Posts Tagged ‘Democratic institutions’

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series I”

January 7, 2026

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“Geometric Allegory,” digital painting 2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

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To my parents

Preface

“Unmasking Disappointment” follows a line of inquiry present throughout my work:   the examination of identity, memory, and the relations that emerge when life unfolds across cultural boundaries.   Although I have lived outside Venezuela for more than five decades and became a naturalized citizen of the United States twenty-four years ago, my relationship to the country of my birth remains a persistent point of reference.   The distance between these conditions—belonging and removal—forms the backdrop against which this narrative takes shape.

This work belongs to a broader autobiographical project that gathers experiences, observations, and questions accumulated over time.   While personal in origin, it does not proceed as confession or memoir.   Its method is sequential rather than expressive:   individual exposure is situated within historical forces and political structures that have shaped Venezuelan life across generations.   The intention is not to reconcile these tensions, but to render them visible through recurrence, record, and consequence.

“Series I” introduces the first thematic clusters of this inquiry.   The episodes assembled here do not advance a single thesis, nor do they aim at resolution.   They trace points of friction where private experience intersects with public power, and where political narratives exert pressure on ordinary life.   Across these encounters, patterns emerge—not as abstractions, but as conditions that alter how authority is exercised, how responsibility is displaced, and how agency is constrained.

The chapters that follow examine the pressures produced by systemic inequality and trace contemporary Venezuelan conditions back to their historical formation.   Autocratic rule and popular consent appear not as opposing forces, but as elements that increasingly entangle and weaken one another.   Within this entanglement, truth does not disappear; it becomes less evenly accessible and more readily displaced by narrative.

When public discourse is shaped by propaganda and misinformation, authoritarian structures gain resilience.   Recovering truth under such conditions does not resolve political conflict, but it clarifies the limits within which political life operates.   Agency emerges not as an ideal, but as a condition sustained—or undermined—through practice and consequence.

This work does not propose deterministic explanations or simple remedies.   It proceeds by accumulation, drawing attention to patterns that persist despite changing circumstances.   What it asks of the reader is not agreement, but attention:   to evidence, to sequence, and to the conditions under which political freedom may be meaningfully exercised.

Writing from Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, I remain aware of the distance between the environments in which this work is composed and the conditions it examines.   That distance does not confer authority; it imposes responsibility.

Ricardo Federico Morín
Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, January 21, 2025

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Table of Contents

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  • Chapter I – A Written Language.
  • Chapter II – Our Recklessness.
  • Chapter III – Point of View.
  • Chapter IV – A Dialogue.
  • Chapter V – Abstract.
  • Chapter VI – Chronicles of Hugo Chávez (§§ I-XVII).
  • Chapter VII – The Allegorical Mode.
  • Chapter VIII – The Ideal Government and the Power of Virtue.
  • Chapter IX – The First Sign:   On Political and Social Resentment.
  • Chapter X – The Second Sign:   The Solid Pillar of Power:   The Military Forces.
  • Chapter XI – The Third Sign:  The Asymmetry of Political Parties.
  • Chapter XII – The Fourth Sign:  Autocracy (§§ 1-9):  Venezuela (§§ 10-23), The Asymmetry of Sanctions (§§ 24-32).
  • Chapter XIII – The Fifth Sign:  The Pawned Republic.
  • Chapter XIV – The First Issue:   Partisanship, Non-partisanship, and Antipartisanship.
  • Chapter XV – The Second Issue:   On Partial Truths and Repressive Anarchy.
  • Chapter XVI – The Third Issue:   The Clarion of Democracy.
  • Chapter XVII – The Fourth Issue:   On Human Rights.
  • Chapter XVIII – The Fifth Issue:  On the Nature of Violence.
  • Chapter XIX – The Ultimate Issue:   About the Deliverance of Injustice.
  • Acknowledgments.
  • Epilogue.
  • PostScript.
  • Appendix:   Author’s Note, Prefatory Note.     A). Venezuelan Constitutions [1811-1999], Branches, and Departments of Government.   B) Evolution of Political Parties: 1840-2024.    C) Laws Enacted by the Asamblea Nacional.  D) Clarificatory Note on Domestic Coercion, Foreign Presence, and Intervention.
  • Bibliography.

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Chapter I

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A Written Language

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Stability is often sought where it cannot be secured.   Experience has shown this repeatedly.   Even careful intentions tend to draw one into uncertain terrain, where understanding lags behind consequence.   At the desk, as late-afternoon light reaches the page, writing assumes a practical function:   it becomes a means of ordering what would otherwise remain unsettled.   The act does not resolve vulnerability, but it records it.   Whether time alters such conditions remains uncertain; what can be done is to give them form.

What follows moves from the conditions of writing to the conditions it must confront.

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Chapter II

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Our Recklessness

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“Our painful struggle to deal with the politics of climate change is surely also a product of the strange standoff between science and political thinking.” — Hannah Arendt:   The Human Condition:   Being and Time [1958], Kindle Book, 159.

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1

The COVID pandemic and the 2023 Canadian wildfires, among other recent events, have made visible conditions that were already in place.     These events did not introduce new vulnerabilities as much as they revealed the extent to which existing systems depend on economic incentives and political habits that privilege extraction over preservation.   During the period when smoke from the fires reached the northeastern United States, daylight in parts of Pennsylvania was visibly altered and registered the reach of events unfolding at a considerable distance.   Such occurrences do not stand apart from prevailing economic arrangements; they coincide with a model that treats natural conditions as commodities and absorbs their degradation as an external cost.

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The fires in California in 2025, like those that spread across Canada in 2023, do not present themselves as isolated occurrences.   They form part of a sequence shaped by environmental neglect, political inertia, and sustained industrial expansion.   Conditions such as desertification, resource scarcity, and population displacement no longer appear solely as projected outcomes; they are increasingly registered as present circumstances.   Scientific assessments indicate that these patterns are likely to intensify in the absence of structural change. [1][2][3]   What is brought into view, over time, is not a singular failure but a system that continues to operate according to priorities that favor immediate yield over long-term continuity.

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The question of balance does not arise solely as a technical problem.   It emerges within a moral and political field shaped by prevailing economic assumptions.   The treatment of nature—and more recently of artificial intelligence—as a commodity reflects a trajectory in which matters of shared survival are increasingly translated into market terms.    Under such conditions, considerations that once belonged to collective responsibility are recast as variables within systems of calculation.

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Such patterns place increasing strain on conditions necessary for collective survival.   Responses to these conditions vary and range from indifference to urgency, though urgency does not invariably produce clarity.   What becomes apparent, across repeated instances, is a tendency for crisis to recur without sustained adjustment.   This recurrence parallels the political histories examined in the chapters that follow, where warning and consequence frequently fail to align.

Endnotes—Chapter II

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Chapter III

Point of View

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Conversations with my editor, Billy Bussell Thompson, have accompanied the development of this work over time.    His attention to research method and to the structure of argument has contributed to the clarification of its scope and direction.    These exchanges, often conducted at a distance and without ceremony, formed part of the process through which the present narrative took shape.    After an extended period of uncertainty regarding how to approach the subject of Hugo Chávez, the contours of Unmasking Disappointment gradually emerged.

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Hugo Chávez entered national political life as a leader whose authority was exercised in opposition to political liberalism. [1]  While his public discourse emphasized alignment with the poor, the material benefits of power accumulated within a narrow circle. [2]  Over the course of his tenure, democratic institutions in Venezuela experienced progressive weakening, and governance assumed increasingly authoritarian forms.   These developments become more legible when situated within the historical record and examined through documented practice rather than rhetorical claim.

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The events that followed Chávez’s rule are marked by disorder and unresolved consequence.   Their persistence draws attention to questions of historical accountability and collective responsibility that remain unsettled.   Examining the record of autocratic leadership—its ambitions as well as its failures—provides a means of approaching the problem of justice in Venezuela without presuming resolution.   Through this examination, enduring tensions come into view as conditions to be understood rather than conclusions to be reached.

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Endnotes—Chapter III

  • [1]   The term caudillo originates in Spanish and has historically been used to describe a leader who exercises concentrated political and military authority.    In the Venezuelan context, the term carries particular resonance and refers to figures associated with the post-independence period of the nineteenth century.    Such leaders tended to consolidate power through a combination of personal authority, allegiance from armed factions, and the promise—whether substantive or rhetorical—of maintaining order under conditions of instability.    While some were regarded as defenders of local or national causes, others became associated with practices that facilitated authoritarian governance and weakened institutional structures.    The concept of the caudillo continues to function within Venezuelan political culture as a descriptive category applied to leadership forms that combine popular support with concentrated power.

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Chapter IV

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A Dialogue

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A series of conversations between BBT and the author accompanied the examination of Venezuelan politics and history developed in this section.   These exchanges formed a transitional space in which reflection gave way to historical inquiry, allowing questions of interpretation, responsibility, and record to be addressed through dialogue rather than exposition.

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—RFM:   “My writing has been concerned with the evolution of Venezuela’s political landscape, with particular attention to the emergence of authoritarian forms of rule.   The focus has been less on abstract doctrine than on how specific policies translated into everyday conditions for ordinary Venezuelans.”

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—BBT:   “Examining how authoritarian leadership shapes political conditions is necessary, though the term itself is often contested and applied unevenly.   In Chávez’s case, the use of propaganda was not exceptional in form, but it was consistently employed as an instrument of governance.   How did official narratives during his tenure circulate, and what effects did they have on public perception over time?”

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—RFM:  “Propaganda is not unique to Chávez; it functions as a recurring instrument across political systems.   In Venezuela, official media regularly attributed economic hardship to external interference rather than to domestic policy decisions.    At the same time, material conditions deteriorated, with shortages emerging from economic mismanagement and later compounded by external restrictions.   Opposition groups also circulated counter-narratives, which in turn elicited responses from the State.    These exchanges unfolded within a historical context shaped by civil conflict and Cold War alignments, and produced a fragmented informational environment.   Within that environment, responsibility for economic decline was frequently displaced, while public perception was managed through repetition rather than resolution.   The social and economic reforms invoked in justification did not, over time, yield the reductions in poverty and inequality that had been promised.”

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—BBT:  “To render Venezuela’s political conditions with some accuracy, attention must be given to how ordinary citizens encountered these dynamics in daily life.     How were such conditions navigated in practice, particularly where political discourse intersected with immediate economic necessity?”

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—RFM:  “The economic collapse that followed the decline of the oil-based model intensified poverty and placed sustained pressure on public services.   Examined in sequence, this period shows how colonial legacies and authoritarian practices converged in the formation of Chavismo.   Episodes such as the 1989 riots known as El Caracazo registered widespread disaffection with established parties and democratic institutions.   Under such conditions, the demands of securing basic necessities frequently outweighed engagement with abstract political principles.”

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—BBT:   “Clarity in narrative depends in part on recognizing the assumptions that guide interpretation.   When these assumptions are made explicit and examined, the account becomes less directive and more accessible, allowing readers to follow the record without being steered toward a predetermined position.”

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—RFM:  “No narrative proceeds without interpretation, including this one.   Writing provides a means of approaching Venezuela’s history—its colonial formation, episodes of authoritarian rule, and periods of political disruption—without foreclosing alternative readings.    A coherent account need not be exhaustive; it remains open insofar as it attends to implication and consequence rather than resolution.”

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—BBT:  “The exchange itself underscores the importance of careful narration when approaching Venezuela’s political and social record.    Attending to multiple viewpoints does not resolve complexity, but it allows a more coherent account to emerge without reducing that history to a single explanatory frame.”

The exchange marked a transition from reflective inquiry to historical record.

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Chapter V

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Abstract

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This section examines the sequence through which the political project articulated under Hugo Chávez assumed autocratic form.    Rather than attributing this outcome to a single cause, the inquiry proceeds by tracing how leadership decisions unfolded within a convergence of historical conditions, institutional arrangements, economic pressures, and geopolitical alignments.   The account does not begin from conclusion, but from record.

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Attention remains on how authority was exercised and how its effects registered within Venezuelan society.    Historical circumstance, institutional design, and external influence are examined not to simplify the record, but to make visible the interdependencies through which power consolidated over time.    What emerges is not an explanatory thesis, but a configuration whose coherence can be assessed only through sustained attention to sequence and consequence.

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“The Case for an Independent Treasury”

July 27, 2025

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Ricardo Morin
An Embroidered Question
CGI
2025

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To the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System—in recognition of the ongoing challenge of aligning institutional independence with public responsibility.

By Ricardo Morin

July 27, 2025

Abstract

This essay examines the conceptual validity of an independent treasury, free from executive control and governed by long-term, nonpartisan economic reasoning. It argues that the alignment of fiscal institutions with short-term political leadership creates structural risks that compromise transparency, sustainability, and public trust. By contrast, an autonomous treasury—operating within clear legal mandates and guided by professional expertise—can promote fiscal stability and integrity while preserving essential democratic oversight. The analysis rejects both executive subordination and technocratic absolutism, and proposes a balanced institutional model in which independence functions as a form of principled restraint. This concept, as developed in the essay, refers to the structured and lawful limitation of authority in pursuit of long-term public interest—discipline rooted not in detachment, but in ethics, transparency, and legality. This framework, abstracted from any specific national context, is intended to apply broadly to the theory and design of sound fiscal governance.

The Case for an Independent Treasury

The question of how a treasury should be structured—whether subordinated to political leadership or operating autonomously—raises fundamental concerns about institutional integrity, fiscal responsibility, and democratic accountability. While treasuries are often housed within executive power, there is a strong theoretical case for granting such institutions political independence. A treasury removed from direct control of governing administrations and guided instead by economic expertise, long-term reasoning, and publicly defined mandates can provide a more stable and ethically sound foundation for fiscal policy.

At the heart of this argument is the fact that fiscal decisions—such as setting tax levels, allocating public spending, and managing debt—extend far beyond the timeline of electoral cycles or political terms. When treasury operations are subject to short-term political priorities, fiscal policy risks being distorted by opportunism—through unsustainable tax cuts, politically timed spending increases, or the concealment of uncomfortable debt projections. These distortions undermine both the credibility of fiscal governance and the long-term stability that supports public trust and financial soundness.

A common set of distortions includes election-cycle spending surges that prioritize immediate electoral gains over lasting fiscal balance; strategic underreporting or reclassification of deficits to hide true fiscal conditions; and biased tax enforcement, where tax authorities selectively target or protect groups based on political motives. Such behaviors not only threaten fiscal sustainability but also weaken the treasury’s role as a neutral guardian of public resources.

Principled restraint is key to addressing these challenges. This concept refers to a structured commitment to ethical limits and responsible governance. It is a form of authority that binds itself willingly to the public interest, resisting both political capture and technocratic arrogance. Principled restraint is not the absence of power, but its disciplined and transparent exercise, grounded in law, deliberation, and long-term accountability. It affirms the treasury’s role as a steward of the public good across political transitions and economic cycles.

An autonomous treasury, governed by clear statutes and staffed by nonpartisan experts, can anchor fiscal management to long-term goals such as sustainability, fairness, and generational equity. Its purpose is not to replace democratic decision-making but to ensure that such decisions are carried out with consistency, impartiality, and professional skill. Just as some institutions responsible for macroeconomic stability are insulated from immediate political pressures, so too might a treasury—especially in functions like forecasting, revenue collection, and debt issuance.

The credibility of an independent treasury extends beyond its internal workings. Reliable and professionally managed fiscal behavior builds confidence among citizens, investors, and institutions. When financial governance is free from sudden reversals or partisan manipulation, it fosters trust and encourages long-term investment. Independence also helps prevent the politicization of fiscal enforcement, reducing the temptation to use taxation or regulations as tools of political favor or retaliation.

However, institutional independence is not without risks. Fiscal decisions are not merely technical; they are moral and distributive, touching on societal values, justice, and competing visions of the common good. Shielding these decisions entirely from democratic debate risks technocratic overreach, ideological rigidity, or disconnect from lived realities. Expertise alone cannot legitimize choices that affect livelihoods and social priorities.

The solution is not absolute independence but a careful balance between insulation and accountability. A treasury designed for long-term neutrality must be bound by clear mandates, subject to transparent review, and accountable through publicly visible processes. Its leadership should be appointed through pluralistic methods that reduce capture by any one faction, and its actions should undergo open reporting, independent audits, and legal oversight. Protected from arbitrary dismissal or short-term interference, it must still answer ultimately to the legal and ethical framework established by society through its representative institutions.

Moreover, any institutional design must include mechanisms for coordinated emergency response. No treasury, however independent, should be structurally paralyzed in times of acute crisis. Temporary protocols for collaboration with political authorities—limited by law and time—ensure that flexibility does not compromise integrity.

Ultimately, the case for an independent treasury rests not only on technical competence but on maintaining civic trust. When fiscal governance is shaped by rules rather than impulses, by analysis rather than improvisation, and by impartial stewardship rather than partisan interest, it becomes a stabilizing force in public life. The institutional form must embody a dual commitment: to professional expertise and democratic legitimacy. Independence, in this sense, is not isolation but principled restraint—a structured commitment to ethical limits and responsible governance. It is the disciplined and transparent use of power, grounded in law, public deliberation, and long-term accountability. This discipline protects the treasury’s role as steward of the public good across political changes and economic cycles.

Any society seeking to secure the long-term integrity of its public finances must confront the structural incentives shaping its treasury. If fiscal authority remains vulnerable to fleeting political agendas, sustainability will always be precarious. But if that authority drifts too far from public input, it risks losing the legitimacy it depends on. The challenge is to build institutions that are durable without becoming unresponsive, disciplined without becoming opaque, and independent without giving up accountability.

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Annotated Bibliography

  • Blyth, Mark: Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 (Blyth explains how austerity, often framed as a technical necessity, has historically served as a political tool to restructure economic power. His analysis is crucial to understanding why an independent treasury should not be conceived as a default promoter of restrictive policy but as an institution committed to fiscal sustainability with social responsibility).
  • Brunner, Roger: “Independent Fiscal Authorities: A Comparative Analysis”. Public Finance Quarterly 21 (4): 482–505. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1993 (Brunner offers a comparative analysis of different models of independent fiscal authorities. His study provides an empirical foundation for evaluating how institutional independence can be balanced with effective mechanisms of democratic accountability).
  • Goodhart, Charles, and Dimitrios Tsomocos: The Challenge of Fiscal Independence. London: CEPR Press, 2021 (This volume examines the conceptual and practical challenges of separating fiscal policy from short-term political pressures. Its contribution is key to supporting the argument that fiscal independence must be grounded in clearly defined limits and democratic legitimacy to avoid self-referential technocracy).
  • Lledó, Victor, and Teresa Ter-Minassian: “Fiscal Councils and Independent Fiscal Institutions”. Washington; IMF Working Paper WP/22/47. International Monetary Fund, 2022 (This IMF paper provides a detailed overview of independent fiscal institutions across multiple jurisdictions. It emphasizes that the effectiveness of such institutions depends not only on their legal design but also on their integration into transparent democratic processes).
  • Ooms, Thomas: “Fiscal Policy and the Risk of Politicization”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 32 (3): 75–92. Nashville: American Economic Association, 2018 (Ooms argues that the politicization of fiscal policy leads to significant distortions in resource allocation. His article supports the idea that a structurally protected treasury can reduce the risk of decisions driven by partisan interests).
  • Stiglitz, Joseph E.: Economics of the Public Sector. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000 (This classic textbook offers a comprehensive framework on public sector economics. Stiglitz’s discussion of market failures and the role of institutions provides a solid theoretical foundation for justifying the careful design of a treasury with structural independence and public accountability).
  • Wehner, Joachim: Legislatures and the Budget Process: The Myth of Fiscal Control. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010 (Wehner challenges the presumption that legislatures exercise effective control over public budgets. His work suggests that, given legislative weakness, strengthening the institutional role of the treasury may be necessary to ensure transparency and fiscal discipline).

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