Posts Tagged ‘Venezuela’

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series XIV”

August 31, 2026

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“Geometric Allegory” digital painting 2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

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Scope and Use

This entry forms part of the constitutional corpus presented in the Appendix, which gathers the twenty-five constitutions of Venezuela and is arranged for consultation rather than continuous reading.  Collation proceeds by means of permanent rubric codes whose identity remains constant throughout the corpus; absent rubrics signify constitutional silence, while withdrawn rubrics are not reassigned.  Citations are anchored first in the article number and follow the CIDEP recension linked at the close of the entry.  The complete definition of the corpus, its methodology, and its citation convention appear in the Scope and Use note that heads the Constitutions of the Nineteenth Century, opening in the instalment “Unmasking Disillusion: Series XI”: https://observacionessobrelanaturalezade.com/2026/06/15/desenmascarar-la-desilusion-serie-xi/

Translation Convention

Institutional and technical names are given first in italicized Latinate Castilian and followed by their contemporary Latinate English equivalents in brackets.  All constitutional quotations appear in italic type between quotation marks and are rendered in contemporary Latinate English, faithfully preserving the substance and distinctions of the original charters.  Comparative references are restricted to 1874 against 1864 and 1881 against 1874.  The apparatus retains the classifications cont., cf., and new.

Ricardo F. Morín

August 31, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania



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7).  The Constitución de 1874

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874], formally the Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela], was decreed by the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] at Caracas on 23 May 1874 and ordered executed by Presidente [President] Antonio Guzmán Blanco on 27 May 1874.

DOC-PRE—Preámbulo [Preamble]

The Congress of the United States of Venezuela, under the invocation of the Supreme Author and Legislator of the Universe, and by authority of the people of Venezuela, manifested in the petitions addressed to it by the Legislatures of the twenty States composing the Venezuelan Union, requesting the reform of the Constitution of 1864 decreed by the Constituent Assembly of the States, and in conformity with its Article 122; decrees:

FND-TER—Territorio [Territory]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] declared that the Estados [States] which the Constitution of March 1864 had declared independent and united to form the Federación Venezolana [Venezuelan Federation], and which were then denominated Apure, Bolívar, Barquisimeto, Barcelona, Carabobo, Cumaná, Cojedes, Falcón, Guzmán Blanco, Guárico, Guayana, Guzmán, Maturín, Nueva Esparta, Portuguesa, Táchira, Trujillo, Yaracuy, Zamora, and Zulia, undertook to continue forming an independent and sovereign Nación [Nation] under the denomination Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela] (Tít. I, Sec. I, Art. 1; cf. 1864, Tít. I, Sec. I, Art. 1:  “The Provinces of Apure, Aragua, Barcelona, Barinas, Barquisimeto, Carabobo, Caracas, Cojedes, Coro, Cumaná, Guárico, Guayana, Maracaibo, Maturín, Mérida, Margarita, Portuguesa, Táchira, Trujillo, and Yaracuy declare themselves independent States and unite to form a free and sovereign Nation under the name ‘UNITED STATES OF VENEZUELA’.”).

The limits of each Estado [State] were those which the Law of 28 April 1856 had assigned to the Provincias [Provinces], that law having fixed the last territorial division (Art. 2; cont. 1864, Tít. I, Sec. I, Art. 2).

The limits of the Estados Unidos [United States] composing the Federación Venezolana [Venezuelan Federation] were those that in 1810 corresponded to the former Capitanía General de Venezuela [Captaincy General of Venezuela] (Art. 3; cont. 1864, Tít. I, Sec. I, Art. 3).

The political entities expressed in Article 1 reserved the faculty of two or more uniting to form a single Estado [State], while always retaining the liberty to recover their character as an Estado [State]; in either case notice was given to the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive], the Congreso [Congress], and the other Estados de la Unión [States of the Union] (Art. 4; cont. 1864, Tít. I, Sec. I, Art. 4).

The Estados [States] that had exercised the faculty conferred by the preceding article retained their votes for the Presidencia de los Estados Unidos [Presidency of the United States], the appointment of Senadores [Senators], and the presentation of Vocales [Justices] for the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] (Art. 5; cont. 1864, Tít. I, Sec. I, Art. 5).

POW-LEG—Congreso [Congress]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] provided that the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] comprise two Cámaras [Chambers], one of Senadores [Senators] and the other of Diputados [Deputies] (Tít. IV, Sec. I, Art. 18; cont. 1864, Tít. IV, Sec. I, Art. 18).

The Estados [States] determined the manner of appointing Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] (Art. 19; cont. 1864, Art. 19).

Each Estado [State] appointed Diputados [Deputies] by popular election in conformity with Article 13, no. 23, at the ratio of one for every twenty-five thousand inhabitants and one additional Deputy for every excess exceeding twelve thousand, with an equal number of substitutes elected in the same manner (Tít. IV, Sec. II, Art. 20; cf. 1864, Art. 20).

The Diputados [Deputies] served for two years and were renewed in their entirety (Art. 21; cont. 1864, Art. 21).

The Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] examined the annual account presented by the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela], passed votes of censure upon the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State], and heard accusations against the person charged with the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive], the Ministers and other national employees, and the high public functionaries of the Estados [States], in the cases stated by Article 22 (Art. 22; cf. 1864, Art. 22:  “To hear accusations against the person charged with the National Executive for treason against the Fatherland or for common offences, and against the Ministers and other national employees for infringement of the laws and for malperformance of their functions, in conformity with Article 82 of this Constitution.”).

When a Diputado [Deputy], corporation, or individual proposed an accusation, the Cámara [Chamber] appointed, by secret ballot, a commission of three Deputies; the commission delivered its opinion within the third day; and the Chamber decided by an absolute majority of the members present, the accusing Deputy abstaining from the vote (Art. 23; cont. 1864, Art. 23).

The declaration that there was ground to proceed suspended the accused by operation of law and disqualified him from exercising any public office during the trial (Art. 24; cont. 1864, Art. 24).

Each Estado [State] elected two principal Senadores [Senators] and two substitutes to fill vacancies (Tít. IV, Sec. III, Art. 25; cont. 1864, Art. 25).

To be a Senador [Senator], a person was required to be Venezuelan by birth and thirty years of age (Art. 26; cont. 1864, Art. 26).

The Senadores [Senators] served for two years (Art. 27; cf. 1864, Art. 27:  “The Senators shall remain in their offices for four years and one half shall be renewed.  When for any reason they are appointed in their entirety, one shall be elected for two years.”).

The Senado [Senate] conducted and resolved the trials initiated in the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] (Art. 28; cont. 1864, Art. 28).

If a trial had not concluded during the sessions, the Senado [Senate] remained assembled for that purpose alone until the cause was terminated; in such a case the Senadores [Senators] received no allowances (Art. 29; cont. 1864, Art. 29).

The Legislatura [Legislature] assembled annually in the capital of the Estados Unidos [United States] on 20 February, or on the earliest possible day thereafter, without awaiting convocation; its sessions lasted seventy days and could be prolonged to ninety (Tít. IV, Sec. IV, Art. 30; cont. 1864, Art. 30).

The Cámaras [Chambers] opened their sessions with at least two thirds of their members; in the absence of that number, those present met as a preparatory commission and adopted measures to secure the attendance of the absentees (Art. 31; cont. 1864, Art. 31).

Once the sessions had opened, the Cámaras [Chambers] could continue with two thirds of those who had installed them, provided that the number did not fall below one half of the total membership appointed (Art. 32; cont. 1864, Art. 32).

The Cámaras [Chambers] functioned separately, but assembled as Congreso [Congress] when the Constitución [Constitution] or the law so determined, or when one Chamber judged it necessary; if the invited Chamber concurred, it fixed the day and hour of the meeting (Art. 33; cont. 1864, Art. 33).

The sessions were public, and secret whenever the Cámara [Chamber] so resolved (Art. 34; cont. 1864, Art. 34).

The Cámaras [Chambers] possessed the rights enumerated in Article 35 concerning their rules, discipline, internal police, correction of spectators, removal of obstacles to the exercise of their functions, execution of their exclusive resolutions, qualification of their members, and hearing of resignations (Art. 35; cont. 1864, Art. 35).

Neither Cámara [Chamber] could suspend its sessions or change its seat without the consent of the other; in case of disagreement, the Chambers assembled and the determination of the majority was executed (Art. 36; cont. 1864, Art. 36).

The exercise of any public function was incompatible, during the sessions, with the office of Senador [Senator] or Diputado [Deputy]; the law fixed their indemnities, which could not be increased during the constitutional period in which they were established (Art. 37; cont. 1864, Art. 37).

The Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] enjoyed immunity from 20 January of each year until thirty days after the sessions had ended; immunity consisted in the suspension of every proceeding, whatever its origin or nature.  When a member committed an act deserving corporal punishment, the investigation continued through the conclusion of the preliminary inquiry and remained in that state for the duration of the immunity (Art. 38; cont. 1864, Art. 38).

The Congreso [Congress] was presided over by the Presidente del Senado [President of the Senate], while the Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados [President of the Chamber of Deputies] served as Vice-President (Art. 39; cont. 1864, Art. 39).

Members of the Cámaras [Chambers] were not responsible for the opinions or speeches they delivered therein (Art. 40; cont. 1864, Art. 40).

The Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] could not accept offices or commissions from the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] until one year after the conclusion of the period for which they had been appointed; the offices of Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State], diplomatic employment, and military commands in time of war were excepted, acceptance of any such office vacating the seat occupied in the Chamber (Art. 41; cont. 1864, Art. 41).

The Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] could not enter into contracts with the Gobierno General [General Government] or prosecute the claims of others before it (Art. 42; cont. 1864, Art. 42).

The Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] possessed the attributions enumerated in Article 43, including the resolution of controversies among the Estados [States]; erection and organization of the Distrito Federal [Federal District]; organization of the Aduanas [Customs Houses], ports, posts, national codes, currency, national symbols, national employments, public debt, loans, census and statistics, Armed Force, war, treaties, public-works contracts, budgets, public prosperity, weights and measures, amnesties, territories, procedures and penalties for trials before the Senado [Senate], population basis for the Diputados [Deputies], admission of foreigners to public service, presidential elections, military retirements and pensions, responsibility of national and State employees, and military ranks or promotions (Art. 43; cf. 1864, Art. 43, no. 14:  “To prescribe the rules for the formation and replacement of the forces expressed in the preceding number”; Art. 43, no. 28:  “To enact the law governing the responsibility of all national employees.”).

In addition to the preceding enumeration, the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] could enact such laws of general character as were necessary (Art. 44; cont. 1864, Art. 44).

Laws and decrees of the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] could be initiated by members of either Cámara [Chamber], in the manner prescribed by their rules (Tít. IV, Sec. VI, Art. 45; cont. 1864, Art. 45).

Upon presentation, a bill was considered for admission; once admitted, it received three debates, with an interval of at least one day between each, under the rules established for debate (Art. 46; cont. 1864, Art. 46).

Bills approved in the Cámara [Chamber] in which they had originated passed to the other Chamber for the purposes of Article 46; if not rejected, they were returned to the Chamber of origin with the alterations they had undergone (Art. 47; cont. 1864, Art. 47).

If the Cámara [Chamber] of origin did not accept the alterations, it could insist and transmit its written reasons to the other Chamber; the Chambers could also assemble as Congreso [Congress] and constitute themselves as a general commission to seek agreement, and if none was attained, the bill became void when the Chamber of origin so decided separately (Art. 48; cont. 1864, Art. 48).

When bills passed from one Cámara [Chamber] to the other, the days upon which they had been debated were stated (Art. 49; cont. 1864, Art. 49).

A law reforming another was drafted in its entirety, and the anterior law was repealed in all its parts (Art. 50; cont. 1864, Art. 50).

Laws employed the formula “The Congress of the United States of Venezuela decrees.” (Art. 51; cf. 1864, Art. 51: the formula was “The Congress of the United States of Venezuela.  Decree.”).

Bills rejected in one Legislatura [Legislature] could not be presented anew except in another (Art. 52; cont. 1864, Art. 52).

Bills pending in a Cámara [Chamber] at the close of the sessions underwent the same three debates in succeeding Legislatures (Art. 53; cont. 1864, Art. 53).

Laws were repealed with the same formalities by which they were enacted (Art. 54; cont. 1864, Art. 54).

When the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State] had maintained before a Cámara [Chamber] that a bill was unconstitutional and it nevertheless became law, the Ejecutivo de la Unión [Executive of the Union] could submit it to the Nación [Nation], represented in the Legislaturas de los Estados [State Legislatures] (Art. 55; cont. 1864, Art. 55).

In such a case, each Estado [State] represented one vote, expressed by the majority of the members attending its Legislatura [Legislature], and transmitted the result to the Corte Federal [Federal Court] with the formula “I Confirm” or “I Object” (Art. 56; cont. 1864, Art. 56).

If a majority of the Estados [States] concurred with the Ejecutivo [Executive], the Corte [Court] ordered the law suspended and reported to the Congreso [Congress], transmitting the entire record (Art. 57; cont. 1864, Art. 57).

Laws entered into observance only after publication with the prescribed solemnity (Art. 58; cont. 1864, Art. 58).

The faculty conferred for the sanctioning of a law was not delegable (Art. 59; cont. 1864, Art. 59).

No legislative provision had retroactive effect, except in judicial procedure and when imposing a lesser penalty (Art. 60; cont. 1864, Art. 60).

ECO-HAC—Hacienda [Public Finance]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] conferred upon the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] the faculty of organizing all matters relating to the Aduanas [Customs Houses], whose revenues formed the Tesoro de la Unión [Treasury of the Union] until replaced by others (Tít. IV, Sec. V, Art. 43, no. 3; cont. 1864, Tít. IV, Sec. V, Art. 43, no. 3).

The Estados [States] having no mines in operation received from national revenues the sum of sixteen thousand venezolanos, which was fixed in the annual budget of public expenditures and delivered in anticipated quarters (Tít. II, Art. 13, no. 17; cf. 1864, Tít. II, Art. 13, no. 17:  “To reserve from national revenues, for the benefit of the States having no mines in operation, the sum of twenty thousand pesos…”).

The Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] determined all matters relating to the national debt and contracted loans upon the credit of the Nación [Nation] (Art. 43, nos. 10–11; cont. 1864, Art. 43, nos. 10–11).

The Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] annually formed the budgets of public expenditures (Art. 43, no. 18; cont. 1864, Art. 43, no. 18).

The Presidente de la Unión [President of the Union] supervised the collection of national revenues (Tít. V, Sec. II, Art. 72, no. 3; cont. 1864, Tít. V, Sec. II, Art. 72, no. 3).

The Presidente [President] appointed empleados de hacienda [Treasury employees] whose appointment was not attributed to other functionaries, Venezuelan birth being required for those offices (Art. 72, no. 10; cont. 1864, Art. 72, no. 10).

In foreign war, the Presidente [President] could demand contributions in advance or negotiate decreed loans whenever ordinary revenues were insufficient (Art. 72, no. 15.2; cont. 1864, Art. 72, no. 15.2).

Within the first five sessions of each year, the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State] presented to the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] the budget of public expenditures and the general account of the preceding year (Tít. V, Sec. III, Art. 80; cont. 1864, Tít. V, Sec. III, Art. 80).

The Congreso [Congress] could not increase the taxes burdening exports or constitute further mortgages upon them; once the existing obligations were satisfied by payment, compensation, or substitution, the exportation of national products was forever free (Tít. VII, Art. 103; cont. 1864, Tít. VII, Art. 103).

No expenditure could be made from the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] unless the Congreso [Congress] had expressly appropriated a sum in the annual budget; those contravening this provision were civilly responsible to the National Treasury for the sums paid.  In every expenditure from the public treasury, ordinary expenditures were preferred to extraordinary ones (Art. 108; cont. 1864, Art. 108).

Offices collecting national contributions and offices making payments remained separate; the former could make no payments other than the salaries of their own employees (Art. 109; cont. 1864, Art. 109).

When for any reason the budget corresponding to a fiscal period was not enacted, the budget of the immediately preceding period continued in force (Art. 110; cont. 1864, Art. 110).

POW-EXE—Ejecutivo [Executive]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] entrusted the general administration of the Nación [Nation] to a magistrate bearing the title Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] (Tít. V, Sec. I, Art. 61; cont. 1864, Tít. V, Sec. I, Art. 61).

To be Presidente [President], a person was required to be Venezuelan by birth and thirty years of age (Art. 62; cont. 1864, Art. 62).

The Presidente [President] was elected by the citizens of all Estados [States] through direct and public ballot, each State possessing one vote constituted by the relative majority of its electors (Arts. 63–66; cf. 1864, Arts. 63–65:  “The election of the President shall be made by the citizens of all the States through direct and secret ballot, in such a manner that each State possesses one vote, which shall be that of the relative majority of its electors.”).

Temporary absences of the Presidente [President] were supplied by one of the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State], selected by a majority vote of his colleagues.  Absolute vacancies arising from death, resignation, removal, or cessation in command upon termination of the period were supplied by the Presidente de la Alta Corte Federal [President of the High Federal Court], who was required to convoke new elections unless the vacancy occurred within the final six months of the constitutional period.  Whoever supplied the President was required to possess the constitutional qualifications for the office (Arts. 67–68; cf. 1864, Arts. 67 and 69).

The Presidente [President] served for two years, counted from 20 February.  The outgoing President, or the person replacing him in an absolute vacancy, could not be elected for either the period immediately succeeding the one then ending or the period following it; the same prohibition applied to the relatives of either within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity (Arts. 69–70; cf. 1864, Arts. 68 and 70: the presidential period was four years, and the prohibition extended only to the immediately succeeding period and did not encompass relatives).

The Constitución [Constitution] enumerated the attributions of the Presidente [President], including preservation of the Nación [Nation] from external attack; execution of the laws and decrees of the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature]; supervision of national revenues; administration of terrenos baldíos [public lands] according to law; convocation of the Legislature; appointment of diplomatic representatives and Treasury employees; direction of diplomatic negotiations and treaties; conclusion of national contracts subject to legislative approval; appointment and removal of the Ministros [Ministers]; granting of cartas de nacionalidad [letters of nationality]; issuance of patentes de navegación [navigation patents]; declaration of war following a decree of the Congreso [Congress]; exercise of the extraordinary faculties prescribed for foreign war and armed insurrection; direction of military operations; granting of pardons; defence of the Distrito Federal [Federal District]; and performance of the other functions attributed by national law (Tít. V, Sec. II, Arts. 72–73; cont. 1864, Tít. V, Sec. II, Arts. 72–73).

POW-JUD—Poder Judicial [Judicial Power]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] vested national judicial authority in the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court], whose organization, composition, and jurisdiction were regulated in Title VI (Tít. VI, Arts. 85–89; cf. 1864, Tít. VI, Arts. 85–89).

The Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] comprised five Vocales [Justices], who were required to be Venezuelan by birth or to have ten years of naturalization, and to be thirty years of age (Art. 85; cont. 1864, Art. 85).

The Legislatura [Legislature] of each Estado [State] presented candidates for the Corte [Court], and the Congreso [Congress] declared elected the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes in each of the five electoral groups established by the Constitution; ties were resolved by Congress, which also filled vacancies when the States had not transmitted their presentations (Art. 86; cf. 1864, Art. 86, which did not provide for Congress to fill such vacancies).

The law determined the respective functions of the Vocales [Justices] of the Corte [Court] and its other employees (Art. 87; cont. 1864, Art. 87).

The Vocales [Justices] and their respective substitutes served for two years; neither the principals nor the substitutes in exercise could accept offices appointed by the Ejecutivo [Executive] during that period, even after resigning their judicial office (Art. 88; cf. 1864, Art. 88:  “The Justices and their respective substitutes […] shall remain in their offices for four years…”).

The competence of the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] comprised civil and criminal causes involving diplomatic employees in the cases permitted by the law of nations; causes against the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State] and diplomatic agents; causes against high functionaries of the Estados [States] in conformity with Article 13, no. 24; civil causes in which the Nación [Nation] was defendant when so determined by law; controversies of jurisdiction among employees of different States; matters voluntarily submitted by the States; declaration of the law in force when national laws collided with one another or with State laws; controversies arising from contracts or negotiations concluded by the Presidente de la Unión [President of the Union]; prize causes; and the other attributions prescribed by law (Art. 89; cf. 1864, Art. 89, no. 5, which conditioned causes against high State functionaries upon the laws of the respective States).

POW-SUB—Gobierno subnacional [Subnational Government]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] reserved to the Estados [States] everything not expressly attributed by the Constitution to the Administración General de la Nación [General Administration of the Nation] (Tít. VII, Art. 90; cont. 1864, Tít. VII, Art. 90).

The courts of justice of the Estados [States] were declared independent; causes initiated under their own procedure and concerning matters within their exclusive competence terminated within the respective States without submission to examination by any external authority (Art. 91; cont. 1864, Art. 91).

Every act of the Congreso Nacional [National Congress] or the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] that violated the rights guaranteed to the Estados [States] by the Constitution, or attacked their independence, was to be declared void by the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] whenever requested by a majority of the State Legislatures (Art. 92; cont. 1864, Art. 92).

The Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could maintain within the Estados [States] no other resident employees exercising jurisdiction or authority than those of the States themselves, except Treasury employees and personnel assigned to national fortresses, parks established by law, naval stations, and enabled ports, whose jurisdiction was confined to their respective offices and installations (Art. 99; cont. 1864, Art. 99).

The Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could not station forces or military commanders exercising command within an Estado [State] without the permission of that State’s government (Art. 100; cont. 1864, Art. 100).

Neither the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] nor the Ejecutivos de los Estados [State Executives] could intervene by Armed Force in the domestic conflicts of a State; they were permitted only to offer their good offices toward a peaceful resolution (Art. 101; cont. 1864, Art. 101).

CON-AMD—Reforma de la Constitución [Constitutional Amendment]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] authorized the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] to reform the Constitution in whole or in part whenever requested by a majority of the Legislaturas de los Estados [State Legislatures]; no reform could extend beyond the points comprised in the State petitions (Tít. VII, Art. 122; cont. 1864, Tít. VII, Art. 122).

CIV-SUF—Sufragio [Suffrage]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] provided that Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] be elected in the manner determined by the Estados [States] (Tít. IV, Arts. 19, 25; cont. 1864, Tít. IV, Arts. 19, 25).

The Diputados [Deputies] were elected by popular vote at the ratio of one for every twenty-five thousand inhabitants and one additional Deputy for every excess exceeding twelve thousand, with an equal number of substitutes elected in the same manner (Art. 20; cf. 1864, Art. 20).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to establish in their constitutions direct, public, written, and signed suffrage for popular elections, with a registration period of thirty days and a voting period of eight days, including the final two Sundays (Tít. II, Art. 13, no. 23; cf. 1864, Tít. II, Art. 13, no. 23:  “To establish direct and secret suffrage in popular elections.”).

The Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] was elected by the citizens of all Estados [States] through direct and public ballot, each State possessing one vote constituted by the relative majority of its electors (Tít. V, Arts. 63–66; cf. 1864, Tít. V, Art. 63:  “The election of the President shall be made by the citizens of all the States through direct and secret ballot.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed liberty of suffrage in popular elections, without restriction other than minority below eighteen years of age (Tít. III, Art. 14, no. 11; cont. 1864, Tít. III, Art. 14, no. 11).

CIV-CIT—Ciudadanía [Citizenship]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] defined as Venezuelans all persons born in the territory of Venezuela, whatever the nationality of their parents; children of a Venezuelan father or mother born in another territory who established domicile in the country and manifested the will to be Venezuelan; foreigners who had obtained a carta de nacionalidad [letter of nationality]; and persons born in any of the Spanish American Republics or the Spanish Antilles who established residence in the territory of the Unión [Union] and desired to be Venezuelan (Tít. I, Sec. II, Art. 6; cont. 1864, Tít. I, Sec. II, Art. 6).

Venezuelans who established domicile and acquired nationality in a foreign country did not lose their character as Venezuelans (Art. 7; cont. 1864, Art. 7).

Venezuelan men above twenty-one years of age were eligible for public offices, subject to the exceptions established by the Constitución [Constitution] (Art. 8; cont. 1864, Art. 8).

All Venezuelans were bound to serve the Nación [Nation] in the manner prescribed by law, with the sacrifice of their property and life if necessary for its defence (Art. 9; cont. 1864, Art. 9).

Venezuelans present in the territory of any Estado [State] possessed therein the same rights and duties as those domiciled in that State (Art. 10; cont. 1864, Art. 10).

The law determined the rights corresponding to the condition of foreigner (Art. 11; cont. 1864, Art. 11).

RTS-GAR—Derechos [Rights]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] guaranteed Venezuelans the inviolability of life and abolished capital punishment, whatever law might establish it (Tít. III, Art. 14, no. 1; cont. 1864, Tít. III, Art. 14, no. 1).

It guaranteed property with all its rights, subject only to contributions established by the legislative authority, judicial decision, and taking for public works following indemnification and an adversarial proceeding (Art. 14, no. 2; cont. 1864, Art. 14, no. 2).

It guaranteed the inviolability and secrecy of correspondence and other papers; the inviolability of the domestic home, except to prevent the perpetration of an offence in conformity with law; liberty of thought expressed by word or through the press, without restriction; liberty of transit, domicile, departure from the Republic, and return thereto; liberty of industry; liberty of unarmed meeting and association; liberty of petition and the right to obtain a resolution; liberty of instruction; religious liberty, with public worship outside temples reserved to the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion; personal security; and equality before the law (Art. 14, nos. 3–15; cont. 1864, Art. 14, nos. 3–15).

Under the guarantee of personal liberty, the Constitución [Constitution] abolished forced recruitment, proscribed slavery forever, declared free the slaves who entered Venezuelan territory, and recognized the right of each person to do whatever did not prejudice another (Art. 14, no. 5; cont. 1864, Art. 14, no. 5).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the enumeration of guarantees did not restrict the faculty of the Estados [States] to accord other guarantees to their inhabitants (Art. 15; cont. 1864, Art. 15).

The laws of the Estados [States] prescribed penalties for infringers of those guarantees and established the procedures for making them effective (Art. 16; cont. 1864, Art. 16).

Persons who issued, signed, executed, or ordered the execution of decrees, orders, or resolutions violating any guarantee accorded to Venezuelans were declared culpable and punished according to law, and any citizen was competent to accuse them (Art. 17; cont. 1864, Art. 17).

REG-MIL—La fuerza armada [The Armed Force]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] provided that the fuerza pública nacional [National Public Force] was divided into naval and land forces and composed of the Milicia Ciudadana [Citizen Militia] organized by the Estados [States] under their laws (Tít. VII, Art. 93; cont. 1864, Tít. VII, Art. 93).

The force under charge of the Unión [Union] was formed from volunteers and a proportional contingent supplied by each Estado [State], which called to service the citizens obliged to render it under its laws (Art. 94; cont. 1864, Art. 94).

In time of war, the contingent could be augmented by bodies of the Milicia Ciudadana [Citizen Militia] to the number of men required by the Gobierno Nacional [National Government] (Art. 95; cont. 1864, Art. 95).

The Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could change the commanders of the fuerza pública [Public Force] furnished by the Estados [States] in the cases and with the formalities prescribed by national military law, the States then providing replacements (Art. 96; cont. 1864, Art. 96).

Military and civil authority could never be exercised by the same person or corporation (Art. 97; cont. 1864, Art. 97).

During national and State electoral periods, the fuerza pública [Public Force] was to be disarmed in the manner prescribed by law (Art. 111; cont. 1864, Art. 111).

The fuerza armada [Armed Force] could not deliberate; it was declared passive and obedient.  No armed body could make requisitions or demand assistance of any kind except through the civil authorities and in the manner prescribed by law (Art. 116; cont. 1864, Art. 116).

REG-REL—Religión [Religion]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] invoked the Supreme Author and Legislator of the Universe in its Preámbulo [Preamble], decreed by the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] under the authority of the people of Venezuela (Preamble; cont. 1864, Preamble).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed religious liberty, but provided that only the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion could exercise public worship outside temples (Tít. III, Art. 14, no. 13; cont. 1864, Tít. III, Art. 14, no. 13).

The Nación [Nation], being in possession of the right of ecclesiastical patronage, was to exercise it in the manner prescribed by law (Tít. VII, Art. 98; cont. 1864, Tít. VII, Art. 98).

REG-SLA—Esclavitud [Slavery]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] proscribed slavery forever and declared free the slaves who entered the territory of Venezuela (Tít. III, Art. 14, no. 5.2–3; cont. 1864, Tít. III, Art. 14, no. 5.2–3).

ECO-INF—Infraestructura [Infrastructure]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] empowered the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] to resolve all matters relating to the enabling and security of ports and maritime coasts; create and organize the national posts and establish charges upon the carriage of correspondence; promote measures conducive to the prosperity of the country and the advancement of the sciences and arts; fix and unify national weights and measures; and approve or reject, before execution, contracts concerning national public works concluded by the Presidente de la Unión [President of the Union] (Tít. IV, Sec. V, Art. 43, nos. 4–5, 17, 19–20; cont. 1864, Tít. IV, Sec. V, Art. 43, nos. 4–5, 17, 19–20).

The Constitución [Constitution] authorized the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] to establish temporarily, under the denomination territorios [territories], regions that were unpopulated or inhabited by uncivilized Indigenous peoples, which depended directly upon the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] (Art. 43, no. 22; cont. 1864, Art. 43, no. 22).

The Nación [Nation] and the Estados [States] were to promote immigration and the colonization of foreigners in conformity with their respective laws (Tít. VII, Art. 117; cont. 1864, Tít. VII, Art. 117).

CON-FIN—Disposiciones finales [Final Provisions]

The Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] provided that the laws and dispositions of the governments of the Estados [States] remained in force until the new State Legislatures brought them into harmony with the Constitution, which was to occur within four months (Tít. VII, Art. 121; cont. 1864, Tít. VII, Art. 121).

The Constitución [Constitution] could be reformed in whole or in part by the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] at the request of a majority of the Legislaturas de los Estados [State Legislatures], without any reform extending beyond the points comprised in those petitions (Art. 122; cont. 1864, Art. 122).

The Constitución [Constitution] entered into force upon its official publication in each Estado [State].  Public acts and official documents were to date the Federación [Federation] from 20 February 1859 and the Law from 28 March 1864 (Art. 123; cf. 1864, Art. 123).

The sole transitory provision established that the new constitutional period for the offices of the Administración General de la República [General Administration of the Republic] would begin on 20 February 1877, upon expiration of the current period, while the periods of State employees would begin when the periods then in force terminated under the respective State constitutions (Tít. VIII, Art. 124; new; cf. 1864: constitutional silence).

The Constitución [Constitution] was given and signed in the Palacio de Sesiones del Cuerpo Legislativo Federal [Palace of Sessions of the Federal Legislative Body] at Caracas on 23 May 1874 by the officers and members of the Congreso [Congress], and was ordered executed and observed in the Palacio Federal [Federal Palace] at Caracas on 27 May 1874 by Presidente [President] Antonio Guzmán Blanco and his Ministros [Ministers].

Note  

  • The original text of the Constitución de 1874 [Constitution of 1874] may be consulted in the CIDEP (Recopilación de Leyes y Decretos de Venezuela [Compilation of the Laws and Decrees of Venezuela]):  https://cidep.online/files/constituciones/1874.pdf

* *

8).  The Constitution of 1881

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881], formally the Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela], was sanctioned by the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] at Caracas on 4 April 1881 and ordered executed by Presidente [President] Antonio Guzmán Blanco on 27 April 1881.  It declared as the Constitution of the United States of Venezuela the text requested by the Legislatures of the twenty States of the Federación Venezolana [Venezuelan Federation] and organized those States into nine great political entities.

DOC-PRE—Preámbulo [Preamble]

The Congress of the United States of Venezuela, having considered and scrutinized the petitions addressed by means of their Legislatures by the twenty States composing the Venezuelan Federation, requesting the reform of the Constitution of 1874, in complete conformity with the Project submitted by Congress for their consideration, and with each and every modification proposed by the Illustrious American, President of the Republic, in the Message he addressed to the State Legislatures on 15 October 1880, without essential difference upon the general points of the reform; and having present, moreover, the will expressed by the Sections concerning their own grouping, decrees:

Sole Article.  The Constitution of the United States of Venezuela requested by the Legislatures of the twenty States of the Venezuelan Federation is hereby declared, in the following terms:

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF VENEZUELA.

FND-TER—Territorio [Territory]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] constituted as nine great political entities the twenty Estados [States] that had remained independent and united since the Constitution of 28 March 1864, preserving their union as a single free, sovereign, and independent Nación [Nation] under the denomination Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela] (Art. 1; cf. 1874, Art. 1).  The territorial organization comprised the Estados [States] of Oriente, Guzmán Blanco, Carabobo, Sur de Occidente, Norte de Occidente, Los Andes, Bolívar, Zulia, and Falcón, formed by grouping the former twenty States (Art. 1; new; cf. 1874: no corresponding grouping).

The limits of the great Estados [States] continued to be determined by the territorial division established by the Law of 28 April 1856 until reformed (Art. 2; cont. 1874, Art. 2).  The exterior limits of the República [Republic] remained those that in 1810 corresponded to the former Capitanía General de Venezuela [Captaincy General of Venezuela] (Art. 3; cont. 1874, Art. 3).

The grouped Estados [States] were denominated Secciones [Sections] and declared equal among themselves.  Their constitutions were to accord with the federative principles established by the national Constitution, while sovereignty not expressly delegated continued to reside in the constituent States, subject only to the limitations arising from the compact of association (Art. 4; cf. 1874, Art. 12:  “The States forming the Venezuelan Union reciprocally recognize their autonomies, declare themselves equal as political entities, and retain in all its plenitude their sovereignty not expressly delegated by this Constitution.”).

POW-LEG—Congreso [Congress]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] retained a bicameral Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature], composed of a Cámara de Senadores [Chamber of Senators] and a Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] (Art. 18; cont. 1874, Art. 18).  The Estados [States] determined the manner of electing the Deputies, while the Senators were elected by the respective State Legislatures (Arts. 19, 25; cf. 1874, Arts. 19, 25).  Each State elected three principal Senators and an equal number of substitutes, and the senatorial period was extended from two to four years (Arts. 25–27; cf. 1874, Arts. 25–27).

Representation in the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] was modified to one Diputado [Deputy] for every thirty-five thousand inhabitants, with one additional Deputy for every remainder not below fifteen thousand, and an equal number of substitutes (Art. 20; cf. 1874, Art. 20:  “…one for every twenty-five thousand inhabitants, and another for every excess exceeding twelve thousand.”).  The Deputies continued to be elected by direct popular vote, but their period was increased from two to four years (Arts. 20–21; cf. 1874, Arts. 20–21).

The Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] retained the faculty of examining the annual account of the Presidente [President], censuring the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State], and hearing accusations against the Ejecutivo [Executive], the Ministers, national employees, and high functionaries of the Estados [States] for the causes determined in Article 22 (Art. 22; cont. 1874, Art. 22).  The accusation procedures, declaration that there was ground to proceed, suspension of the accused, and disqualification during trial remained substantially unchanged (Arts. 23–24; cont. 1874, Arts. 23–24).

The Senado [Senate] continued to conduct and resolve trials initiated in the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] (Art. 28; cont. 1874, Art. 28).  If a trial had not concluded during the sessions, the Senate remained assembled for that purpose alone until the cause was terminated; the 1874 provision denying allowances to the Senators in such a case no longer appeared (Art. 29; cf. 1874, Art. 29).

The Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] assembled annually in the capital on 20 February, or on the earliest possible day thereafter, without prior convocation.  The sessions were reduced from seventy to sixty days and remained prolongable to ninety, in the judgment of the majority (Art. 30; cf. 1874, Art. 30).

The quorum requirements, separate functioning of the Cámaras [Chambers], public or secret sessions, internal faculties, presidency of the Congreso [Congress], and nonresponsibility for opinions and speeches remained substantially unchanged (Arts. 31–36, 39–40; cont. 1874, Arts. 31–36, 39–40).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that any increase in legislative indemnities would not enter into force until the succeeding period, after complete renewal of the Chambers that had sanctioned it (Art. 37; cf. 1874, Art. 37; deferred-operation rule, new).

The Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] enjoyed immunity from 20 January of each year until thirty days after the sessions ended; immunity consisted in the suspension of every civil or criminal proceeding, whatever its origin or nature (Art. 38; cf. 1874, Art. 38).

The Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] who accepted from the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] any office or commission thereby vacated their seat in the corresponding Cámara [Chamber] by operation of law (Art. 41; cf. 1874, Art. 41).

The Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] could not contract with the Gobierno General [General Government] or prosecute the claims of others before it (Art. 42; cont. 1874, Art. 42).

The Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] retained the attributions relating to controversies among the Estados [States], the Distrito Federal [Federal District], the Customs Houses, ports, posts, national codes, currency, national symbols, national offices, public debt, loans, the Armed Force, war, treaties, public works, budgets, public prosperity, weights and measures, amnesties, territories, trials before the Senado [Senate], representation in the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies], military retirements and pensions, responsibility of public employees, and military ranks or promotions (Art. 43; cf. 1874, Art. 43).

Article 43 reduced from ten to three square miles the maximum extent of the Distrito Federal [Federal District]; replaced the formation of the census with the perfection of the census then in force; restored the reference to replacement of the Armed Force; provided that contracts concerning national public works be concluded by the Presidente [President] with the approval of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council]; suppressed the attribution to enact the law of presidential elections; and attributed to the Congreso [Congress] the election of the Federal Council and convocation of the substitutes of the Senators and Deputies elected to compose it (Art. 43, nos. 2, 12–14, 17, and 29; cf. 1874, Art. 43; Art. 43, no. 29, new; cf. 1874: constitutional silence).

The Congreso [Congress] retained the faculty of enacting necessary laws of general character, provided that they did not conflict with the Constitución [Constitution] (Art. 44; cf. 1874, Art. 44:  “In addition to the preceding enumeration, the National Legislature may enact such laws of general character as are necessary.”).

The initiative of laws and decrees remained with the members of either Cámara [Chamber], but the respective bills were required to conform to the provisions established for the Parlamento de Venezuela [Parliament of Venezuela] (Art. 45; cf. 1874, Art. 45).

Upon presentation, a bill was to be read and considered for admission; once admitted, it received three debates separated by at least one day (Art. 46; cf. 1874, Art. 46, which did not expressly require the initial reading).  If the originating Chamber did not accept alterations made by the other and no agreement was reached, the bill became void once the originating Chamber separately ratified its insistence (Art. 48; cf. 1874, Art. 48, which referred to a separate decision without expressly requiring ratification of the insistence).

The remaining rules concerning bicameral consideration, statement of the days of debate, integral redrafting of a reformed law, the legislative formula, rejected and pending bills, repeal, publication, nondelegability of the faculty to sanction laws, and the prohibition of retroactive legislation except in judicial procedure or when a lesser penalty was imposed remained substantially unchanged (Arts. 47, 49–54, 58–60; cont. 1874, Arts. 47, 49–54, 58–60).

When the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State] had maintained that a bill was unconstitutional and it had nevertheless been sanctioned as law, the Ejecutivo [Executive], with the affirmative vote of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council], suspended its execution and requested the vote of the State Legislatures.  If a majority of the Legislatures concurred with the Executive, the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] confirmed the suspension and the Executive reported to the succeeding Congreso [Congress] (Arts. 55–57; cf. 1874, Arts. 55–57).

ECO-HAC—Hacienda [Public Finance]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] retained the provision under which the revenues of the Aduanas [Customs Houses] formed the Tesoro de la Unión [Treasury of the Union] until replaced by others, and established a system for distributing certain revenues between the Federación [Federation] and the Estados [States] (Arts. 13, nos. 32–33; 43, no. 3; cf. 1874, Arts. 13, nos. 16–17; 43, no. 3).

The Estados [States] ceded to the Gobierno Federal [Federal Government] the administration of mines, terrenos baldíos [public lands], and saltworks.  Two thirds of the revenues arising from transit duties, mines, public lands, and saltworks belonged to the States and were distributed in proportion to their population; the remaining third was reserved to the Poder Federal [Federal Power] for the advancement of the country (Art. 13, nos. 15 and 32–33; cf. 1874, Art. 13, nos. 16–17).

The Congreso [Congress] continued to exercise authority over the national debt, loans, annual appropriations, administration of the Customs Houses, and organization of the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] (Art. 43, nos. 3, 10–11, and 18; cont. 1874, Art. 43, nos. 3, 10–11, and 18).

No expenditure could be made from the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] unless the Congreso [Congress] had expressly appropriated a sum in the annual budget, and those contravening the provision were civilly responsible to the National Treasury for the sums paid.  Ordinary expenditures continued to be preferred to extraordinary ones (Art. 105; cont. 1874, Art. 108).

Offices collecting national contributions and offices making payments remained separate, and the former could make no payments other than the salaries of their own employees (Art. 106; cont. 1874, Art. 109).  If the budget corresponding to a fiscal period was not enacted, the budget of the immediately preceding period continued in force (Art. 107; cont. 1874, Art. 110).

Exportation was declared free in Venezuela, and the imposition of duties burdening it was prohibited (Art. 101; cf. 1874, Art. 103).

POW-EXE—Ejecutivo [Executive]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] established a Consejo Federal [Federal Council] composed of one Senador [Senator] and one Diputado [Deputy] from each Estado [State], together with one Deputy for the Distrito Federal [Federal District], elected by the Congreso [Congress] for two-year periods (Art. 61; new).  From among its members, the Federal Council elected the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] and the member who was to supply his temporary or absolute absences; a presidential election falling upon a person who did not belong to the Federal Council was void (Arts. 62–64; new).

The Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] and the members of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] served for two years.  Neither the President nor the members of the Council could be reelected for the immediately succeeding period, although the Councillors resumed their legislative seats upon completion of their functions in the Council (Art. 63; cf. 1874, Arts. 69–70, which barred the outgoing President and the person replacing him in an absolute vacancy from election for either of the two succeeding periods).

The Presidente [President] appointed and removed the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State]; presided over the Gabinete [Cabinet]; received diplomatic representatives; signed official communications addressed to foreign sovereigns or presidents; ordered execution of the laws and decrees of the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature]; promulgated resolutions and decrees approved by the Consejo Federal [Federal Council]; organized the Distrito Federal [Federal District]; issued patentes de navegación [navigation patents]; reported annually to the Congreso [Congress] on the exercise of the faculties conferred by Article 66; and performed the other functions attributed by national law (Art. 65; cf. 1874, Art. 72).

With the deliberative vote of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council], the Presidente [President] preserved the Nación [Nation] from external attack; administered public lands, mines, and saltworks; convoked the Congreso [Congress]; appointed diplomatic and consular employees; directed treaty negotiations; concluded contracts of national interest; appointed and removed Treasury employees; declared war following authorization by Congress; exercised the extraordinary faculties prescribed for foreign war; restored constitutional order after an armed rebellion; intervened to terminate an armed collision between Estados [States]; directed war and organized the national force; granted pardons; and defended the Distrito Federal [Federal District] (Art. 66; cf. 1874, Art. 72).

The Presidente [President] continued to be assisted by the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State], whose number, functions, duties, and Secretarías [Departments] were determined by law (Art. 67; cont. 1874, Art. 74).  To be a Minister, a person was required to be twenty-five years of age and Venezuelan by birth or to possess five years of nationality (Art. 68; cont. 1874, Art. 75).

The Ministros [Ministers] were the natural and necessary organs of the Presidente [President].  All presidential acts were to be subscribed by them in order to be fulfilled or executed by authorities, employees, or private persons (Art. 69; cont. 1874, Art. 76).  The personal responsibility of the Ministers was not saved by an order of the President, even when received in writing (Art. 70; cont. 1874, Art. 77).

Decisions foreign to the internal administration of the Secretarías [Departments] were resolved in Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers], and ministerial responsibility was collective and solidary (Art. 71; cf. 1874, Art. 78:  “The decision of all matters other than the internal administration of the Departments shall be resolved in Council of Ministers; and responsibility is collective.”).

The Ministros [Ministers] were to report annually to the Cámaras [Chambers] concerning what had been accomplished or projected in their respective branches and to furnish the written or verbal information required of them.  They could reserve only that which it was not expedient to publish concerning diplomatic negotiations; the 1874 reservation relating to war no longer appeared (Art. 72; cf. 1874, Art. 79).

The Ministros [Ministers] were to present the budget of public expenditures and the general account of the preceding year, possessed the right to speak in the Cámaras [Chambers], and were obliged to appear when summoned (Arts. 73–74; cont. 1874, Arts. 80–81).

The Ministros [Ministers] answered for treason against the Fatherland, infringement of the Constitution or laws, misappropriation of public funds, expenditures exceeding appropriations, bribery or corrupt payment, and failure to execute decisions of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] (Art. 75; cf. 1874, Art. 82; Art. 75, no. 6, new).

The first paragraph of Article 86 provided that the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] was exercised by the Consejo Federal [Federal Council], the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] or the person acting in his stead, in union with the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State], who were its organs (Art. 86, para. 1; cf. 1874, Art. 83).  Its second paragraph required the President to be Venezuelan by birth (Art. 86, para. 2; cf. 1874, Art. 62, which additionally required thirty years of age).

When the Presidente [President], with approval of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council], assumed command of the Ejército [Army] or left the Distrito Federal [Federal District] upon matters of public interest, he was replaced by the Federal Council in conformity with Article 62 (Art. 87; cf. 1874, Art. 84).

POW-JUD—Poder Judicial [Judicial Power]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] retained the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court], modified its composition, and established a Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] as tribunal of the Estados [States] (Arts. 76–85; cf. 1874, Arts. 85–89; Arts. 81–85, new).

The Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] comprised one Vocal [Justice] for each Estado de la Federación [State of the Federation], and each Justice was required to be Venezuelan by birth and thirty years of age (Art. 76; cf. 1874, Art. 85:  “The High Federal Court shall be composed of five Justices…”).

The Vocales [Justices] were elected by the Congreso [Congress] from lists formed by the assembled representation of each Estado [State] (Art. 77; cf. 1874, Art. 86).  The law determined the functions of the Justices and the other employees of the High Federal Court (Art. 78; cont. 1874, Art. 87).

The Vocales [Justices] and their substitutes served for four years.  Neither the principals nor the substitutes in exercise could accept appointments from the Ejecutivo [Executive] without first resigning their judicial office, and infringement of this prohibition was punished by four years of disqualification from public office (Art. 79; cf. 1874, Art. 88).

The competence of the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] comprised civil and criminal causes involving diplomatic employees in the cases permitted by the law of nations; causes against the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State] and diplomatic agents; civil causes in which the Nación [Nation] was defendant when so determined by law; controversies of jurisdiction or competence among authorities of different Estados [States]; matters voluntarily submitted by the States; determination of the law in force when national laws collided with one another or with State laws; controversies arising from contracts or negotiations concluded by the Presidente [President]; prize causes; and the other attributions determined by law (Art. 80; cf. 1874, Art. 89).

The Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] was a tribunal of the Estados [States] and comprised one Vocal [Justice] for each State, with four-year periods (Art. 81; new).  To be a Justice, a person was required to be a practising lawyer with at least six years of practice, to be Venezuelan, and to be thirty years of age (Art. 82; new).

The Legislaturas de los Estados [State Legislatures] presented lists of candidates from which the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] elected the Justice corresponding to each Estado [State].  Absolute vacancies were filled by lot from the general list of unelected candidates and temporary vacancies in conformity with law (Arts. 83–84; new).

The Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] heard criminal causes or causes of responsibility against high functionaries of the Estados [States]; the recourse of cassation in the manner prescribed by law; reported annually to the Congreso [Congress] concerning obstacles opposed to the unity of civil and criminal legislation; and resolved conflicts of jurisdiction among judicial authorities of different States and, when applicable, among those of the same State (Art. 85; new).

POW-SUB—Gobierno subnacional [Subnational Government]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] grouped the twenty Estados [States] existing under the Constitution of 1874 into nine great States formed by territorial Secciones [Sections], and declared the constituent States equal among themselves (Arts. 1, 4; cf. 1874, Arts. 1, 12).

The constitutions of the Secciones [Sections] were to accord with the federative principles established by the national Constitution.  Sovereignty not expressly delegated continued to reside in the constituent Estados [States], subject only to the limitations arising from the federal compact (Art. 4; cf. 1874, Art. 12).

Everything not expressly attributed by the Constitución [Constitution] to the Administración General de la Nación [General Administration of the Nation] belonged to the Estados [States] (Art. 88; cont. 1874, Art. 90).

The Estados [States] were to organize themselves according to the principles of popular, elective, federal, representative, alternative, and responsible government, and to establish their internal constitutional order in harmony with the national Constitution (Art. 13, nos. 1–2; cf. 1874, Art. 13, no. 1).

The Estados [States] bound themselves to preserve the independence and integrity of the Federación [Federation]; not to alienate territory or implore foreign protection; not to maintain political or diplomatic relations with foreign nations; not to establish Customs Houses or impose differential internal contributions; not to obstruct interstate commerce; and not to declare or make war among themselves (Art. 13, nos. 3–13 and 27–30; cf. 1874, Art. 13).

The Estados [States] were to cede the lands necessary for the Distrito Federal [Federal District] and other federal establishments; recognize federal jurisdiction over navigation, national roads, mines, public lands, saltworks, and insular territories; maintain uniform substantive civil and criminal legislation and uniform procedural laws; provide primary education and instruction in arts and trades; recognize the jurisdiction of the Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation]; establish criminal extradition as a constitutional principle; contribute contingents to the national Armed Force; preserve neutrality in controversies among States; and submit interstate controversies to the Congreso [Congress] or the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] (Art. 13, nos. 6–34; cf. 1874, Art. 13).

The Estados [States] ceded to the Gobierno Federal [Federal Government] the administration of mines, public lands, and saltworks.  Two thirds of the revenues arising from transit duties, mines, public lands, and saltworks were distributed among the States in proportion to their population, while the remaining third was reserved to the Poder Federal [Federal Power] for the advancement of the country (Art. 13, nos. 15 and 32–33; cf. 1874, Art. 13, nos. 16–17).

The courts of justice of the Estados [States] were declared independent, without prejudice to the recourse of cassation in the cases established by law (Art. 89; cf. 1874, Art. 91).  Acts of the Congreso [Congress] or the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] violating the constitutional rights or independence of the States were to be declared void by the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] at the request of a majority of the State Legislatures (Art. 90; cont. 1874, Art. 92).

The Gobierno de la Federación [Government of the Federation] could maintain in the Estados [States] no other resident employees exercising jurisdiction or authority than those of the States themselves, except Treasury employees and personnel of the forces assigned to national fortresses, parks established by law, naval stations, and enabled ports.  Article 97 further recognized that the existing instruments of war belonged to the Gobierno Nacional [National Government] and that the States could acquire those necessary for their internal defence (Art. 97; cf. 1874, Art. 99).

CON-AMD—Reforma de la Constitución [Constitutional Amendment]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] provided that when a majority of the Legislaturas de los Estados [State Legislatures] requested constitutional reform, the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] was required to sanction it.  The reform could not comprise points other than those upon which the State petitions concurred (Art. 118; cf. 1874, Art. 122).

CIV-SUF—Sufragio [Suffrage]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] established direct and public suffrage for popular elections, grounded upon an electoral census and made obligatory.  The vote was to be cast in public session of the respective electoral board, entered in the register established by law, and signed by the voter or, if he could not sign, by another citizen at his request; without this formality no vote could be deemed validly cast (Art. 13, no. 22; cf. 1874, Art. 13, no. 23).

The Constitución [Constitution] continued to guarantee liberty of suffrage in popular elections, without restriction other than minority below eighteen years of age (Art. 14, no. 11; cont. 1874, Art. 14, no. 11).

Eligibility for public offices remained confined to Venezuelan men above twenty-one years of age, subject to the exceptions established by the Constitución [Constitution] (Art. 7; cont. 1874, Art. 8).

The Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] ceased to be elected directly by the citizens and was instead elected by the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] from among its members (Art. 62; cf. 1874, Arts. 63–66).  The Senadores [Senators] were elected by the State Legislatures, while the Diputados [Deputies] continued to be elected by direct popular vote (Arts. 19–25; cf. 1874, Arts. 19–25).

CIV-CIT—Ciudadanía [Citizenship]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] retained the constitutional definition of Venezuelan nationality.  Venezuelans were all persons born in the territory of Venezuela, whatever the nationality of their parents; children of a Venezuelan mother or father born in another territory who established domicile in the República [Republic] and manifested the will to be Venezuelan; foreigners who had obtained a carta de nacionalidad [letter of nationality]; and persons born in any of the Spanish American Republics or the Spanish Antilles who established residence in the Republic and manifested the will to be its citizens (Art. 5; cont. 1874, Art. 6).

Venezuelans who established domicile abroad and acquired a foreign nationality did not lose their character as Venezuelans (Art. 6; cont. 1874, Art. 7).

Eligibility for public offices remained confined to Venezuelan men above twenty-one years of age, subject to the exceptions established by the Constitución [Constitution] (Art. 7; cont. 1874, Art. 8).

Every Venezuelan was bound to serve the Nación [Nation], including the sacrifice of property and life when necessary for its defence (Art. 8; cont. 1874, Art. 9).

Venezuelans throughout the Federación [Federation] enjoyed the rights and immunities inherent in their condition as citizens and were subject to the same duties as persons native to and domiciled in the Estado [State] in which they resided (Art. 9; cf. 1874, Art. 10).

Foreigners enjoyed the same civil rights as Venezuelans and equal security in their persons and property.  They could employ the diplomatic channel according to public treaties and in cases permitted by law (Art. 10; new).  The law determined the rights corresponding to the condition of foreigner and distinguished between foreigners domiciled in the República [Republic] and transient foreigners (Art. 11; cf. 1874, Art. 11).

RTS-GAR—Derechos [Rights]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] retained the catalogue of constitutional guarantees established in 1874 and modified certain formulations (Arts. 14–17; cf. 1874, Arts. 14–17).

The Nación [Nation] guaranteed the inviolability of life through abolition of capital punishment; property; inviolability and secrecy of correspondence; inviolability of the domestic home; personal liberty; liberty of expression; liberty of transit; liberty of industry; liberty of meeting and association; the right of petition; liberty of suffrage; liberty of instruction; religious liberty; personal security; and equality before the law (Art. 14; cf. 1874, Art. 14).

Property was guaranteed with all its attributes, immunities, and privileges, subject only to contributions decreed by the legislative authority, judicial decision, and taking for public works following indemnification and an adversarial proceeding (Art. 14, no. 2; cf. 1874, Art. 14, no. 2:  “Property with all its rights…”).

Personal liberty comprised abolition of forced recruitment, proscription of slavery, freedom of the slaves who entered Venezuelan territory, and the rule that no person was obliged to do what the law did not command or prevented from doing what it did not prohibit (Art. 14, no. 5; cf. 1874, Art. 14, no. 5).

Liberty to express thought by word or through the press was not subject to prior censorship; actions for calumny, insult, or prejudice to a third person nevertheless remained available under the common laws (Art. 14, no. 6; cf. 1874, Art. 14, no. 6).

The authorities could exercise no act of inspection or coercion over unarmed meetings or associations (Art. 14, no. 9; cf. 1874, Art. 14, no. 9).

Religious liberty was retained without the 1874 provision reserving to the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion the exercise of public worship outside temples (Art. 14, no. 13; cf. 1874, Art. 14, no. 13).

Personal security comprised protection against imprisonment for debt except in cases of fraud or offence; forced quartering of troops; special tribunals; arbitrary arrest; incommunication; compulsory self-incrimination; imprisonment without legal cause; criminal punishment without prior citation and lawful hearing; corporal punishment exceeding ten years; and imprisonment for political reasons once constitutional order had been restored (Art. 14, no. 14; cf. 1874, Art. 14, no. 14).

The enumeration of guarantees did not restrict the faculty of the Estados [States] to grant other guarantees to their inhabitants (Art. 15; cont. 1874, Art. 15).  The laws of the States prescribed penalties for infringers and established procedures for making the guarantees effective (Art. 16; cont. 1874, Art. 16).  Persons who issued, signed, executed, or ordered the execution of measures violating the constitutional guarantees were responsible according to law, and every citizen was competent to accuse them (Art. 17; cont. 1874, Art. 17).

REG-MIL—La fuerza armada [The Armed Force]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] retained the organization of the fuerza pública nacional [National Public Force] into naval and land forces, composed of the Milicia Ciudadana [Citizen Militia] organized by the Estados [States] in conformity with their laws (Art. 91; cont. 1874, Art. 93).

The force under charge of the Federación [Federation] was formed by contingents contributed by the Estados [States] in proportion to their population; the 1874 reference to volunteers no longer appeared (Art. 92; cf. 1874, Art. 94).  In time of war, the contingents could be augmented by bodies of the Citizen Militia to the number required by the Gobierno Nacional [National Government] (Art. 93; cont. 1874, Art. 95).

The Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could change the commanders of State contingents in the cases and under the procedures prescribed by national military law, the Estados [States] then providing the necessary replacements (Art. 94; cont. 1874, Art. 96).  Civil and military authority could not be exercised simultaneously by the same person or corporation (Art. 95; cont. 1874, Art. 97).

The Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could not station forces or military commanders exercising command within an Estado [State] without the consent of that State’s government (Art. 98; cont. 1874, Art. 100).  Neither the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] nor the Ejecutivos de los Estados [State Executives] could intervene by Armed Force in the domestic conflicts of a State; they could only offer their good offices toward a peaceful resolution (Art. 99; cont. 1874, Art. 101).

During electoral periods, the national fuerza pública [Public Force] and that of the Estados [States] were to remain rigorously quartered while popular elections were conducted (Art. 108; cf. 1874, Art. 111:  “During the electoral periods of the Nation and the States, the Public Force shall be disarmed; and the respective laws shall determine the manner of effecting it.”).

The fuerza armada [Armed Force] could not deliberate; it was passive and obedient.  No armed body could make requisitions or demand assistance except through the civil authorities and in the manner prescribed by law (Art. 113; cont. 1874, Art. 116).

REG-REL—Religión [Religion]

The introductory text of the Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] did not reproduce the invocation of the Supreme Author and Legislator of the Universe contained in the Preámbulo [Preamble] of 1874 (cf. 1874, Preamble).

The Constitución [Constitution] retained religious liberty and eliminated the 1874 provision reserving to the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion the exercise of public worship outside temples (Art. 14, no. 13; cf. 1874, Art. 14, no. 13).

The Nación [Nation] continued to exercise the right of ecclesiastical patronage in the manner prescribed by law (Art. 96; cont. 1874, Art. 98).

REG-SLA—Esclavitud [Slavery]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] proscribed slavery forever and declared free the slaves who entered the territory of Venezuela (Art. 14, no. 5.2–3; cont. 1874, Art. 14, no. 5.2–3).

ECO-INF—Infraestructura [Infrastructure]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] reserved to the powers of the Federación [Federation] specified competences over national infrastructure and communications (Arts. 13, 43; cf. 1874, Art. 43).

The Estados [States] reserved to the powers of the Federación [Federation] legislative and executive jurisdiction over maritime, coastal, and river navigation and over caminos nacionales [national roads], understood as those exceeding the limits of one State and leading to the frontiers of another and to the Distrito Federal [Federal District] (Art. 13, no. 9; new).

The Estados [States] ceded to the Federación [Federation] the land necessary for the Distrito Federal [Federal District] and for the erection of fortifications, storehouses, shipyards, penitentiaries, and the other buildings indispensable to the Administración General [General Administration] (Art. 13, nos. 6–7; cf. 1874, Art. 13, no. 3).

The Congreso [Congress] retained the faculty of enabling and securing the ports and maritime coasts of the República [Republic], organizing the national posts, establishing postal charges, and approving contracts concerning national public works (Art. 43, nos. 3–5 and 17; cf. 1874, Art. 43, nos. 3–5 and 17).

The Congreso [Congress] could enact measures conducive to the prosperity of the country and the advancement of the sciences and arts (Art. 43, no. 19; cont. 1874, Art. 43, no. 19).  The Nación [Nation] and the Estados [States] were to promote immigration and the colonization of foreigners in conformity with their respective laws (Art. 114; cont. 1874, Art. 117).

CON-FIN—Disposiciones finales [Final Provisions]

The Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] entered into force upon its official promulgation in each Estado [State].  Public acts and official documents were to continue dating the Federación [Federation] from 20 February 1859 and the Law from 28 March 1864 (Art. 119; cont. 1874, Art. 123).

The newly constituted great Estados [States] were to elect Diputados Seccionales [Sectional Deputies] to compose Asambleas Constituyentes [Constituent Assemblies] charged with sanctioning local constitutions in accord with the principles of the federal Constitution and the laws applicable throughout the territory of each grouping (Art. 120; new; cf. 1874: constitutional silence).

Once the great Estados [States] had been constituted, each was to elect its Presidente [President] and the Diputados [Deputies] and Senadores [Senators] of the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature], so that the Legislature might be installed on 20 February 1882, elect the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] from its own body, and the Council elect the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] (Art. 121; new; cf. 1874: constitutional silence).

The new constitutional period for the offices of the Administración General de la República [General Administration of the Republic] would begin on 20 February 1882, when the current period terminated (Art. 122; cf. 1874, Tít. VIII, Art. 124).

For all acts of the civil and political life of the Estados de la Federación [States of the Federation], the population basis continued to be that determined by the census approved on 6 June 1874 until reformed (Art. 123; new; cf. 1874: constitutional silence).

The Constitución [Constitution] expressly repealed the federal Constitution sanctioned in 1874 (Art. 124; new; cf. 1874: constitutional silence).

The Constitución [Constitution] was given and signed in the Palacio de las Sesiones del Cuerpo Legislativo Federal [Palace of Sessions of the Federal Legislative Body] at Caracas on 4 April 1881 by the members of the Congreso [Congress], and was ordered executed and observed on 27 April 1881 by Presidente [President] Antonio Guzmán Blanco and his Ministros [Ministers].

Note  

  • The original text of the Constitución de 1881 [Constitution of 1881] may be consulted in the CIDEP (Recopilación de Leyes y Decretos de Venezuela [Compilation of the Laws and Decrees of Venezuela]):  https://cidep.online/files/constituciones/1881.pdf

“PENDING MATTERS”

August 29, 2026
Ricardo F. Morín
Temple of Zeus Underwater
CGI
2003

The siblings had spent many years trying to conclude matters that had survived both of their parents.  Their father had died nearly three decades earlier.  Their mother died years after him, and even then the responsibilities did not end.  Properties remained unsold.  Before those matters were completed, another loss entered the family.  The middle sister died the year before.  Her own property and affairs now had to be incorporated into responsibilities that had already extended across many years.

Old registries and chains of title extending into the nineteenth century carried certifications, seals, and annotations from different decades and governments.

The country itself had changed during the last three decades.  Currency and property lost value before transactions could be completed.  Offices closed and reopened under different regulations, sometimes even under different names.

To release properties, formalize transfers, and liquidate assets, it became necessary to gather records, certifications, and documentary chains that different offices and fiscal authorities required for review.  Procedures stalled among administrative demands, fiscal obligations, and intermediaries capable of accelerating processes that otherwise could remain paralyzed for months.  Files accumulated beside seals, signatures, and annotations originating from different decades.

The matters had already extended across months and years.  Meanwhile the siblings aged separately on opposite sides of the Atlantic.  The oldest, still practicing law in Venezuela, continued moving between courts, registries, and offices in pursuit of unresolved claims and transfers.

At the same time, land previously belonging to the family remained tied to a legal dispute after having been illegally expropriated by the State years earlier.  Defending the claim required certifications, archival records, legal filings, authorizations, appeals, and countersuits.  Municipal fees, taxes, and procedural costs continued accumulating while the responsibilities themselves remained unfinished.

From outside the country, it was possible to perceive only partially how procedures there changed from month to month and sometimes from day to day.  Some introduced further demands.  Others became unavailable altogether.  Another day had already been spent moving between offices, registries, and courts.

Messages moved constantly between them through calls, forwarded emails, receipts, scanned documents, explanations, and reminders.  One sibling asked whether a payment could still be completed before another increase in tax fees made the transfer even more burdensome.  The reply listed offices already visited that week and certifications still missing.  Before the question returned again, the exchange had shifted toward an earlier disagreement others believed had already been resolved.

The second oldest, who had left Venezuela many years earlier, explained to one sibling that reminders concerning powers of attorney were meant to prevent delays.  To another, he explained that unanswered messages were beginning to be understood differently.  One sibling wrote late into the night to avoid misunderstanding.  Another answered briefly the next morning before returning to the offices.

A signature believed to be sufficient was later rejected for lacking an additional authentication no one had mentioned before.  One office requested papers already sent weeks earlier.  Another confirmed receipt but could not say when the matter would be reviewed.  A delayed response no longer remained only a delay.

Some questions received partial replies.  Others were acknowledged and left unanswered.  A message asking whether the funds could still be sent before the end of the month received only this reply:  “We are doing what we can from here.”  Another asking whether the property sale documents had already been submitted received a response about summer travel plans and whether the necessary signature would still be available in time.

He remembered a childhood game in which a sentence passed from one person to another until it returned altered, sometimes accidentally and sometimes not.  At the time, the changes were part of the amusement.

When he attempted to describe some of this, one sibling told him that he was philosophizing again.  The remark was mild enough to avoid argument, yet the explanation did not continue after that.

A requirement completed one week returned the next with another condition attached to it.

A message revised several times before being sent remained unanswered for days.  Another received only a brief acknowledgment that did not refer to what had actually been written.  By the time the next reply arrived, what had gone unanswered in the earlier message had already begun shaping the exchange that followed.

Later, a message arrived saying that one of the unresolved matters had finally been completed.  No one referred to what had preceded the resolution.  The exchanges resumed in a calmer tone, and attention moved toward whatever remained pending.

Ricardo F. Morín, May 7, 2026, Bala Cynwyd, PA.


“Displacement of Venezuela’s Constitutional Agency”

July 27, 2026

*


Ricardo F. Morín
CGI 2026

Any examination of the policies adopted by the United States toward Venezuela must begin with the constitutional consequence of the presidential election of 28 July 2024.⠀⠀The publicly available, disaggregated polling-station results indicated the election of Edmundo González Urrutia to the presidential term extending until 2031, while the Venezuelan electoral authorities did not publish corresponding disaggregated results capable of substantiating their contrary proclamation.⠀⠀The failure to confront that antecedent constitutional fact allowed subsequent policy to proceed without determining whether the mandate produced by the election remained constitutionally operative.

That omission constitutes the first defect.⠀⠀A constitutional mandate does not arise from diplomatic recognition, foreign approval, or political convenience.⠀⠀A mandate arises from the exercise of constitutional authority by the community from which the constitutional order derives.⠀⠀The election of a president is not identical with constitutional agency, but is a particular expression of it:⠀⠀the constitutional community acts through its institutions and produces a mandate whose authority cannot be displaced merely because an external power chooses not to give the mandate practical effect.

Constitutional agency consists in the capacity of a constitutional community to determine and exercise its own constitutional order through its own institutions.⠀⠀That capacity precedes any judgment concerning the legitimacy of a government.⠀⠀Once the authority to determine legitimacy has been transferred outside the constitutional community itself, constitutional legitimacy cannot be restored.

Even if one were to assume, solely for the sake of argument, that Venezuela’s constitutional order had become impaired, the policies adopted in response could not constitutionally remedy that impairment by relocating essential decisions to the discretionary authority of the Executive Branch of the United States.⠀⠀A remedy directed toward the restoration of constitutional government must preserve the agency of the constitutional community whose government is to be restored.⠀⠀Otherwise, the remedy abolishes the condition upon which constitutional restoration depends.

The distinction between representation and agency becomes decisive at this point.⠀⠀Diplomatic recognition determines whom a foreign government chooses to treat as the representative of another state.⠀⠀Constitutional agency determines how the people and institutions of that state establish and exercise constitutional authority.⠀⠀Recognition may acknowledge constitutional agency, but recognition cannot create, replace, or suspend it.⠀⠀To recognize an external representative while disregarding the constitutional mandate produced by the Venezuelan electorate is therefore not equivalent to preserving Venezuela’s capacity to act constitutionally.

The policies adopted with respect to Venezuela have nevertheless placed decisions concerning national assets, diplomatic representation, the exercise of public authority and the conditions of political succession outside the constitutional community to which they belong.⠀⠀The consequence does not consist merely in foreign influence.⠀⠀It consists in the practical subordination of Venezuela’s constitutional action to decisions adopted by a foreign executive power.⠀⠀Therein lies the fundamental constitutional contradiction.

The constitutional concern does not arise from the existence of foreign assistance itself, but from the relationship between the resources retained under foreign control and those returned as assistance.⠀⠀If revenues derived from Venezuelan national assets substantially exceed the humanitarian assistance subsequently provided, the resulting asymmetry invites a constitutional question.⠀⠀Assistance may then cease to appear as the restoration of Venezuela’s own constitutional capacity and instead become the conditional administration of resources that constitutionally belong to the Nation.

The justification of democratic transition does not resolve that contradiction.⠀⠀A democratic transition can possess constitutional legitimacy only when it restores the authority of the constitutional community rather than replacing that authority with an externally designed succession.⠀⠀A transition that disregards an existing electoral mandate, conditions the disposition of national assets, or determines in advance which political actors may exercise authority does not restore constitutional agency.⠀⠀It substitutes a political design for the constitutional judgment of the nation concerned.

The existence of an electoral mandate, however, does not by itself restore constitutional government.⠀⠀The election determines who is entitled to exercise the Presidency.⠀⠀It does not by itself restore the remaining institutions through which constitutional government ordinarily functions.⠀⠀The Constitution identifies the Presidency, but it does not expressly provide how the interrupted constitutional order is to be restored once its ordinary operation has ceased.

That unanswered question cannot simply be ignored.⠀⠀A constitutional government cannot consist of the Presidency alone.⠀⠀The legislative, judicial, electoral, and other institutions through which public authority is exercised must also be restored.⠀⠀Where the Constitution provides no express procedure for accomplishing that task, the need for a provisional governing body naturally arises.

The constitutional question therefore is not whether such a provisional body may become necessary.⠀⠀Under the present circumstances it may well be.⠀⠀The question is whether its authority proceeds from the constitutional Presidency established by the election or independently of it.⠀⠀If its purpose is to restore constitutional government, it cannot begin by setting aside the constitutional consequence of the presidential election.⠀⠀Otherwise, the process intended to restore the constitutional order would begin by replacing the very constitutional foundation upon which that restoration depends.

The same principle applies to the invocation of national security and to the historical assumptions associated with the Monroe Doctrine.⠀⠀Neither national security nor hemispheric policy may operate as self-validating premises exempt from the constraints imposed by constitutional and international law.⠀⠀Whenever either is invoked to justify the continuing control of another nation’s assets, political representation, or governmental succession, the language of protection assumes the character of tutelage.

The policies adopted toward Venezuela therefore contain two related, though conceptually distinct, defects.⠀⠀The first consists in disregarding the antecedent constitutional mandate produced by the presidential election of 28 July 2024.⠀⠀The second, which remains even if the first were conceded, consists in transferring the exercise of constitutional judgment from Venezuela’s constitutional community to the discretionary authority of a foreign sovereign.

The fundamental constitutional error lies in confusing the power to recognize a representative with the authority to displace a nation’s constitutional agency.⠀⠀Representation may express the constitutional will of a people, but it cannot substitute for that people’s capacity to determine it.⠀⠀A policy that seeks to remedy a defect of constitutional legitimacy by depriving the constitutional community of its capacity to act does not restore constitutional order.⠀⠀It produces a defect more fundamental than the one it purports to correct.

*

July 27, 2026

Oakland Park, Florida


“What Can Presently Be Stated About Venezuela”

July 18, 2026
Ricardo F. Morín
CGI 2026

An officially announced political process is scheduled to begin on August 1, 2026, while authorities in Washington are reportedly considering a broader mechanism through which the United States might assist Venezuela’s material reconstruction.   The former has been publicly confirmed by the parties and by the United States Department of State.   The latter remains under consideration as a longer-term technical and financial framework and has not yet become official United States policy, notwithstanding the humanitarian assistance already authorized by the United States in response to the recent earthquakes affecting portions of Venezuela.

The announced political process follows the removal of Nicolás Maduro from the exercise of executive authority on January 3, 2026.⠀⠀The governmental structure that had previously exercised public authority nevertheless remains in place as part of the transitional arrangements announced by the Trump administration.⠀⠀Those arrangements do not explain the constitutional consequence of the presidential election of July 28, 2024, despite the available voting records indicating that Edmundo González Urrutia had received the majority of the votes, while the electoral authorities withheld the complete results and declared Nicolás Maduro the winner.⠀⠀Nor do they identify whose constitutional authority is to be exercised after August 1.⠀⠀The possible establishment of a junta, or of some other governing authority composed of representatives drawn from opposing political factions, would leave that antecedent constitutional question unresolved.⠀⠀Any subsequent electoral process conducted under an authority whose constitutional basis has not first been established would necessarily inherit that unresolved condition.

Against that background, the contacts between Jorge Rodríguez, who presides over the legislative body presently exercising parliamentary functions in Caracas, and Dinorah Figuera, who presides from exile over the body composed of the deputies elected in 2015, gave rise to the agenda subsequently announced.⠀⠀That agenda encompasses institutional reconstruction, the strengthening of the electoral system, the establishment of guarantees for political participation, and the restoration of civil liberties.⠀⠀The United States has formally adopted that agenda as a Venezuelan initiative directed toward a democratic transition.

The participation of the deputies elected in 2015 must nevertheless be understood within its constitutional limits.   Their presence identifies them as political interlocutors possessing an objectively ascertainable representative antecedent.   Claims have been advanced that their constitutional standing continued beyond the expiration of their elected term.   Those claims, however, do not themselves demonstrate the continuing representative mandate required by the Constitution.   Their participation therefore cannot, by itself, resolve the constitutional status of the body in whose name they act.

The negotiations simultaneously expose a second constitutional question.   If the displacement of the National Assembly elected in 2015 occurred without constitutional foundation, the title of the legislative body that replaced it necessarily becomes subject to the same inquiry.   A successor institution cannot derive constitutional validity from the unconstitutional displacement of its predecessor.   Its title must therefore be demonstrated independently rather than presumed from its continued exercise of legislative authority.

The consequence is that the negotiations bring together two legislative bodies whose constitutional situations remain unresolved for different reasons.   One asserts the continuation of a representative status requiring demonstration.   The other continues to exercise legislative authority under a title that likewise requires demonstration.   Neither circumstance is resolved by the passage of time, by the effective exercise of institutional power or by participation in a political agreement.   The burden of demonstration therefore applies equally to both.

The presidential election of July 28, 2024 occupies a different constitutional position.   It constitutes the most recent direct act through which the Venezuelan Nation attributed the Presidency of the Republic.   The voting records examined by independent observers demonstrate that Edmundo González Urrutia obtained the majority of the votes, while the National Electoral Council did not publish the disaggregated results necessary to substantiate its contrary announcement.   The constitutional period corresponding to that election remains in effect.

The announced negotiations may therefore contribute to constitutional restoration by facilitating the recovery of electoral guarantees, civic freedoms and the institutional conditions indispensable to the functioning of the Republic.   They cannot themselves constitute a new source of public authority or cure, by agreement alone, unresolved defects in title.   Their proper constitutional function, should they attain their declared objectives, would be to facilitate the effectiveness of the Nation’s most recent electoral act rather than substitute another title in its place.

Separately, reports indicate that authorities in Washington have examined a possible technical and financial framework through which the United States might contribute to Venezuela’s long-term reconstruction.   The proposal contemplates technical personnel, engineers and financial resources dedicated to rebuilding infrastructure and essential public services beyond the humanitarian relief already authorized following the recent earthquakes.   No public announcement, executive order, enacted appropriation or bilateral agreement has yet established that broader reconstruction framework as official policy.

Foreign technical assistance would be compatible with Venezuelan sovereignty only insofar as it remained subordinate to constitutionally attributable Venezuelan authority.   It could assist in rebuilding infrastructure, administering resources allocated for that purpose and restoring the operational capacity of public administration.   It could not independently determine the source of Venezuelan public authority or replace the attribution already expressed by the Nation through the presidential election of 2024.

The developments presently unfolding increasingly intersect with one another.   Political negotiations, diplomatic recognition, institutional accommodations, sanctions policy and proposals for material reconstruction no longer operate independently.   Each may appear justifiable when considered in isolation, particularly in light of Venezuela’s prolonged institutional deterioration and the humanitarian consequences recently aggravated by natural disaster.   Considered together, however, they may progressively shape a political settlement before the source of public authority has itself been determined.   In that event, the unresolved defect would risk becoming incorporated into the very institutions intended to restore the Republic.

The constitutional question therefore remains antecedent to every political arrangement that may emerge from these concurrent developments.   Neither political agreement, institutional continuity, the effective exercise of power, foreign assistance nor diplomatic recognition can supply the title that only the Nation itself is competent to attribute.   Urgency cannot eliminate uncertainty, nor can constitutional method guarantee the course of events.   It does, however, furnish the only criterion capable of distinguishing constitutional restoration from the consolidation of a new distribution of public authority.   The seriousness demanded by that inquiry cannot be presumed from negotiations principally designed to achieve political accommodation, immediate stability or material reconstruction.   It requires the prior and public demonstration of constitutional title.   Any arrangement proceeding without resolving that antecedent question would not overcome Venezuela’s constitutional crisis but instead transmit it into the future under a different institutional form.

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania

July 18, 2026


“The Exercise of Power and Constitutional Title”

July 13, 2026
Ricardo F. Morín
CGI 2026

The question concerning the exercise of public power can arise only after the constitutional title under which that power is exercised has been identified.   Once that order of inquiry is altered, the very nature of the constitutional problem likewise changes.   Attention ceases to be directed toward the act through which public authority became constitutionally attributable to the Nation and turns instead toward identifying those who effectively exercise power.

What occurs when the inquiry into the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela itself abandons the question of constitutional title?

At first sight, the inversion appears innocuous.   The institutions that administer the State, exercise the public force, dispose of public resources, represent the Republic in its international relations, or adopt governmental decisions are identified.   The description may attain a high degree of precision.   None of those observations, however, determines the constitutional title by which that power is attributable to the Nation.

The constitutional question is displaced.   The foundation of public authority ceases to constitute the original object of inquiry.   The exercise of power assumes its place.

A recent example illustrates that alteration in the order of inquiry with particular clarity.   In an extensive report published by The New York Times, Tyler Pager and Anatoly Kurmanaev describe the effective exercise of power in Venezuela through a detailed reconstruction of the functions attributed to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Delcy Rodríguez, as well as the interim government itself.¹   The report attributes to Marco Rubio control over the public finances, the direction of foreign policy, and decisive influence over ministerial appointments and the timing of future elections, while describing Delcy Rodríguez and the interim government as the authorities responsible for the ordinary conduct of government.   None of those descriptions is accompanied by the antecedent constitutional question.   The analysis does not examine by what constitutional act Marco Rubio, Delcy Rodríguez, or the interim government itself became constitutionally attributable to the Venezuelan Nation.

The consequence extends beyond the particular case.   The effective exercise of power becomes the principal object of analysis while constitutional title ceases to be an object of inquiry.   Governmental stability, the administration of public resources, territorial control, foreign policy, or the holding of future elections consequently acquire decisive importance because the analysis has come to be organized within a geopolitical framework.   The constitutional question receives no different answer.   It simply ceases to be asked.

The difficulty, therefore, does not lie in the description of the facts.   It lies in the order of inquiry.   So long as the effective exercise of power occupies the place of constitutional title, the antecedent constitutional question remains unexamined.

Once the question of constitutional title has been displaced, the sovereign will of the Nation ceases to govern the Republic constitutionally.   Power continues to be exercised in the name of Venezuela, yet the constitutional attribution of that power no longer proceeds demonstrably from the Nation.   From that moment forward, the people cease to constitute the foundation of the power exercised over them and become its serf.   The Republic thereupon becomes tributary to decisions whose origin no longer resides within the Nation itself.   A Republic ceases to be genuinely democratic when public authority continues to be exercised without the Nation being able to demonstrate constitutionally that such authority proceeds from it.

The omission of the constitutional question therefore tends to perpetuate itself.   Each new proposal for political transition begins from the effective exercise of the power already in existence rather than from the constitutional act through which the Nation would once again attribute public authority.   The political order thus begins to reconstruct itself upon the very constitutional omission that made its restoration necessary.   The indeterminacy of constitutional title consequently ceases to constitute a transitory anomaly and risks becoming the permanent condition within which every future solution seeks to unfold.

Epilogue

Every constitutional inquiry necessarily remains open to the passage of time.   No line of reasoning can anticipate the particular manner in which history will ultimately unfold.   It can, however, identify the constitutional conditions within which that history must proceed so long as the question of constitutional title remains absent from public reasoning.

Future elections may take place sooner or later.   Governments may succeed one another.   International alignments may change.   Effective centers of decision may shift from one nation to another or be redistributed among different political actors.   None of those transformations will, of itself, alter the antecedent constitutional question.   So long as the Nation has not recovered the capacity publicly to demonstrate the act by which it attributes public authority, the restoration of constitutional government will remain an expectation rather than a constitutional reality.

Time, moreover, does not of itself remedy constitutional omissions.   It may prolong them.   It may conceal them beneath new institutional forms.   It may even transform them into the silent premise upon which entire generations come to understand the exercise of power without perceiving the absence of the constitutional title from which that power ought to derive.

That may well constitute the deepest consequence of a prolonged constitutional rupture.   The disappearance of constitutional title ceases to be perceived as an anomaly requiring restoration and gradually comes to be accepted as the ordinary condition of public life.   The very horizon of public life ultimately contracts to the administration of the power already in existence.   The Nation ultimately grows accustomed to debating who governs without ever again asking from what constitutional source the power exercised in its name proceeds.

A Republic may survive for a long time despite the degradation of its institutions.   It may even survive the succession of governments.   What is far less likely to survive is the loss of the constitutional question.   Upon that question every public authority depends.   Once that question disappears from the consciousness of a Nation, the restoration of constitutional order no longer depends solely upon political will.   It comes to depend upon the recovery of the constitutional memory of a free and sovereign people.

July 13, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania

Endnote

  • ¹ Tyler Pager and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “How Marco Rubio Is Running Venezuela From Afar,” The New York Times, July 11, 2026; updated July 13, 2026.

“Constitutional Title: Part Two”

July 11, 2026
Ricardo F. Morín
CGI, 2026

The Venezuelan constitutional controversy is not fundamentally a dispute over the exercise of governmental power.  It is a dispute over the constitutional attribution of authority.  By constitutional attribution of authority is meant the constitutional act through which public authority becomes publicly ascertainable and therefore juridically attributable to the sovereign Nation.  Until that antecedent question has been constitutionally resolved, proposals concerning transitional governments, constitutional amendment, constitutional reform, constituent power, or any other institutional arrangement remain incapable of establishing the constitutional title from which governmental authority itself derives.

The present analysis therefore proposes neither a governing junta, an interim presidency, a constitutional amendment, a constitutional reform, nor the convocation of a constituent assembly.  Each of those proposals may ultimately prove constitutionally sufficient or insufficient.  That question cannot be answered in the abstract.  Their constitutional validity depends upon antecedent conditions more fundamental than the institutional arrangements themselves.  The object of the present analysis is to identify the constitutional conditions by which every proposal intended to restore the constitutional attribution of governmental authority must ultimately be judged.

The constitutional attribution of governmental authority is no longer publicly ascertainable.  It has not been demonstrated that the existing constitutional organs retain the constitutional capacity to restore the constitutional conditions under which constitutional title may once again arise.  Nor has it been demonstrated that a transitional authority may itself acquire constitutional title before the restoration of those constitutional conditions constitutes the very purpose of its existence.  Equally unresolved is whether constituent power may be invoked while simultaneously claiming juridical continuity with the constitutional order established by the Constitution of 1999.  More fundamentally, constitutional theory has yet to demonstrate that any extra-constitutional arrangement can avoid reproducing the very constitutional defect it purports to remedy.  Under those circumstances, it necessarily remains unresolved whether the constitutional procedures governing amendment, reform, or any other mechanism established by the Constitution may validly be invoked by authorities whose own constitutional title forms part of the very controversy those procedures are expected to resolve.  From that constitutional uncertainty arises what may be described as the burden of constitutional demonstration.  By that expression is meant the obligation resting upon every claimant to constitutional authority to demonstrate that the constitutional conditions under which public authority may lawfully become publicly ascertainable and therefore juridically attributable to the Nation have in fact been satisfied.  That burden necessarily rests upon those who claim the authority to prescribe the constitutional means by which those conditions are to be restored.  Until it has been discharged, no institutional proposal may presume the constitutional legitimacy it seeks to establish.

Precisely because those antecedent questions remain unresolved, any proposal intended to restore the constitutional attribution of governmental authority must satisfy conditions arising from the nature of constitutional authority itself.  It cannot derive its legitimacy solely from political agreement, military success, diplomatic recognition, or practical necessity.  It cannot presume the constitutional title whose constitutional attribution remains unresolved.  It cannot exercise powers that presuppose the very authority whose constitutional attribution remains unresolved.   Nor can it substitute institutional convenience for the publicly verifiable manifestation of the Nation’s sovereign will.

Those constitutional conditions necessarily govern not only the constitutional sufficiency of every proposal for restoration but also the constitutional position of those entrusted with restoring them.  It is the constitutional recognition that the constitutional attribution of public authority, from which constitutional title alone may arise, is too fundamental to depend upon assumptions concerning the good faith of those temporarily exercising public authority.  The preservation of the integrity of constitutional title therefore requires objective constitutional safeguards.  Those entrusted with restoring the constitutional conditions under which constitutional title may once again arise cannot be permitted to exercise temporary authority under conditions that allow its continued possession to become indistinguishable from the constitutional title whose restoration constitutes the sole justification for its existence.  For that reason, the temporary exercise of public authority must remain confined to those acts strictly necessary to restore the constitutional conditions under which the sovereign will of the Nation may once again become publicly ascertainable.  Because temporary authority derives its constitutional justification exclusively from the restoration of constitutional conditions, its existence cannot extend beyond the fulfillment of that constitutional purpose.  Because constitutional title can arise only through a constitutional act that is publicly ascertainable, the process through which that act is made possible must itself remain transparent, publicly ascertainable, and independently verifiable.  Those entrusted with administering that process must therefore remain constitutionally incapable of deriving personal or political advantage from the constitutional title whose restoration they are charged with making possible.  Only under such conditions does the burden of constitutional demonstration remain objectively capable of being discharged.

The restoration of the constitutional attribution of governmental authority does not require the impossible expectation of politically neutral actors.  Constitutional government presupposes political plurality, and plurality necessarily entails competing interests among those entrusted with the exercise of public authority.  Conflict of interest is therefore not an accidental defect of democratic government but an inherent consequence of representative institutions.  The constitutional difficulty arises, not because public officials possess political commitments, but because those whose own constitutional title forms part of the controversy cannot alone furnish the constitutional demonstration by which that controversy is to be resolved.

The first objective is therefore neither the replacement of one government by another nor the immediate exercise of governmental power.  It is the re-establishment of the constitutional conditions under which the sovereign will of the Nation once again becomes publicly ascertainable through a transparent constitutional process capable of attributing public authority in a manner that is independently verifiable and binding upon all.  Only after those antecedent conditions have been restored may governmental authority once again become constitutionally attributable to the Nation.

The present analysis therefore advances no institutional blueprint.  It establishes the constitutional conditions by which every institutional proposal must be judged.  Whether the eventual solution assumes the form of a constitutional amendment, a constitutional reform, a constituent assembly, a transitional authority, or another institutional arrangement altogether, none may claim constitutional legitimacy until it satisfies those antecedent conditions under which constitutional title may once again arise.

Bala Cynwyd, Pensylvannia
July 11, 2026

Endnote:  

  • The Constitution of 1999 does not contemplate a “constitutional emergency” as an autonomous juridical institution or as a specific mechanism for the substitution or reorganization of public authority.  If the concept is employed in a strictly juridical sense, it requires an independent constitutional foundation.  If, on the contrary, it is used merely as a doctrinal description of a constitutional crisis, it cannot by itself produce the normative consequences later attributed to it.

“Constitutional Title”

July 4, 2026

*


Ricardo F. Morín
CGI, 2026

Every constitution presupposes a constitutional subject more fundamental than the government it establishes.   Before there can be presidents, legislatures, courts, or public officials, there must already exist the Nation from which public authority derives.   Governments do not constitute the Nation.   The Nation constitutes government through the lawful means prescribed by the constitutional order.

For that reason, constitutions concern themselves with more than the organization of power.   They identify the source from which public authority may arise in law and prescribe the constitutional act through which that authority becomes publicly ascertainable, a function that preserves the Nation’s exclusive constitutional authority to constitute public authority.   Authority is not created by those who exercise it.   It is temporarily entrusted to them by the Nation acting under constitutional forms.   Government therefore possesses neither an autonomous existence nor an independent title.   Every public office derives from a constitutional act antecedent to itself.  

The constitutional significance of an election resides precisely in that antecedent act.   Elections do not merely record political preferences, produce governing majorities, or permit the peaceful succession of governments.   Their constitutional purpose is to render the sovereign will of the Nation publicly ascertainable through a process whose transparency permits the lawful attribution of public authority.   Transparency is therefore neither an administrative virtue nor a procedural safeguard.   It is the constitutional condition through which the title to govern becomes publicly distinguishable from the mere possession of power.  

Whenever that condition ceases to exist, the object of constitutional inquiry changes with it.   The question no longer concerns the constitutional act through which authority became attributable to the Nation, but the government by which authority is presently exercised.   Public offices may remain occupied.   Legislatures may continue to enact laws.   Courts may continue to pronounce judgment.   Taxes may continue to be collected.   International relations may proceed without interruption.   Each describes the continued exercise of public authority.   None identifies the constitutional act from which that authority became publicly attributable to the sovereign will of the Nation.  

The displacement is easily overlooked because governments are visible whereas constitutional title is not.   Political discussion therefore turns almost instinctively toward the recognition of governments, negotiated settlements, transitional authorities, constitutional reforms, sanctions, diplomatic initiatives, and international agreements.   Each concerns the exercise, distribution, or succession of political power.   None identifies the constitutional act through which the Nation confers title upon those who govern in its name.   Without noticing it, the inquiry abandons the constitutional origin of authority and begins instead to examine the political administration of authority already being exercised.  

The Venezuelan constitutional controversy illustrates that displacement with unusual clarity.   International discussion has largely proceeded by asking which government should replace the existing one and under what political arrangements that transition should occur.   Yet every proposal presupposes a condition that remains antecedent to them all.   If the constitutional process through which the Nation makes its sovereign will publicly ascertainable has ceased to provide a transparent and verifiable attribution of public authority, no subsequent political arrangement identifies the constitutional source from which the proposed government derives its title.  

The participation of foreign States introduces no exception to that condition.   Diplomatic recognition, mediation, economic sanctions, military guarantees, political commitments, or negotiated agreements may influence the circumstances within which constitutional decisions are made.   They may alter political outcomes, strengthen institutions, or hasten transitions.   They remain external to the constitutional order through which the Nation alone confers public authority.   A foreign State may recognize a government, encourage a constitutional settlement, or seek to influence political events.   It does not participate in the constitutional act through which another Nation lawfully constitutes its own government, nor can it prescribe the juridical process by which that act acquires constitutional effect.  

Every proposal for constitutional restoration therefore returns to the same antecedent condition from which it first departed.   Before governments may be recognized, replaced, negotiated, or reconstituted, the Nation must first have made its sovereign will publicly ascertainable through the transparent constitutional process from which public authority derives its title.

Toronto, Canada
July 4, 2026


“The Burden of Uncertainty”

July 3, 2026

*

Figure 1. USGS ShakeMap depicting the distribution of ground-shaking intensity produced by the magnitude 7.5 earthquake of Wednesday, June 24, 2026, in north-central Venezuela. The map illustrates the geographical extent and relative intensity of the seismic event rather than structural damage. Courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). [1]

Ricardo F. Morín

July 3, 2026

Toronto, Canada

*

Scientific inquiry does not begin with certainty.  It begins by identifying the boundaries of what is known, what remains unknown, and why the distinction matters.  The absence of sufficient evidence neither confirms nor disproves a hypothesis; it defines the limits of present knowledge and establishes the necessity for further investigation.  Nowhere is this principle more consequential than in environmental policy, where decisions made under conditions of uncertainty may shape the integrity of entire ecosystems for generations.

The first obligation of responsible governance is therefore not to defend a predetermined conclusion, but to ensure that the scientific conditions necessary to reach one exist.  Where those conditions are absent, the appropriate response is neither affirmation nor dismissal, but verification.

Venezuela presents a circumstance that calls for independent scientific inquiry.  The earthquakes of Wednesday, June 24, 2026, brought renewed attention to a question whose importance reaches far beyond those seismic events.  They underscore the need to determine whether the scientific knowledge presently available is adequate to evaluate any interaction that may exist between intensive subsurface carbon extraction and the geological dynamics of one of the most tectonically complex regions in the Western Hemisphere.  The country contains some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves while also being traversed by active fault systems whose behavior demands continuous observation, precise measurement, and independent scientific verification.

Whether recent seismic activity bears any relationship to large-scale subsurface carbon extraction cannot presently be determined without transparent access to operational records, geological mapping, high-resolution seismic observations, and independent scientific analysis.  The necessary evidence must first be established, verified, and subjected to rigorous scrutiny before any responsible conclusion—affirmative or negative—can be sustained.

This absence of verified knowledge is not a procedural inconvenience.  It is itself an environmental concern.  Carbon extraction necessarily alters the subsurface environment through drilling, reservoir depletion, fluid movement, pressure redistribution, and other engineering interventions.  The degree to which those alterations interact with naturally stressed geological systems cannot be assumed.  It must be measured.  Where extensive extraction occurs within tectonically active regions, uncertainty becomes the principal reason for scientific investigation rather than an excuse to postpone it.

The question therefore extends well beyond the explanation of any individual seismic event.  It concerns whether present scientific understanding adequately characterizes the cumulative interaction between industrial intervention and the geological systems upon which entire populations depend.  Resolving that question requires continuous seismic monitoring, comprehensive geological characterization, transparent operational reporting, independent verification, and the willingness to revise conclusions as new evidence emerges.

The implications are not confined to Venezuela.  They concern the broader governance of carbon extraction throughout the world.  Every nation possessing significant hydrocarbon resources situated within geologically sensitive environments confronts the same responsibility:  to ensure that economic activity proceeds within the limits established by demonstrable scientific understanding rather than by commercial urgency or geopolitical expediency.

Under conditions of institutional weakness, diminished regulatory independence, or limited transparency, this responsibility becomes even more critical.  Scientific uncertainty should never become a refuge for either complacency or speculation.  Instead, it imposes a higher standard of public accountability.  The legitimacy of environmental regulation depends not upon confidence in predetermined outcomes, but upon confidence in the integrity of the investigative process itself.

This principle transcends the identity of any particular government, corporation, or foreign investor.  Whether extraction is undertaken by domestic enterprises, multinational corporations, or state-owned entities, the obligation remains identical.  Every operator should be subject to the same independent scientific oversight, the same environmental scrutiny, and the same public disclosure of information necessary to evaluate geological and ecological consequences.  Responsible stewardship cannot depend upon the nationality of capital.  It depends upon the universality of scientific standards.

When those standards are weakened or subordinated to political or economic priorities, the consequences extend far beyond the extraction site.  The risks are borne by landscapes, watersheds, ecosystems, infrastructure, and communities whose stability depends upon geological conditions that cannot be negotiated once altered.  Economic benefit may be immediate; environmental consequences may endure for generations.

The responsible extraction of carbon resources therefore demands more than technological capability or financial investment.  It requires institutions capable of recognizing that uncertainty is not the absence of responsibility but its beginning.  Scientific knowledge is not merely one consideration among many in environmental governance.  It is the foundation upon which every legitimate regulatory decision must rest.

The Earth records every intervention with complete fidelity.  Whether humanity possesses the wisdom to understand those records before they become irreversible consequences remains one of the defining environmental questions of our time.

[1]. https://earthquake.usgs.gov/data/shakemap/?utm_source=chatgpt.com


“Concealed Succession”

July 1, 2026
Ricardo F. Morín
Ascension 2
CGI
2005

This essay examines the political conditions surrounding the final months of the presidency of Hugo Chávez.  Rather than revisiting the episode as a matter of historical controversy, the analysis focuses on the structural dynamics that became visible during that transition.  The objective is diagnostic.  The essay proposes that when political authority becomes inseparable from a single leader, succession may cease to appear as an institutional process and instead emerge through the management of information surrounding the leader’s condition.

Ricardo F. Morín

March 4, 2026

Oakland Park, F


The death of Hugo Chávez did not simply mark the end of a presidency.  It exposed the fragility of a political order that had come to depend heavily on the authority of a single figure whose influence extended far beyond the borders of his own country.  The ambiguity surrounding the final phase of Chávez’s life revealed how closely the stability of that system had become tied to the fate of one leader.  To understand why that moment produced such uncertainty, it is necessary to place it within the longer evolution of revolutionary politics in Latin America during the twentieth century.  

During the early decades after the Cuban Revolution, the government led by Fidel Castro promoted a strategy aimed at transforming Latin America through insurgent movements.  Across the region guerrilla organizations and clandestine networks attempted to replicate the revolutionary experience of Cuba and to challenge existing political systems.  

Venezuela itself became one of the early arenas where these tensions appeared.  During the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt, the young democratic government faced a series of military uprisings and insurgent movements that sought to destabilize the constitutional order.  Episodes such as the Barcelonazo in 1961, the Carupanazo in 1962, and the Porteñazo in 1962 formed part of that turbulent decade.  Although these attempts failed to overturn the Venezuelan State, they revealed the extent to which revolutionary movements inspired by the Cuban example had begun to influence political struggles throughout Latin America.  

Over the following decades the strategy of those movements changed.  Guerrilla campaigns rarely succeeded in seizing power.  Many organizations therefore abandoned armed struggle and entered electoral politics.  Former militants reorganized as political parties and pursued their objectives through institutions rather than insurgency.  

Leaders such as Gustavo Petro in Colombia and José Mujica in Uruguay illustrate how figures once associated with insurgent movements later obtained power through elections.  The ideological ambitions of these movements remained, but their methods adapted to new political conditions.  

Hugo Chávez represented another variation of this transformation.  Chávez emerged from the Venezuelan military rather than from a guerrilla organization, yet he adopted many of the revolutionary narratives that had circulated in Latin America since the Cold War.  After winning the presidency in 1998, he reorganized the Venezuelan State and established close cooperation with the Cuban government.  

During the early twenty first century that cooperation expanded into regional frameworks such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, the Union of South American Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.  These organizations coordinated diplomatic initiatives among participating governments and promoted the idea that Latin America could operate independently of the United States.  Commentators such as Noam Chomsky described this aspiration as part of a broader movement toward a multipolar world.  

The Venezuelan State financed much of this cooperation.  Revenue from petroleum exports allowed the government in Caracas to provide subsidized energy agreements and financial assistance to partner States.  These resources strengthened the regional network associated with the Bolivarian project.  

Within this political structure the health of Chávez acquired strategic importance.  Chávez was diagnosed with cancer in 2011 and traveled repeatedly to Cuba for treatment.  In December 2012 he underwent another surgery in Havana and then disappeared from public view.  

After that moment Venezuelan authorities released only intermittent statements about his condition.  No verified images of the president appeared for extended periods.  Officials asked citizens to assume that the president continued to govern even though the public could no longer observe him performing the duties of the office.  

When a population cannot observe its head of State, public reality becomes difficult to verify.  Statements replace appearances, and narratives replace observable authority.  Under those conditions uncertainty expands because citizens cannot distinguish between political communication and factual information.  

Questions about the chronology of Chávez’s death emerged from that uncertainty.  The Venezuelan government announced in March 2013 that the president had died from complications related to cancer.  Critics questioned whether that announcement corresponded to the actual moment of death.  They pointed to the long absence of the president from public life and the limited information that officials released about his medical condition.  

Events that followed the announcement reinforced suspicion.  Authorities initially declared that Chávez’s body would be embalmed and displayed permanently.  Shortly afterward officials abandoned that plan.  The government also released no autopsy report or detailed medical record that could clarify the exact circumstances of the president’s death.  

Whether the official chronology reflects the full sequence of events remains disputed.  What can be observed with certainty is the political environment that surrounded the transition.  

When a governing coalition depends heavily on the authority of a single leader, succession threatens the stability of the entire system.  In that situation the leader’s illness becomes a political problem rather than a purely medical one.  Those who control the State therefore face an incentive to regulate how information about the leader’s condition reaches the public.  

The Venezuelan transition of 2013 illustrates the phenomenon described here as concealed succession.  The disappearance of Chávez from public life, the limited disclosure about his illness, and the uncertainty surrounding the announcement of his death together produced a political situation in which the transfer of authority could not occur openly.  

Seen across several decades, the end of the Chávez presidency also clarifies the evolution of revolutionary movements in Latin America.  Armed insurgencies of the 1960s gradually transformed into political parties that competed in elections.  Some of those parties later formed governments and created regional frameworks through which they coordinated policy.  In the twenty first century those networks increasingly interact with a wider geopolitical environment in which emerging powers encourage alternative centers of influence.  

This development forms a continuous trajectory rather than a rupture.  Guerrilla organizations became political parties, political parties formed governments, and those governments created regional frameworks that extended their influence.  The illness and death of Hugo Chávez exposed how strongly that architecture depended on the authority of a single leader whose position linked several of these layers at once.  

When political authority becomes inseparable from the physical presence of a single leader, succession cannot occur transparently.  The continuity of the system becomes tied to the management of information surrounding that leader’s condition.  In such circumstances the transfer of power no longer appears as an institutional process.  It emerges instead through the regulation of visibility and the control of public knowledge.  What appeared in Venezuela during the final months of Chávez’s presidency therefore reveals a structural principle of personalized political systems:  when the survival of a regime depends on one figure, succession must first be concealed before it can be resolved.


“Unmasking Disappointment: Series IX”

May 20, 2026
“Geometric Allegory” digital painting 2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

 

Ricardo F. Morín

January 13, 2026

Oakland Park, Fl.

This installment continues the diagnostic examination of Venezuela’s political condition and focuses on the ethical and institutional consequences that emerge when authority, governance, and accountability are no longer aligned.  Rather than advancing prescriptions, it examines how the degradation of human rights, the normalization of violence, and the diffusion of responsibility function as systemic conditions within a prolonged authoritarian context.  The inquiry remains situated within a broader historical pattern, attentive to structures rather than events and to consequences rather than intentions.  Documented cases are treated as occasions on which the framework’s claims become testable, and the analysis refrains from extending beyond what the evidence supports.

 

 

The Fourth Issue

 

On Human Rights

 

1

 

Venezuela’s modern political history has been marked by recurring skepticism toward collective institutions and a persistent substitution of personal authority for shared civic frameworks.  Over time, citizens have lost the expectation that freedom can be exercised in daily life rather than merely invoked in public language.  In such contexts, human rights do not disappear rhetorically;  they lose their operational force.  Their absence becomes visible not in formal declarations, but in the diminished capacity of individuals to act without fear, to participate without coercion, and to sustain dignity without dependence.

 

2

 

A society may retain wealth, institutions, and formal declarations while individuals lose the practical ability to move, speak, work, dissent, or plan without fear.  In that condition, human rights no longer operate as aspirations stated in public language; they become thresholds that determine whether social and political life remain possible.  Where those thresholds are upheld, individuals retain agency within public life.  Where they are suspended, social possibility contracts regardless of available resources.

 

3

 

Isolation, whether political, ideological, or institutional, accelerates this contraction.  When governments or social groups withdraw from accountability, corruption ceases to be an anomaly and becomes a governing mechanism.  In Venezuela, where the State has progressively withdrawn from democratic norms and international oversight, citizens increasingly act as though institutional procedures will not protect them, and arbitrary decisions by officials have ceased to provoke either correction or surprise.  From a diagnostic standpoint, the State’s primary responsibility is not moral leadership but the preservation of civic conditions under which individuals can exercise consequential choices.  Approaches such as the framework of capabilities articulate this responsibility not as charity, but as an institutional obligation to preserve the material and political preconditions of dignity.  [1]

 

4

 

Individuals cannot exercise freedom meaningfully where daily life is shaped simultaneously by fear and material precarity: conditions whose prolonged operation in Venezuela has displaced approximately 6.9 million citizens beyond the country’s borders. [3]  Protection from arbitrary violence and access to the basic conditions necessary for survival therefore operate together rather than separately within civic life.  Political conflict itself does not indicate social failure; plural societies inevitably generate disagreement, competition, and tension.  The decisive distinction emerges in how institutions regulate those conflicts:  courts no longer rule against the executive; citizens who comply with the law are not thereby protected from detention; State’s agents act knowing that internal review will not follow, The rights enumerated in the 1999 Constitution become unavailable in practice to those who would invoke them.  The constitutional text remains present within official language even as its protections become progressively absent from lived civic reality.  [2]

 


Endnotes — Chapter XVII

 

§ 3

 

  • [1] Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development:  The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4–14, 71–72, 114–123.

 

§ 4

 

  • [2] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge:  Harvard University Press (1971), 111, 337–338, 511, 515, 545.
  • [3] Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants. As of mid-2025, R4V reports approximately 6.9 million Venezuelans displaced across the seventeen host countries of the regional response. Accessed January 2026.

 


Chapter XVIII

 

The Fifth Issue

 

On the Nature of Violence

 

1

 

Violence shapes a society not only through the harm inflicted on those it reaches, but through what follows or fails to follow: whether perpetrators are identified; whether evidence is preserved and prosecutions proceed; and whether the institutions charged with these tasks are themselves subject to review.  Its regulation depends on two interdependent structures:  the social contract and governance.  The social contract establishes the conditions under which individuals relinquish certain freedoms in exchange for protection and justice.  Governance operationalizes that contract by translating authority into predictable, constrained action.  When governance fails, whether through incapacity, corruption, or deliberate distortion, violence ceases to be exceptional and becomes systemic.

 

2

 

The distinction between legitimate force and illegitimate violence is not merely rhetorical.  The legal-procedural tradition grounds the distinction in law, proportionality, and institutional accountability:  force exercised within these constraints differs in kind from force exercised outside them.  The critical tradition, while attending more closely to the historical and political conditions under which legitimacy is constituted, similarly distinguishes between power that preserves the capacity for collective action and violence that destroys it.  Both traditions, despite their differences, converge on a common diagnostic point:  force severed from ethical constraint and institutional oversight ceases to operate as legitimate authority.  Historical revolutions demonstrate that when governance collapses entirely, violence may emerge as a substitute rather than a solution.  Such substitutions rarely restore order; instead, they entrench instability, break authority into non-accountable centers, and prolong social recovery across generations.

 

3

 

In contemporary Venezuela, violence has become an instrument of political preservation rather than public protection.  The pattern is documented rather than inferred.  The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela has reported, across successive findings since 2020, that state security forces and intelligence services participated in extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, torture, and sexual violence against perceived opponents, and that these acts followed identifiable chains of command rather than individual deviation.  During the 2017 protests, more than one hundred deaths were recorded over four months, alongside the deployment of military tribunals against civilians.  The 2024 post-electoral repression produced over two thousand detentions within weeks, including minors, under a framework the government termed “Operación Tun Tun.”  Earlier emblematic cases, Leopoldo López imprisoned in 2014, Antonio Ledezma detained in 2015, Manuel Rosales arrested the same year, prefigured a pattern in which judicial institutions, including the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, functioned not as safeguards but as mechanisms legitimizing repression through legal form.   [1]  [2]  [3]

 

4

 

Official narratives frame such actions as defenses of national security.  Yet when intelligence services monitor opposition figures rather than foreign threats, when the National Guard is deployed against neighborhood protests rather than against external incursion, and when detention without charge becomes a tool applied to citizens rather than to combatants, the citizen approaching a uniformed officer or a courthouse no longer expects protection from harm but calculates the likelihood of becoming its next subject.  Citizens no longer experience institutions as safeguards operating under law, but as structures through which uncertainty and exposure are administered.  In that condition, legitimacy weakens even when authority remains intact: governance increasingly depends on public performance rather than civic trust; legal procedure detaches itself from protective function; and violence is gradually normalized as an instrument of rule.

 

5

 

The normalization of violence proceeds incrementally and is rarely perceived in real time. What is initially defended as exceptional, curfews, military tribunals for civilians, indefinite pretrial detention, restrictions on assembly, accumulates into the ordinary architecture of governance. Each measure recalibrates expectation: citizens adapt their conduct; institutions adapt their procedures; and the threshold separating legitimate force from arbitrary coercion migrates without formal declaration. Diagnostic vigilance consists in tracking that migration rather than awaiting its terminus.

 

6

 

Where these institutional restraints fail or disappear, abuses are no longer interrupted consistently through judicial review, public documentation, legislative inquiry, or prosecutorial independence.  Violations accumulate without reliable correction; officials increasingly operate without expectation of consequence; and citizens gradually adapt themselves to diminished protections.  Under such conditions, institutional repetition itself begins to normalize abuse: the same operations recur against successive cohorts of citizens; the same categories of case remain unopened; and the same outcomes continue to receive judicial confirmation. What would once have required justification as an emergency measure no longer requires justification at all.

 


Endnotes — Chapter XVIII

 

§ 3

 

  • [1] William Newman, “Venezuelan Opposition Leader Leopoldo López Sentenced to Prison Over Protest,” New York Times, September 10, 2015.
  • [2] “Venezuelan Opposition Politician Manuel Rosales Arrested,” BBC News, October 15, 2015.
  • [3] “Venezuela Police Raid Arrests Caracas Mayor Antonio Ledezma,” BBC News, February 20, 2015.

 


Chapter XIX

 

The Sixth Issue

 

On the Persistence of Injustice

 

1

 

In political systems where decisions are made without transparent review, where institutional failures carry few consequences for those responsible, and where citizens gradually lose confidence that participation can alter outcomes, injustice acquires durability beyond the intentions of individual leaders. A decade of institutional substitution and electoral exclusion in Venezuela, documented progressively across Series IX, has demonstrated the process.  Where decisions are made by a narrowing circle of officials who face no review, the costs of those decisions (economic, legal, and personal) are absorbed by citizens who had no part in making them.  Under such conditions, citizens increasingly occupy the position of spectators rather than participants, and governance loses the corrective pressures through which democratic systems ordinarily adjust, restrain, and renew themselves.  [1]

 

2

 

Apathy is not merely a personal disposition; it is a political condition produced by sustained exclusion from meaningful agency. Where participation carries risk without influence, disengagement becomes rational. The Venezuelan presidential election of July 2024, following the precedent established in 2018 and documented in earlier chapters of Series IX, illustrates the dynamic in its concentrated form. Opposition witnesses collected poll-station tallies documenting a result the official authority refused to recognize; the declared outcome reversed the documented one, and the citizens, jurists, and electoral observers who pressed the discrepancy were detained, exiled, or stripped of standing. Once the witnesses who held the tallies had been detained, the jurists who challenged the proclamation had been exiled, and the observers who documented the discrepancy had been stripped of standing, the official result faced no remaining domestic institution capable of revising it, and what began as a contested outcome settled into the country’s operative reality.

 

3

 

In political systems where elections can be lost by incumbents, where legislatures can refuse executive requests, and where courts can rule against the government that appointed them, justice and freedom are sustained not as fixed possessions but through the ordinary repetition of these adjustments; in systems where each of these outcomes has been foreclosed, the appearance of stability is purchased at the cost of the corrective mechanism itself.  When governance forecloses negotiation among competing interests, it must present its decisions as already settled; the appearance of certainty then replaces the slower work of adjustment, and the system loses the capacity to correct itself when conditions change.  Effective governance depends on the capacity to absorb conflict without suppressing it.  [2]

 

4

 

Individual agency remains relevant not as moral heroism but as structural participation.  When citizens can still publish what officials would prefer unpublished, still gather without prior authorization, and still petition courts that retain some margin of independence, an official contemplating an arbitrary act must weigh the likelihood that the act will be recorded, contested, and at some later date reviewed; some, facing that weight, do not proceed.  [3]

The restoration of justice depends on reconstituting conditions under which individuals can act without fear and without illusion.  Citizens must be able to criticize public officials without anticipating detention, to document irregularities without expecting retaliation, and to petition courts without assuming in advance that outcomes have already been decided elsewhere.  Elections cannot function as ceremonial affirmations whose outcomes are settled before votes are cast.  Journalists cannot operate under the expectation that investigation itself may trigger surveillance, prosecution, or exile.  Under such conditions, participation ceases to resemble managed exposure and begins again to recover the practical character of civic agency.

The restoration of justice also depends on reconnecting personal responsibility to collective structures rather than isolating it within conscience alone.  A judge who privately recognizes procedural abuse but understands that appellate review no longer functions may remain silent despite personal objection.  When editors, courts, universities, and professional associations cease defending independent inquiry, journalists who continue documenting irregularities eventually operate without institutional protection.  Citizens who recognize electoral manipulation but encounter no reliable mechanism through which evidence can alter outcomes gradually retreat from participation into private disillusionment.  Under such conditions, ethical recognition survives individually while corrective capacity disappears collectively.  Responsibility becomes internalized as private awareness rather than sustained through institutions capable of transforming recognition into civic consequence.

 


Endnotes — Chapter XIX

§ 1

  • [1] Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 55–69.

 § 3

  • [2] Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York:  Knopf, 1999), 123–137, 146–159, 282–287.

§ 4

  • [3] Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development:  The Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), 66–72, 104–110, 124–130.