Palestinian actions, despite operating within an interconnected region where the consequences of one engagement affect all others.  The divergence reflects a procedural evasiveness that stabilizes one position while it leaves another without an articulated pathway toward recognition or resolution.

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When the three circumstances—the Trinidad strike, the shifting position toward Ukraine and Russia, and the procedural asymmetry in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—are examined together, their differences do not obscure the common pattern.   In each case, established procedures that ordinarily govern the use of force or the recognition of sovereignty diverge from the principles publicly invoked.   In Trinidad, the divergence takes the form of reclassification after the fact.   In Ukraine, it appears as a reversal in how the principles of civilian protection and territorial integrity are applied.   In Israel and Palestine, it emerges as a partial application of the right to self-defense without a corresponding recognition of the procedural requirements associated with sovereignty.   The alignment across cases arises from the way procedures shift to accommodate political needs rather than guiding action according to a stable set of criteria.

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This alignment does not rest on the equivalence of the conflicts but on the consistency of the procedural departures.   Each case shows how the same vocabulary—armed conflict, self-defense, sovereignty, and civilian protection—operates differently when applied to different actors.   The procedures attached to these terms change according to circumstance rather than principle.   As a result, the meaning of each term becomes unstable.   What counts as an armed conflict in Trinidad, a sovereign defense in Ukraine, or a legitimate use of force in Gaza depends not on a uniform procedural standard but on the political frame selected in each instance.

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When procedural standards governing the use of force, the recognition of sovereignty, and the classification of conflict are applied inconsistently, their meaning becomes unstable. Procedures cease to function as governing criteria and instead operate as instruments of post-hoc justification or strategic accommodation. This instability does not arise from disagreement over principles but from their variable procedural application. The result is a foreign policy environment in which legal and institutional commitments lose interpretive reliability, complicating accountability and weakening the coherence on which international relations depend.

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The examination of these cases through a single lens does not equate them; it identifies the procedural incoherence that appears when the principles governing the use of force, recognition of sovereignty, and classification of conflict do not align with the actions taken.   The result is a field of international affairs in which the stated basis for action varies according to circumstance, and in which procedural language adapts to political needs rather than providing a stable standard for decision-making.   The inferences that follow are left to the reader, who can judge how the departure from procedural coherence shapes the credibility of U.S. conduct abroad.