Posts Tagged ‘Identity’

“Dolos Principle: Part Two”

October 21, 2026

Silence III by Ricardo Morín
22″ × 30″
Watercolor, graphite, gesso, acrylic on paper
2010

IX. The Commission

In the days that followed she did very little, and it was in doing very little that she began to see.

She had not known how much of her life had been occupied with being somewhere.  Now there was nowhere she was expected, and the hours, released from appointment, came back to her with things in them she had not put there:  a word, a glance across a hall, a man at a window with nothing to put into a silence.  She did not go looking for these.  They arrived, as the light arrived in the apartment in the mornings, from the direction of his tower, and lay upon things until she noticed them.

She noticed, for instance, that she had kept Nexys’s glance at the gala as though it were the first fact of something, and that she did not know, now, what it had been the first fact of.  She had thought, that night, that she had seen something in him.  It occurred to her, turning it over on the fourth or fifth morning, that he might rather have seen something in her, and that the flicker she had kept was his recognition and not her discovery.  The thought did not distress her.  It interested her, as a painting interests one on the second visit, when one sees that the figure one took for the subject is looking out of the frame at something one had not thought to look at.

The commission reported on a Thursday.  She had not meant to watch.  She told herself she would watch only to know what was said, and she sat down before the screen in the posture she used for watching her own appearances, a little forward, one hand at her throat, and recognized the posture, and did not change it.

The chairman spoke.  The figures were given.  The word was used, several times, in ways that made it sound like a thing that had been mislaid and found.  And then the chairman turned, with a gesture she knew because she had once suggested it to Nexys, and introduced someone who would speak to what the promise had always meant.

She had expected the footage.  She had expected her own face, and had prepared for it as one prepares for cold water.  It was not her face.

The woman was younger:  not by much, but by enough.  She was dark where Astra was dark, and composed where Astra was composed, and she was not, in any feature Astra could have named, like her.  The caption gave her name as Astrid.

Astra heard the name as one hears a word one has repeated too often, so that it comes apart into sound.  Then the woman began to read.

It was the statement.  It had been altered, very slightly, to fit another mouth:  the promise was still larger than any one man, and would still, at last, be kept, but the person who had helped to bring the truth to light was now one who had stood “beside those who sold the dream, and could not bear to watch it betrayed.”  Astra listened to the alteration with professional attention and found it right.  Then she stopped attending to the words, because she could attend to nothing but the voice.

The delay before the key word.  The soft ending.  The breath taken not where the sentence needed it but where the listener would need it, half a beat before the listener knew.  The young woman had all of it.  She had not been taught it from footage; or if she had, she had been taught it so thoroughly that it no longer looked taught.  It looked like candor.  It looked, Astra thought, with a sensation for which she had no name, exactly as she had always supposed it looked from the other side of the screen, where she had never once sat to see.

She sat there now.  And she believed it.

That was what she could not get past.  Not that it had been done, or done well, or done without her; but that for the length of a sentence, perhaps two, sitting forward with her hand at her throat, she had believed the woman on the screen meant what she said; had been moved by it; had felt the old warm motion toward the promise; and had felt it from the place where she had always supposed the crowd felt it, and where she had never, in all her years of producing that motion in others, once stood.

The broadcast ended.  The screen showed the weather.  She sat for a long time without moving, and the light from his tower, which had come on at dusk as it always did, lay across the floor between her chair and the window.

The woman in the café had said that she was the only one who needed to believe.  She had taken it as a judgment on her sincerity.  She wondered now whether it had been something plainer:  a description of where she had always stood, which was where belief was made and never where it was received.  She could not tell whether that was the whole of it.  She knew only that she had stood, for two sentences, among those who received it, and had found something there waiting for her, warm, ready-made, and not her own.

She thought she would like to see the young woman.  She did not know what she would say.  She was not sure, examining the wish, that she wished to say anything; it seemed rather that she wished to look, from close by and in an ordinary light, at the face that had done this to her, and to learn whether, at that distance, it would look like anyone she knew.

X. Astrid

The message came from Astrid herself, three days after the broadcast, and was so plainly worded that Astra read it twice for the trick in it and found none.  She would be in the public garden by the river on Sunday morning, early, before the paths filled.  If Astra wished to come, she would be glad.

Astra went.  She arrived before the hour, as she had never arrived anywhere, and walked the gravel paths while the gardeners were still at work.  The light was the ordinary light she had wished for:  grey, even, without direction, falling on the benches and the backs of the gardeners and the surface of the river with no preference among them.

Astrid was on a bench near the water with a paper cup in her hands.  She rose when she saw Astra, not quickly.  In the plain light she was younger than on the screen, and less finished; there was a small scar at her hairline that the broadcast had not shown, and her coat was good but not new.

“You came,” she said, and then, as if hearing herself, smiled.  “That isn’t what I meant to say first.  I’d rehearsed something better.”

“So had I,” said Astra.  It was not true until she said it, and then she found that it had been.

They sat.  For a time neither spoke, and Astra was aware of being looked at, closely, by someone who knew precisely what she was looking at; and it was the first time this had happened to her in such a light, with no screen between.

“I watched you for years,” Astrid said at last.  “Before any of this.  I was fourteen the first time.  You were on a screen in a shop window, talking about the ledger that no one owns, and I stood in the street until the shop closed.”  She turned the cup in her hands.  “I’m not telling you that so you’ll feel anything.  It’s why they found me.  I’d learned you without meaning to.  They only had to finish it.”

“And you let them.”

“I needed the work.”  She said it as the woman in the café had named a distance.  “And I wanted to see whether I could.  You’ll understand that.”

Astra did.

“Do you want to know what was hardest?”  Astrid asked.  Astra said nothing, and Astrid, who had learned her, seemed to take the silence correctly, as yes.  “Not the voice.  The voice is only music; anyone can learn music.  It was something you do with your eyes.”  She looked away briefly, to the side, toward the river, and back.  “Just before the important word.  Every time.  As if you were checking whether someone had come into the room.  I had to learn not to do it.  They said it read as doubt.”

Astra sat very still.

She had watched herself, she supposed, a thousand times.  She had studied her appearances as she studied everything, for their effect; she had corrected her hands, her posture, the angle of her chin.  She had never seen that.  She thought of the gala, of Nexys’s eyes finding hers across the hall, of what had passed between them that she had kept as the first fact; and she understood, on the bench in the even light, that he had seen it long before.  Perhaps others had:  the crowd, with its patient look; the late man at the table, with his physician’s interest.  It was possible that anyone who had watched her closely had seen her look aside before the word, as though someone might come in, and that only she, who had made the word, had never once been placed to see it.

“Did it?”  she said.  “Read as doubt?”

Astrid considered her with the frank attention of a craftsman.  “Not to most people.  To most people it read as sincerity.  That’s what made it dangerous.  Doubt that looks like sincerity is the most convincing thing there is.”  She paused.  “They didn’t want convincing.  They wanted calm.”

A gardener passed with a barrow.  Both women watched him go, and Astra noticed, as he went, that Astrid’s eyes moved to the side, toward the path behind them, quickly, before she spoke again; and that Astrid caught herself doing it; and that something in her face closed.

Astra did not remark on it.  She could not have said whether it was the trace of a habit learned and not quite unlearned, or something of Astrid’s own, older than the lessons, which the lessons had failed to remove.  She found she could not tell.  She found, too, that she had no right to ask, and that it was the first time in a long while she had recognized such a limit as belonging to another person and not to the situation.

“Why did you write to me?”

Astrid looked at the water.  “Because you’re the only person who would know what I was doing while I did it.”  A small movement of her shoulders.  “It’s lonely, otherwise.  You’ll know that too.”

They sat a while longer.  There seemed to be nothing further either of them needed to say, and Astra, who had spent her life in rooms where silence was a move, discovered that here it was not; it was only the time two people take to finish sitting together.

When they rose, Astrid held out her hand, and Astra took it, and for a moment they stood as they would have stood for a photograph, and both of them knew it, and neither turned toward a camera, because there was none.

Astra walked home along the river.  She did not look at the water, though it was there the whole way, grey and plain and willing to show her anything.  She was thinking of a glance to the side before an important word, and of how many years a thing can be visible on one’s own face to everyone but oneself; and she was thinking that she would have to look, sooner or later, and that she was not yet ready, and that this, at least, she could see.

XI. The Tower

She went to see him because he had asked, and because she found, examining the reasons she might have given for not going, that each of them was a sentence she would have spoken to an audience.

The tower admitted her without question.  The doorman knew her; the elevator knew her floor; the glass of the lobby, where his name was cut, had been cleaned that morning, and the name stood in it as clearly as ever.  On the wall beside the elevators a new portrait had been hung, large, a little idealized, in the manner of portraits commissioned for institutions, and beneath it a small plate gave his name and two dates.  The first was the year the city’s first tower had risen.  The second was this year.  She looked at the second date for some time.  He was not dead.  She understood that the plate did not mean he was dead.

He received her in the office.  Nothing in it had been moved:  the dark wood, the cold metal, the angles that admitted no doubt.  The screen on the desk was lit and showed the price, which had recovered nearly half of what it had lost.  He rose this time.  He came round the desk and took both her hands and looked at her with an expression of open warmth.  It was the expression he used for donors.

“You came back,” he said.

“You asked me to.”

“I did.  I hoped.”  He released her hands and went to the window.  “Look at it.  Nothing has changed.”

She looked.  Nothing had.  The towers stood in their silver order, and the avenues ran with light, and below them the people moved with the ease of those who believe themselves looked after; and from this height the doorways and the debris could not be seen at all.

He talked.  He talked well; he had always talked well.  He told her that the commission was in good hands, that several of its members had been his friends for twenty years, that the reform would be named, as was only fitting, for the founder, and he smiled at the word as he said it, as if it were a garment someone had given him that fit better than he had expected.  He told her he had been consulted at every stage.  He told her the mediator was an able man.  He did not tell her when he had first met the mediator, and she found she did not need to be told; she was watching his hands, which rested on the sill and did not drum.

“You knew,” she said.  “Before the gala.”

He did not turn.  “I knew it was coming.  Someone was always going to come.  A man who builds a thing like this and imagines he’ll be allowed to keep it is a fool, and I am not a fool.”  He paused.  “I chose how it would end.  That’s all anyone can choose.  I chose that my name would stay on the glass.”

“And me?”

Now he turned, and his face held something she had seen once before, across a hall, and kept.  “You were going anyway,” he said.  “I saw it long before you did.  You used to look aside before you said the word:  every time, for years, as if you were expecting someone.  I used to watch for it.  I thought someone would notice, and it would be over.”  He shook his head.  “No one ever did.  They thought it was sincerity.”

“Someone did,” she said, and did not say who.

He waited, and when she said nothing further he took it, as he had always taken her silences, for agreement; and she let him, and noticed that she let him, and that it no longer felt like a move.

“It went perfectly,” he said.  “Considering.”

She heard the word fall.  It did not ring false this time.  It did not ring at all; it lay where it fell, as a coin lies on carpet, and she understood that he meant it, and that he would go on meaning it, in this office, with the screen on the desk showing him a number that recovered by the day, beneath a portrait whose second date he had not yet gone down to read.

She stayed a little longer, because leaving at once would have been a kind of speech.  They spoke of nothing:  of a dinner years ago, of a city abroad where they had once been photographed together.  He was charming.  He had always been charming.  When she rose to go he kissed her hand, which he had never done, and she understood that it was a gesture from a part he had begun to play, the founder, gracious and retired, and that he would play it well and for a long time, and that the playing would spare him from ever standing at the window long enough to see the doorways.

In the elevator she did not look at the steel.

In the lobby the light was going.  As she passed the portrait, the tower’s lights came on, all at once, floor upon floor above her, at the hour they always came on; and she thought of him upstairs at the window, watching them come on, and believing, as she was almost certain he would, that he had switched them on himself.

XII. The Window

It was evening when she reached the apartment, and she did not turn on the lamps at once.  She sat in the chair facing the window, as she had sat to watch the commission, and let the room go dark around her while the city came up outside it, tower by tower, until the glass held nothing but the city:  entire, luminous, composed, as it had offered itself to her from the balcony, as it offered itself to anyone who could afford the height.

She found that she was waiting, and did not know for what, and did not try to know.

When at last she rose and turned on the lamp beside the chair, the window changed.  It did so all at once, as such windows do:  the city withdrew behind the glass, still there but faint, and in its place the room appeared, the chair, the lamp, the table where she had set down the device on the first night, and a woman standing in the middle of it.

She had seen her reflection in that window a thousand times.  She had used it, at night, before going out, to check the line of a dress.  She had never stood before it with nothing to check.

She looked at the woman.  The woman was not young and not old; she was composed; she was, Astra supposed, what people meant when they said she was beautiful, and the word did not seem to attach to anything in particular.  She held herself as Astra held herself, a little forward, as if about to be addressed.  Astra watched her for a long time.  It was not difficult.  It was only unfamiliar, like the light in the garden, which had preferred nothing.

Then, because there was no one else in the room, and because she had spent her life saying things aloud before she knew she believed them, she began to say something to the woman in the glass, she did not afterward know what; and before the word that mattered, she saw the woman’s eyes go aside.

It was very quick.  It was, as Astrid had said, as if someone might have come into the room.  Nobody had.  She saw the glance, and saw the eyes come back, and the face around them settle again into what it had been.  She did not know what it had been looking for.  It might have been doubt, as they had said.  It might have been the habit of a performer listening for her audience, or of someone keeping watch on a door she did not mean to open.  It occurred to her that it might have been looking for her, and the thought stayed, and she did not try to make it the only one.

She did not finish the sentence she had begun.  She thought of the stars, which she had once seen above the city and then said, and found that she could no longer tell how much of the seeing had been for the sake of the saying.  Something else spoke then, in her own voice, though not the one she used on screens:  the voice she would have used to tell a stranger the time.  It did not tell her what she must do.  It did not tell her that she was forgiven, or free, or that anything would now be otherwise.  It did not explain her to herself.

It said her name.

It was not loud.  It was not the name as the crowd had said it, nor as Nexys had said it.  It was said as one says the name of someone in the same room, plainly, to establish that she is there.

“Yes,” she said.

Outside, faint behind her reflection, the towers kept their silver order, and the avenues ran with light, and nothing in the city had changed or would change because a woman in one of its windows had answered to her name.  She knew that.  She did not look past the glass to confirm it.  She stood where she was and let the woman in the glass look at her for as long as it lasted, and found that she could stand there, which was not the same as being at peace there.

The lamp burned beside her.  She did not turn it off.

Ricardo F. Morín

October 15, 2026

Oakland Park, Florida


“The Continuity of Attention”

September 22, 2026

Ricardo F. Morín. 
Self-Portrait, 1988. 
Mixed media:  collage, charcoal, and ink pen. 
30 × 48 inches.

The traditions and rituals through which we identify ourselves should remain open to questioning, particularly when they concern guilt, repentance, and forgiveness.  An inquiry into the meaning of fasting on Yom Kippur led me to ask how a practice of atonement relates to the conduct of daily life.  The question can be asked of any such practice, within or outside a religion:  does observing it deepen our attention to others, or can the observance take the place of that attention?  Why should reflection occupy a separate place in a life whose every relationship already calls for awareness?

The difficulty begins when we treat living and examining how we live as separate activities.  We act, withdraw, assess, and seek release from what we have done.  Looking back is necessary because our understanding is incomplete and consequences often become apparent only later.  But the limits of what we can know at any moment do not remove our responsibility to pay attention while acting.  How we speak, decide, listen, or withhold a response already matters to other people.  Reflection belongs within those acts, while we can still influence what happens, as well as afterwards, when we consider the consequences.

The observance that prompted this inquiry explicitly guards against allowing ritual to replace responsibility towards another person.  Mishnah Yoma 8:9 (https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Yoma.8.9) states that Yom Kippur does not atone for wrongs committed against another person until the wronged person has been appeased.  The teaching requires us to address the person we have injured; observing the day alone cannot fulfil that obligation.  The question of how reflection belongs within living nevertheless remains.  Addressing an injury is a responsibility that follows wrongdoing.  Attention to another person is already required within the relationship before any injury occurs.

A day devoted to repentance may renew an awareness that continues throughout the year.  The distinction that concerns me is between reflecting from time to time and making reflection part of everything we do.  An observance can support attention throughout daily life.  Speaking, working, eating, and living with others already involve choices through which we acknowledge or disregard their circumstances.  Where reflection is separated from daily conduct, sincerity in observing a ritual does not resolve the separation.

Questioning a ritual can be difficult because the practice may express commitments we hold deeply.  A person may observe it out of religious conviction, loyalty to family customs, or a wish to be recognised as a member of a religious community.  Belief in a teaching, loyalty to one’s family, and recognition by others are distinct considerations, even when they lead to the same observance.  If questioning the practice feels like betraying one’s family or risking a community’s acceptance, defending the practice may take precedence over examining it.  Careful examination can also express a serious commitment to understanding one’s faith.  The reasons for valuing a ritual therefore need to be distinguished from the question of how observing it affects our conduct towards others.

Fasting may help someone concentrate by interrupting familiar habits.  Even so, why should deprivation have a privileged role in making us more aware?  Whatever attention a fast encourages must continue within daily life.  When deprivation is understood as punishment, attention may shift from daily conduct to the intensity of one’s own suffering.  My suffering does not, by itself, repair suffering I have caused.  I may become absorbed in how much I can endure and pay less attention to the person affected by my conduct.  The effort to become worthy again can then displace the work of understanding another person’s experience and making whatever repair is possible.

The preoccupation with recovering one’s own moral worth becomes especially restrictive when a wrong action is taken as proof of a defective human nature.  Recognising our limitations can make us more receptive to correction.  But a belief in our own defectiveness can keep us occupied with whether we are guilty, purified, forgiven, or restored.  Our relation to others does not begin with an injury for which we must answer.  When I listen to another person, I may discover how much my assumptions have left out.  When we make a decision together, I need to consider the other person’s circumstances as well as my own.  The other person’s reality precedes my judgment of how well I have responded to it.  Responsibility develops within the relationship and includes answering for harm when harm occurs.  A satisfactory judgment of myself does not bring my responsibility within the relationship to an end.

Confession can interrupt denial by acknowledging an injury we have concealed or refused to face.  Naming the injury can make an honest conversation with the person affected possible.  An apology may relieve the person who offers it while leaving the injured person’s loss or distrust unresolved.  In admitting what I did, I show a willingness to answer for my conduct.  The admission alone cannot establish that I have fulfilled my responsibility.

No one owes me forgiveness so that I may consider my moral account settled.  Forgiveness may change a relationship profoundly, allowing affection or trust to become possible again.  But forgiveness does not erase the consequences of what happened.  Trust may need to be rebuilt, a loss may remain irreparable, and the injured person may still need to maintain boundaries within the relationship.  My responsibility continues even if I am not forgiven.  Nor can I demand that reconciliation take the form I desire.

To live consciously does not require us to sit in constant judgment of ourselves.  Constant self-judgment would reproduce the self-absorption that can make penitence an obstacle to understanding others.  Attention to others requires a willingness to notice, to listen, and to reconsider a judgment.  Our intentions do not fully explain what our actions mean to someone else.  Continuing attention means allowing what we learn from another person to influence how we proceed, even when that knowledge unsettles our understanding of ourselves.  We will sometimes fail to pay attention.  Recognising a failure can help us respond more adequately without turning the acknowledgment into a ceremony of self-condemnation.

The separation of reflection from daily conduct can arise within the most familiar relationships.  We may presume that familiarity tells us what another person needs, or that good intentions spare us from reconsidering a decision.  Confidence in our own understanding can then replace attention to a person whose needs or views may have changed.  Confession, forgiveness, and observance belong within our relationships, but none can account for everything those relationships require of us.  The daily acts of listening, choosing together, and responding to change have an ethical significance of their own, whether or not an injury ever occurs.

I cannot conceive of reflection as an interval after which one returns to living relieved of its demands.  Reflection belongs to our participation in one another’s lives, through which we continually develop and revise our understanding.  A ritual’s importance to our religious commitments or family customs does not settle the question of how observing it affects our conduct towards others.  Another person’s reality remains before us after the words have been spoken and the appointed day has ended.


“Axis II: Identity as Mnemonic Construction”

September 2, 2026
Ricardo F. Morín
Templates II
40"h. x 30"w.
Watercolor on paper
2003
Ricardo F. Morín
Templates II
40″h. x 30″w.
Watercolor on paper
2003

People come to know who they are over time rather than all at once.  A person recognizes themselves through earlier actions, remembered choices, and past commitments, even though the conditions under which those moments occurred no longer remain the same.  What feels continuous is not encountered directly, but pieced together through recollection and interpretation as circumstances change.  Because of this, uncertainty enters any effort to maintain a stable sense of self, not through confusion or deceit, but through the simple passage of time.

A person’s relation to themselves is therefore never fixed at its origin.  It is mediated by memory, revision, and reassessment as life unfolds.  What once made sense as a response to a particular moment must be understood again under different conditions.  Identity does not remain secured by intention alone, because continuity can only be reconstructed after the fact rather than preserved intact.

Once identity must be reconstructed instead of taken as given, expectations of consistency begin to exert pressure.  Past actions, statements, and commitments are treated as benchmarks against which the present self is measured, even when the circumstances that produced them no longer exist.  Continuity is demanded where only relation is possible.  What once functioned as a response to a specific situation is asked to stand as proof of an enduring self.

Because people encounter identity through memory and interpretation rather than direct access, identity becomes subject to demands for legibility.  Others rely on familiar patterns of speech, behavior, and commitment to orient their expectations.  When those patterns persist, continuity is assumed.  When they shift, uncertainty arises.  What cannot be readily recognized is often treated as absence rather than transformation.

Under these conditions, adjustment is frequently misread as violation.  Changes made in response to altered circumstances are interpreted as departures from an assumed core rather than as necessary recalibrations.  Earlier expressions of self are treated as binding commitments even when the conditions that produced them have changed.  What is experienced internally as adaptation is therefore received externally as betrayal, not because trust has been broken, but because the expectation of fixity has remained in place.

After reconstruction is complete, identity offers no fixed origin.  It offers only a coherence that must be maintained under changing conditions of recognition.  Efforts to settle distress about identity fail when they ignore a simple fact:  people change before others adjust their expectations.  The difficulty does not arise from change itself, but from being required to remain readable according to standards that no longer apply.

Ricardo F. Morín

January 31, 2026

Oakland Park, Fl


“The Identities We Maintain”

August 10, 2026

*

* *

A person does not acquire an understanding of himself in isolation.   From childhood onward, conduct meets approval, resistance, affection, expectation, disappointment and judgment.   Through these encounters, a person learns not only how others respond to him but also how to recognize himself.   Some of that recognition is indispensable.   Without relations with others, language itself could scarcely provide the distinctions through which experience becomes intelligible.   Yet the same process introduces a difficulty:   a form of recognition that initially helps a person understand himself can eventually become something he must preserve in order to remain intelligible to himself.

The difficulty does not reside in having an identity.   No person goes through life without some continuity between memory, conduct and expectation.   The difficulty arises when maintaining that continuity begins to determine what the person can acknowledge.   A settled conception of oneself may then cease to register experience and begin instead to select from experience whatever confirms that conception.   Contradiction becomes harder to admit because it no longer concerns only an action or judgment.   It threatens the conception of the person through which that action or judgment has been understood.

The desire to be good makes this relation particularly visible.   Ethical regard requires that a person consider his conduct and its consequences for others.   Concern for how he is perceived can also expose conduct that private intention would excuse too readily.   Neither goodness nor concern for another person’s judgment is therefore suspect in itself.   A different condition appears when being recognized as good becomes necessary to the person’s conception of himself.   He may then preserve the appearance of generosity while resenting what generosity requires, consent when he wishes to refuse, or suppress anger because anger contradicts the person he believes himself to be.

Carl Jung’s concept of the persona identifies part of this difficulty.   The persona describes the social presentation through which a person enters relations with others.   Such presentation is unavoidable.   Different circumstances properly call forth different aspects of conduct, and no single encounter reveals the entirety of a person.   The problem begins when social presentation acquires authority over what the person can recognize in himself.   The appearance of goodness then does more than communicate character to others.   It regulates which reactions may enter the person’s own understanding of that character.

Jung’s shadow addresses what such an understanding excludes.   The value of the concept does not depend upon imagining a hidden repository of unacceptable qualities.   Its diagnostic force lies in a simpler observation:   what a person cannot reconcile with his conception of himself does not therefore cease to operate.   Anger denied because it conflicts with kindness may appear as resentment.   A wish to refuse may survive beneath repeated consent.   Rivalry may accompany generosity without appearing in the generous person’s explanation of his conduct.   The discrepancy matters because conscious intention no longer accounts adequately for what the person does.

That discrepancy establishes a distinction that will become necessary later.   The shadow retains diagnostic value so long as it names a divergence that can be examined among conduct, reaction and the explanation a person gives of himself.   It need not posit an invisible structure as the cause of that divergence.   One thing is to recognize that conscious self-description fails to account for what is observed; another is to infer from that insufficiency an entity or prior structure responsible for producing it.   The first operation leaves inquiry open.   The second introduces an explanation whose presence no longer necessarily depends upon what can be observed.

Recognition of this discrepancy complicates another form of conduct ordinarily regarded as virtuous:   helping.   A person may respond to another’s need because the need warrants assistance.   Repeated assistance, however, also establishes a relation between the person who helps and the person who receives help.   Within that relation, the helper may acquire usefulness, authority, gratitude, intimacy or a sense of necessity.   None of these consequences invalidates the assistance.   They become diagnostically significant when the continuation of another person’s need begins to preserve something the helper requires in order to recognize himself.

The distinction cannot be settled by observing generosity alone.   Identical acts may proceed from different relations to oneself and to another person.   A more revealing moment may occur when assistance is declined, becomes unnecessary, or succeeds.   If another person’s independence produces resentment, loss of purpose or an impulse to restore the former dependency, the reaction discloses a function that helping had acquired.   The conduct that appeared to concern another person’s welfare had also begun to sustain the helper’s conception of his own importance.

Such a possibility does not warrant classifying habitual helpers as psychologically dependent upon those they assist.   The classification would obscure the very relation that requires examination.   A diagnostic inquiry asks instead what the conduct is doing in a particular life.   Helping may express affection, obligation, generosity, control, fear of abandonment, desire for recognition, or several of these at once.   The relevant distinction emerges from the relation among conduct, circumstance and response, not from assigning the person to a psychological type.

The same difficulty appears when the desired response from another person is understanding rather than need.   Human beings explain themselves because understanding permits communication, intimacy and correction.   To wish to be understood belongs to many relations.   But explanation can acquire another function.   A person may continue explaining after the relevant facts have been communicated because disagreement or incomprehension has begun to unsettle his confidence in his own judgment.   Another person’s understanding then ceases to be the object of communication and becomes a condition required for certainty about oneself.

The turning point may become visible when the explanation no longer changes what is being communicated and seeks only to change the listener’s response.   If the facts have been stated, the reasons have been understood and the person nevertheless continues reformulating them until assent is obtained, the persistence discloses something other than an effort at clarification.   The conversation has begun to sustain a need for ratification.   Disagreement is no longer received only as a difference of judgment:   it threatens the stability of the interpretation the person maintains of his own experience.

The difference between understanding and validation is easily obscured.   Someone who refuses all external judgment does not thereby possess greater independence.   Another person may perceive an inconsistency that the person acting cannot see.   Evidence may require revision, and disagreement may reveal error.   Independence of judgment therefore cannot mean insulation from correction.   It consists instead in preserving the distinction between evidence that challenges a judgment and another person’s failure to ratify it.   Without that distinction, agreement can be mistaken for truth and disagreement for invalidation.

If the need to be understood allows another person’s perception to govern one’s understanding of oneself, projection permits the inverse movement.   One person’s expectation can govern what he recognizes in another.   Jung’s treatment of projection becomes useful at precisely this point because it directs scrutiny toward the contribution made by the perceiver to what appears to have been discovered in someone else.

The operation is particularly difficult to recognize when expectation assumes the form of hope.   To perceive another person’s capacities is not necessarily to misperceive that person.   People learn, reconsider, deteriorate, recover and change.   Present conduct cannot exhaust every future possibility.   Yet possibility can also displace evidence.   A person repeatedly encountered as unreliable may continue to be treated according to the reliability he might someday develop.   Someone who repeatedly injures another may be encountered through an anticipated transformation rather than through the conduct that continues to occur.

Hope reveals its displacement when repetition ceases to modify expectation.   If a form of conduct recurs, produces recognizable consequences and nevertheless continues to be interpreted each time as an exception preceding a change that remains perpetually imminent, future possibility has begun to protect the perceiver from present evidence.   Hope no longer enlarges what may occur.   It reduces the authority of what is occurring.

Projection reveals why perception of another person cannot be examined solely by asking whether the description appears plausible.   The perceiver also enters the description.   What he fears, desires or requires can organize which features become prominent and which remain subordinate.   Recognition of this participation is one of Jung’s durable contributions.   Its value lies in returning an interpretation to the person making it rather than granting that person privileged access to the psychological truth of someone else.

The same discipline becomes necessary when interpretation turns toward the past.   Injury differs from projection because the event may be demonstrable and its consequences enduring.   A person who has suffered abandonment, humiliation, violence or loss does not falsify experience by recognizing that the event changed him.   Memory preserves facts that neither psychological development nor the passage of time can repeal.   The diagnostic question concerns something else:   the relation between what happened and the authority subsequently granted to what happened.

An injury can explain a present reaction without explaining the whole person who reacts.   It can constrain later possibilities without determining every later choice.   It can remain painful without requiring every new relation to reproduce its original terms.   The distinction becomes important when a past event supplies a stable interpretation for circumstances that differ from the event itself.   What once explained a response may then begin to organize responses before present circumstances have been adequately perceived.

This does not mean that a person should relinquish an identity formed through suffering, as though identity could be discarded by decision.   Nor does it authorize an observer to determine when another person has remembered an injury for too long.   Such judgments would reproduce the error under examination by allowing an interpretation to precede the experience it claims to explain.   The relevant question remains diagnostic:   whether memory continues to register what happened or whether what happened has acquired governing authority over what can happen now.

Goodness, helping, understanding, hope and memory do not therefore form a catalogue of symptoms or five interchangeable variations of a single disposition.   Each engages a different relation:   another person’s judgment enters into goodness; another person’s need modifies the meaning of help; understanding introduces the relation between communication and ratification; hope introduces the distance between present conduct and future possibility; memory confronts the persistence of what has occurred with the openness of new circumstances.   What they share is not a hidden common cause, but the possibility that each relation may acquire authority over the identity of the person engaged in it.

Jung’s psychology becomes particularly valuable at this juncture.   Persona, shadow and projection do not have to be treated as compartments within a psychological anatomy.   They can identify relations that expose the insufficiency of conscious self-description.   The persona draws attention to the social form through which a person presents himself.   The shadow registers the discrepancy among that presentation, the accompanying conception of oneself and what conduct discloses.   Projection examines what the perceiver contributes to an apparently external perception.

Individuation occupies a broader place in Jung than these particular operations.   It does not merely designate the detection of contradictions within one’s identity, but a process of differentiation and integration through which contents previously subordinated, excluded or projected may enter into a less unilateral relation with consciousness.   The notion therefore retains a distinct place within Jungian thought before it serves the inquiry pursued here.   Its relevance to this essay lies in the fact that the process does not require treating a person’s self-explanation as complete, while neither does it turn every discrepancy into evidence of an unseen structure.

The strength of this approach lies in its refusal to equate consciousness with the account consciousness gives of itself.   A person may sincerely misunderstand his own conduct.   He may act from several motives while recognizing only one.   He may perceive accurately and still introduce into perception an expectation he does not recognize.   He may preserve a truthful memory while allowing that memory to determine circumstances that no longer reproduce it.   Jung’s concepts provide a vocabulary for examining these discrepancies without requiring that conscious intention be dismissed as fraudulent.

The same vocabulary, however, introduces a further difficulty when Jung moves from discrepancies and relations that can be confronted with experience to archetypes.   Human lives undoubtedly contain recurrences.   Birth, dependency, separation, sexuality, rivalry, authority, danger, loss, aging and death confront human beings under widely different historical and cultural conditions.   Stories and images produced from these conditions consequently exhibit correspondences.   Recognition of those correspondences can enlarge perception by allowing one representation to illuminate features of another that might otherwise remain unnoticed.

Here the distinction between observable discrepancy and postulated structure becomes important again.   A contradiction between conduct and the explanation a person gives of himself can be examined in the very terms in which it appears.   An archetype, by contrast, proposes that separate recurrences refer to a psychic organization that precedes them.   Similarity among phenomena may justify comparison; by itself, it does not establish the existence of the structure invoked to explain that similarity.

An archetype remains useful while it allows recurrence to be recognized without determining its meaning in advance.   The difficulty begins when recurrence is taken as evidence of an underlying psychic structure and that structure is then invoked to explain why the recurrence exists.   The direction of inquiry has changed.   An affinity first discovered among experiences becomes the antecedent from which those experiences are said to proceed.

This movement creates an interpretive advantage that is also a methodological weakness.   If two representations resemble one another, their resemblance can be cited as evidence of an archetypal form.   If they differ, the differences can be understood as particular cultural or individual manifestations of the same form.   The archetype can therefore survive both resemblance and variation.   As its capacity to accommodate different manifestations increases, the conditions under which the interpretation could prove inadequate become more difficult to specify.

A further problem follows.   An archetype does not identify itself.   An interpreter decides that different images, stories or experiences disclose the same recurrent form.   That decision may be illuminating, but the act of comparison belongs to the interpreter.   If the resulting archetype is subsequently treated as a structure inherent in the phenomena themselves, the interpretive operation that produced the resemblance disappears from view.   A method devised partly to expose projection can then conceal the interpreter’s own participation in constructing the category.

The tension does not require either accepting or rejecting archetypal thought as a whole.   It requires preserving a distinction between recognition and explanation.   Recurrent forms deserve examination because recurrence may disclose relations that isolated observation misses.   Recurrence does not by itself establish that a universal psychic structure produced them.   The archetype can remain a means of comparison without becoming an ontology of human consciousness.

The same restraint permits a return to individuation without reducing it to the method of this essay.   Within Jung’s thought, individuation retains its broader scope as a process of differentiation and integration of the personality.   Outside any doctrinal acceptance of that process, a more limited consequence remains useful:   no established self-description should be exempt from what experience reveals in contradiction with it.   This formulation neither turns individuation into a general theory of authenticity nor assumes the recovery of a true self concealed beneath social adaptation.

If individuation were understood as the recovery of such a true self, the concept would merely replace one fixed identity with another.   The authentic person would become another model to inhabit, complete with expectations about autonomy, integration and freedom from dependence.   By contrast, recognizing that an identity may exclude aspects of experience does not require prescribing a final identity.   Inquiry alters the authority granted to self-description without asserting that a completed self lies hidden beneath it.

This distinction returns the inquiry to the identities with which it began.   The purpose is not to cease wanting to be good, helping others, seeking understanding, recognizing possibility or remembering injury.   Each remains part of human relation.   Nor is the purpose to uncover a purified self from which dependency has disappeared.   A person continues to exist among other people, to be affected by them, to depend upon judgment, memory and expectation, and to participate in relations that cannot be reduced to individual autonomy.

What changes under examination is not necessarily the relation itself but the authority it acquires.   A person can ask whether the desire to be good prevents acknowledgment of an ungenerous response; whether helping another has become necessary to feeling necessary; whether an explanation continues to seek understanding or has begun to demand ratification; whether hope remains open to possibility or converts repeated contrary evidence into exception; whether memory informs present judgment or determines it before current circumstances can disclose themselves.   None of these questions supplies its answer through the category used to formulate it.

That limitation is also their value.   Diagnostic thought does not need to tell a person what he secretly is.   It can examine what his conduct requires him not to notice in order for an established account of himself to remain coherent.   Jung’s most durable concepts assist that examination when they disclose a discrepancy or relation without claiming to have exhausted its cause.   They become less reliable when the name assigned to a recurrence begins to substitute for the inquiry that made the recurrence perceptible.

The question that remains is therefore neither which identity should be abandoned nor which archetype contains its explanation.   It is whether the identity through which a person recognizes himself continues to answer to experience, or whether experience has begun to answer to the identity.

*

Ricardo F. Morín

August 10, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania


“The Clinician”

May 3, 2026

Ricardo F. Morín
Orpheus
4.47″x 10.38″
2003

Scene One: Monday Morning

Could it be safe to take a shower between 7 and 8 am?

He will take his morning medication just before the shower.  

It is 43 degrees Fahrenheit outside, rising to 64 by the time he arrives at Penn Medicine in University City.

He considers scheduling an Uber for 11:45 am; his husband will say it is too early.

It’s 7:05.  He hears his husband making the beds in the next room.  He goes to shower.

His husband asks whether he would be up to taking a ride tomorrow, the day before departure.

He says he would decide based on how he felt.

Each choice has required assessment.

Two bowel movements.  A familiar pattern, a sense of incomplete evacuation.  An anti-diarrheal may be needed.

Not diarrhea.  An accelerated colon.

He does not exceed 2 mg unless it becomes continuous.

Propulsion.  Heartburn.  Hiatal hernia.  Micro-aspirations.  They do not occur separately, especially while recovering from a respiratory infection.

It’s 8:40 am.  Three hours before the Uber arrives.

Would a warm compress help?

His husband hears him cough and asks if he wants tea.

The N95 mask was used recently at the ER.  The new ones are in the carry-on.  Is it necessary to look for them?

His husband helps.  He will keep a mask for the flight to London.  It is reassuring, even in business class.

Should he take a nasal cleanser on the cruise to the British Isles?

He switches shoes.  Cold feet persist.  No marked improvement.

With an hour and a half before leaving, better not to wear shoes.  Wool slippers instead.  Cold feet persist.  He will decide on the spot before leaving:  the clogs.

The interior temperature is 66 degrees with the humidifier on.

He is dressed warmly, but the air feels nippy.

He does not turn up the heat.

He turns off the humidifier, rests his feet over the yoga bolster, and covers them with a blanket.

Scene Two: Monday Afternoon

When he spoke to the physician, she asked, in a friendly tone, how often he visited his family in Venezuela.  He said he would not assume she was unfamiliar with Venezuela.  For over three decades, it had not been safe for him to return.*

She stated that his resilience was a testament to how far HIV treatment had advanced.  He did not respond immediately.  When he did, he was not entirely sure whether medication or sheer DNA disposition had protected him from opportunistic infections, though he had developed full AIDS.

She was eager to know who he was.  At the same time, he detected a degree of vulnerability in her:  a young, enthusiastic virologist, a mother of seven months.

He asked about the baby’s name.  She shared it.  She said the child was struggling to walk and that the intensity of it felt overwhelming.

When he brought up his infectious disease doctor before moving from New York to Florida, he mentioned that both she and her husband were HIV positive.  She had treated him for twenty-five years.  Her care was not only clinical.  It was also informed by lived knowledge, though she never made it the center of her care.  He held that knowledge as a standard to meet.

The physician widened her eyes.  She said she knows this was her first child and that much lay ahead;  right now it felt demanding.  He said she will eventually look back on this time with affection.  She completed his sentence.

What he is now talking about is not diagnostic, analytic, or logical.  It is something else.

Before they part, she says she looks forward to learning from him.  He quips:  learning from each other.

The physician led the consultation from the moment she stated her objectives.  She said she wanted to show herself and hoped he would do the same.  It was unusual.  She was poised, centered.  He had not experienced this kind of rapport before.  Was it his letter of introduction?  The way he had organized his clinical history and his team of caregivers?

Afterward, his husband asks whether she is the right fit.  He answers with hesitation.  Her eagerness repeats itself.  Time will tell.

He wonders whether his husband sees himself reflected in his responses, and about his own perception, whether there is intent behind it.

Shortly after they return home, his husband comes to him.  He wants to hug and kiss him, pleased with how it went.  He says, “we did it; we are now safe to travel with everything in the right place.”  Then he returns seconds later to tell him it was because of his generosity.

*

Scene Three: Monday Night

*

After he left the office of the infectious disease doctor at Penn Medicine, and before returning home past 4 pm, he was hungry.  They stopped at the hospital cafeteria, where he had chicken noodle soup loaded with condiments, more than he would normally have.

The soup was saltier than his preference.

When he took the first spoonful, his throat and esophageal sphincter contracted, and he paused.

He remembered that small sips, spaced a few minutes apart, were necessary.  After a few sips, he reached a level of comfort that allowed him to finish the soup.

They walked outside, and by the main entrance he ordered an Uber back home.  He arrived just in time to consider the next meal after the soup.

He had two consecutive meals without heartburn.

He had been weighed at 126 pounds.  He had lost six to eight pounds since contracting a viral infection.

At 9:34 pm, he was watching a movie about bodies living with severe disabilities.

His rib cage felt as if it were pressing on his liver.

He had been dealing with a medication-induced fatty liver and elevated enzymes.

He realized that liver failure is possible, though he had been a long-term HIV survivor without ever facing a major opportunistic infection, even when he experienced wasting syndrome thirty years ago and had only thirty-four T cells.

He cannot account for his good fortune, but he knows he has it.

Ricardo F. Morín

April 29, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pa

Video portrait set to a Piazzolla tango composition. Mixed media drawing rendered in Maya. Red and black figure study with rotating fields; hair and flame introduced in sequence, drawing from a classical descent motif.

“Lines That Divide”

March 1, 2026
Ricardo Morin
Silence III
22’ x 30” 
Watercolor, graphite, gesso, acrylic on paper 
2010

  • Rethinking Identity and Entitlement in Civic Life


The phrase “my people” draws lines.  It signals allegiance before argument begins.  It may express familiarity, shared memory, or recognition.  Yet the same words separate one group from another.  A boundary forms, often without intention.  Those inside feel affirmed; those outside may feel unseen.

Such moments rarely begin as acts of exclusion.  They arise from ordinary human impulses:  the desire to protect what feels familiar, to defend what has been wounded, or to claim space where one has felt overlooked.  But when identity becomes the primary language through which claims are made, conversations change.  Disagreement becomes personal.  Listening becomes strategic.  The space where people meet as equals contracts.

Group identity has long provided people with strength and protection.  It helps individuals recover dignity when they feel ignored or misunderstood, and it offers language through which shared experiences can be recognized.  Yet the same force can also narrow perception.  When group identity becomes the main lens through which people judge one another, ideas are weighed less on their merit and more on the speaker’s affiliation.

When ideas begin to be judged primarily through identity rather than merit, the change is often subtle.  An exchange that begins openly can become defensive as participants look for signs of alignment or opposition.  Words are weighed for allegiance.  Questions are interpreted as challenges rather than invitations to examine ideas together.  Over time, dialogue shifts from exploration toward defense of positions. Judgment shifts from the merit of an idea to the standing of the speaker.

Many people carry an expectation into public life that they will be treated consistently.  Uneven rules are recognized quickly.  When identity determines whose voice counts before ideas are heard, trust weakens not only among those excluded, but also among those unsure whether they are seen as individuals or as representatives of a category.

Problems deepen when identity stops being one part of a person’s experience and begins to overshadow all others.  Public debate narrows.  Arguments are interpreted as attacks on identity rather than disagreements over ideas.  People feel compelled to defend positions not because they are persuaded by them, but because reconsidering publicly may be treated as betrayal.  The result is not stronger community, but increasing rigidity, where listening carries risk and reconsideration feels unsafe.

People turn toward simplification and absolutism to reduce uncertainty and relieve the strain of complexity.  This tendency does not permanently define human interaction; it marks moments when ambiguity feels intolerable and certainty appears easier to sustain.  Certainty offers relief, but it reduces the space in which plurality can endure.  The tension itself does not disappear; only the way people attempt to manage it changes.

Contemporary communication technologies accelerate the circulation and visibility of opinion.  Expressions that promise certainty or provoke fear travel farther and faster; expressions that sustain ambiguity move more slowly.  This circulation amplifies tendencies toward simplification, reinforcing what attracts attention rather than what withstands examination.

When identity becomes the basis for deciding who others are before dialogue takes shape, examination gives way to labeling.  Nuance is set aside.  Individuals become symbols of larger struggles, and ordinary encounters carry the weight of broader conflicts.  Under these conditions, disagreement resembles confrontation even when intentions remain sincere.

Public life rests on an expectation that the same rules apply to all.  Uneven application becomes visible when some voices are heard more readily than others or when identity determines credibility before ideas are considered.  Under these conditions, conversation shifts from exchange toward competition for recognition, and the possibility of shared judgment becomes more difficult to sustain.

The tension does not belong to one group alone; this situation affects everyone who participates in public life.  Each person seeks recognition while fearing misinterpretation.  Attempts to resolve disagreement through persuasion alone often reach limits beyond individual control.  Listening, under these conditions, does not erase distance but allows interaction to continue despite it.

Differences remain, and disagreement persists.  The lines that divide do not disappear; they shift, harden, or soften as people respond to one another in ordinary encounters.  Living together does not remove tension; living together reveals tension.  No shared answer resolves the matter.  Each person must decide how to respond and how to live alongside others within limits no one fully controls.

Ricardo F. Morín, February 15, 2026, Oakland Park, Florida.


“Unmasking Disappointment: Series II”

January 21, 2026

*

“Geometric Allegory” digital painting ©2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

Reflections from previous chapters eventually lead to a more historical inquiry, in which the following archive, Chronicles of Hugo Chávez, becomes another lens through which I approach the Venezuelan experience.

*

Ricardo F. Morín, December 12, 2025, Oakland Park, Florida.


Chronicles of Hugo Chávez

1

Hugo Chávez, who spearheaded the Bolivarian Revolution, was born on July 28, 1954, in Sabaneta, Venezuela.   He died on March 5, 2013, at 4:25 p.m. VET (8:55 p.m. UTC) in Caracas, at the age of 58.   As the leader of the revolution, Chávez left a discernible imprint on Venezuela’s political history.   To reconstruct this history is to revisit a landscape whose consequences continue to shape Venezuelan life.

At the core of Chavismo lies a deliberate fusion of nationalism, centralized power, and military involvement in politics.   This fusion shaped his vision for a new Venezuela, one that would be fiercely independent and proudly socialist.

~

Hugo Chávez at age 11, sixth grade, 1965 (Photo: Reuters).

2

Hugo Chávez’s childhood was spent in a small town in Los Llanos, in the northwestern state of Barinas.   This region has a history of indigenous chiefdoms (i.e., “leaderships,” “dominions,” or “rules”) dating back to pre-Columbian times. [1]   Chávez was the second of six brothers, and his parents struggled to provide for the large family.   As a result, he and his older brother Adán were sent to live with their paternal grandmother, Rosa Inés, in the city of Barinas.   After her death, Chávez honored his grandmother’s memory with a poem; it concludes with a stanza that reveals the depth of their bond:

Entonces, /  abrirías tus brazos/  y me abrazarías/  cual tiempo de infante/   y me arrullarías/  con tu tierno canto/  y me llevarías/  por otros lugares/  a lanzar un grito/  que nunca se apague. [2]

[Author’s translation:   Then, /  you would open your arms /  and draw me in /  as if returned to childhood /  and you would steady me /  with your tender voice /  and you would carry me /  to other places /  to release a cry /  that would not be extinguished].

3

In his second year of high school, Chávez encountered two influential teachers, José Esteban Ruiz Guevara and Douglas Ignacio Bravo Mora, both of whom provided guidance outside the regular curriculum. [3][4]   They introduced Chávez to Marxism-Leninism as a theoretical framework, sparking his fascination with the Cuban Revolution and its principles—a turning point more visible in retrospect than it could have been in the moment.

4

At 17, Chávez enrolled in the Academia Militar de Venezuela at Fuerte Tiuna in Caracas, where he hoped to balance military training with his passion for baseball.  He dreamed of becoming a left-handed pitcher, but his abilities did not match his ambition.   Despite his initial lack of interest in military life, Chávez persisted in his training, graduating from the academy in 1975 near the bottom of his class.

5

Chávez’s military career began as a second lieutenant; he was tasked with capturing leftist guerrillas.   As he pursued them, he found himself identifying with their cause and believed they fought for a better life.   But by 1977, Chávez was prepared to abandon his military career and join the guerrillas.   Seeking guidance, he turned to his brother Adán, who persuaded him to remain in the military by insisting, “We need you there.” [5]   Chávez now felt a sense of purpose and understood his mission as a calling.   In 1982, he and his closest military associates formed the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement-200:   they aimed to spread their interpretation of Marxism within the armed forces and ultimately hoped to stage a coup d’état. [6]

6

On February 4, 1992, Lieutenant Chávez and his military allies launched a revolt against the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.   Their rebellion, however, was swiftly quashed.   Surrounded and outnumbered, Chávez surrendered at the Cuartel de la Montaña, the military history museum in Caracas, near the presidential palace, on the condition that he be allowed to address his companions via television.   He urged them to lay down their arms and to avoid further bloodshed.   He proclaimed, « Compañeros, lamentablemente por ahora los objetivos que nos planteamos no fueron logrados . . . » [Author’s translation:   “Comrades, unfortunately, our objectives have not been achieved… yet,”].[7]   The broadcast marked the beginning of his political ascent.   His words resonated across the nation and sowed the seeds of his political future.

~

Chávez announces his arrest on national television and urges insurgent troops to surrender.

7

In 1994, newly elected President Rafael Caldera Rodríguez pardoned him. [8]   With this second chance, Chávez founded the Movimiento V República (MVR) in 1997 and rallied like-minded socialists to his cause. [9]   Through a campaign centered on populist appeals, he secured an electoral victory at age 44.

8

In his first year as President, Chávez enjoyed an 80% approval rating.   His policies sought to eradicate corruption in the government, to expand social programs for the poor, and to redistribute national wealth.   Jorge Olavarría de Tezanos Pinto, initially a supporter, emerged by the end of the elections as a prominent voice of the opposition.   Olavarría accused Chávez of undermining Venezuela’s democracy through his appointment of military officers to governmental positions. [10]   At the same time, Chávez was drafting a new constitution, which allowed him to place military officers in all branches of government.   The new constitution, ratified on December 15, 1999, paved the way for the “mega elections” of 2000, in which Chávez secured a term of six years.   Although his party failed to gain full control of the Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly), it passed laws by decree through the mechanism of the Leyes Habilitantes (Enabling Laws). [11][12]   Meanwhile, Chávez initiated reforms to reorganize the State‘s institutional structure, but the constitution’s requirements were not met.   The appointment of judges to the new Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJ] was carried out without rigor and raised concerns about its legitimacy and competence.   Cecilia Sosa Gómez, the outgoing Corte Suprema de Justicia president, declared the rule of law “buried” and the court “self-dissolved.” [13][14]

9

Although some Venezuelans saw Chávez as a refreshing alternative to the country’s unstable democratic system, which had been dominated by three parties since 1958, many others expressed concern as the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) consolidated power and became the sole governing party. [15]   Legislative and executive powers were increasingly centralized, and the narrowing of judicial guarantees limited citizens’ participation in the democratic process.   Chávez’s close ties with Fidel Castro and his desire to model Venezuela after Cuba’s system—dubbed VeneCuba—raised alarm. [16]   He silenced independent radio broadcasters, and he antagonized the United States and other Western nations.  Instead, he strengthened ties with Iraq, Iran, and Libya.   Meanwhile, domestically, his approval rating had plummeted to 30%, and anti-Chávez demonstrations became a regular occurrence.

10

On April 11, 2002, a massive demonstration of more than a million people converged on the presidential palace to demand President Chávez’s resignation.   The protest turned violent when agents of the National Guard and masked paramilitaries opened fire on the demonstrators. [17]   The tragic event—the Puente Llaguno massacre—sparked a military uprising that led to Chávez’s arrest and to the installation of a transitional government under Pedro Francisco Carmona Estanga. [18]   Carmona’s leadership, however, was short-lived; he swiftly suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Asamblea Nacional and the Corte Suprema, and dismissed various officials.   Within forty-eight hours, the army withdrew its support for Carmona.   The vice president, Diosdado Cabello Rondón, was reinstated as president and promptly restored Chávez to power. [19]

11

The failed coup d’état enabled Chávez to purge his inner circle and to intensify his conflict with the opposition.   In December 2002, Venezuela’s opposition retaliated with a nationwide strike aimed at forcing Chávez’s resignation.   The strike targeted the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), which generated roughly 80% of the country’s export revenues. [20]   Chávez responded by dismissing its 38,000 employees and replacing them with loyalists.   By February 2003, the strike had dissipated, and Chávez had once again secured control over the country’s oil revenues.

12

From 2003 to 2004, the opposition launched a referendum to oust Chávez as president, but soaring oil revenues, which financed social programs, bolstered Chávez’s support among lower-income sectors. [21]   By the end of 2004, his popularity had rebounded, and the referendum was soundly defeated.   In December 2005, the opposition boycotted the elections to the National Assembly and protested against the Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Council) (CNE). [22]   As anticipated in view of the opposition boycott, Chávez’s coalition capitalized on the absence of an effective opposition and strengthened its grip on the Assembly. [23]    By that point, legislative control rested almost entirely with Chávez’s coalition.    What followed was not a departure from this trajectory, but its extension through formal policy.

13

In December 2006, Chávez secured a third presidential term, a victory that expanded the scope of executive initiative.   He nationalized key industries—gold, electricity, telecommunications, gas, steel, mining, agriculture, and banking—along with numerous smaller entities. [24][25][26][27][28][29]   Chávez also introduced a package of constitutional amendments designed to expand the powers of the executive and to extend its control over the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV).   In a controversial move, he unilaterally altered property rights and allowed the state to seize private real estate without judicial oversight.   Furthermore, he proposed becoming president for life.   In December 2007, however, the National Assembly narrowly rejected the package of sweeping reforms.

14

In February 2009, Chávez reintroduced his controversial proposals and succeeded in advancing them.   Following strategic counsel from Cuba, he escalated the crackdown on dissent. [30]   He ordered the arrest of elected opponents and shut down all private television stations.

15

In June 2011, Chávez announced that he would undergo surgery in Cuba to remove a tumor, a development that sparked confusion and concern throughout the country. [31]   As his health came under increasing scrutiny, more voters began to question his fitness for office.   Yet, in 2012, despite his fragile health, Chávez campaigned against Henrique Capriles and secured a surprise presidential victory. [32]

~

Chávez during the electoral campaign in February 2012.

16

In December 2012, Chávez underwent his fourth surgery in Cuba.   Before departing Venezuela, he announced his plan for transition and designated Vice President Nicolás Maduro as his successor, alongside a powerful troika that included Diosdado Cabello [military chief] and Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño [administrator of PDVSA]. [33][34][35]   Following the surgery, Chávez was transferred on December 11 to the Hospital Militar Universitario Dr. Carlos Arvelo (attached to the Universidad Militar Bolivariana de Venezuela, or UMBV) in Caracas, where he remained incommunicado, further fueling speculation and rumors.   Some government officials dismissed reports of assassination, while others, including former Attorney General Luisa Ortega Díaz, claimed he had already died on December 28. [36]   Maduro’s cabinet vehemently refuted these allegations and insisted that no crime had been committed.   Amidst the uncertainty, Maduro asked the National Assembly to postpone the inauguration indefinitely.    This further intensified political tensions.

17

The National Assembly acquiesced to Maduro and voted to postpone the inauguration.   Chávez succumbed to his illness on March 5.   His body was embalmed in three separate stages without benefit of autopsy, which further fueled suspicions and conspiracy theories.   Thirty days later, Maduro entered office amid sustained political uncertainty. [37]   The implications of this transition extend beyond chronology; they shape the conditions examined in the chapters that follow in this series, which comprises 19 chapters, miscellaneous rubrics, and an appendix.

~


Endnotes:

§ 2

[1]   Charles S. Spencer and Elsa M. Redmond, Prehispanic Causeways and Regional Politics in the Llanos of Barinas, Venezuela (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). Abstract: “…relacionados con la dinámica política de la organización cacical durante la fase Gaván Tardía.” Published in Latin American Antiquity, vol. 9, no. 2 (June 1998): 95-110. https://doi.org/10.2307/971989

[2]   Rosa Miriam Elizalde y Luis Báez, Chávez Nuestro, (La Habana: Casa Editora Abril, 2007), 367-369.    https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BzEKs4usYkReRVdWSG5LQkFYQ3c/edit?pli=1&resourcekey=0-yHaK7-YkA47nelVs-7JuBQ 

§ 3

[3] “The Hugo Chávez Show,” PBS Front Line, November 19, 2008.    https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hugochavez/etc/ex2.html

[4]   L’Atelier des Archive, “Interview du révolutionnaire:   Douglas Bravo au Venezuela [circa 1960]” (Transcript:   “… conceptos injuriosos en contra de la revolución cubana …” [timestamp 1;11-14]), YouTube, October 14, 2016.   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1cx2D5VM8VM

§ 5

[5]   “Hugo Chavez Interview,”YouTube, transcript excerpt and time stamp unavailable:   Original quote in Spanish (translated by the author):  “. . . , if not, maybe I’ll leave the Army, no, you can’t leave, Adam told me so, no, we need you there, but who needs me?”   Retrieved October 12, 2023.

[6]   Dario Azzellini and Gregory Wilpert, “Venezuela, MBR–200 and the Military Uprisings of 1992,”in The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest (Wiley 2009).    https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/9781405198073.wbierp1525

§ 6

[7]   “Declarations in a Nationwide Government-Mandated Broadcast,” BancoAgrícolaVe, YouTube, February 4, 1992.    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QqaR1ZjldE

§ 7

[8]   Maxwell A. Cameron and Flavie Major, “Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez: Savior or Threat to Democracy?,” Latin American Research Review, vol. 36, no. 3, (2001):  255-266.    https://www.proquest.com/docview/218146430?sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals

[9]   Gustavo Coronel, “Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela,” Center for Global Liberty & Prosperity:    Development Policy Analysis, no. 2 (CATO Institute, November 27, 2006).   https://www.issuelab.org/resources/2539/2539.pdf.

§ 8

[10]   “Jorge Olavarría Ante El Congreso Bicameral [July 5,1999],” YouTube.    https://youtu.be/_OkqNn8VF-Y?si=Cvuh4Vk391_0Pnut .   Accessed January 9, 2025.

[11]   Mario J. García-Serra, “The ‘Enabling Law’:    The Demise of the Separation of Powers in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela,” University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, vol.32, no. 2, (Spring – Summer, 2001):   265-293.     https://www.jstor.org/stable/40176554

[12]   “Venezuela:   Chávez Allies Pack Supreme Court,” Human Rights Watch, December 13, 2004.    https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/12/13/venezuela-chavez-allies-pack-supreme-court

[13]   “Top Venezuelan judge resigns,” BBC News, August 25, 1999.   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/429304.stm

[14]   “Suprema Injusticia:    ‘These are corrupt judges,” Organización Transparencia Venezuela.    https://supremainjusticia.org/cecilia-sosa-gomez-these-are-corrupt-judges/

§ 9

[15]   “United Socialist Party of Venezuela,” PSUV.   http://www.psuv.org.ve/

[16]   “Venezuela and Cuba, ‘VeneCuba,’ a single nation,” The Economist, February 11, 2010.   https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2010/02/11/venecuba-a-single-nation

§ 10

[17] “Photographs reveal the truth about Puente Llaguno massacre,” April 11, 2002, YouTube.    https://youtu.be/NvP7cL-7KL4?si=cUpMAv0myAWH5UWP

[18] “Pedro Carmona Estanga cuenta su verdad 21 años después,” El Nacional de Venezuela.     https://www.elnacional.com/opinion/pedro-carmona-estanga-cuenta-su-verdad-21-anos-despues/

[19] “Diosdado Cabello Rondón:Narcotics Rewards Program: Wanted,” U.S. Department of State.     https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs/releases/2025/01/diosdado-cabello-rondon

§ 11

[20]   Marc Lifsher, “Venezuela Strike Paralyzes State Oil Monopoly PdVSA,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2002.    https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1039101526679054593

§ 12

[21] “Socialism with Cheap Oil,” The Economist, December 30, 2008.    https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2008/12/30/socialism-with-cheap-oil

[22] “Venezuela: Increased Threats to Free Elections; New Electoral Body Puts Reforms at Risk,” Human Rights Watch, June 22, 2023 7:00AM.    https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/22/venezuela-increased-threats-free-elections

[23] Juan Forero, “Chávez Grip Tightens as Rivals Boycott Vote,” The New York Times, December 5, 2005.    https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/05/world/americas/chavezs-grip-tightens-as-rivals-boycott-vote.html?referringSource=articleShare

§ 13

[24] Louise Egan, “Chavez to nationalize Venezuelan gold industry,” Reuters, August 17, 2011, 2:40 PM.   https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-gold/chavez-to-nationalize-venezuelan-gold-industry-idUSTRE77G53L20110817/

[25] Juan Forero, “Chavez Eyes Nationalized Electrical, Telcom Firms,” Reuters, January 9, 2007, 6:00 AM ET.    https://www.npr.org/2007/01/09/6759012/chavez-eyes-nationalized-electrical-telcom-firms

[26] James Suggett, “Venezuela Nationalizes Gas Plant and Steel Companies, Pledges Worker Control,” Venezuelanalysis, May 23, 2009.    https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/4464/

[27] David Brunnstrom, “Factbox: Venezuela’s nationalizations under Chavez,” Reuters, October 7, 2012, 10:51 PM.    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election-nationalizations/factbox-venezuelas-nationalizations-under-chavez-idUSBRE89701X20121008/

[28] Frank Jack Daniel–Analysis–, “Food, farms the new target for Venezuela’s Chavez,” Reuters, March 5, 2009, 6:06 PM EST.   https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-chavez-analysis-sb/food-farms-the-new-target-for-venezuelas-chavez-idUSTRE5246OO20090305/

[29] Daniel Cancel, “Chavez Says He Has No Problem Nationalizing Banks,” Bloomberg, November 29, 2009, 15:02 GMT-5.    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-11-29/chavez-says-he-has-no-problem-nationalizing-banks

§ 14

[30] Angus Berwick, “Special Report: How Cuba taught Venezuela to quash military dissent,” Reuters, August 22, 2019, 8:22 AM ET.    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-cuba-military-specialreport/special-report-how-cuba-taught-venezuela-to-quash-military-dissent-idUSKCN1VC1BX/

§ 15

[31] Robert Zeliger, Passport: “Hugo Chavez’s medical mystery,” Foreign Policy, June 24, 2011, 10:20 PM.   https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/24/hugo-chavezs-medical-mystery/

[32] Juan Forero, “Hugo Chavez Beats Henrique Capriles,” The Washington Post, October 7, 2012.   https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/venezuelans-flood-polls-for-historic-election-to-decide-if-hugo-chavez-remains-in-power/2012/10/07/d77c461c-10c8-11e2-9a39-1f5a7f6fe945_story.html

§ 16

[33] Bryan Winter and Ana Flor, “Exclusive:   Brazil wants Venezuela election if Chavez dies – sources,” Reuters, January 14, 2013, 9:12 PM EST, updated 12 years ago.    https://www.reuters.com/article/cnews-us-venezuela-chavez-brazil-idCABRE90D12320130114/

[34] “Venezuela National Assembly chief: Diosdado Cabello,” BBC News, March 5, 2013.   https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20750536

[35] “Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño of Venezuela Chair of Fourth Committee,” United Nations, BIO/5031*-GA/SPD/630; 25 September 2017.   https://press.un.org/en/2017/bio5031.doc.htm

[36] Ludmila Vinogradoff, “La exfiscal Ortega confirma que Chávez murió dos meses antes de la fecha anunciada,” ABCInternacional, actualizado Julio 16, 2018, 12:44    https://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-confirman-chavez-murio-meses-antes-fecha-anunciada-201807132021_noticia.html?ref=https://www.google.com/

§ 17

[37] “Cuerpo de Chávez fue tratado tres veces para ser conservado: … intervenido con inyecciones de formol para que pudiera ser velado,” El Nacional De Venezuela – Gda, Enero 27, 2024, 05:50, actualizado Marzo 22, 2013, 20:51.   https://www.eltiempo.com/amp/archivo/documento/CMS-12708339

~

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series I”

January 7, 2026

“Geometric Allegory,” digital painting 2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

To my parents

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge Billy Bussell Thompson for his meticulous editorial guidance.  His feedback sharpened the structure, precision, and internal discipline of this work.

Preface

“Unmasking Disappointment” follows a line of inquiry present throughout my work:   the examination of identity, memory, and the relations that emerge when life unfolds across cultural boundaries.   Although I have lived outside Venezuela for more than five decades and became a naturalized citizen of the United States twenty-four years ago, my relationship to the country of my birth remains a persistent point of reference.   The distance between these conditions—belonging and removal—forms the backdrop against which this narrative takes shape.

This work belongs to a broader autobiographical project that gathers experiences, observations, and questions accumulated over time.   While personal in origin, it does not proceed as confession or memoir.   Its method is sequential rather than expressive:   individual exposure is situated within historical forces and political structures that have shaped Venezuelan life across generations.   The intention is not to reconcile these tensions, but to render them visible through recurrence, record, and consequence.

“Series I” introduces the first thematic clusters of this inquiry.   The episodes assembled here do not advance a single thesis, nor do they aim at resolution.   They trace points of friction where private experience intersects with public power, and where political narratives exert pressure on ordinary life.   Across these encounters, patterns emerge—not as abstractions, but as conditions that alter how authority is exercised, how responsibility is displaced, and how agency is constrained.

The chapters that follow examine the pressures produced by systemic inequality and trace contemporary Venezuelan conditions back to their historical formation.   Autocratic rule and popular consent appear not as opposing forces, but as elements that increasingly entangle and weaken one another.   Within this entanglement, truth does not disappear; it becomes less evenly accessible and more readily displaced by narrative.

When public discourse is shaped by propaganda and misinformation, authoritarian structures gain resilience.   Recovering truth under such conditions does not resolve political conflict, but it clarifies the limits within which political life operates.   Agency emerges not as an ideal, but as a condition sustained—or undermined—through practice and consequence.

This work does not propose deterministic explanations or simple remedies.   It proceeds by accumulation, drawing attention to patterns that persist despite changing circumstances.   What it asks of the reader is not agreement, but attention:   to evidence, to sequence, and to the conditions under which political freedom may be meaningfully exercised.

Writing from Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, I remain aware of the distance between the environments in which this work is composed and the conditions it examines.   That distance does not confer authority; it imposes responsibility.

Ricardo Federico Morín
Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, January 21, 2025


*

Table of Contents

  • Chapter I — A Written Language.
  • Chapter II — Our Recklessness.
  • Chapter III — Point of View.
  • Chapter IV — A Dialogue.
  • Chapter V — Abstract.
  • Chapter VI — Chronicles of Hugo Chávez (§§ I-XVII).
  • Chapter VII — The Allegorical Mode.
  • Chapter VIII — The Ideal Government and the Power of Virtue.
  • Chapter IX — First Sign:   On Political and Social Resentment.
  • Chapter X — Second Sign:   The Solid Pillar of Power; The Military Forces.
  • Chapter XI — Third Sign:  The Asymmetry of Political Parties.
  • Chapter XII — Fourth Sign:  Autocracy (§§ 1-9); Venezuela (§§ 10-23); The Asymmetry of Sanctions (§§ 24-32).
  • Chapter XIII – Fifth Sign:  The Pawned Republic.
  • Chapter XIV — First Issue:   Partisanship, Non-partisanship, and Antipartisanship.
  • Chapter XV — Second Issue:   On Partial Truths and Repressive Anarchy.
  • Chapter XVI — Third Issue:   The Clarion of Democracy.
  • Chapter XVII — Fourth Issue:   On Human Rights.
  • Chapter XVIII — Fifth Issue:  On the Nature of Violence.
  • Chapter XIX — Sixth Issue:   On the Persistence of Injustice.
  • Chapter XX — The Ultimate Issue:   Constitutional Form and Its Hollowing.
  • Appendix:   Author’s Note, Prefatory Note.     A). Venezuelan Constitutions [1811-1999], Branches, and Departments of Government.   B) Evolution of Political Parties: 1840-2024.    C) Laws Enacted by the Asamblea Nacional.  D) Clarificatory Note on Domestic Coercion, Foreign Presence, and Intervention.
  • Bibliography.

A Written Language

Stability is often sought where it cannot be secured.   Experience has shown this repeatedly.   Even careful intentions tend to draw one into uncertain terrain, where understanding lags behind consequence.   At the desk, as late-afternoon light reaches the page, writing assumes a practical function:   it becomes a means of ordering what would otherwise remain unsettled.   The act does not resolve vulnerability, but it records it.   Whether time alters such conditions remains uncertain; what can be done is to give them form.

What follows moves from the conditions of writing to the conditions it must confront.


*

Our Recklessness

~

“Our painful struggle to deal with the politics of climate change is surely also a product of the strange standoff between science and political thinking.” — Hannah Arendt:   The Human Condition:   Being and Time [1958], Kindle Book, 159.

1

The COVID pandemic and the 2023 Canadian wildfires, among other recent events, have made visible conditions that were already in place.     These events did not introduce new vulnerabilities as much as they revealed the extent to which existing systems depend on economic incentives and political habits that privilege extraction over preservation.   During the period when smoke from the fires reached the northeastern United States, daylight in parts of Pennsylvania was visibly altered and registered the reach of events unfolding at a considerable distance.   Such occurrences do not stand apart from prevailing economic arrangements; they coincide with a model that treats natural conditions as commodities and absorbs their degradation as an external cost.

2

The fires in California in 2025, like those that spread across Canada in 2023, do not present themselves as isolated occurrences.   They form part of a sequence shaped by environmental neglect, political inertia, and sustained industrial expansion.   Conditions such as desertification, resource scarcity, and population displacement no longer appear solely as projected outcomes; they are increasingly registered as present circumstances.   Scientific assessments indicate that these patterns are likely to intensify in the absence of structural change. [1][2][3]   What is brought into view, over time, is not a singular failure but a system that continues to operate according to priorities that favor immediate yield over long-term continuity.

3

The question of balance does not arise solely as a technical problem.   It emerges within a moral and political field shaped by prevailing economic assumptions.   The treatment of nature—and more recently of artificial intelligence—as a commodity reflects a trajectory in which matters of shared survival are increasingly translated into market terms.    Under such conditions, considerations that once belonged to collective responsibility are recast as variables within systems of calculation.

4

Such patterns place increasing strain on conditions necessary for collective survival.   Responses to these conditions vary and range from indifference to urgency, though urgency does not invariably produce clarity.   What becomes apparent, across repeated instances, is a tendency for crisis to recur without sustained adjustment.   This recurrence parallels the political histories examined in the chapters that follow, where warning and consequence frequently fail to align.


Endnotes—Chapter II


*

Point of View

1

Conversations with my editor, Billy Bussell Thompson, have accompanied the development of this work over time.    His attention to research method and to the structure of argument has contributed to the clarification of its scope and direction.    These exchanges, often conducted at a distance and without ceremony, formed part of the process through which the present narrative took shape.    After an extended period of uncertainty regarding how to approach the subject of Hugo Chávez, the contours of Unmasking Disappointment gradually emerged.

2

Hugo Chávez entered national political life as a leader whose authority was exercised in opposition to political liberalism. [1]  While his public discourse emphasized alignment with the poor, the material benefits of power accumulated within a narrow circle. [2]  Over the course of his tenure, democratic institutions in Venezuela experienced progressive weakening, and governance assumed increasingly authoritarian forms.   These developments become more legible when situated within the historical record and examined through documented practice rather than rhetorical claim.

3

The events that followed Chávez’s rule are marked by disorder and unresolved consequence.   Their persistence draws attention to questions of historical accountability and collective responsibility that remain unsettled.   Examining the record of autocratic leadership—its ambitions as well as its failures—provides a means of approaching the problem of justice in Venezuela without presuming resolution.   Through this examination, enduring tensions come into view as conditions to be understood rather than conclusions to be reached.

~


Endnotes—Chapter III

  • [1]   The term caudillo originates in Spanish and has historically been used to describe a leader who exercises concentrated political and military authority.    In the Venezuelan context, the term carries particular resonance and refers to figures associated with the post-independence period of the nineteenth century.    Such leaders tended to consolidate power through a combination of personal authority, allegiance from armed factions, and the promise—whether substantive or rhetorical—of maintaining order under conditions of instability.    While some were regarded as defenders of local or national causes, others became associated with practices that facilitated authoritarian governance and weakened institutional structures.    The concept of the caudillo continues to function within Venezuelan political culture as a descriptive category applied to leadership forms that combine popular support with concentrated power.

Chapter IV

A Dialogue

A series of conversations between BBT and the author accompanied the examination of Venezuelan politics and history developed in this section.   These exchanges formed a transitional space in which reflection gave way to historical inquiry, allowing questions of interpretation, responsibility, and record to be addressed through dialogue rather than exposition.

1

—RFM:   “My writing has been concerned with the evolution of Venezuela’s political landscape, with particular attention to the emergence of authoritarian forms of rule.   The focus has been less on abstract doctrine than on how specific policies translated into everyday conditions for ordinary Venezuelans.”

2

—BBT:   “Examining how authoritarian leadership shapes political conditions is necessary, though the term itself is often contested and applied unevenly.   In Chávez’s case, the use of propaganda was not exceptional in form, but it was consistently employed as an instrument of governance.   How did official narratives during his tenure circulate, and what effects did they have on public perception over time?”

3

—RFM:  “Propaganda is not unique to Chávez; it functions as a recurring instrument across political systems.   In Venezuela, official media regularly attributed economic hardship to external interference rather than to domestic policy decisions.    At the same time, material conditions deteriorated, with shortages emerging from economic mismanagement and later compounded by external restrictions.   Opposition groups also circulated counter-narratives, which in turn elicited responses from the State.    These exchanges unfolded within a historical context shaped by civil conflict and Cold War alignments, and produced a fragmented informational environment.   Within that environment, responsibility for economic decline was frequently displaced, while public perception was managed through repetition rather than resolution.   The social and economic reforms invoked in justification did not, over time, yield the reductions in poverty and inequality that had been promised.”

4

—BBT:  “To render Venezuela’s political conditions with some accuracy, attention must be given to how ordinary citizens encountered these dynamics in daily life.     How were such conditions navigated in practice, particularly where political discourse intersected with immediate economic necessity?”

5

—RFM:  “The economic collapse that followed the decline of the oil-based model intensified poverty and placed sustained pressure on public services.   Examined in sequence, this period shows how colonial legacies and authoritarian practices converged in the formation of Chavismo.   Episodes such as the 1989 riots known as El Caracazo registered widespread disaffection with established parties and democratic institutions.   Under such conditions, the demands of securing basic necessities frequently outweighed engagement with abstract political principles.”

6

—BBT:   “Clarity in narrative depends in part on recognizing the assumptions that guide interpretation.   When these assumptions are made explicit and examined, the account becomes less directive and more accessible, allowing readers to follow the record without being steered toward a predetermined position.”

7

—RFM:  “No narrative proceeds without interpretation, including this one.   Writing provides a means of approaching Venezuela’s history—its colonial formation, episodes of authoritarian rule, and periods of political disruption—without foreclosing alternative readings.    A coherent account need not be exhaustive; it remains open insofar as it attends to implication and consequence rather than resolution.”

8

—BBT:  “The exchange itself underscores the importance of careful narration when approaching Venezuela’s political and social record.    Attending to multiple viewpoints does not resolve complexity, but it allows a more coherent account to emerge without reducing that history to a single explanatory frame.”

The exchange marked a transition from reflective inquiry to historical record.

~


Chapter V

Abstract

1

This section examines the sequence through which the political project articulated under Hugo Chávez assumed autocratic form.    Rather than attributing this outcome to a single cause, the inquiry proceeds by tracing how leadership decisions unfolded within a convergence of historical conditions, institutional arrangements, economic pressures, and geopolitical alignments.   The account does not begin from conclusion, but from record.

2
Attention remains on how authority was exercised and how its effects registered within Venezuelan society.    Historical circumstance, institutional design, and external influence are examined not to simplify the record, but to make visible the interdependencies through which power consolidated over time.    What emerges is not an explanatory thesis, but a configuration whose coherence can be assessed only through sustained attention to sequence and consequence.

~


“Geographies of Survival”

December 2, 2025

*

Ricardo Morín
Still Thirty-seven: Geographies of Survival
Oil on linen & board
15″ x 12″ x 1/2″
2012

Ricardo F. Morín

November 2025

Oakland Park, Florida

This essay examines how human groups respond to instability when the conditions that once sustained them begin to fail.  Its focus is not on specific crises, events, or regions, but on the structural pressures that compel populations either to relocate or to defend their ground.   I approach the subject without moral interpretation and without attributing virtue or fault to the choices communities make under duress.  The aim is simply to describe the grammars of behavior that arise when survival becomes uncertain and to trace how identity, claims to legitimacy, and patterns of continuity reorganize themselves under those pressures.  The essay does not propose solutions or anticipate outcomes; it observes the patterns that emerge when stability dissolves and the land itself ceases to offer guarantees.

Geographies of Survival explores two fundamental responses to instability: migration and entrenchment.   When climate disruption, scarcity, or civic breakdown exceed a community’s capacity to endure, populations seek stability either through movement or through defending their position.   Migration reorganizes identity through adaptation to new conditions; entrenchment intensifies identity to preserve continuity in place.   These responses arise from the same pressures and function as parallel strategies for survival rather than opposing moral positions.   The essay examines how claims to legitimacy, patterns of identification, and the search for continuity are reshaped by these pressures, and how the friction between movement and resistance reflects structural forces rather than cultural incompatibility.   Its purpose is to illuminate the conditions under which these survival grammars emerge and the ways they transform the meaning of land, stability, and collective life.


1

Migration is often described as the movement of people from one place to another, but this description obscures the deeper forces at work.   Migration is not merely geography in motion; it is also the expression of a survival grammar that becomes visible whenever a community faces conditions it can no longer absorb.  Climate shifts, failing economies, collapsing states, and persisting insecurities create pressures that exceed the capacity of existing structures.   Under these pressures, a population confronts a choice so fundamental that it precedes ideology:  to move or to entrench.

2

These are not parallel options.   They are opposing responses built from the same materials—fear, instability, and the search for continuity.   Migration seeks stability by relocating; entrenchment seeks stability by confronting the agents of instability directly.   Neither response is superior.   Neither is voluntary.   Both emerge from conditions that compress judgment, narrow possibility, and force communities to defend themselves against forces too large to negotiate.

3

Migration begins when a group concludes that the geography that sustained it can no longer guarantee survival.   The land fails, or institutions collapse, or the future narrows.   Movement becomes the only remaining form of protection.   Yet movement does not dissolve identity—it reorganizes it.   A migrating population must redefine its internal coherence in relation to unfamiliar surroundings.   Identity becomes adaptive not by preference but by necessity.   Adaptation is not reinvention; it is survival.

4

Entrenchment moves in the opposite direction.   When a group chooses to remain in place, it must defend what movement would surrender:   territory, memory, continuity, and the stability that comes from rootedness.   Entrenchment therefore intensifies identification rather than loosening it.   Boundaries become rigid.   Narratives harden.   Conflict becomes a strategy rather than an interruption.   A community that fights to remain where it is must believe that displacement would erase it.   Confrontation becomes a method of preservation.

5

Cultural confrontation arises most sharply when a migrating population settles on land that another group interprets as an extension of its own continuity.   To the migrant community, the land represents safety, possibility, or relief from pressures that made departure unavoidable.   To the entrenched community, the same land represents memory, inheritance, and the boundary that protects its historical coherence.   Each group sees the other as the agent of potential erasure:   migrants perceive exclusion and hostility; entrenched populations perceive encroachment and loss.   Conflict escalates not because either group seeks domination, but because each interprets survival through a different grammar—adaptation for one, preservation for the other.

6

Policies adopted in countries such as Denmark and the United Kingdom illustrate how entrenched societies respond when migration is perceived as a threat. For many asylum seekers, these deterrent measures narrow the distance between the pressures that forced them to leave and the pressures they encounter upon arrival, a condition that makes stability difficult to distinguish from exclusion.   Governments frequently defend entrenched policies by arguing that the resources needed to support asylum seekers are limited, and that extending those resources further would risk weakening existing systems of welfare, housing, and public order.

7

These responses of movement and entrenchment seem incompatible, yet they describe a single reality:   populations under pressure behave according to the survival strategies available to them, not according to idealized accounts of culture or volition.   When migrants and entrenched populations come into contact, each sees the other through the lens of its own pressures.   Migrants see protection; the entrenched see threat.   Migrants carry adaptation; the entrenched carry defense.   Each posture misreads the other because each is responding to different forms of danger.

8

Climate change intensifies these divergent responses, not by determining them but by tightening the conditions under which communities must choose.   Climate does not produce conflict by itself; it alters the margins within which stability is possible.   Regions once predictable become irregular; resources once continuous become intermittent.   As these margins narrow, some populations interpret movement as the only viable safeguard, while others interpret remaining in place as the only defensible continuity.   The same pressure exposes different vulnerabilities, and each community responds according to its own history, capacity, and thresholds of endurance—rather than to climate alone.

9

The friction between these grammars—movement and entrenchment—should not be mistaken for a clash of civilizations.   It is a collision between two interpretations of threat.   One group treats survival as relocation; the other treats survival as resistance.   Both postures emerge from instability; both use identity as a tool shaped by circumstance rather than as a fixed inheritance.   Identity becomes an instrument of continuity, shaped by conditions that leave little room for negotiation or reflection.

10

The world often interprets these collisions through moral, ideological, or geopolitical frames, but such interpretations obscure the deeper movement:   instability reorganizes identity faster than identity reorganizes the world.   When geography shifts, populations adapt.   When populations adapt, meanings shift.   Collective life becomes contested not because cultures are inherently antagonistic, but because survival pressures force groups into patterns they would not otherwise choose.

11

If there is a universal character to the present century, it is this: the pressures that produce migration are the same pressures that produce conflict among those who refuse to migrate.   To understand one without the other is to misunderstand both.   Movement and entrenchment are not opposites but consequences—expressions of the structural instability that now shapes every region, every culture, every claim to continuity.

12

The question that follows is neither predictive nor ideological.   It is simply the next step in the logic of this analysis:   What forms of stability become possible when migration and entrenchment are understood not as opposing moral positions but as parallel responses to the same changing world?   The answer is not yet visible, but the conditions that will shape it already are.


“The Myth of Rupture:

September 30, 2025

Continuity as the Enabling Condition of Change”


Ricardo F. Morín
Untitled #6
Watercolor
2003

By Ricardo Morin

September 30, 2025

Bala Cynwyd, Pa

Nothing human begins from nothing.   Institutions, languages, belief systems, and works of art all arise from what preceded them.   Creation is not the rejection of inheritance but the transformation of it.   Every act of making draws upon accumulated perception, memory, and experience.   This insight is crucial to understanding contemporary culture, where claims of unprecedented change often conceal deep continuities beneath the surface of novelty.   Human beings, bound by temporality, cannot detach themselves from what has been; they can only reorder and reinterpret the materials already available to them.

The notion of invention is often described as a break with the past, a leap into the unknown.   Yet even the most radical departures are shaped by what came before.   The ideals of modern democracy, for example, did not emerge spontaneously.   They were built upon classical Greek ideas of citizenship as a shared civic responsibility, rooted in isonomia—equality before the law—and in the belief that legitimate authority derives from the deliberation and participation of free citizens.   They also drew deeply on Roman conceptions of law as a universal and rational order capable of binding diverse peoples into a common political framework, and on the Roman principle of res publica, which conceived the State as a public entity oriented toward the common good rather than the will of a single ruler.   These foundational ideas, adapted and reinterpreted over centuries, provided the intellectual architecture on which modern democratic institutions were constructed.   Perception frames invention.   It provides the vocabulary, assumptions, and conceptual tools that make new ideas possible.   What seems entirely new still carries the imprint of what it sought to move beyond.   On closer examination, the products of creativity are not isolated acts of originality but reconfigurations of existing structures.   Evolution, rather than spontaneous emergence, governs how ideas, institutions, and cultures take shape.

Memory underlies this process.   It is not a passive record of events but an active medium through which possibilities are conceived and action becomes intelligible.   Imagination draws its material from memory; it combines and redirects memory toward conditions not yet realized.   This is nowhere more evident than in the idea of freedom, a concept that resists simple definition yet has long carried two complementary meanings.   The first, articulated most clearly in the classical Greek tradition, understands freedom as eleutheria—the condition of living without domination or external constraint, a state in which individuals are not subject to arbitrary power.   The second, rooted in the Roman legal and civic tradition, conceives freedom as libertas—the capacity to participate actively in the governance of a political community and to shape its laws and institutions.   Both meanings reveal how deeply freedom depends on historical precedent:   it requires language to articulate its claims, institutions to guarantee its exercise, and collective memory to frame its significance.   Far from existing apart from what has been, freedom is shaped and enabled by what has already been conceived, argued, and enacted.   Prior experience supplies the references and alternatives against which choices acquire meaning.   Without that reservoir of knowledge, novelty would lack coherence and direction, and the exercise of freedom would collapse into arbitrary impulse.   Human beings do not invent in a void; they work within the continuity of time and adapt what has been lived and learned into forms suited to what is yet to come.

This same dynamic defines the formation of identity.   Selfhood is not an isolated act of invention but a continuous negotiation with what has been received.   The very idea of the self has itself evolved through history:   in classical philosophy, it was often conceived as a psyche—an inner essence shaped by reason and virtue and embedded within a larger cosmic order.   Christian thought reinterpreted this understanding through the notion of the soul as a unique bearer of moral responsibility, oriented toward salvation and defined by its relationship to God.   Early modern thinkers such as John Locke then transformed this inheritance by grounding personal identity in memory and consciousness — a conception that would later inform modern ideas of individual autonomy.   Even the impulse to define oneself against the past relies on categories inherited from it.   Identity is therefore neither static nor wholly self-created; it is a process of reinterpretation through which the individual positions what is given in relation to what is chosen.   Human beings exist in the tension between inheritance and aspiration, between the weight of memory and the desire for renewal.   That tension is not an obstacle to authenticity but its condition, for without the framework provided by the past there would be nothing from which to depart.   Continuity and change are not opposing forces.   Without continuity, there is no ground on which to become.   Without change, continuity hardens into mere repetition.   The act of becoming depends on the dynamic between the two.

Viewed from this perspective, the human condition is defined less by pure invention than by the capacity to transform.   What is called “new” is the familiar reorganized with new intentions, the established redirected toward new purposes.   Recognizing this does not diminish creativity.   It clarifies its nature.   Humanity’s most significant achievements—in politics, art, science, and thought—are not escapes from what has been.   They are deliberate reinterpretations of what has been, shaped to answer new questions and confront new circumstances.   In the sciences, paradigmatic shifts often described as revolutions still follow this pattern.   Einstein’s theory of relativity did not erase Newtonian mechanics; it incorporated and extended its principles, a revision that revealed their limits while preserving their usefulness within a broader understanding of space, time, and motion.   This same principle governs artistic innovation.   The Renaissance revival of classical forms did not merely reproduce antiquity; it reinterpreted ancient visual languages to express the spiritual and humanistic concerns of a new era.   The evolution of digital communication and artificial intelligence reflects a comparable continuity.   The internet did not replace human interaction; it expanded its reach and scale, a transformation that altered how language circulates, how memory is archived, and how collective knowledge is formed.   Similarly, artificial intelligence—often portrayed as autonomous or unprecedented—rests on centuries of linguistic, mathematical, and conceptual developments.   These systems extend rather than supersede the cognitive inheritance from which they originate.   The future is built in this way:   not in its rejection of the past but in its continuous interaction with it.

Resistance to this understanding persists wherever the idea of evolution is denied.   Such resistance is rarely a matter of evidence alone.   It reflects a desire for permanence—for a beginning that is untouched by change and a truth that stands apart from time.   It offers certainty where process allows none and promises stability in place of adaptation.   Yet even this resistance is shaped by the forces it seeks to escape.   Languages evolve, beliefs adjust, and traditions adapt, even as they proclaim their immutability.   Those who defend what is fixed do so with concepts and arguments that themselves have been shaped by historical change.   The very doctrines that claim timeless authority — such as the medieval conception of divine sovereignty, once invoked to legitimize monarchies and later transformed into the principle of popular sovereignty in modern constitutional systems—reveal this dependence:   they persist not by remaining unchanged but by being continually reinterpreted to meet new contexts.   The contrast, therefore, is not between evolution and its absence, but between recognition and refusal.   The reality remains:   existence unfolds through transformation, and humanity, whether consciously or not, participates in that unfolding—a truth with profound implications for how societies remember their past, shape their present, and imagine their future.


Further Reading:

  • Arendt, Hannah: Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York: Viking Press, 1961.
  • Kuhn, Thomas S.: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
  • MacIntyre, Alasdair: After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.
  • Floridi, Luciano: The Philosophy of Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  • Koselleck, Reinhart: Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Translated by Keith Tribe. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.