Posts Tagged ‘Human Rights’

“Unmasking Disappointment:  Series XXIV”

October 29, 2026


“Geometric Allegory” digital painting (2023) by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist, born in Venezuela, 1954)

APPENDIX (cont.)

CONTENT

A-2 · Government and ministries

A-3 · Armed forces

A-4 · Intelligence and security

B · Political organizations

Appendix Sources and documentary notes

Series’ Bibliography


Scope and chronology:

This concluding installment records the organization of public power under the constitutional frameworks of 1961 and 1999, the development of Venezuela’s military and security institutions, and political organizations from the nineteenth century through 21 October 2026.  Dates accompanying entries identify periods of activity, establishment, or reorganization.  Assessments of institutional conduct are attributed to the reports or studies from which they are drawn.

The political catalogue is selective and includes parties, electoral coalitions, and earlier personalist movements.  The numbering continues that of the Appendix.  Section A-1, “Constitutions,” is identified in the Series X appendix index and covered in the preceding constitutional installments.


A-2).  Branches and Departments of Government [1961–2026]

The 1961 constitutional order organized national government around legislative, executive, and judicial powers.  Article 136 of the 1999 Constitution divides Poder Público Nacional [National Public Power] into five powers:  legislative, executive, judicial, citizen, and electoral. [1] [2]

A-2.1).  Poder Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive Power]

Under the 1961 Constitution, the President served a five-year term, and immediate presidential reelection was prohibited.  The 1999 Constitution established a six-year term and initially permitted one immediate reelection.  The constitutional amendment approved by referendum in February 2009 removed the numerical restriction on reelection for the presidency and other elected offices. [1][2] [3]

The President is head of State and of the national executive, directs government action and foreign relations, and exercises supreme command of the armed forces.  The executive also includes the Executive Vice-President, ministers, and other constitutionally or legally established officials.  Article 236 assigns the appointment and removal of the Executive Vice-President and ministers to the President. [2]

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported a deterioration of the separation of powers and restrictions on the National Assembly’s functions.  The International Commission of Jurists documented political influence over judicial appointments and tenure. [4] [5]

Maduro took the presidential oath on 10 January 2025 following the CNE’s disputed declaration of the 2024 result. [85]  On 3 January 2026, United States forces captured Maduro and Cilia Flores and transferred them to United States custody.  Delcy Rodríguez, previously Executive Vice-President, was sworn in as acting President on 5 January. [86]

In Judgment No. 00001 of 3 January 2026, the Constitutional Chamber ordered Rodríguez to exercise the presidency in an acting capacity.  The decision invoked Articles 234 and 239 and expressly reserved the definitive classification of Maduro’s absence as temporary or absolute.  Articles 233 and 234 establish different succession procedures for those categories.  The order itself did not determine a date for a presidential election. [87] [2]

A-2.2).  Congreso de la República de Venezuela [Congress of the Republic of Venezuela; 1961–1999 framework]

The Congress comprised the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.  The Senate incorporated territorial representation, while the Chamber of Deputies represented the population through the electoral arrangements established by the Constitution and legislation.  Congress enacted laws, considered the budget, exercised political oversight, and participated in constitutionally prescribed appointments and authorizations. [1]

The 1999 Constitution replaced Congress with a unicameral National Assembly. [2]

A-2.3).  Asamblea Nacional [National Assembly; established by the 1999 Constitution, first elected in 2000]

The National Assembly exercises legislative authority, approves the national budget, conducts political oversight, and participates in appointments assigned to it by the Constitution.  Deputies serve five-year terms.  Article 186 provides for a population-based allocation using a base of 1.1 per cent of the country’s total population, with three additional deputies per federal entity and three Indigenous deputies elected according to law and their traditions. [2]

The electoral system combines constituency and list voting.  Electoral legislation and administrative rules have governed their operation and the allocation of seats.  The European Union’s 2021 election observation report records changes in the Assembly’s composition and electoral arrangements. [6]

After the opposition won the December 2015 legislative election, Supreme Tribunal decisions restricted the Assembly’s operation.  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights documented these restrictions and the assumption of legislative functions by the constituent body installed in 2017. [4]

The Assembly elected in 2025 comprised 285 seats.  The Inter-Parliamentary Union records 253 seats for the governing Great Patriotic Pole alliance and twenty-nine for other political organizations, with three Indigenous seats elected separately on 1 June.  Legislative voting took place on 25 May alongside regional elections.  The principal opposition platform boycotted the process, while other opposition politicians participated.  These figures record the announced allocation of seats. [88]  The new Assembly was installed on 5 January 2026. [86]

A-2.4).  Asamblea Nacional Constituyente [National Constituent Assembly; 2017–2020]

President Maduro initiated the 2017 constituent process without a prior popular referendum authorizing its convocation.  Articles 347 and 348 distinguish the people’s original constituent power from the initiative to promote a constituent assembly, which specified actors, including the President in the Council of Ministers, may exercise.  In its examination of the disputed convocation, the Venice Commission concluded that presidential initiative could not substitute for the people’s decision to convene the body. [2] [7]

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported that the government-aligned constituent assembly claimed authority over constituted institutions, assumed legislative functions, and removed Luisa Ortega Díaz from her office as Prosecutor General of the Republic. [4]

The constituent body concluded its activities in December 2020 without producing a new constitution.  During its operation it issued instruments denominated leyes constitucionales [constitutional laws], including the armed-forces enactment discussed in A-3.2. [8] [9]

A-2.5).  Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice; 1961–1999 framework]

The Supreme Court was the apex of the judiciary under the 1961 constitutional order.  Its responsibilities included constitutional review and the adjudication of matters assigned to it by the Constitution and legislation.  Its organization evolved during the period.  Under the 1976 Organic Law, it comprised three chambers of five magistrates each:  Political-Administrative, Civil Cassation, and Criminal Cassation.  The resulting membership was fifteen. [1] [10]

A-2.6).  Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Supreme Tribunal of Justice; 1999–2026]

The 1999 Constitution replaced the Supreme Court with the Supreme Tribunal, organized into specialized chambers, including a Constitutional Chamber.  Its functions encompass constitutional adjudication, final judicial review within its assigned jurisdictions, and responsibilities for the administration and supervision of the judiciary.  Article 267 assigns the direction, government, and administration of the judicial branch to the Tribunal. [2]

Legislation determines the Tribunal’s membership.  It initially had twenty magistrates; the 2004 Organic Law expanded the number to thirty-two; and the 2022 reform reduced it to twenty. [11] [5]

The International Commission of Jurists’ 2021 report examined the appointment, tenure, and removal of judges and concluded that political interference compromised judicial independence. [5]

A further Organic Law reform, effective on 22 May 2026, expanded the prescribed membership to thirty-two:  seven magistrates in the Constitutional Chamber and five in each of the other five chambers.  The reform provided for appointments to the new composition. [89]

A second reform, published on 15 September 2026, established a twenty-three-member Judicial Nominations Committee comprising eleven National Assembly deputies and twelve representatives nominated by other sectors of society. [90]  Reporting on 14 October described the selection of the new Tribunal as an ongoing process.  The statutory expansion and the completion of appointments are therefore recorded separately. [91]

A-2.7).  Poder Electoral and Consejo Nacional Electoral [Electoral Power and National Electoral Council]

The name Consejo Nacional Electoral [National Electoral Council; CNE] predates the 1999 Constitution, having been adopted under the electoral reform of 1997.  The 1999 Constitution established Electoral Power as a separate national power, with the CNE as its governing body.  Its responsibilities include organizing elections and referendums, maintaining the electoral register, and regulating matters assigned to it by electoral law. [12] [2]

Article 296 provides for five principal members unaffiliated with political organizations.  Three are nominated by civil society, one by the faculties of legal and political sciences of national universities, and one by Citizen Power.  The National Assembly appoints them by a two-thirds vote for seven-year terms, subject to the constitutional arrangements governing their selection and renewal. [2]

After the presidential election of 28 July 2024, the CNE declared Maduro the winner.  The Carter Center reported that the CNE failed to publish polling-station results substantiating the announced totals and supplied no evidence supporting its claim of a cyberattack. [13]  The Center concluded that the election failed to meet international standards and could not be considered democratic. [14]

In its final report, published in February 2025, the Carter Center concluded that the available polling-station records demonstrated a clear victory for Edmundo González Urrutia in the 2024 election. [13]

On 22 August 2024 the Supreme Tribunal’s Electoral Chamber endorsed the CNE’s announced result. [92]

On 23 September 2026 Rodríguez publicly promised elections without specifying a date.  Reuters reported that opposition representatives sought changes to the judiciary and electoral authority as conditions for a competitive process. [93]

A-2.8).  Poder Ciudadano [Citizen Power; 1999–2026]

Citizen Power is exercised through the Consejo Moral Republicano [Republican Moral Council], comprising the Prosecutor General of the Republic, the Ombudsman, and the Comptroller General.  Its constituent institutions possess constitutional autonomy and perform distinct functions concerning legality, rights, and the administration of public resources. [2]

Article 279 establishes a shared appointment framework.  The Republican Moral Council convenes a nominations evaluation committee with participation from different sectors of society.  The public evaluation process produces a shortlist of three candidates for each office, submitted to the National Assembly for selection by a two-thirds vote within thirty consecutive days.  If agreement is not reached, the Constitution provides for submission of the slate to a popular vote.  If the evaluation committee is not convened, the Assembly proceeds to the appointment within the period determined by law. [2]

a).  Ministerio Público [Public Ministry; incorporated into Citizen Power in 1999].  Headed by the Fiscal General de la República [Prosecutor General of the Republic], the Public Ministry directs criminal investigations, brings public criminal actions where appropriate, and safeguards constitutional guarantees in judicial proceedings.  The institution existed before 1999; the new Constitution placed it within Citizen Power.  Article 284 provides for the Prosecutor General of the Republic’s seven-year term and appointment through the Citizen Power framework. [1] [2]

On 9 April 2026 the National Assembly appointed Larry Devoe as Prosecutor General of the Republic, following Tarek William Saab’s resignation in February. [94]

The Procurador General de la República [Procurator General of the Republic] represents and defends the Republic’s patrimonial interests.  Article 249 provides for presidential appointment to that office with authorization from the National Assembly. [2]

b).  Defensoría del Pueblo [Ombudsman’s Office; established by the 1999 Constitution].  The Defensor del Pueblo[Ombudsman] promotes and defends constitutional and human rights, monitors the conduct of public authorities and public services, and may undertake the actions assigned to the office by law.  The officeholder serves a seven-year term and is selected under Article 279. [2]

The Assembly appointed Eglée González Lobato as Ombudsman on 9 April 2026, following Alfredo Ruiz’s resignation in February.  EFE reported objections by civil-society organizations to the transparency and composition of the selection process for both Citizen Power appointments. [94]

c).  Contraloría General de la República[Office of the Comptroller General; incorporated into Citizen Power in 1999].  The Comptroller General supervises public revenues, expenditures, and assets and exercises fiscal control within the constitutional and statutory framework.  This institution also predates 1999.  The Constitution provides for a seven-year term and selection under Article 279.  Its audit responsibilities are distinct from the prosecution of crimes and the adjudication of criminal liability. [1] [2]

A-2.9).  Executive Ministries and Principal Administrative Portfolios [1999–2026]

Ministries formulate and implement national policy within the executive.  Article 236 authorizes the President to appoint and remove ministers and, within the legal framework, to determine the organization and competence of ministries.  The National Assembly exercises legislative oversight through its budgetary, investigative, and political-control functions. [2]

The eighteen portfolios below provide a selective functional overview.  Their names, competences, and organizational arrangements changed during the period.  The 2016 decree on the organization of the national administration supplies a documentary reference for the distribution of responsibilities, supplemented where indicated by other enactments and records. [15]

1.  Defense:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Defensa.  The ministry develops defense policy and administers military personnel, resources, procurement, and related responsibilities within the executive.  The 2020 armed-forces enactment assigns administrative responsibilities to the ministry and operational responsibilities to the Strategic Operational Command. [9]

On 18 March 2026 Rodríguez appointed Gustavo González López as Minister of Defense, replacing Vladimir Padrino López, who had held the portfolio since 2014. [95]

2.  Foreign Affairs:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores.  This ministry conducts diplomacy, manages diplomatic and consular services, participates in treaty negotiations, and represents the government in international organizations.  It implements presidential foreign policy within the constitutional framework, including legislative approval of international agreements where required. [15][2]

3.  Interior, Justice, and Peace:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Interiores, Justicia y Paz.  Its responsibilities encompass internal security, policing policy, public order, civil protection, and associated administrative matters.  Article 267 assigns judicial government and administration to the Supreme Tribunal; criminal prosecution belongs to the Public Ministry. [15] [2]

4.  Economy and Finance:  Ministerio del Poder Popular de Economía y Finanzas, under successive denominations.  The finance portfolio prepares and administers fiscal policy, coordinates budgetary and treasury matters, manages public credit, and supervises entities assigned to it by law.  Article 318 assigns monetary functions to the Central Bank of Venezuela and provides for its autonomy in the formulation and exercise of policies within its competence. [15] [2]

5.  Planning:  Ministerio del Poder Popular de Planificación, formerly associated with the designation Planificación y Desarrollo.  This portfolio coordinates national development planning, public investment priorities, institutional planning, and related statistical work. [15]

6.  Education:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educación.  This ministry directs policy for initial, primary, and secondary education and the educational modalities assigned to it.  University education has also been administered through a separate portfolio.  A January 2024 ministerial announcement records coordination between the education and university-education ministries. [16]

7.  Health:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Salud.  The health portfolio directs public health policy, epidemiological surveillance, disease prevention, and the coordination of services and institutions assigned to it. [15]  The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 2019 report documented shortages of medicines, deteriorating facilities, and barriers to healthcare. [17]

8.  Food:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Alimentación.  This ministry coordinates food supply and distribution policies and the public entities entrusted with those functions.  The administrative framework distributes related responsibilities among bodies concerned with agriculture, commerce, imports, nutrition, and social assistance. [15]

9.  Science and Technology:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para Ciencia y Tecnología, under changing organizational arrangements.  The portfolio promotes research, technological development, innovation, and cooperation among public institutions and the scientific community.  In the 2016 administrative framework, university education, science, and technology were combined in one ministry. [15]

10.  Commerce:  Domestic Commerce and Foreign Trade Portfolios.  Commercial policy has been distributed among portfolios responsible for industry and domestic commerce, foreign trade, and international investment.  The 2016 decree separately identifies the Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Industria y Comercio [Ministry of Popular Power for Industry and Commerce] and the Ministerio del Poder Popular para el Comercio Exterior e Inversión Internacional [Ministry of Popular Power for Foreign Trade and International Investment]. [15]

11.  Housing and Habitat:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para Hábitat y Vivienda.  The housing portfolio formulates policies for residential construction, housing finance, and improvements to living environments, with responsibilities involving urban development and residential services. [15]

12.  Electric Power:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Energía Eléctrica.  This ministry directs policy and planning for the electricity sector and supervises entities assigned to it.  Generation, transmission, distribution, and maintenance are carried out through operating institutions. [15]

13.  Petroleum:  Ministerio del Poder Popular de Petróleo, under successive denominations.  The petroleum portfolio formulates hydrocarbons policy, regulates activity within its competence, and oversees the State’s interests in the sector.  Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. [PDVSA] and other enterprises conduct production, refining, and commercial operations. [15]

The Organic Hydrocarbons Law was amended on 29 January 2026.  The reform introduced provisions on contracts for primary activities and revised the framework governing operations, fiscal arrangements, and ministerial authority. [96]  On 17 October Rodríguez announced an expectation of nearly US$76 billion in petroleum investment over five years, referring to new agreements, including cooperation with the United States.  This was a government forecast. [97]

14.  Agriculture and Lands:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Agricultura Productiva y Tierras.  This portfolio coordinates agricultural development, productive capacity, rural policy, and land matters assigned to it by law.  The 2016 administrative framework assigned fisheries, urban agriculture, and food distribution to separate ministerial portfolios. [15]

15.  Transport:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para el Transporte, under changing combinations with public works.  Transport responsibilities encompass infrastructure, services, regulation, and the supervision of relevant agencies and public enterprises.  The 2016 decree assigned land, water, and air transport responsibilities to the Ministry of Popular Power for Transport and Public Works. [15]

16.  Women and Gender Equality:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Mujer y la Igualdad de Género[created in 2009].  This ministry coordinates policies concerning women’s rights, equal participation, and the prevention of gender-based discrimination and violence.  Its establishment followed earlier institutional arrangements for women’s affairs. [18] [15]

17.  Communication and Information:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información.  The portfolio coordinates executive communications and the public media responsibilities assigned to it. [15]  Human Rights Watch’s report on events in 2023 documented restrictions on independent media and harassment of journalists. [19]

18.  Culture:  Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura.  This ministry develops cultural policy, supports artistic activity, and oversees institutions concerned with heritage, museums, publishing, and related cultural functions.  The Constitution recognizes cultural freedom, diversity, and the rights of creators and communities. [15] [2]


A-3).  Fuerzas Armadas [Armed Forces]

The armed forces’ organization and duties are addressed in the constitutional provisions on national defense and security and in subsequent military legislation.  The entries below distinguish the 1961 and 1999 constitutional frameworks and later legislative changes. [1] [2]

A-3.1).  Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales [National Armed Forces; 1961–1999]

The armed forces under the 1961 constitutional framework included the Army, Navy, Aviation, and National Guard.  The National Guard, established in 1937, was already part of the military institution before the 1999 Constitution.  The 1995 Organic Law expressly identified these four components. [1] [20]

Article 132 of the 1961 Constitution defined the armed forces as an apolitical, obedient, and non-deliberative institution serving the Republic.  Its responsibilities included national defense, constitutional stability, and the protection of the democratic order. [1]

A-3.2).  Fuerza Armada Nacionaland Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana [1999–2026]

Article 328 of the 1999 Constitution describes the Fuerza Armada Nacional [National Armed Force] as a professional institution without political militancy, organized to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity.  It also assigns participation in internal order and national development within the constitutional framework.  The four components named in the constitutional text are the Army, Navy, Aviation, and National Guard.  Article 330 permits active military personnel to vote but prohibits partisan political activity and candidacy for elected office while in active service. [2]

The designation Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana [Bolivarian National Armed Force; FANB] was incorporated through the 2008 organic legislation. [21]

The Asamblea Nacional Constituyente issued the Ley Constitucional de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana [Constitutional Law of the Bolivarian National Armed Force], published in Official Gazette No. 6,508 Extraordinary on 30 January 2020.  Its preamble invoked Articles 347–349 of the Constitution.  Articles 22 and 59 identify the Milicia Bolivariana [Bolivarian Militia] as a componente especial [special component].  The designation ley constitucional records the legislative form used by that constituent body, whose contested convocation is addressed in A-2.4. [9]

In her 2023 study published by Fundación Carolina, Francine Jácome documented military participation in cabinet positions, public enterprises, territorial administration, and economic activities.  She examined these roles as aspects of the militarization of government and society. [22]

The January 2026 capture of Maduro was carried out by United States forces.  The subsequent acting presidency and the March change of defense minister are recorded in A-2.1 and A-2.9. [86] [95]

A-4).  Intelligence Agencies and State Security Bodies

The institutions below perform intelligence, military counterintelligence, criminal investigation, and public-order functions.  Their organizational positions and responsibilities are described separately under their respective entries.

The United Nations fact-finding mission’s 2022 findings documented the use of intelligence services in the repression of actual or perceived government opponents, including arbitrary detention and torture.  The mission examined institutional structures, operational practices, and chains of responsibility. [23]

A-4.1).  Organismos de Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia [Intelligence and Counterintelligence Agencies]

1.  Dirección de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención [Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services; DISIP, 1969–2010].  Commonly associated with the later designation Dirección General Sectorial de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención, DISIP served as the principal civilian intelligence and political security agency.  Its institutional history crossed the pre-1999 and Bolivarian periods.  A reorganization initiated in 2009 culminated in the formal change of name to SEBIN by Decree No. 7,453 of 1 June 2010. [24] [25]

2.  Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional [Bolivarian National Intelligence Service; SEBIN, 2010–2026].  SEBIN is the principal civilian intelligence service, responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence functions within its assigned remit.  Its administrative attachment has changed.  It operates within the executive security structure. [25]

The United Nations fact-finding mission documented arbitrary detention, torture, and other violations by SEBIN against perceived opponents.  Its 2022 findings linked these practices to a state plan of political repression and identified grounds for responsibility extending to senior officials. [23]

In September 2026 Acceso a la Justicia reported that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had ordered the closure of El Helicoide in an April judgment notified to Venezuela on 10 June.  The organization stated that publicly available information was insufficient to verify compliance and distinguished reported prisoner transfers from implementation of the judgment’s reparations. [98]

3.  Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar [General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence; DGCIM, present designation from 2011].  DGCIM developed from earlier military intelligence structures, including the Dirección de Inteligencia Militar[DIM].  Its counterintelligence responsibilities concern threats to military security. [25]

In March 2026 Germán Gómez Lárez was appointed to head DGCIM after González López’s transfer to the Ministry of Defense. [95]

The fact-finding mission described arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, and other severe abuses associated with DGCIM facilities and personnel, including operations against military personnel and civilians perceived as opponents. [25]

A-4.2).  Organismos de Seguridad del Estado [State Security Bodies]

The National Guard is a military component; CICPC is an investigative police body; the National Police is a civilian police institution; and FAES was a specialized unit within the National Police.  State and municipal police form part of the wider policing system. [9] [26]

4.  Guardia Nacional and Guardia Nacional Bolivariana [National Guard and Bolivarian National Guard; 1937–2026].  Created during the presidency of Eleazar López Contreras, the National Guard combines military status with responsibilities involving internal order, border control, and support for law enforcement.  Article 329 of the 1999 Constitution assigns it a basic responsibility for operations required to maintain internal order. [27] [2]

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 2018 report documented excessive force, arbitrary detention, and ill-treatment involving the National Guard and other security bodies during demonstrations. [28]

5.  Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas [Scientific, Criminal, and Forensic Investigations Corps; CICPC, 2001–2026].  CICPC succeeded the Cuerpo Técnico de Policía Judicial, commonly known as the Policía Técnica Judicial [PTJ], which dated from 1958.  Its responsibilities include criminal investigation, forensic examination, and the technical collection of evidence.  In criminal proceedings, investigative work operates under the direction of the Public Ministry and within the safeguards of criminal procedure. [29] [2]

6.  Cuerpo de Policía Nacional Bolivariana [Bolivarian National Police Corps; PNB, operational from 2009].  The national police emerged from the policing reforms and organic legislation adopted during the Chávez administration.  It exercises national police functions, including crime prevention, public order, and the responsibilities assigned to it in designated areas and services.  It operates within the executive’s internal-security structure. [26]

The police-service law establishes national policy, coordination, and supervision within a system that includes national, state, and municipal police, each with assigned competences. [26]

7.  Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales[Special Action Forces; FAES, establishment variously dated to 2016 or 2017].  FAES was a specialized PNB unit associated with anti-crime operations.  Human Rights Watch’s September 2019 account dates its creation to 2017.  A June 2019 report by TalCual, republished by PROVEA, gives April 2016. [30] [31]

Human Rights Watch and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented killings during purported confrontations, arbitrary detentions, and other abuses involving FAES, particularly in low-income communities.  The High Commissioner’s 2019 report called for its dissolution and the investigation of its members. [30] [17]

Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2024states that FAES was dissolved in 2022 and replaced by the Dirección de Acciones Estratégicas y Tácticas [Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Actions; DAET].  Citing the United Nations fact-finding mission, it reports similar functions and methods and the placement of former FAES personnel implicated in abuses in key DAET positions. [19]

A-4.3).  Post-election Detention, Amnesty, and Judicial Proceedings [2024–2026]

The United Nations fact-finding mission’s September 2024 report recorded twenty-five deaths in the repression following the presidential election, together with arbitrary detention and violations affecting protesters and perceived opponents. [92]

In March 2025 the United Nations fact-finding mission reported that severe repression and crimes against humanity continued.  Its September assessment emphasized the absence of effective domestic accountability and the need for international action on behalf of victims. [99] [100]

The Ley de Amnistía para la Convivencia Democrática [Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence] entered into force on 19 February 2026.  It covers offenses associated with specified events within a period beginning on 1 January 1999, subject to its eligibility rules and exclusions.  Its application requires the procedures established in the statute. [101]

In September 2026 the United Nations fact-finding mission reported that the state’s repressive apparatus remained intact despite limited political changes. [102]  Reuters’s account of the findings noted a reduction in politically motivated detentions alongside continuing abuses, including torture and the detention of hundreds of people.  The mission characterized the changes as limited and reversible. [103]

Supreme Tribunal Resolution No. 2026-0010, dated 13 October 2026, reorganized the handling of terrorism cases, ending the nationwide jurisdiction of the specified special courts and redistributing cases within the criminal judicial system, subject to transitional exceptions.  The resolution concerns jurisdiction and case allocation; the underlying criminal provisions remain a separate matter. [104]

On 8 October 2026 the United States Department of Justice announced a superseding indictment charging Maduro and Flores with conspiracy to commit torture alongside narcotics and weapons offenses.  The prosecution alleged the use of state institutions in the abuse of detainees. [105]  Both defendants pleaded not guilty on 15 October.  Their trial was scheduled for 14 June 2027; the charges remained unadjudicated at this draft’s cutoff. [106]


B).  Evolution of Political Parties and Movements [1830–2026]

This section records selected nineteenth-century factions, modern parties, revolutionary movements, electoral organizations, and coalitions.  Dates identify documented origins or periods of activity, with qualifications where a movement preceded registration as a party.

Entries distinguish historical leadership and membership from the control of registered party names and electoral symbols where judicial interventions affected these arrangements.

B-1).  Early Political Traditions and Personalist Movements [1830–1935]

1.  Conservadores [Conservatives; principally the 1830s–1850s].  The conservative current developed around the governing order associated with José Antonio Páez and its commercial, landholding, and administrative supporters.  It favored political stability and established authority.  It was a historical alignment rather than a continuously registered modern party. [32]

2.  Partido Liberal and Gran Partido Liberal [Liberal Party and Great Liberal Party; from 1840].  Associated initially with Antonio Leocadio Guzmán, Tomás Lander, and the newspaper El Venezolano, liberal organization challenged the existing governing establishment.  Federalism and wider political participation became important elements of its evolving appeal. [32]

3.  Guzmancismo and Liberalismo Amarillo [Guzmán’s Political Following and Yellow Liberalism; principally from 1870].  Guzmancismo refers to Antonio Guzmán Blanco’s political following within nineteenth-century Venezuelan liberalism. [32]

4.  Crespismo [Crespo’s Political Following; especially the 1890s].  Joaquín Crespo’s supporters operated within the broader liberal tradition through personal allegiance and political patronage. [32]

5.  Gomecismo [Gómez’s Governing Network; 1908–1935].  Juan Vicente Gómez maintained power through military authority, regional relationships, administrative control, and repression.  Gomecismo describes the regime and its networks of allegiance rather than a competitive electoral party.  Opposition activity included exile organizations, student mobilization, and clandestine political groups. [33]

After Gómez’s death, Eleazar López Contreras’s administration faced opposition from emerging political organizations, student groups, and labor activists.  ORVE and the PDN formed during this period. [34] [35]

B-2).  The Formation of Modern Parties and the Democratic Transitions [1926–1958]

6.  Partido Revolucionario Venezolano [Venezuelan Revolutionary Party; PRV, founded in exile in 1926].  This organization brought together opponents of the Gómez dictatorship within an emerging revolutionary and socialist milieu. [36]

7.  Partido Comunista de Venezuela [Communist Party of Venezuela; PCV, founded in 1931].  The PCV developed as a Marxist-Leninist organization associated with labor mobilization and socialist transformation.  It experienced clandestinity, legalization, repression, and participation in both electoral and revolutionary strategies.  It was excluded from the 1958 Pacto de Puntofijo[Puntofijo Pact]. [37] [38]

The PCV’s established leadership supported Chávez and subsequently became critical of Maduro, participating in the formation of the APR in 2020.  In 2023 the Supreme Tribunal appointed an alternative leadership. [39] [19]

8.  Organización Venezolana [Venezuelan Organization; ORVE, 1936].  ORVE operated during the post-Gómez political opening.  Its participants included figures subsequently active in the PDN and Acción Democrática. [34]

9.  Partido Republicano Progresista [Progressive Republican Party; PRP, 1936].  The PRP emerged in the post-dictatorial opening and provided a legal political vehicle for Marxist and communist activists.  Its immediate antecedents lay in left-wing organization and opposition to dictatorship. [40]

10.  Partido Democrático Nacional [National Democratic Party; PDN, 1936–1941].  The PDN developed from efforts to coordinate democratic opposition and continued clandestinely after official recognition was denied.  It was a direct organizational antecedent of Acción Democrática.  Its work contributed to the formation of a national party structure in the late 1930s. [35] [41]

11.  Acción Democrática [Democratic Action; AD, founded in 1941].  AD developed as a mass party with a social-democratic orientation, labor and peasant constituencies, and a program of political inclusion and national development.  It participated with military officers in the overthrow of Medina Angarita in October 1945.  After 1958, it participated in national government. [41] [42]

In June 2020 the Supreme Tribunal suspended AD’s leadership and appointed an ad hocboard.  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recorded the intervention in its annual report. [43]

12.  Partido Democrático Venezolano [Venezuelan Democratic Party; PDV, 1943–1945].  The PDV was organized to support President Isaías Medina Angarita.  It belonged to a period of political liberalization in which party activity and public debate expanded, while presidential selection remained indirect and suffrage restricted.  Its activity ended after the military-civilian overthrow of October 1945. [44]

13.  Unión Republicana Democrática [Democratic Republican Union; URD, founded in 1945].  URD developed as a nationalist and democratic organization closely associated with Jóvito Villalba.  It opposed military rule and was one of the three signatories of the Puntofijo Pact. [42] [38]

14.  Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente [COPEI, founded in 1946].  Commonly identified as the Social Christian Party, COPEI developed under Rafael Caldera and other Christian-democratic leaders.  It combined a social-Christian orientation with electoral organization and participation in representative institutions.  It participated in national government after 1958.  The European Union’s 2021 election observation report records the judicial intervention affecting its leadership. [45][6]

The democratic sequence.  The military-civilian overthrow of Medina Angarita on 18 October 1945 was followed by an expansion of electoral participation.  Rómulo Betancourt headed the provisional revolutionary junta.  Rómulo Gallegos won the December 1947 election, becoming Venezuela’s first president chosen by universal, direct, and secret suffrage, and assumed office in February 1948.  A military coup removed him in November 1948.  The ensuing period of military rule ended in January 1958. [42] [46]

The Puntofijo Pact of October 1958 committed AD, COPEI, and URD to defend the electoral and constitutional order and cooperate around a common minimum program.  Betancourt won the presidential election of December 1958. [38][34]

B-3).  Party Formation and Reorganization [1960–1998]

15.  Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria [Revolutionary Left Movement; MIR, founded in 1960].  MIR emerged from a division within AD and became associated with the revolutionary left and armed insurgency.  Subsequent disagreements over strategy produced further divisions, while important sectors later returned to legal political activity. [47]

16.  Cruzada Cívica Nacionalista [Nationalist Civic Crusade; CCN, organized in the 1960s].  This organization represented a political current associated with former dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez and his Nuevo Ideal Nacional [New National Ideal]. [48]

17.  Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo [People’s Electoral Movement; MEP, founded in 1967].  The MEP arose from a division in AD led by Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa and other figures.  It developed a left-nationalist orientation and subsequently participated in different electoral alliances, including the Bolivarian governing coalition. [49]

18.  Bandera Roja [Red Flag; BR, founded in 1970].  Bandera Roja originated in a division of the revolutionary left and initially pursued armed struggle.  It subsequently developed legal political activity and became an opponent of the Chávez and Maduro governments. [50]

19.  Movimiento al Socialismo [Movement Toward Socialism; MAS, founded in 1971].  MAS emerged from a division in the PCV.  It participated in elections and coalition politics, and later experienced divisions over support for Chávez. [51] [52]

20.  La Causa R [The Radical Cause; LCR, founded in 1971].  Associated with Alfredo Maneiro, La Causa R developed through labor and community organization, particularly in industrial Guayana.  It contested elections in the early 1990s.  PPT emerged from a division within La Causa R in 1997. [53]

21.  Liga Socialista [Socialist League; LS, 1973–2007].  The Socialist League belonged to the revolutionary left and participated in political and labor organizing.  It later supported Chávez and joined the process of integration into the PSUV in 2007. [54]

22.  Organización Renovadora Auténtica [Authentic Renewal Organization; ORA, founded in 1987].  ORA emerged with an evangelical Christian identity and participated in electoral politics. [55] [56]

23.  Convergencia [Convergence; founded in 1993].  Convergencia developed around Rafael Caldera’s presidential candidacy after his separation from COPEI.  It formed part of the broader coalition that supported his 1993 victory, commonly known as the chiripero. [57][58]

24.  Patria Para Todos [Homeland for All; PPT, founded in 1997].  PPT arose from a division in La Causa R and subsequently participated in the Bolivarian coalition.  Judicial intervention in 2020 displaced its existing leadership and affected control of the party’s electoral identity.  The party label remained in electoral use in 2024. [53] [59] [56]

25.  Movimiento V República [Fifth Republic Movement; MVR, 1997–2007].  MVR supported Hugo Chávez’s successful 1998 presidential candidacy.  It developed from the political trajectory associated with the earlier Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200[Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200; MBR-200].  MVR joined the PSUV in 2007. [60][61]

26.  Proyecto Venezuela [Project Venezuela; founded in 1998].  Proyecto Venezuela developed around Henrique Salas Römer’s national political project, building on his earlier regional base in Carabobo.  It supported his presidential candidacy against Chávez in 1998 and subsequently participated in opposition politics.  Its national foundation is distinct from the earlier regional organization Proyecto Carabobo. [62]

B-4).  Parties and Political Movements in the Bolivarian Period [1999–2026]

27.  Un Nuevo Tiempo [A New Era; UNT, regional origins in 1999, national organization from 2006].  UNT developed from a political base in Zulia associated with Manuel Rosales.  Its national expansion accompanied his 2006 presidential candidacy.  It subsequently participated in opposition alliances. [63]

28.  Primero Justicia [Justice First; PJ, civic origins in 1992, party organization from 2000].  Primero Justicia began as a civic association concerned with legal and institutional reform and later became an opposition party. [64]

In June 2020 the Supreme Tribunal appointed an ad hoc leadership headed by José Brito; the Court subsequently suspended that measure.  On 22 April 2024, Constitutional Chamber Judgment No. 207 again placed an ad hoc board under Brito in control of the party’s electoral label and symbols.  The established party leadership rejected the intervention.  The PJ label appeared on the 2024 presidential ballot supporting Brito, while the established leadership supported Edmundo González Urrutia. [65] [66]

29.  Alianza Bravo Pueblo [Alliance of the Brave People; ABP, founded in 2000].  Associated with Antonio Ledezma and a division from AD, ABP became part of the opposition to the Bolivarian government. [67]

30.  Por la Democracia Social [For Social Democracy; PODEMOS, founded in 2002].  PODEMOS emerged from a division in MAS.  It initially supported Chávez, later moved into opposition, and subsequently experienced judicial intervention that transferred control of the party to a different leadership. [68]

31.  Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaro [Tupamaro Revolutionary Movement; movement origins preceding party registration in 2004].  The Tupamaro organization developed from urban revolutionary activism and later participated in electoral politics as a supporter of the Bolivarian process.  Disagreements with the government and judicial intervention in 2020 produced competing claims to its leadership and identity. [69] [70]

32.  Unidad Popular Venezolana [Venezuelan Popular Unity; UPV, founded in 2004].  Associated with Lina Ron, UPV developed as a militant supporter of Chávez and retained an identifiable electoral presence in later governing alliances.  Its party label appeared on the 2024 presidential ballot within the alliance supporting Maduro. [71] [56]

33.  Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela [United Socialist Party of Venezuela; PSUV, formation initiated in 2007].  Chávez promoted the PSUV as a unified organization for forces supporting his political project.  Its formation incorporated MVR and other organizations or sectors, while some allies retained separate identities.  The party held its founding congress in 2008. [61][72]

The PSUV headed the governing electoral alliance supporting Maduro in 2024 and occupied the first position on the presidential ballot. [66]

34.  Voluntad Popular [Popular Will; VP, movement launched in 2009, recognized as a party in 2011].  Associated with Leopoldo López and other organizers, Voluntad Popular developed around democratic participation, political change, and opposition to the governing authorities.  Its leaders and activists faced prosecution, detention, and exile.  Judicial intervention also created a competing claim to the party’s official identity. [73] [6]

35.  Movimiento Progresista de Venezuela, subsequently Movimiento por Venezuela [Progressive Movement of Venezuela, subsequently Movement for Venezuela; MPV, founded in 2012].  MPV emerged from divisions within the left and participated in opposition coordination. [74]

36.  Avanzada Progresista [Progressive Advance; AP, founded in 2012].  Associated with Henri Falcón and other leaders, AP developed as a center-left organization supporting electoral participation and political negotiation.  Its strategies sometimes differed from those of the principal opposition coalition, particularly over participation in elections whose conditions were contested. [75]

37.  Vente Venezuela [Vente Venezuela; founded in 2012].  Associated with María Corina Machado, Vente developed as a liberal political movement emphasizing individual liberties, private initiative, and democratic change.  Machado won the opposition’s 2023 primary and was excluded from the 2024 presidential ballot. [76] [13]

Machado received the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize for her work on democratic rights and a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela. [107]

38.  Movimiento Somos Venezuela [We Are Venezuela Movement; social movement established in 2017, party transformation in 2018].  Promoted by Maduro, Somos Venezuela developed in connection with social-program mobilization and the Carnet de la Patria [Homeland Card] system.  In 2018 it acquired an electoral identity through the transformation of Nuevo Camino Revolucionario [New Revolutionary Path; NCR]. [77]

39.  Cambiemos Movimiento Ciudadano [Let Us Change Citizens’ Movement; founded in 2018].  Associated with Timoteo Zambrano, Cambiemos promoted electoral participation and dialogue.  It became part of the sector of the opposition that pursued negotiations and electoral strategies outside the principal unity coalition. [78]

40.  Encuentro Ciudadano [Citizens’ Encounter; founded in 2018].  Associated with Delsa Solórzano, Encuentro Ciudadano developed as an opposition organization emphasizing democratic participation and human rights.  It participated in opposition coordination and the 2023 primary process. [79]

41.  Primero Venezuela [Venezuela First; established in 2020].  Primero Venezuela was formed by dissidents from Primero Justicia, including José Brito, and participated in the 2020 parliamentary election. [80]  Acceso a la Justicia’s 14 May 2024 account records Brito’s presidential candidacy under the Primero Venezuela label and the addition of the PJ label following the judicial intervention. [65]

42.  Fuerza Vecinal [Neighborhood Force; founded in 2021].  Fuerza Vecinal developed around municipal leaders and an emphasis on local administration and electoral participation. [81]

B-5).  Electoral Coalitions and Coordinating Platforms

43.  Mesa de la Unidad Democrática [Democratic Unity Roundtable; MUD, developed in 2008–2009].  The MUD brought together parties with different ideologies around opposition coordination, common candidacies, and electoral competition.  It helped organize major electoral campaigns, including the opposition’s parliamentary victory in 2015. [82] [6]

44.  Gran Polo Patriótico Simón Bolívar [Simón Bolívar Great Patriotic Pole; GPPSB, launched in 2011].  This alliance assembled the PSUV, allied parties, and social organizations supporting the Bolivarian government. [83] [72]

45.  Alternativa Popular Revolucionaria [Popular Revolutionary Alternative; APR, formed in 2020].  The APR brought together communist and other revolutionary-left organizations and sectors critical of Maduro’s administration.  In 2020 the Supreme Tribunal appointed alternative leaderships to PPT and Tupamaro, whose displaced leaders participated in the coalition. [39] [59] [70]

46.  Plataforma Unitaria Democrática [Democratic Unitary Platform; PUD, publicly constituted in 2021 after earlier unity initiatives].  The platform developed as a coordinating framework for opposition parties and allied sectors.  It participated in negotiations, promoted the 2023 opposition primary, and supported Edmundo González Urrutia in the 2024 presidential election after Machado’s exclusion. [84] [13]

B-6).  Electoral Labels, Organizational Continuity, and Judicial Intervention

The 2024 ballot included additional organizations alongside those described above.  El Diario’s reproduced ballot identifies Partido Verde [Green Party], Futuro Venezuela[Future Venezuela], Enamórate [Fall in Love], Partido Arepa [Arepa Party], CONDE, Unidad Visión Venezuela [Unity Vision Venezuela], and Derecha Democrática [Democratic Right]. [66]

The European Union’s 2021 election observation mission reported court interventions affecting party leaderships and control of names, symbols, and electoral nominations.  Human Rights Watch subsequently recorded the 2023 intervention in the PCV; Acceso a la Justicia documented the renewed intervention in Primero Justicia in 2024. [6] [19] [65]

### B-7).  Electoral Participation and Political Negotiations [2025–2026]

Opposition organizations pursued different strategies in the 2025 legislative election.  The PUD boycotted the process, while Henrique Capriles and other opposition figures participated.  The Inter-Parliamentary Union records eleven seats for the UNT–Unión alliance within the announced results. [88]

On 6 August 2026 Reuters reported the opening of United States-backed talks between representatives of the acting government and an opposition delegation.  Jorge Rodríguez and Dinorah Figuera headed the respective delegations.  Machado was outside that negotiating process. [108]

In October Machado called for elections by July 2027.  Her proposed timetable was distinct from an official electoral calendar. [109]  The September presidential announcement cited in A-2.7 supplied no date. [93]


Sources and Documentary Notes

The notes identify constitutional and legislative texts, independent institutional reports, historical scholarship, contemporary reporting, and organizational accounts. Party publications are used for origins and declared purposes; assessments of institutional conduct are attributed to the relevant reports or studies. The documentary cutoff for this working revision is 21 October 2026. Notes 1–84 retain their original numbering; subsequent notes document the expansion. English institutional names are explanatory translations.

[1] Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela (1961), especially the provisions concerning national powers, the presidency, Congress, the judiciary, and the armed forces.  CIDEP documentary edition.
https://cidep.online/files/constituciones/1961.pdf
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[2] Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (1999), especially Articles 136, 186–187, 192, 225–236, 247–249, 253–279, 280–296, 318, 328–330, and 347–349.  Text hosted by the Organization of American States.
https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/constitucion_venezuela.pdf
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[3] Constitution of Venezuela incorporating the 2009 amendment.  Compare Article 230 with the original text; see also Article 279.  Constitute Project.
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Venezuela_2009?lang=es
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[4] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Democratic Institutions, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Venezuela (country report adopted in 2017, English edition published in 2018).
https://www.oea.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/venezuela2018-en.pdf
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[5] International Commission of Jurists, Jueces en la cuerda floja (2021):  judicial appointments, tenure, and political influence.
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Venezuela-Judges-on-the-tightrope-Publications-Reports-Thematic-reports-2021-SPA.pdf
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[6] European Union Election Observation Mission, Venezuela 2021:  Final Report.  Covers the legal framework, electoral administration, political participation, and party interventions.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_eom_ven_2021_fr_en.pdf
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[7] Venice Commission, Opinion CDL-AD(2017)024 on the legal issues raised by Venezuela’s 2017 constituent process, especially paragraph 27.  Official opinion record and electoral-law reproduction.
https://www.coe.int/en/web/venice-commission/-/cdl-ad-2017-024-e
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[8] Reuters, report on the closing session of Venezuela’s constituent assembly, 18 December 2020, reproduced by Infobae.  Read with the IACHR’s 2020 assessment of its failure to draft a new constitution.
https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2020/12/18/oficialistas-de-venezuela-cierran-criticada-asamblea-constituyente-2/
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[9] Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, Ley Constitucional de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana, Official Gazette No. 6,508 Extraordinary, 30 January 2020.  Preamble invoking Articles 347–349; Articles 22 and 59 designate the Milicia Bolivariana as a special component.  Gazette reproduction hosted by Control Ciudadano.
https://www.controlciudadano.org/web/wp-content/uploads/LOFANB-2020-GO-6.508-ExT-30.01.2020.pdf
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[10] Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice (1976), Article 24:  three chambers with five magistrates each.  Legislative text reproduced by Justia.
https://venezuela.justia.com/estatales/miranda/leyes/ley-organica-de-la-corte-suprema-de-justicia-1976/gdoc/
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[11] Carlos Lusverti, analysis of Venezuela’s 2022 Supreme Tribunal reform, Justicia en las Américas, 15 March 2022.  On the earlier expansion, see the ICJ report cited above.
https://dplfblog.com/2022/03/15/nueva-ley-y-nuevos-jueces-pero-el-mismo-control-politico-de-siempre-sobre-el-tribunal-supremo-de-venezuela/
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[12] Organization of American States, electoral observation report concerning Venezuela’s 1998 elections, published in 1999.  Documents the electoral authority and the pre-1999 legal framework.
https://www.oas.org/sap/publications/1999/moe/venezuela/pbl_22_1999_spa.pdf
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[13] The Carter Center, Venezuela Presidential Election 2024:  Final Report (published February 2025).  Used retrospectively for events and evidence concerning the 2024 election.
https://www.cartercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/venezuela-final-report-2025.pdf
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[14] The Carter Center, statement on Venezuela’s presidential election, 30 July 2024.  Distinct from its subsequently published final report.
https://www.cartercenter.org/news/venezuela-073024/
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[15] Decree No. 2,378 on the General Organization of the National Public Administration, Official Gazette No. 6,238 Extraordinary, 13 July 2016.  Historical legislative text reproduced by Pandectas Digital; subsequent reorganizations are acknowledged in the text.
https://pandectasdigital.blogspot.com/2016/07/decreto-sobre-organizacion-general-de.html
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[16] Ministry of Education, announcement of coordination between the education and university-education ministries, 16 January 2024.  Establishes their separate institutional existence during the period examined.
https://www.mppe.gob.ve/noticias/2024/01/16/articulaci%C3%B3n-acad%C3%A9mica-por-la-juventud-venezolana-mppe-y-el-mppeu-firman-resoluci%C3%B3n/
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[17] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, report A/HRC/41/18 (2019), concerning economic and social rights, security operations, and accountability.  Copy hosted by the United States Congress.
https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/files/documents/20190705_UNHRC_HRinVZ_A.HRC_.41.18_0.pdf
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[18] Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Montevideo Consensus platform:  record concerning Venezuela’s Ministry for Women and Gender Equality and its establishment in 2009.
https://consensomontevideo.cepal.org/es/node/1244
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[19] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2024, Venezuela chapter.  Documents developments during 2023, including the PCV intervention and the reorganization of FAES.
https://www.hrw.org/es/world-report/2024/country-chapters/venezuela
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[20] Organic Law of the National Armed Forces (1995), especially Articles 4–7.  Historical legislative text reproduced by Venciclopedia.
https://www.venciclopedia.org/index.php/Ley_Org%C3%A1nica_de_las_Fuerzas_Armadas_1995
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[21] Decree No. 6,239, Organic Law of the Bolivarian National Armed Force, Official Gazette No. 5,891 Extraordinary, 31 July 2008.  Digitized gazette held by the Library of Congress.
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llflg/75/64/35/27/_v/e2/00/80/73/1c/75643527_ve20080731c/75643527_ve20080731c.pdf
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[22] Francine Jácome, “Militarismo y militarización. El caso venezolano,” in Marcos Robledo Hoecker and Francisco J. Verdes-Montenegro (eds.), Militarización, militarismo y democracia: ¿nuevas tendencias en América Latina? (Fundación Carolina, 2023), pp. 153–169.
https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Militarizacion.pdf
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[23] United Nations Office at Geneva, Human Rights Council discussion of the Venezuela fact-finding mission’s findings, 26 September 2022.
https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/meeting-summary/2022/09/morning-human-rights-council-holds-interactive-dialogue-fact
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[24] Decree No. 7,453, Official Gazette No. 39,436, 1 June 2010:  change of DISIP’s denomination to SEBIN.  Legal record maintained by Iusdata.
https://iusdata.com/denominacion-cambio-disip-por-sebin/
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[25]United Nations fact-finding mission, detailed findings on crimes committed through state intelligence services, A/HRC/51/CRP.3, September 2022.  Official report collection.
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffmv/report-ffmv-september2022
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[26] Organic Law of the Police Service and the Bolivarian National Police Corps, Official Gazette No. 5,940 Extraordinary, 7 December 2009.  Legislative text reproduced by Tu Gaceta Oficial.
https://tugacetaoficial.com/leyes/ley-organica-del-servicio-de-policia-y-del-cuerpo-de-policia-nacional-gaceta-5940-2009/
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[27] Héctor Bencomo Barrios, Fuerzas Armadas, Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar.  Historical development of the military components and National Guard.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/f/fuerzas-armadas/
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[28] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Venezuela report (2018), concerning violations, accountability, and the treatment of protesters.
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/VE/VenezuelaReport2018_EN.pdf
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[29] Keymer Ávila and colleagues, Visión panorámica del sistema policial en Venezuela (2000–2018), Acceso a la Justicia.  See the sections on CICPC, national policing, and their institutional antecedents.
https://www.accesoalajusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Informe-sobre-desempe%C3%B1o-sistema-policial-venezolano-2000-2018.pdf
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[30] Human Rights Watch, investigation of extrajudicial killings in low-income areas of Venezuela, 18 September 2019.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/18/venezuela-extrajudicial-killings-poor-areas
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[31] TalCual, “Tres estados acumularon 50% de las 143 muertes a manos de las FAES durante mayo,” republished by PROVEA, 12 June 2019.  Gives April 2016 as the date of creation; the Human Rights Watch account cited separately gives 2017.
https://provea.org/actualidad/tres-estados-acumularon-50-de-las-143-muertes-a-manos-de-las-faes-durante-mayo/
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[32] Partidos políticos, Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar.  Used for nineteenth-century party traditions and personalist alignments.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/p/partidos-politicos/
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[33] Gómez, Juan Vicente, gobierno de, Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/g/gomez-juan-vicente-gobierno-de/
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[34] Betancourt, Rómulo, Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar.  Includes the post-Gómez organizations and the democratic transitions.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/b/betancourt-romulo/
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[35] Fundación Empresas Polar, historical chronology:  organization of the National Democratic Party in 1936.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/_custom/static/cronologia_hv/zoom/s20/1936-32.html
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[36] Fundación Empresas Polar, historical chronology:  formation of the Venezuelan Revolutionary Party in exile, 1926.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/_custom/static/cronologia_hv/zoom/s20/1926-7.html
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[37] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for the Communist Party of Venezuela.  Founding date and organizational orientation; contemporary leadership claims are assessed separately through independent sources.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partido_Comunista_de_Venezuela
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[38] Rafael Caldera documentary archive, account and documentary material concerning the Puntofijo Pact and its signatories.
https://rafaelcaldera.com/puntofijo/
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[39] Popular Revolutionary Alternative founding communiqué, reproduced in August 2020.  Primary source for the coalition’s formation and declared aims.
https://www.idcommunism.com/2020/08/alternativa-popular-revolucionaria-venezuela-new-antiimperialist-and-socialist-alliance.html
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[40]Wikipedia, historical reference entry for the Progressive Republican Party of Venezuela, including its establishment in 1936 and communist connections.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partido_Republicano_Progresista_(Venezuela)
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[41] Acción Democrática, organizational history.  Used for the PDN antecedent and AD’s foundation in 1941; institutional assessments rely on independent reports.
https://acciondemocratica.org.ve/adport/componentes/Historia2/
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[42] Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/j/junta-revolucionaria-de-gobierno/
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[43] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2020, Chapter IV.B, Venezuela.  Includes the political-institutional context and interventions affecting party leadership.
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2020/Chapters/IA2020cap.4b.VE-en.pdf
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[44] Medina Angarita, Isaías, gobierno de, Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/m/medina-angarita-isaias-gobierno-de/
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[45] Fundación Empresas Polar, historical chronology:  the foundation and social-Christian orientation of COPEI in 1946.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/_custom/static/cronologia_hv/zoom/s20/1946-2.html
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[46] Gallegos, Rómulo, gobierno de, Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/g/gallegos-romulo-gobierno-de/
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[47] Guerrillas, Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar.  Covers the revolutionary left and the development of armed insurgency.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/g/guerrillas/
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[48] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for the Nationalist Civic Crusade and its association with Pérez Jiménez.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cruzada_C%C3%ADvica_Nacionalista
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[49] Fundación Empresas Polar, historical chronology:  foundation of the People’s Electoral Movement in 1967.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/_custom/static/cronologia_hv/zoom/s20-2/1967-46.html
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[50] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for Bandera Roja:  origins in 1970, revolutionary-left background, and subsequent electoral activity.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandera_Roja_(Venezuela)
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[51] Movimiento al Socialismo, programmatic document published by Nueva Sociedad (1980).  Primary source for its democratic-socialist orientation.
https://pre.nuso.org/articulo/movimiento-al-socialismo-venezuela/
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[52] Scholarly study of the Movement Toward Socialism, published in 1981 and indexed by JSTOR.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3539979
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[53] Understanding the Collapse of Venezuela’s Causa Radical, Journal of Politics in Latin America, vol. 6, no. 1 (2014).  Includes the party’s origins and the division that produced PPT.
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/jpla/v6i1/f_0031490_25538.pdf
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[54] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for the Socialist League.  For the announced integration into the PSUV, see also the contemporary report by Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias, 21 December 2006.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_League_(Venezuela)
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[55] Institute of Legal Research, study and historical tables concerning Venezuelan political parties, including ORA’s foundation in 1987.
https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/12/5544/6.pdf
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[56] La República, presentation of the CNE’s 2024 presidential ballot.  Date displayed on the article:  11 May 2024; URL date segment:  2024/05/09.
https://larepublica.pe/mundo/venezuela/2024/05/09/elecciones-venezuela-2024-conoce-el-tarjeton-electoral-del-cne-que-revela-los-10-candidatos-presidenciales-235737
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[57] Convergencia, organizational history and leadership record, including its establishment in June 1993.
https://partidoconvergencia.org/liderazgo/
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[58] CIDOB, Rafael Caldera Rodríguez:  political biography, including the 1993 candidacy and supporting coalition.
https://www.cidob.org/en/lider-politico/rafael-caldera-rodriguez
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[59] Supreme Tribunal, Constitutional Chamber, Judgment No. 0122 of 21 August 2020, concerning PPT.  Decision and case record reproduced by Acceso a la Justicia.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/intervencion-judicial-de-la-organizacion-con-fines-politicos-patria-para-todos-ppt/
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[60] Universidad de Belgrano, study of Venezuela’s Fifth Republic Movement and the development of the Chávez political project.
https://repositorio.ub.edu.ar/bitstream/handle/123456789/185/55_rodriguez_games.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=2
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[61] Margarita López Maya, El PSUV y el sistema de partidos, 20 January 2008.  Contemporary analysis of party formation and political concentration.
https://margaritalopezmaya.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/El-PSUV-y-el-sistema-de-partidos-UN-20-1-08.pdf
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[62] Fundación Empresas Polar, historical chronology:  Proyecto Venezuela and the 1998 presidential election.
https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/_custom/static/cronologia_hv/zoom/s20-10/1998-87.html
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[63] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for Un Nuevo Tiempo, distinguishing its regional origins from national expansion.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Un_Nuevo_Tiempo
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[64]Primero Justicia, retrospective account distinguishing the civic association established in 1992 from party organization in 2000.
https://www.primerojusticia.org.ve/cms/index.php?Itemid=468&cid=149%3Anoticias&id=21622%3Aalejandro-vivas-primero-justicia-15-anos-resteados-con-el-cambio-para-venezuela&option=com_flexicontent&view=item
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[65] Acceso a la Justicia, “La segunda intervención judicial de Primero Justicia y su impacto en las presidenciales de 2024,” 14 May 2024.  See the section “Ocultando al rival” for Brito’s candidacy under Primero Venezuela and the intervened PJ label.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/segunda-intervencion-judicial-primero-justicia-impacto-presidenciales-2024/
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[66] El Diario, account and reproduction of the presidential ballot, updated 8 May 2024.  Includes the intervened Primero Justicia label supporting José Brito and the labels Futuro Venezuela and Partido Arepa.
https://eldiario.com/2024/05/08/boleta-electoral-elecciones-presidenciales-venezuela/
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[67] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for Alianza Bravo Pueblo, its origins in 2000, and its connection with Antonio Ledezma.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alianza_Bravo_Pueblo
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[68] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for Por la Democracia Social, including its origins in 2002 and the leadership intervention of 2012.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Por_la_Democracia_Social
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[69] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for the Venezuelan Tupamaro movement, distinguishing earlier activism from legalization as a political party in 2004.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupamaro_(Venezuela)
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[70] Runrun.es, report on the Tupamaro movement’s response to judicial intervention, 19 August 2020.
https://runrunes.org/noticias/419292/movimiento-tupamaro-rechazo-intervencion-del-tsj-se-ha-consumado-el-robo-del-partido/
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[71] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for Venezuelan Popular Unity.  Its later electoral presence is independently documented by the 2024 ballot.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unidad_Popular_Venezolana
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[72]CLACSO, Venezuela chronology for 2007.  Contemporary record of political developments during the formation of the PSUV.
https://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/osal/20190429034519/Venezuela_2007.pdf
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[73] Leopoldo López, organizational account of Voluntad Popular:  movement launched in December 2009 and recognition as a party in January 2011.
https://leopoldolopez.com/voluntad-popular/
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[74] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for Movimiento por Venezuela, originally Movimiento Progresista de Venezuela, founded in June 2012.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movimiento_por_Venezuela
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[75] Tomás Straka, Los partidos de última generación en Venezuela, PolítiKa UCAB, 4 September 2023.  Discusses established and recently formed parties.
https://politikaucab.net/2023/09/04/los-partidos-de-ultima-generacion-en-venezuela/
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[76] Vente Venezuela, organizational account published 24 May 2021, identifying its foundation in 2012 and national development.
https://www.ventevenezuela.org/2021/05/24/maria-corina-machado-vente-es-una-realidad-en-toda-venezuela/
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[77] El Pitazo, report on the transformation of Somos Venezuela into a political party, distinguishing the 2017 movement from its 2018 electoral registration.
https://elpitazo.net/sucesos/madurismo-se-convierte-partido-movimiento-somos-venezuela/
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[78] Wikipedia, historical reference entry for Cambiemos Movimiento Ciudadano, founded in 2018 and associated with Timoteo Zambrano.
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambiemos_Movimiento_Ciudadano
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[79] Encuentro Ciudadano, official organizational statement identifying its foundation on 13 December 2018 and its emphasis on rights and civic freedoms.
https://encuentrociudadano.org/quienes-somos/
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[80] Runrun.es, account of lesser-known parties contesting the 2021 elections, including Primero Venezuela’s origins.
https://runrun.es/noticias/453207/guachimanelectoral-los-partidos-poco-conocidos-que-van-a-las-elecciones-del-21n/
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[81] Directorio Legislativo, report on Venezuela’s 2021 regional and municipal elections, published in January 2022.  Describes Fuerza Vecinal’s municipal origins and formation in 2021.
https://alertas-v3.directoriolegislativo.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Venezuela-Elecciones-regionales-y-municipales-2021-2022-1.pdf
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[82] María Dubuc, account of the MUD’s 2008 agreement and 2009 reorganization, published by Primero Justicia, 22 January 2014.
https://www.primerojusticia.org.ve/cms/index.php?Itemid=499&cid=160%3Anuestros-dirigentes-opinan&id=13644%3Amaria-dubuc-un-responsabilidad-historica-la-verdadera-unidad&option=com_flexicontent&view=item
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[83] PSUV, third-anniversary account of the Great Patriotic Pole’s formation on 7 October 2011, published 7 October 2014.
https://www.psuv.org.ve/temas/noticias/presidente-maduro-reconoce-lucha-gpp-a-tres-anos-su-conformacion/
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[84] Crónica Uno, account of the Unitary Platform’s organizational development and appointment of Omar Barboza, 2022.  Describes the process initiated in April 2021.
https://cronica.uno/plataforma-unitaria-anuncia-refundacion-y-confirma-a-omar-barboza-como-secretario-ejecutivo/
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[85] Associated Press, report on Maduro’s inauguration, 10 January 2025.
https://apnews.com/article/41df1203ab06e1ee9168622d12aac461
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[86] Reuters, “Delcy Rodriguez formally sworn in as Venezuela’s interim president,” 5 January 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/delcy-rodriguez-formally-sworn-venezuelas-interim-president-2026-01-05/
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[87]Supreme Tribunal, Constitutional Chamber, Judgment No. 00001, 3 January 2026, case 2026-00001.  Decision and commentary reproduced by Acceso a la Justicia.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-sc-ordena-que-delcy-rodriguez-presidencia-de-la-republica/
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[88] Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parline, Venezuela: National Assembly election of 25 May 2025.  Seat totals reproduce the reported electoral outcome.
https://data.ipu.org/parliament/VE/VE-LC01/election/VE-LC01-E20250525/
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[89] Acceso a la Justicia, record of the Supreme Tribunal Organic Law reform, Official Gazette No. 7,025 Extraordinary, 22 May 2026; published analysis, 3 June 2026.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/ley-organica-de-reforma-parcial-de-la-ley-organica-del-tribunal-supremo-de-justicia/
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[90] Acceso a la Justicia, record of the Supreme Tribunal Organic Law reform, Official Gazette No. 7,074 Extraordinary, 15 September 2026; published analysis, 21 September 2026.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/ley-organica-de-reforma-parcial-de-la-lotsj/
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[91] El País, report on the pending selection of Supreme Tribunal magistrates, 14 October 2026.
https://elpais.com/america/2026-10-14/un-nuevo-supremo-para-venezuela-con-prisa-y-sin-reglas-claras.html
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[92] United Nations fact-finding mission, report A/HRC/57/57, 17 September 2024.  Includes the post-election institutional response and repression.
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/advance-versions/a-hrc-57-57-en.pdf
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[93] Reuters, report on Delcy Rodríguez’s promise of elections, 23 September 2026.  The announcement supplied no election date.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-rodriguez-promises-elections-2026-09-23/
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[94]EFE, “El Parlamento de Venezuela designa a un nuevo fiscal general y a una defensora del pueblo,” 9 April 2026.
https://efe.com/mundo/2026-04-09/nuevo-fiscal-defensora-del-pueblo-venezuela/
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[95] Reuters, “Venezuela’s acting president replaces long-time defense minister with intelligence head,” 18 March 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-acting-president-replaces-long-time-defense-minister-2026-03-18/
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[96] Acceso a la Justicia, record of the Organic Hydrocarbons Law reform, Official Gazette No. 6,978 Extraordinary, 29 January 2026; published analysis, 26 February 2026.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/ley-de-reforma-de-la-ley-organica-de-hidrocarburos/
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[97] Reuters, report on Rodríguez’s oil-investment forecast, 17 October 2026.  The figure is an announced expectation, not a record of completed investment.
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/venezuela-expects-nearly-76-billion-oil-investment-over-five-years-acting-2026-10-17/
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[98] Acceso a la Justicia, review of compliance with the Inter-American Court’s El Helicoide judgment, 3 September 2026.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/casi-3-meses-sentencia-sobre-helicoide-que-ha-hecho-estado-venezolano-cumplirla/
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[99] United Nations fact-finding mission, statement on continuing repression and crimes against humanity, 18 March 2025.
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/venezuela-harsh-repression-and-crimes-against-humanity-ongoing-fact-finding
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[100] United Nations fact-finding mission, statement on accountability and international justice, 22 September 2025.
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/venezuela-only-hope-victims-find-justice-lies-international-community-says
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[101] Ley de Amnistía para la Convivencia Democrática, Official Gazette No. 6,990 Extraordinary, 19 February 2026.  Legislative record and analysis by Acceso a la Justicia, 24 February 2026.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/engaceta-ley-de-amnistia/
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[102] United Nations fact-finding mission, statement on continuing repression, 16 September 2026.
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/09/venezuela-amidst-limited-political-changes-countrys-repressive-apparatus
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[103] Reuters, report on the United Nations fact-finding mission’s September findings, 16 September 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/rights-abuses-persist-venezuela-despite-maduros-removal-un-experts-say-2026-09-16/
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[104] Supreme Tribunal, Resolution No. 2026-0010, dated 13 October 2026, reproduced by Acceso a la Justicia on 16 October.  Reorganizes jurisdiction over terrorism cases.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/resolucion-2026-0010-mediante-la-cual-se-modifica-la-estructura-organizacional-de-los-juzgados-con-competencia-en-terrorismo/
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[105] United States Department of Justice, announcement of a superseding indictment against Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores, 8 October 2026.  The indictment contains allegations requiring adjudication.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nicolas-maduro-moros-and-cilia-adela-flores-de-maduro-charged-torture
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[106] Reuters, report on Maduro and Flores’s not-guilty pleas and the rescheduled trial, 15 October 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-maduro-due-court-over-new-us-torture-charge-2026-10-15/
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[107] Norwegian Nobel Committee, announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2025, awarded to María Corina Machado, 10 October 2025.
https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2025/10/press-peaceprize2025.pdf
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[108] Reuters, report on the opening of United States-backed talks between the acting government and an opposition delegation, 6 August 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-acting-government-opposition-delegation-begin-talks-2026-08-06/
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[109] Reuters, report on Machado’s call for elections by July 2027, 9 October 2026, citing her Financial Times interview.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-machado-calls-elections-by-july-ft-reports-2026-10-09/
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Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A New Translation by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins.  Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2011.

Arráiz Lucca, Rafael:   Venezuela: 1830 a nuestros días: Breve historia política.Caracas:   Editorial Alfa, 2016.

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Corrales, Javier:   The Politics of Venezuela’s Opposition.   New York, Routledge (2015)

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“Unmasking Disappointment: Series IX”

May 20, 2026
“Geometric Allegory” digital painting 2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

 

Ricardo F. Morín

January 13, 2026

Oakland Park, Fl.

This installment continues the diagnostic examination of Venezuela’s political condition and focuses on the ethical and institutional consequences that emerge when authority, governance, and accountability are no longer aligned.  Rather than advancing prescriptions, it examines how the degradation of human rights, the normalization of violence, and the diffusion of responsibility function as systemic conditions within a prolonged authoritarian context.  The inquiry remains situated within a broader historical pattern, attentive to structures rather than events and to consequences rather than intentions.  Documented cases are treated as occasions on which the framework’s claims become testable, and the analysis refrains from extending beyond what the evidence supports.

 

 

The Fourth Issue

 

On Human Rights

 

1

 

Venezuela’s modern political history has been marked by recurring skepticism toward collective institutions and a persistent substitution of personal authority for shared civic frameworks.  Over time, citizens have lost the expectation that freedom can be exercised in daily life rather than merely invoked in public language.  In such contexts, human rights do not disappear rhetorically;  they lose their operational force.  Their absence becomes visible not in formal declarations, but in the diminished capacity of individuals to act without fear, to participate without coercion, and to sustain dignity without dependence.

 

2

 

A society may retain wealth, institutions, and formal declarations while individuals lose the practical ability to move, speak, work, dissent, or plan without fear.  In that condition, human rights no longer operate as aspirations stated in public language; they become thresholds that determine whether social and political life remain possible.  Where those thresholds are upheld, individuals retain agency within public life.  Where they are suspended, social possibility contracts regardless of available resources.

 

3

 

Isolation, whether political, ideological, or institutional, accelerates this contraction.  When governments or social groups withdraw from accountability, corruption ceases to be an anomaly and becomes a governing mechanism.  In Venezuela, where the State has progressively withdrawn from democratic norms and international oversight, citizens increasingly act as though institutional procedures will not protect them, and arbitrary decisions by officials have ceased to provoke either correction or surprise.  From a diagnostic standpoint, the State’s primary responsibility is not moral leadership but the preservation of civic conditions under which individuals can exercise consequential choices.  Approaches such as the framework of capabilities articulate this responsibility not as charity, but as an institutional obligation to preserve the material and political preconditions of dignity.  [1]

 

4

 

Individuals cannot exercise freedom meaningfully where daily life is shaped simultaneously by fear and material precarity: conditions whose prolonged operation in Venezuela has displaced approximately 6.9 million citizens beyond the country’s borders. [3]  Protection from arbitrary violence and access to the basic conditions necessary for survival therefore operate together rather than separately within civic life.  Political conflict itself does not indicate social failure; plural societies inevitably generate disagreement, competition, and tension.  The decisive distinction emerges in how institutions regulate those conflicts:  courts no longer rule against the executive; citizens who comply with the law are not thereby protected from detention; State’s agents act knowing that internal review will not follow, The rights enumerated in the 1999 Constitution become unavailable in practice to those who would invoke them.  The constitutional text remains present within official language even as its protections become progressively absent from lived civic reality.  [2]

 


Endnotes — Chapter XVII

 

§ 3

 

  • [1] Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development:  The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4–14, 71–72, 114–123.

 

§ 4

 

  • [2] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge:  Harvard University Press (1971), 111, 337–338, 511, 515, 545.
  • [3] Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants. As of mid-2025, R4V reports approximately 6.9 million Venezuelans displaced across the seventeen host countries of the regional response. Accessed January 2026.

 


Chapter XVIII

 

The Fifth Issue

 

On the Nature of Violence

 

1

 

Violence shapes a society not only through the harm inflicted on those it reaches, but through what follows or fails to follow: whether perpetrators are identified; whether evidence is preserved and prosecutions proceed; and whether the institutions charged with these tasks are themselves subject to review.  Its regulation depends on two interdependent structures:  the social contract and governance.  The social contract establishes the conditions under which individuals relinquish certain freedoms in exchange for protection and justice.  Governance operationalizes that contract by translating authority into predictable, constrained action.  When governance fails, whether through incapacity, corruption, or deliberate distortion, violence ceases to be exceptional and becomes systemic.

 

2

 

The distinction between legitimate force and illegitimate violence is not merely rhetorical.  The legal-procedural tradition grounds the distinction in law, proportionality, and institutional accountability:  force exercised within these constraints differs in kind from force exercised outside them.  The critical tradition, while attending more closely to the historical and political conditions under which legitimacy is constituted, similarly distinguishes between power that preserves the capacity for collective action and violence that destroys it.  Both traditions, despite their differences, converge on a common diagnostic point:  force severed from ethical constraint and institutional oversight ceases to operate as legitimate authority.  Historical revolutions demonstrate that when governance collapses entirely, violence may emerge as a substitute rather than a solution.  Such substitutions rarely restore order; instead, they entrench instability, break authority into non-accountable centers, and prolong social recovery across generations.

 

3

 

In contemporary Venezuela, violence has become an instrument of political preservation rather than public protection.  The pattern is documented rather than inferred.  The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela has reported, across successive findings since 2020, that state security forces and intelligence services participated in extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, torture, and sexual violence against perceived opponents, and that these acts followed identifiable chains of command rather than individual deviation.  During the 2017 protests, more than one hundred deaths were recorded over four months, alongside the deployment of military tribunals against civilians.  The 2024 post-electoral repression produced over two thousand detentions within weeks, including minors, under a framework the government termed “Operación Tun Tun.”  Earlier emblematic cases, Leopoldo López imprisoned in 2014, Antonio Ledezma detained in 2015, Manuel Rosales arrested the same year, prefigured a pattern in which judicial institutions, including the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, functioned not as safeguards but as mechanisms legitimizing repression through legal form.   [1]  [2]  [3]

 

4

 

Official narratives frame such actions as defenses of national security.  Yet when intelligence services monitor opposition figures rather than foreign threats, when the National Guard is deployed against neighborhood protests rather than against external incursion, and when detention without charge becomes a tool applied to citizens rather than to combatants, the citizen approaching a uniformed officer or a courthouse no longer expects protection from harm but calculates the likelihood of becoming its next subject.  Citizens no longer experience institutions as safeguards operating under law, but as structures through which uncertainty and exposure are administered.  In that condition, legitimacy weakens even when authority remains intact: governance increasingly depends on public performance rather than civic trust; legal procedure detaches itself from protective function; and violence is gradually normalized as an instrument of rule.

 

5

 

The normalization of violence proceeds incrementally and is rarely perceived in real time. What is initially defended as exceptional, curfews, military tribunals for civilians, indefinite pretrial detention, restrictions on assembly, accumulates into the ordinary architecture of governance. Each measure recalibrates expectation: citizens adapt their conduct; institutions adapt their procedures; and the threshold separating legitimate force from arbitrary coercion migrates without formal declaration. Diagnostic vigilance consists in tracking that migration rather than awaiting its terminus.

 

6

 

Where these institutional restraints fail or disappear, abuses are no longer interrupted consistently through judicial review, public documentation, legislative inquiry, or prosecutorial independence.  Violations accumulate without reliable correction; officials increasingly operate without expectation of consequence; and citizens gradually adapt themselves to diminished protections.  Under such conditions, institutional repetition itself begins to normalize abuse: the same operations recur against successive cohorts of citizens; the same categories of case remain unopened; and the same outcomes continue to receive judicial confirmation. What would once have required justification as an emergency measure no longer requires justification at all.

 


Endnotes — Chapter XVIII

 

§ 3

 

  • [1] William Newman, “Venezuelan Opposition Leader Leopoldo López Sentenced to Prison Over Protest,” New York Times, September 10, 2015.
  • [2] “Venezuelan Opposition Politician Manuel Rosales Arrested,” BBC News, October 15, 2015.
  • [3] “Venezuela Police Raid Arrests Caracas Mayor Antonio Ledezma,” BBC News, February 20, 2015.

 


Chapter XIX

 

The Sixth Issue

 

On the Persistence of Injustice

 

1

 

In political systems where decisions are made without transparent review, where institutional failures carry few consequences for those responsible, and where citizens gradually lose confidence that participation can alter outcomes, injustice acquires durability beyond the intentions of individual leaders. A decade of institutional substitution and electoral exclusion in Venezuela, documented progressively across Series IX, has demonstrated the process.  Where decisions are made by a narrowing circle of officials who face no review, the costs of those decisions (economic, legal, and personal) are absorbed by citizens who had no part in making them.  Under such conditions, citizens increasingly occupy the position of spectators rather than participants, and governance loses the corrective pressures through which democratic systems ordinarily adjust, restrain, and renew themselves.  [1]

 

2

 

Apathy is not merely a personal disposition; it is a political condition produced by sustained exclusion from meaningful agency. Where participation carries risk without influence, disengagement becomes rational. The Venezuelan presidential election of July 2024, following the precedent established in 2018 and documented in earlier chapters of Series IX, illustrates the dynamic in its concentrated form. Opposition witnesses collected poll-station tallies documenting a result the official authority refused to recognize; the declared outcome reversed the documented one, and the citizens, jurists, and electoral observers who pressed the discrepancy were detained, exiled, or stripped of standing. Once the witnesses who held the tallies had been detained, the jurists who challenged the proclamation had been exiled, and the observers who documented the discrepancy had been stripped of standing, the official result faced no remaining domestic institution capable of revising it, and what began as a contested outcome settled into the country’s operative reality.

 

3

 

In political systems where elections can be lost by incumbents, where legislatures can refuse executive requests, and where courts can rule against the government that appointed them, justice and freedom are sustained not as fixed possessions but through the ordinary repetition of these adjustments; in systems where each of these outcomes has been foreclosed, the appearance of stability is purchased at the cost of the corrective mechanism itself.  When governance forecloses negotiation among competing interests, it must present its decisions as already settled; the appearance of certainty then replaces the slower work of adjustment, and the system loses the capacity to correct itself when conditions change.  Effective governance depends on the capacity to absorb conflict without suppressing it.  [2]

 

4

 

Individual agency remains relevant not as moral heroism but as structural participation.  When citizens can still publish what officials would prefer unpublished, still gather without prior authorization, and still petition courts that retain some margin of independence, an official contemplating an arbitrary act must weigh the likelihood that the act will be recorded, contested, and at some later date reviewed; some, facing that weight, do not proceed.  [3]

The restoration of justice depends on reconstituting conditions under which individuals can act without fear and without illusion.  Citizens must be able to criticize public officials without anticipating detention, to document irregularities without expecting retaliation, and to petition courts without assuming in advance that outcomes have already been decided elsewhere.  Elections cannot function as ceremonial affirmations whose outcomes are settled before votes are cast.  Journalists cannot operate under the expectation that investigation itself may trigger surveillance, prosecution, or exile.  Under such conditions, participation ceases to resemble managed exposure and begins again to recover the practical character of civic agency.

The restoration of justice also depends on reconnecting personal responsibility to collective structures rather than isolating it within conscience alone.  A judge who privately recognizes procedural abuse but understands that appellate review no longer functions may remain silent despite personal objection.  When editors, courts, universities, and professional associations cease defending independent inquiry, journalists who continue documenting irregularities eventually operate without institutional protection.  Citizens who recognize electoral manipulation but encounter no reliable mechanism through which evidence can alter outcomes gradually retreat from participation into private disillusionment.  Under such conditions, ethical recognition survives individually while corrective capacity disappears collectively.  Responsibility becomes internalized as private awareness rather than sustained through institutions capable of transforming recognition into civic consequence.

 


Endnotes — Chapter XIX

§ 1

  • [1] Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 55–69.

 § 3

  • [2] Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York:  Knopf, 1999), 123–137, 146–159, 282–287.

§ 4

  • [3] Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development:  The Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), 66–72, 104–110, 124–130.

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series I”

January 7, 2026

“Geometric Allegory,” digital painting 2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

To my parents

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge Billy Bussell Thompson for his meticulous editorial guidance.  His feedback sharpened the structure, precision, and internal discipline of this work.

Preface

“Unmasking Disappointment” follows a line of inquiry present throughout my work:   the examination of identity, memory, and the relations that emerge when life unfolds across cultural boundaries.   Although I have lived outside Venezuela for more than five decades and became a naturalized citizen of the United States twenty-four years ago, my relationship to the country of my birth remains a persistent point of reference.   The distance between these conditions—belonging and removal—forms the backdrop against which this narrative takes shape.

This work belongs to a broader autobiographical project that gathers experiences, observations, and questions accumulated over time.   While personal in origin, it does not proceed as confession or memoir.   Its method is sequential rather than expressive:   individual exposure is situated within historical forces and political structures that have shaped Venezuelan life across generations.   The intention is not to reconcile these tensions, but to render them visible through recurrence, record, and consequence.

“Series I” introduces the first thematic clusters of this inquiry.   The episodes assembled here do not advance a single thesis, nor do they aim at resolution.   They trace points of friction where private experience intersects with public power, and where political narratives exert pressure on ordinary life.   Across these encounters, patterns emerge—not as abstractions, but as conditions that alter how authority is exercised, how responsibility is displaced, and how agency is constrained.

The chapters that follow examine the pressures produced by systemic inequality and trace contemporary Venezuelan conditions back to their historical formation.   Autocratic rule and popular consent appear not as opposing forces, but as elements that increasingly entangle and weaken one another.   Within this entanglement, truth does not disappear; it becomes less evenly accessible and more readily displaced by narrative.

When public discourse is shaped by propaganda and misinformation, authoritarian structures gain resilience.   Recovering truth under such conditions does not resolve political conflict, but it clarifies the limits within which political life operates.   Agency emerges not as an ideal, but as a condition sustained—or undermined—through practice and consequence.

This work does not propose deterministic explanations or simple remedies.   It proceeds by accumulation, drawing attention to patterns that persist despite changing circumstances.   What it asks of the reader is not agreement, but attention:   to evidence, to sequence, and to the conditions under which political freedom may be meaningfully exercised.

Writing from Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, I remain aware of the distance between the environments in which this work is composed and the conditions it examines.   That distance does not confer authority; it imposes responsibility.

Ricardo Federico Morín
Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, January 21, 2025


*

Table of Contents

  • Chapter I — A Written Language.
  • Chapter II — Our Recklessness.
  • Chapter III — Point of View.
  • Chapter IV — A Dialogue.
  • Chapter V — Abstract.
  • Chapter VI — Chronicles of Hugo Chávez (§§ I-XVII).
  • Chapter VII — The Allegorical Mode.
  • Chapter VIII — The Ideal Government and the Power of Virtue.
  • Chapter IX — First Sign:   On Political and Social Resentment.
  • Chapter X — Second Sign:   The Solid Pillar of Power; The Military Forces.
  • Chapter XI — Third Sign:  The Asymmetry of Political Parties.
  • Chapter XII — Fourth Sign:  Autocracy (§§ 1-9); Venezuela (§§ 10-23); The Asymmetry of Sanctions (§§ 24-32).
  • Chapter XIII – Fifth Sign:  The Pawned Republic.
  • Chapter XIV — First Issue:   Partisanship, Non-partisanship, and Antipartisanship.
  • Chapter XV — Second Issue:   On Partial Truths and Repressive Anarchy.
  • Chapter XVI — Third Issue:   The Clarion of Democracy.
  • Chapter XVII — Fourth Issue:   On Human Rights.
  • Chapter XVIII — Fifth Issue:  On the Nature of Violence.
  • Chapter XIX — Sixth Issue:   On the Persistence of Injustice.
  • Chapter XX — The Ultimate Issue:   Constitutional Form and Its Hollowing.
  • Appendix:   Author’s Note, Prefatory Note.     A). Venezuelan Constitutions [1811-1999], Branches, and Departments of Government.   B) Evolution of Political Parties: 1840-2024.    C) Laws Enacted by the Asamblea Nacional.  D) Clarificatory Note on Domestic Coercion, Foreign Presence, and Intervention.
  • Bibliography.

A Written Language

Stability is often sought where it cannot be secured.   Experience has shown this repeatedly.   Even careful intentions tend to draw one into uncertain terrain, where understanding lags behind consequence.   At the desk, as late-afternoon light reaches the page, writing assumes a practical function:   it becomes a means of ordering what would otherwise remain unsettled.   The act does not resolve vulnerability, but it records it.   Whether time alters such conditions remains uncertain; what can be done is to give them form.

What follows moves from the conditions of writing to the conditions it must confront.


*

Our Recklessness

~

“Our painful struggle to deal with the politics of climate change is surely also a product of the strange standoff between science and political thinking.” — Hannah Arendt:   The Human Condition:   Being and Time [1958], Kindle Book, 159.

1

The COVID pandemic and the 2023 Canadian wildfires, among other recent events, have made visible conditions that were already in place.     These events did not introduce new vulnerabilities as much as they revealed the extent to which existing systems depend on economic incentives and political habits that privilege extraction over preservation.   During the period when smoke from the fires reached the northeastern United States, daylight in parts of Pennsylvania was visibly altered and registered the reach of events unfolding at a considerable distance.   Such occurrences do not stand apart from prevailing economic arrangements; they coincide with a model that treats natural conditions as commodities and absorbs their degradation as an external cost.

2

The fires in California in 2025, like those that spread across Canada in 2023, do not present themselves as isolated occurrences.   They form part of a sequence shaped by environmental neglect, political inertia, and sustained industrial expansion.   Conditions such as desertification, resource scarcity, and population displacement no longer appear solely as projected outcomes; they are increasingly registered as present circumstances.   Scientific assessments indicate that these patterns are likely to intensify in the absence of structural change. [1][2][3]   What is brought into view, over time, is not a singular failure but a system that continues to operate according to priorities that favor immediate yield over long-term continuity.

3

The question of balance does not arise solely as a technical problem.   It emerges within a moral and political field shaped by prevailing economic assumptions.   The treatment of nature—and more recently of artificial intelligence—as a commodity reflects a trajectory in which matters of shared survival are increasingly translated into market terms.    Under such conditions, considerations that once belonged to collective responsibility are recast as variables within systems of calculation.

4

Such patterns place increasing strain on conditions necessary for collective survival.   Responses to these conditions vary and range from indifference to urgency, though urgency does not invariably produce clarity.   What becomes apparent, across repeated instances, is a tendency for crisis to recur without sustained adjustment.   This recurrence parallels the political histories examined in the chapters that follow, where warning and consequence frequently fail to align.


Endnotes—Chapter II


*

Point of View

1

Conversations with my editor, Billy Bussell Thompson, have accompanied the development of this work over time.    His attention to research method and to the structure of argument has contributed to the clarification of its scope and direction.    These exchanges, often conducted at a distance and without ceremony, formed part of the process through which the present narrative took shape.    After an extended period of uncertainty regarding how to approach the subject of Hugo Chávez, the contours of Unmasking Disappointment gradually emerged.

2

Hugo Chávez entered national political life as a leader whose authority was exercised in opposition to political liberalism. [1]  While his public discourse emphasized alignment with the poor, the material benefits of power accumulated within a narrow circle. [2]  Over the course of his tenure, democratic institutions in Venezuela experienced progressive weakening, and governance assumed increasingly authoritarian forms.   These developments become more legible when situated within the historical record and examined through documented practice rather than rhetorical claim.

3

The events that followed Chávez’s rule are marked by disorder and unresolved consequence.   Their persistence draws attention to questions of historical accountability and collective responsibility that remain unsettled.   Examining the record of autocratic leadership—its ambitions as well as its failures—provides a means of approaching the problem of justice in Venezuela without presuming resolution.   Through this examination, enduring tensions come into view as conditions to be understood rather than conclusions to be reached.

~


Endnotes—Chapter III

  • [1]   The term caudillo originates in Spanish and has historically been used to describe a leader who exercises concentrated political and military authority.    In the Venezuelan context, the term carries particular resonance and refers to figures associated with the post-independence period of the nineteenth century.    Such leaders tended to consolidate power through a combination of personal authority, allegiance from armed factions, and the promise—whether substantive or rhetorical—of maintaining order under conditions of instability.    While some were regarded as defenders of local or national causes, others became associated with practices that facilitated authoritarian governance and weakened institutional structures.    The concept of the caudillo continues to function within Venezuelan political culture as a descriptive category applied to leadership forms that combine popular support with concentrated power.

Chapter IV

A Dialogue

A series of conversations between BBT and the author accompanied the examination of Venezuelan politics and history developed in this section.   These exchanges formed a transitional space in which reflection gave way to historical inquiry, allowing questions of interpretation, responsibility, and record to be addressed through dialogue rather than exposition.

1

—RFM:   “My writing has been concerned with the evolution of Venezuela’s political landscape, with particular attention to the emergence of authoritarian forms of rule.   The focus has been less on abstract doctrine than on how specific policies translated into everyday conditions for ordinary Venezuelans.”

2

—BBT:   “Examining how authoritarian leadership shapes political conditions is necessary, though the term itself is often contested and applied unevenly.   In Chávez’s case, the use of propaganda was not exceptional in form, but it was consistently employed as an instrument of governance.   How did official narratives during his tenure circulate, and what effects did they have on public perception over time?”

3

—RFM:  “Propaganda is not unique to Chávez; it functions as a recurring instrument across political systems.   In Venezuela, official media regularly attributed economic hardship to external interference rather than to domestic policy decisions.    At the same time, material conditions deteriorated, with shortages emerging from economic mismanagement and later compounded by external restrictions.   Opposition groups also circulated counter-narratives, which in turn elicited responses from the State.    These exchanges unfolded within a historical context shaped by civil conflict and Cold War alignments, and produced a fragmented informational environment.   Within that environment, responsibility for economic decline was frequently displaced, while public perception was managed through repetition rather than resolution.   The social and economic reforms invoked in justification did not, over time, yield the reductions in poverty and inequality that had been promised.”

4

—BBT:  “To render Venezuela’s political conditions with some accuracy, attention must be given to how ordinary citizens encountered these dynamics in daily life.     How were such conditions navigated in practice, particularly where political discourse intersected with immediate economic necessity?”

5

—RFM:  “The economic collapse that followed the decline of the oil-based model intensified poverty and placed sustained pressure on public services.   Examined in sequence, this period shows how colonial legacies and authoritarian practices converged in the formation of Chavismo.   Episodes such as the 1989 riots known as El Caracazo registered widespread disaffection with established parties and democratic institutions.   Under such conditions, the demands of securing basic necessities frequently outweighed engagement with abstract political principles.”

6

—BBT:   “Clarity in narrative depends in part on recognizing the assumptions that guide interpretation.   When these assumptions are made explicit and examined, the account becomes less directive and more accessible, allowing readers to follow the record without being steered toward a predetermined position.”

7

—RFM:  “No narrative proceeds without interpretation, including this one.   Writing provides a means of approaching Venezuela’s history—its colonial formation, episodes of authoritarian rule, and periods of political disruption—without foreclosing alternative readings.    A coherent account need not be exhaustive; it remains open insofar as it attends to implication and consequence rather than resolution.”

8

—BBT:  “The exchange itself underscores the importance of careful narration when approaching Venezuela’s political and social record.    Attending to multiple viewpoints does not resolve complexity, but it allows a more coherent account to emerge without reducing that history to a single explanatory frame.”

The exchange marked a transition from reflective inquiry to historical record.

~


Chapter V

Abstract

1

This section examines the sequence through which the political project articulated under Hugo Chávez assumed autocratic form.    Rather than attributing this outcome to a single cause, the inquiry proceeds by tracing how leadership decisions unfolded within a convergence of historical conditions, institutional arrangements, economic pressures, and geopolitical alignments.   The account does not begin from conclusion, but from record.

2
Attention remains on how authority was exercised and how its effects registered within Venezuelan society.    Historical circumstance, institutional design, and external influence are examined not to simplify the record, but to make visible the interdependencies through which power consolidated over time.    What emerges is not an explanatory thesis, but a configuration whose coherence can be assessed only through sustained attention to sequence and consequence.

~


“Bound and Unbound:

August 31, 2025

The Articulation of Desire and Sin“


*

Cover design by Ricardo Morín
00032
Oil On Linen
18 by 24 by 3/4 inches
2009

Author’s Note

This essay considers how cultures have spoken about desire through the language of sin, pathology, and identity. The aim is not to defend or condemn, but to observe how words have carried judgments across time and how those judgments still shape our understanding. The reflections that follow are an attempt to restore clarity, to see desire as part of life’s vitality rather than as a distortion imposed by inherited vocabularies.

Abstract

Historically, desire has been articulated through terms such as sexuality, fetishism, morality, and religion. Over time, these words shifted from description to judgment, producing a confusion between nature and culture. Evidence from animal behavior, biology, and public health demonstrates that variation in desire is neither anomaly nor pathology. By grounding ethics in dignity and consent rather than shame, desire can be recognized as a natural expression of vitality rather than a source of suspicion.

The Burden of Words

Our most familiar words already betray the history of our confusion. Sexuality, from the Latin sexus, once indicated simple biological differentiation; only in the nineteenth century did it expand into a comprehensive category, enveloping desire, identity, and conduct (Laqueur 1990). Fetishism, from the Portuguese feitiço (“charm” or “sorcery”), was first applied to African religious objects before being imported into European science, where it came to signify irrational sexual attachment (Foucault 1978). Morality, from mores (“customs”), originally described communal practices but hardened into prescriptions against desire, particularly under Christian influence. Religion, from religare (“to bind”), once meant binding communities into shared ritual but eventually came to bind individuals to guilt and suspicion about their own bodies. Here the meaning of Bound and Unbound comes into view: words that once bound desire to order and judgment now carry within them the possibility of unbinding, of returning desire to the realm of vitality rather than suspicion. Each of these terms began in description and shifted into judgment. When we use them today, we inherit their distortions.

The Articulation of Desire and Sin

Culture has long gazed upon desire not as part of life’s ordinary richness but as a threat to be monitored. Theologies cast it as sin; medical texts classified it as pathology; social codes framed it as danger (Foucault 1978). This does not clarify, it distorts. Sexuality becomes at once overexposed and diminished: in public, it is the subject of rules and prohibitions; in private, it collapses into unrealistic expectations that either inhibit expression or exaggerate it into fetish. What should be natural is turned into a negotiation with shame.

Nature provides a more honest account. Same-sex interactions have been documented in over four hundred species (Bagemihl 1999). Rams form lasting male–male bonds, often rejecting female partners. Dolphins employ genital contact across sexes to cement alliances (de Waal 2005). Swans, gulls, and penguins engage in same-sex pairings that rear offspring as successfully as heterosexual pairs (Roughgarden 2013). Among bonobos, sexual contact occurs across nearly every configuration and functions as a mechanism of peacekeeping and social cohesion (de Waal 2005). Even in insects, behaviors that humans describe as “homosexual” occur routinely as part of dominance rituals or sheer abundance of sexual drive. None of this destabilizes the species; rather, it integrates sexuality into the fabric of survival and affiliation.

Humans display similar variation. Chromosomal conditions such as Klinefelter syndrome (XXY) or Turner syndrome (XO) illustrate that biological sex is not a rigid binary but a spectrum (LeVay 2016). Hormonal influences during gestation shape attraction and behavior before culture applies its labels (Hrdy 1981). Neuroscientific studies suggest correlations between hypothalamic structures and orientation, though no single cause accounts for desire (LeVay 2016). What emerges is not a fixed order but a continuum. The insistence on strict categories—heterosexual or homosexual, normal or deviant—is not nature’s doing but culture’s imposition.

Yet culture continues to conflate desire with identity and narrows it into fixed roles. These categories can be politically useful, but they risk obscuring the fluidity of experience that biology reveals. When identity becomes prescriptive, individuals live their own vitality under suspicion, measuring themselves against cultural ideals that deny variation. The result is estrangement: desire filtered through shame.

An alternative frame already exists. The World Health Organization defines sexual health as “a state of physical, emotional, mental, and social well-being” that includes the possibility of safe and pleasurable experiences (WHO 2006). The World Association for Sexual Health has gone further, affirming sexual pleasure as a fundamental human right (WAS 2019). Such frameworks do not police desire; they protect individuals against coercion and exploitation. They suggest that the role of culture is not to dictate what desires are permissible but to ensure dignity and consent. Once these conditions are secured, desire resumes its natural role: a source of intimacy, bonding, creativity, and balance (Gruskin et al. 2019).

To confront nature’s complexity is to resist its reduction into morality plays of vice and virtue. Desire does not require validation from cultural obsession, nor does it deserve condemnation from inherited vocabularies of sin. It is an aspect of life, as ordinary and vital as hunger or sleep. To acknowledge it without fear is to reclaim joy. By lifting the burden of shame, we return desire to its proper place in the living order: not an aberration requiring defense, but a manifestation of vitality—one that connects us to each other and to the exuberance of nature itself.

*


Annotated Bibliography

  • Bagemihl, Bruce: Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. (A landmark survey documenting same-sex behaviors in more than 450 species. Bagemihl’s research undermines claims that homosexuality is “unnatural” and illustrates the diversity of sexual expression across the animal kingdom. It is essential for grounding sexuality in biological rather than cultural terms.)
  • de Waal, Frans: Our Inner Ape: A Leading Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We Are. New York: Riverhead Books, 2005. (Drawing on primate studies, de Waal emphasizes sex as a social tool among bonobos and chimpanzees, used for alliance-building and conflict resolution. His work demonstrates that sexual behavior is not confined to reproduction but serves broader social and evolutionary functions.)
  • Foucault, Michel: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon, 1978. (In this foundational text on the cultural construction of sexuality, Foucault argues that sexuality is not a timeless natural category but a discourse shaped by power and institutions. Provides the conceptual framework for understanding how morality and pathology have distorted natural instincts.)
  • Gruskin, Sofia, et al. “Sexual Health, Sexual Rights and Sexual Pleasure.” Global Public Health, 2019, 14(10): 1361–1372. (This article situates sexual pleasure within global public health frameworks. It underscores that fulfillment and pleasure are inseparable from health and rights, reinforcing the need for ethics based on dignity rather than prohibition.)
  • Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer: The Woman That Never Evolved. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. (Hrdy reinterprets female primate behavior and shows active strategies in mating and alliance formation. Her work dismantles the myth of female passivity and demonstrates that sexual agency is integral to evolutionary success.)
  • Laqueur, Thomas: Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. (Laqueur traces the cultural and historical shift from the “one-sex” model of antiquity to the modern “two-sex” binary. His work shows how scientific language helped construct cultural categories of sexuality and gender, making him central to the etymological and historical analysis of desire.
  • LeVay, Simon: Gay, Straight, and the Reason Why: The Science of Sexual Orientation. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. (LeVay synthesizes research on brain structures, genetics, and prenatal influences and argues that sexual orientation emerges from a complex interaction of biological factors. Useful for contextualizing the continuum of human desire.)
  • Roughgarden, Joan: Evolution’s Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People. Rev. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013. (Roughgarden challenges traditional Darwinian views of sexual selection, highlighting diversity in gender and sexuality across species. She bridges nonhuman variation and human experience and offers a scientific argument against binary understandings of sexuality.)
  • World Health Organization (WHO): “Defining Sexual Health.” Geneva: WHO, 2006. (This report defines sexual health as a state of well-being that includes the possibility of safe and pleasurable sexual experiences, free of coercion or violence. It offers authoritative language to argue that sexual fulfillment is a health matter, not a moral one.)
  • World Association for Sexual Health (WAS): “Declaration on Sexual Pleasure.” Mexico City: WAS, 2019.(This report affirms sexual pleasure as a fundamental human right. This declaration situates pleasure within global health and rights discourse, supporting the essay’s call for ethics rooted in dignity rather than shame.)

“The Politics of Erasure: Authoritarianism and Spectacle”

August 22, 2025

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Cover design for the essay “The Politics of Erasure: Authoritarianism and Spectacle.” The composite image juxtaposes surveillance, militarization, propaganda, and mass spectacle to underscore how authoritarian regimes render lives expendable while legitimizing control through display.

By Ricardo Morín, In Transit to and from NJ, August 22, 2025

Authoritarianism in the present era does not present itself with uniform symbols. It emerges within democracies and one-party states alike, in countries with declining economies and in those boasting rapid growth. What unites these varied contexts is not the formal shape of government but the way power acts upon individuals: autonomy is curtailed, dignity denied, and dissent reclassified as threat. Control is maintained not only through coercion but also through the appropriation of universal values—peace, tolerance, harmony, security—emptied of their content and redeployed as instruments of supression. The result is a politics in which human beings are treated as expendable and spectacle serves as both distraction and justification.

In the United States, the Bill of Rights secures liberties, yet their practical force is weakened by structural inequality and concentrated control over communication. After the attacks of September 11, the USA PATRIOT Act authorized sweeping surveillance in the name of defending freedom, normalizing the monitoring of private communications (ACLU 2021). Protest movements such as the Black Lives Matter demonstrations of 2020 filled the streets, but their urgency was absorbed into the circuits of media coverage, partisan argument, and corporate monetization (New York Times 2020). What begins as protest often concludes as spectacle: filmed, replayed, and reframed until the original message is displaced by distractions. Meanwhile, the opioid epidemic, mass homelessness, and medical bankruptcy reveal how millions of lives are tolerated as expendable (CDC 2022). Their suffering is acknowledged in statistics but rarely addressed in policy, treated as collateral to an order that prizes visibility over remedy.

Venezuela offers a more direct case. The Ley contra el Odio (“Law against Hatred”), passed in 2017 by a constituent assembly lacking democratic legitimacy, was presented as a measure to protect tolerance and peace. In practice, it has been used to prosecute journalists, students, and citizens for expressions that in a democratic society would fall squarely within the realm of debate (Amnesty International 2019). More recently, the creation of the Consejo Nacional de Ciberseguridad has extended this logic to place fear and self-censorship among neighbors and colleagues (Transparencia Venezuela 2023). At the same time, deprivation functions as a tool of discipline: access to food and medicine is selectively distributed to turn scarcity into a means of control (Human Rights Watch 2021). The state’s televised rallies and plebiscites portray unity and loyalty, but the reality is a society fractured by exile, with over seven million citizens abroad and those who remain bound by necessity rather than consent (UNHCR 2023).

Russia combines repression with patriotic theater. The 2002 Law on Combating Extremist Activity and the 2012 “foreign agents” statute have systematically dismantled independent journalism and civil society (Human Rights Watch 2017), while the 2022 law against “discrediting the armed forces” criminalized even the description of war as war (BBC 2022). Citizens have been detained for carrying blank signs, which demonstrates how any act, however symbolic, can be punished if interpreted as dissent (Amnesty International 2022). The war in Ukraine has revealed the human cost of this system: conscripts drawn disproportionately from poorer regions and minority populations are sent to the frontlines, their lives consumed for national projection. At home, state television ridicules dissent as treason or foreign manipulation, while parades, commemorations, and managed elections transform coercion into duty. The official promise of security and unity is sustained not by coexistence but by the systematic silencing of plural voices, enforced equally through law, propaganda, and ritual display.

China illustrates the most technologically integrated model. The 2017 Cybersecurity Law and the 2021 Data Security Law require companies and individuals to submit to state control over digital information and extend surveillance across every layer of society (Creemers 2017; Kuo 2021). Social media platforms compel group administrators to monitor content and disperses the responsibility of conformity to citizens themselves (Freedom House 2022). At the same time, spectacle saturates the landscape: the Singles’ Day shopping festival in November generates billions in sales, broadcast as proof of prosperity and cohesion, while state media showcases technological triumphs as national achievements (Economist 2021). Entire communities, particularly in Xinjiang, are declared targets of re-education and surveillance. Mosques are closed, languages restricted, and traditions suppressed—all in the name of harmony (Amnesty International 2021). Stability is invoked, but the reality is the systematic denial of dignity: identity reduced to an administrative category, cultural life dismantled at will, and existence itself rendered conditional upon conformity to the designs of state power.

Taken together, these cases reveal a common logic. The United States commodifies dissent and normalizes abandonment as a permanent condition of public life. Venezuela uses deprivation to enforce discipline and the resulting compliance is publicly presented as loyalty to the state. Russia demands sacrifice and transforms coercion into patriotic duty. China fuses surveillance and prosperity and engineers conformity. Entire communities are suppressed in the name of harmony. The registers differ—commercial, ritualistic, militarized, digital—but the pattern is shared: dissent is stripped of legitimacy, lives are treated as expendable, and universal values are inverted to justify coercion.


References

  • ACLU: “Surveillance under the USA PATRIOT Act”. New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2021. (This article documents how post-9/11 legislation expanded state surveillance in the United States and framed “security” as a justification for reducing privacy rights.)
  • Amnesty International: “Venezuela: Hunger for Justice. London: Amnesty International”, 2019. (Amnesty International reports on how Venezuela’s Ley contra el Odio has been used to prosecute citizens and silence dissent under the rhetoric of tolerance.)
  • Amnesty International: “Like We Were Enemies in a War: China’s Mass Internment, Torture and Persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang”. London: Amnesty International. 2021. (Amnesty International provides evidence of mass detention, surveillance, and cultural repression in Xinjiang carried out in the name of “harmony” and stability.)
  • Amnesty International: “Russia: Arrests for Anti-War Protests”. London: Amnesty International, 2022. (Amnesty International details the systematic arrest of Russian citizens, including those holding blank signs, under laws claiming to protect peace and order.)
  • BBC: “Russia Passes Law to Jail People Who Spread ‘Fake’ Information about Ukraine War.” March 4, 2022. (News coverage of Russia’s 2022 law criminalizing criticism of the war shows how “discrediting the armed forces” became a punishable offense.)
  • CDC.: “Opioid Overdose Deaths in the United States. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention”. 2022. (The CDC provides statistical evidence of widespread loss of life in the U.S. and underscores how entire populations are treated as expendable in public health.)
  • Creemers, Rogier: “Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China”: Translation with Annotations. Leiden University, 2017. (An authoritative translation and analysis of China’s 2017 Cybersecurity Law illustrate how digital oversight is institutionalized.)
  • UNHCR: “Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Venezuela: Regional Overview”. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023. (This report offers figures on the Venezuelan exodus and highlights the mass displacement caused by deprivation and repression.)

“The Unmaking of a Nation”

July 29, 2025

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Ricardo Morin
The Unmaking of a Nation
CGI
2025

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To my brother Alberto, whose persistence sustained this reflection and made these pages possible.


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By Ricardo Morin

July 29, 2025

Abstract

This essay examines the fragmentation of Venezuelan national identity amid a prolonged crisis of State failure. It argues that the collapse of institutional sovereignty, the entrenchment of foreign authoritarian influence, and the marginalization of native citizens from civic and economic life have not only hollowed out the republic but have also fractured the symbolic cohesion necessary for shared civic identity. Through a reasoned analysis of foreign entanglement, cultural displacement, and the moral cost of dispossession, the essay contends that Venezuelan identity has become a contested act of memory and resistance. The argument proceeds not from political activism but from a civic and ethical perspective on national dissolution.



Section I: Losing the Nation: Identity in a Failed State

National identity is not an abstraction. It is a lived sense of coherence that binds individuals to a shared history, a common language, and a civic project. In functional States, this identity is sustained by stable institutions of governance, the continuity of law, and the everyday experience of participation in a protected civic order. When a State collapses—through authoritarian control, institutional decay, and the disfigurement of sovereignty—its people do not merely lose services or rights. They begin to lose their place in the world.

As Michel Agier observes, “when institutions that once guaranteed rights, protection, and civic recognition collapse—such as courts, elections, or access to public services—citizens can become internally exiled: physically present, but stripped of belonging”—of any sense of inclusion.

This disintegration is not caused solely by economic collapse or political repression. It has been compounded by the regime’s calculated alignment with foreign authoritarian powers, which have embedded external interests deep within the nation’s economy and territorial administration. Through negotiated dependencies—whether in extractive industries, infrastructure, surveillance, or military cooperation—the Venezuelan State has relinquished control over strategic industries and assets. In doing so, it has not only compromised national sovereignty; it has reordered the social and cultural hierarchy of belonging.

As Louisa Loveluck has documented, these foreign enclaves operate as “parallel structures of control and privilege,” where loyalty to external powers displaces the traditional role of State industries such as in oil and mining resources (Loveluck, “Foreign Control and Local Collapse in Venezuela’s Border Zones,” The Washington Post, 2019).

According to David Smilde, this delegation of sovereign functions to authoritarian allies has transformed the State apparatus into an instrument of regime survival rather than a vehicle of national representation (Smilde, “The Military and Authoritarian Resilience in Venezuela,” Latin American Politics and Society, 2020).

The result is a deep psychological rupture. Arjun Appadurai describes this condition as a form of “identity disanchoring,” in which cultural detachment renders citizens unable to recognize themselves in their historical present (Modernity at Large, 1996).

When a nation’s institutions no longer reflect its people, and when its future is shaped by foreign imperatives, Venezuelanness becomes less a civic reality and more a memory under siege. What is lost is not only territorial—it is existential. Hannah Arendt warned of this condition with stark clarity: the loss of the right to have rights begins when one no longer belongs to a political community capable of guaranteeing them security (The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951).



Section II: Authoritarian Alliances and Economic Infiltration

Venezuela’s transformation into a failed State has not occurred in isolation. Its authoritarian trajectory has been reinforced by a calculated strategy of international alignment with other regimes operating outside the norms of democratic accountability. These alliances—chiefly with Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey—have provided the Maduro regime not only with political legitimacy and technical support, but have also enabled the gradual outsourcing of national functions and resources to foreign control (cf. Ellis 2018, 49–56).

These alliances are transactional:  the Venezuelan State forfeits sovereignty in exchange for survival. Chinese loans secured by oil reserves, Russian stakes in energy infrastructure, Cuban intelligence operations embedded in the military and civil apparatus, and Iranian ventures in mining and logistics have together displaced native Venezuelans from critical sectors of the economy (cf. Trinkunas 2015, 3–6; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 197–198).

In parallel, private and informal business networks—often tied to these foreign interests—have taken root in local markets, at times displacing or outperforming historical domestic producers. This economic infiltration has a dual effect. It distorts the allocation of national resources, diverting wealth and opportunity away from the general population toward a narrow class of regime beneficiaries and their foreign patrons (cf. Corrales 2020, 212–215). And it reconfigures the geography of power: entire regions, especially those rich in oil, minerals, or strategic positions, have come under the functional control of external actors or militias under foreign protection (cf. Romero 2021, 88–91).

In such contexts, Venezuelans do not merely feel excluded from their economy; they experience it as something alien—managed, exploited, and secured by those whose loyalties lie elsewhere. The result is a corrosive alienation. A population that once saw itself as a beneficiary of a national project now confronts the reality of an extractive system in which their labor, land, and culture are no longer valued on their own terms. The economy ceases to be a platform for collective progress and becomes a zone of foreign extraction, protected by repression and organized through impunity (cf. Loveluck and Dehghan 2020; López Maya 2022).

In this environment, the question of identity becomes inseparable from the loss of agency. To be Venezuelan under such conditions is to be subordinated within one’s own country.



Section III: Cultural and Social Displacement

The dissolution of identity in a failed State extends beyond political and economic structures; it reaches into the cultural and social fabric of everyday life. In Venezuela, the displacement of native citizens is not always physical—though mass emigration has marked the national experience. The institutions, customs, and even public spaces that once embodied a shared civic identity are being emptied out, repurposed, or replaced by structures that no longer reflect Venezuelan values or priorities [cf. Salas 2019, 45–47].

Public education, for instance—once a source of national pride and social mobility—has been systematically dismantled. In its place, ideological indoctrination and partisan loyalty have become criteria for access and advancement [cf. Human Rights Watch 2021]. The result is not only the degradation of knowledge and opportunity but even the politicization of childhood itself. Similarly, cultural production—formerly diverse, expressive, and regionally vibrant—has withered under censorship, economic collapse, and the withdrawal of public support for the arts [cf. Ávila 2020, 119–124].

What remains is either trivialized as propaganda or silenced altogether. The result is a cultural silence, where shared narratives are undermined and the cultural life of the nation is reduced to slogans and spectacle. Meanwhile, the influx of foreign interests and their social infrastructure—contract workers, commercial complexes, private security, parallel institutions—has introduced new cultural norms and loyalties into local environments, particularly in border areas and resource-rich zones [cf. Rodríguez and Ortega 2023].

These changes are often subtle: signage in unfamiliar languages, imported goods replacing local ones, new patterns of exclusion in access to services or employment. But over time, they alter the character of a place, displacing not only people but the meanings those places once held. This form of displacement is disorienting because it operates within everyday life. It renders Venezuelans strangers in their own markets, their own schools, their own land. It unravels the mutual recognition that makes coexistence possible.

When communities no longer share a common point of reference—whether legal, linguistic, or moral—they lose the cohesion needed to sustain identity as something lived and affirmed. The rupture is not dramatic; it is slow, cumulative, and deeply damaging [cf. Arendt 1951, 302–306]. In such a context, cultural resilience becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. Identity, once reinforced by public participation and pride in collective achievement, begins to retreat into nostalgia or fracture along lines of class, exile, or ideological survival. It becomes reactive rather than generative—something to defend rather than to build.



Section IV: Dignity and the Struggle to Belong

“Venezuela: Freedom in the World 2024” by Freedom House offers updated empirical data and analytical context regarding the decline of political rights and civil liberties in Venezuela, with particular attention to authoritarian consolidation and State control.

At the heart of national identity lies the human need for dignity: the certainty that one’s life is acknowledged, one’s labor valued, and one’s voice able to contribute to a shared future. In today’s Venezuela, that dignity has been systematically undermined. The collapse of institutions, the degradation of public life, and the influence of foreign entanglements distorting the national economy have created a climate in which the average citizen no longer feels seen or protected by their country. This is not merely a political failure, but a fracture in the ethical foundation of the nation. As Emmanuel Levinas warned, “dignity is not a legal category but the response of the face of the other, who calls and obliges us” (Levinas 1982).

When a government no longer rules on behalf of its people, but rather to ensure its own permanence and serve external patrons, civic inclusion becomes conditional. Loyalty is demanded, not earned. Dissent is criminalized, not heard. Citizenship, far from offering protection, becomes a liability. In such a system, dignity is not merely denied—it is redefined through fear, dependency, and silence. Here, Hannah Arendt’s warning comes to pass: “the loss of human rights begins when the right to have rights is lost” (Arendt 1951).

This leaves Venezuelans—both within and beyond the country—suspended between dispossession and resistance. Many continue to fight for what remains: organizing locally, teaching despite educational collapse, feeding neighbors in the absence of public services, safeguarding memory in the face of propaganda. These acts are heroic, but they also respond to abandonment. They attest to the resilience of the people, but also to the void where the State should be.

For those in exile, the loss is often twofold: the loss of a physical home and the loss of a living context. Cultural reference points no longer match daily experience. One’s accent becomes a marker of displacement. The passport becomes a barrier more than a right. And yet, exile can also sharpen awareness of what has been lost—and what must be preserved. Thus, identity persists not through affirmation of a functioning nation, but through refusal to forget one. In the words of Edward Said, “exile is not simply a condition of loss, but a critical way of being in the world” (Said 2000).

Even so, dignity requires more than memory. It requires restoration: of institutions, of justice, of a civic space where Venezuelans may once again participate as equals. Until such restoration is possible, the struggle to belong will continue to define Venezuelan identity—not as a static inheritance, but as a sustained refusal to surrender what remains of the nation’s moral core.



Section V: A Word for the Dispossessed

To speak of dispossession is to name not only what has been taken but also what continues to be denied: the right to shape one’s future within a framework of justice, belonging, and shared meaning. In Venezuela, dispossession has unfolded through a deliberate dismantling of sovereignty—first by internal corruption, then by foreign entanglement. What remains is a scattered people, a fragmented territory, and an identity under immense pressure. As Achille Mbembe has noted, “dispossession acts not only upon bodies but also upon the collective imaginaries that sustain life in common” (Mbembe 2016).

And yet, dispossession is not the end of identity. The absence of a functional State does not erase a nation’s moral memory. The language, traditions, civic values, and aspirations that once shaped Venezuelan life have not vanished: they have been driven underground, carried into exile, or preserved in the hearts of those who remember. “Language is the house of being,” said Heidegger, and where it is kept alive, a form of belonging endures (Heidegger 1959).

The task now is not only to resist, but to rebuild: to articulate a vision of Venezuelanness that rejects both cynicism and forgetfulness.

This cannot be done through nostalgia alone. Nor can it be deferred to future generations without commitment. It begins with the refusal to normalize what is not normal: the foreign occupation of national resources, the criminalization of dissent, the denial of opportunity, the devaluation of citizenship. It continues in the quiet labor of preserving language, history, and dignity wherever that remains possible—whether in classrooms, in exile, or through the written word. And it gains strength through solidarity: among those who stayed, those who left, and those who bear both destinies.

Under these conditions, Venezuelan identity is not a fixed inheritance but an act of resistance. It is the assertion that dignity is not negotiable, and that a people cannot be permanently replaced by alliances of convenience and control. The recovery of the nation will take time and may require forms not yet imagined. But it will depend, above all, on the preservation of civic spirit—one that knows what has been lost and refuses to let it be forgotten.



Epilogue
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As Venezuela’s history unfolds in waves, the struggle between unity and fragmentation, idealism and authority, repeats itself—not only in the corridors of power but also in the private lives of those who live with its consequences. Power, in its many forms, tests the very fabric of the nation, yet the quest for balance remains elusive. Venezuela remains gripped by a profound humanitarian crisis, with millions deprived of basic healthcare and nutrition, according to the “World Report 2024” by Human Rights Watch. [1] The country now has the highest rate of undernourishment in South America, with 66% of its population in need of humanitarian aid and 65% having irreversibly lost their means of livelihood. Despite repeated promises of reform and amnesty, entrenched power structures have prevented meaningful change and perpetuated what is widely regarded as an authoritarian and corrupt regime. External interventions, primarily diplomatic and economic sanctions, have been frequent, yet they have failed to compel any substantive transformation.

Political theory once held that the spread of democracy would secure peace among nations. [2] The ordeal for Venezuelans suggests the converse: peace recedes where democracy is hollowed into the temporality of chaos. Although such theories do not directly address the persistence of autocracies, the Venezuelan case highlights how regimes strengthened by internal control and by strategic autocratic alliances with external powers can withstand both internal unrest and external pressure.


In Venezuela, theoretical insights find concrete expression in how democratic institutions—elections, legislatures, and courts—are repurposed to entrench authoritarian control. Through staged electoral processes, constrained legislatures, and politicized judiciaries, these regimes suppress dissent, manage perception, and deflect external accountability. Legitimacy transforms from a mandate of the people into a mechanism for the endurance of autocratic power.

While the path forward remains uncertain, the crisis is no longer merely political—it is systemic, embedded in the very fabric of Venezuela’s history. The resolution of this crisis requires more than political turnover or external intervention; it requires an acknowledgment of the historical inheritance that has shaped the nation’s mistrust and dysfunction. The foundations of governance have long been built on conflicting forces, and any potential for change begins with an awareness of this legacy. A coordinated strategy that integrates economic support, diplomatic engagement, and grassroots democratic movements may provide short-term relief, but it cannot resolve what is ingrained. True transformation requires a cultural reckoning—an internal shift in consciousness that confronts the very forces that have enabled autocratic rule. Yet without a profound internal unity—a cultural awakening capable of overcoming centuries of inherent contradictions—the possibility of such transformation may remain distant, though not extinguished.

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Endnotes:

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Annotated Bibliography

  • Améry, Jean: At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. (A philosophical and existential reflection on suffering, exile, and the loss of belonging. The essay draws on his idea that there is no greater violence than being stripped of a place in the world to return to, which becomes a moral axis in the Venezuela of the exodus.)
  • Appadurai, Arjun: Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. (Appadurai introduces the concept of “identity disanchoring” to describe the cultural unmooring brought about by globalization, which disrupts symbolic continuity between past and present. He is cited to explain the subjective rupture in contexts of cultural loss and displacement.)
  • Arendt, Hannah: The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951. (Foundational study on rootlessness, denationalization, and the right to have rights. Her conceptualization of stateless refugees directly informs the argument about the loss of belonging as a form of ontological expulsion.)
  • Ávila, Rafael: La cultura sitiada: Arte, política y silencio en Venezuela. Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 2020. (Ávila examines how censorship, economic precariousness, and institutional control have drastically reduced independent artistic production in Venezuela. He is cited to support the claim that cultural diversity has been replaced by an expression conditioned by power and subsistence.)
  • Corrales, Javier: Autocracy Rising: How Venezuela’s Authoritarian Leaders Consolidated Power. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020. (Corrales explains how regime elites have concentrated economic control through informal networks, enabling foreign-backed oligarchies to displace domestic economic actors. Used to support the claim that foreign patrons and loyalists now dominate Venezuelan resource flows.)
  • Ellis, R. Evan: Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018. (Ellis provides a comprehensive mapping of how foreign actors—especially from Cuba, Russia, and China—embed themselves in the Venezuelan state. Cited to explain the strategic outsourcing of sovereignty to non-democratic allies.)
  • Gessen, Masha: Surviving Autocracy. New York: Riverhead Books, 2020. (Though centered on the United States, this book articulates general patterns of autocratic behavior—such as the distortion of language, the hollowing of institutions, and the disorientation of those governed—which also apply to the Venezuelan case.)
  • Heidegger, Martin: Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959. (Includes the well-known phrase “Language is the house of being,” which is cited to emphasize the relationship between linguistic continuity and existential belonging.)
  • Human Rights Watch: “Venezuela’s Humanitarian Emergency: Large-Scale UN Response Needed to Address Health and Food Crisis.” New York: Human Rights Watch, 2019. (H.R.W. detailed report linking the collapse of public services with violations of basic rights and national dignity, highlighting how the humanitarian crisis contributes to the dissolution of identity.)
  • Levinas, Emmanuel: Totalité et infini: Essai sur l’extériorité. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. (Levinas’s ethics of alterity, centered on responsibility toward the irreducible other, underlies the essay’s argument for a politics founded on dignity, not on state identity or calculated reciprocity.)
  • Levitsky, Steven, and Ziblatt, Daniel: How Democracies Die. Nueva York: Crown Publishing Group, 2018. (Levitsky and Ziblatt offer a framework for understanding democratic degradation via institutional capture and foreign alignment. It is referenced to underline the transactional nature of Venezuela’s external alliances.)
  • López Maya, Margarita: “Economía extractiva y soberanía en disputa: el Arco Minero del Orinoco.” Revista Venezolana de Ciencia Política 45 (2022): 34–49. (López Maya analyzes how mining zones have become semi-autonomous territories controlled by militias and foreign interests, supporting the essay’s argument on geographic alienation and economic fragmentation.)
  • Loveluck, Louisa: “The Collapse of a Nation: Venezuela’s Descent into Authoritarianism.” The Washington Post, July 2020. (Journalistic synthesis of Venezuela’s structural collapse, including firsthand accounts of economic alienation and the psychological cost of state abandonment.)
  • Loveluck, Louisa, and Dehghan, Saeed Kamali: “Venezuela Hands Over Control of Key Assets to Foreign Backers.” The Washington Post, 2020. (Loveluck’s and Dehghan’s investigative report documents the privatization and foreign management of strategic Venezuelan sectors. Their report is cited to demonstrate how national industries have been subordinated to external control.)
  • Mbembe, Achille. Politiques de l’inimitié. Paris: La Découverte, 2016. (Mbembe explores the politics of enmity and the mechanisms of dispossession in late modernity. Quoted to highlight how structural violence targets both material life and the collective imagination.)
  • Rodríguez, Luis, y Ortega, Daniela: Colonización contemporánea: transformaciones culturales en las zonas extractivas de Venezuela. Mérida: Editorial de la Universidad de los Andes, 2023. (An ethnographic study on the sociocultural effects of foreign investment in mining and border regions, including the introduction of new hierarchies, codes of coexistence, and parallel organizational forms. It is cited to support the argument about the transformation of cultural norms and community loyalties.)
  • Romero, Carlos A.: “Geopolítica, militarización y relaciones internacionales del chavismo.” Nueva Sociedad 293 (2021): 82–94. (Romero traces how foreign alliances have militarized border zones and reinforced internal authoritarianism. Used to support the claim that power has shifted toward actors whose loyalties lie beyond Venezuela.)
  • Roth, Kenneth: The Fight for Rights: Human Dignity and the Struggle Against Authoritarianism. New York: W. W. Norton, 2022. (Roth examines the moral and civic foundations of dignity, providing context for the argument that Venezuelan identity must now be preserved through resistance rather than state recognition.)
  • Said, Edward W.: Reflections on Exile and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. (Said explores the experience of exile as an existential and critical condition, beyond mere uprootedness. Cited to support the idea that Venezuelan identity in the diaspora endures not through the affirmation of a functioning nation, but through the refusal to forget.)
  • Salas, Miguel: Arquitectura y desposesión: Espacios públicos y crisis urbana en Venezuela. Caracas: Editorial Punto Cero, 2019. (Salas examines the transformation of public architecture and space in the context of political and social collapse in Venezuela. Cited to support the idea that shared civic structures are being stripped of their symbolic and communal function.)
  • Schmitt, Carl: The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. (Theoretical reference on sovereignty, useful for understanding how the Venezuelan regime defines enemies and allies not through legality but through loyalty, thereby reshaping the very meaning of citizenship.)
  • Shklar, Judith: American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. (Shklar examines how political and social exclusion has shaped the meaning of citizenship in the United States. The essay takes up her premise that to be a citizen implies not only legal rights, but effective belonging and recognized dignity.)
  • Smilde, David: “Participation, Politics, and Culture in Twenty-First Century Venezuela.” Latin American Research Review 52, no. 1 (2017): 157–65. (Analyzes the cultural impact of political polarization and exclusion in Venezuela, and how identity is formed in contested civic spaces.)
  • Trinkunas, Harold A.: “Venezuela’s Defense Sector and Civil-Military Relations.” Washington: Brookings Institution Working Paper, 2015. (Trinkunas examines the entrenchment of Cuban and Russian influence in the Venezuelan military. Cited to explain the redefinition of sovereignty under foreign advisory presence.)

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“Convergence by Design or Consequence?

July 7, 2025

In recent weeks, I’ve watched with growing unease as foreign policy decisions under Donald Trump unfold with a peculiar symmetry—one that echoes, benefits, or subtly enables the strategic priorities of Vladimir Putin.  While these choices are framed by officials as matters of diplomacy, security, or immigration control, the pattern that emerges—when traced across geography and timing—is harder to dismiss.  It suggests not only a convergence of interests but also a convergence of silence, of things not said, not questioned, not confronted.

A sharply argued opinion piece in The Washington Post by Marian Da Silva Parra, a scholar at Columbia Law School’s Human Rights Institute, called out the administration’s expanded travel bans for what they are:  policies that punish Venezuelan dissidents and effectively strengthen Nicolás Maduro’s grip by allowing him to portray his opponents as foreign threats.  But what is more telling than the piece itself is the fact that it appeared only as an op-ed, not as a subject of sustained front-page reporting.  For all its substance, the critique is offered through a medium that functions more like commentary than alert.

At the same time, U.S. support for Ukraine is being retracted and reissued with increasing hesitation.  Aid deliveries were quietly paused and only resumed after public pressure following the July 4 missile strike on Kyiv.  Multilateral sanctions coordination has reportedly faltered, and new diplomatic pressure is being placed on Ukraine to accept a ceasefire—one the Kremlin has shown no real interest in reciprocating.

These are not isolated gestures.  They land, again and again, in Moscow’s favor.

This invites a broader question:  Are we witnessing the quiet shaping of a two-front geopolitical shift—from Eastern Europe to the Western Hemisphere—where American policy, whether by intention or inertia, now facilitates Russia’s global posture?  Or is this merely the result of domestic calculations with unintended consequences abroad?

There is, to be clear, no proof of deliberate collusion.  But outcomes matter.  A weakened Ukraine.  An emboldened Maduro.  A distracted and demoralized press.  A public fed more performance than substance.  The effect is less of a conspiracy than of a stage being set—unexamined, unchallenged, and disturbingly aligned with a worldview in which democratic resistance is treated as destabilizing and authoritarian consolidation as order restored.

In such a climate, perception is not a matter of optics.  It becomes the only terrain left to navigate what official language refuses to name.

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Ricardo F. Morin

Bala Cynwyd, Pa, July 7, 2025


“Global Authoritarianism and the Limits of Traditional Analysis”

February 28, 2025

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The war in Ukraine is often presented as a geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia, but this interpretation can obscure a deeper reality:     the rise of authoritarianism as a global force.     Noam Chomsky, one of the most influential voices in the critique of U.S. foreign policy, has argued that U.S. hegemony is the primary factor driving the conflict.     His approach, rooted in Cold War logic, has been essential for understanding global power dynamics.     However, one must question whether this framework remains sufficient to analyze the coordinated expansion of authoritarian regimes in the world today.

The issue is no longer simply whether U.S. policy contributed to Russia’s aggression, but whether democracies can withstand the deliberate advance of governments seeking to consolidate power at any cost.     What is at stake transcends Ukraine’s sovereignty:     it is the survival of democracy in the world.

Chomsky argues that NATO’s expansion and U.S. financial dominance exacerbated tensions with Russia and limited diplomatic options.     His vision proposes a world in which power is distributed between the United States, Europe, China, and Russia, which he believes would create a more stable and just balance.     This perspective has been crucial in questioning the excesses of U.S. interventionism.     In the present world, however, where authoritarianism is not only reacting to the West but also actively seeking to reshape the global order, is a framework based solely on containing U.S. hegemony sufficient?

The rise of authoritarian regimes is not merely a response to Western influence; it is a deliberate strategy to consolidate power.     While Chomsky has emphasized the importance of distributing global power, it is crucial to analyze the nature of those who would fill this void.     Russia and China are not simply seeking a multipolar stability; their actions reflect an attempt to exert absolute control, without democratic constraints.     Chomsky’s critique helps us understand the roots of international conflicts, but it may need to be expanded to account for how these regimes are transforming the very structure of global politics.

One challenge in applying Chomsky’s traditional analysis to the present is that contemporary authoritarianism no longer aligns solely with past ideological divisions.     It is no longer a struggle between socialism and capitalism, or left and right.     Rather, these regimes share a common objective:     dismantling democratic institutions to ensure their permanence in power.

Putin, for instance, invokes Soviet nostalgia while prohibiting any critical reassessment of Stalinism.     China blends State capitalism with absolute political control.     Hungary and India, once considered democracies aligned with the West, have adopted authoritarian models.     Meanwhile, the U.S. far-right, which historically opposed communism, has begun to adopt the Kremlin’s narrative, portraying it as a defender against “globalist elites.”

This ideological alignment makes modern authoritarianism more dangerous than ever.     It not only transcends traditional power blocs but is also reinforced through strategic alliances, mutual support, and the erosion of democracies from within.     This is perhaps most evident in the United States.     The presidency of Trump revealed an unexpected vulnerability:     the possibility that authoritarianism could thrive within the world’s most influential democracy.     Here, the debate is no longer reduced to a question of isolationism or interventionism, but to the real risk of autocratic tactics being normalized in domestic politics.

The Trump administration sent contradictory signals regarding the Kremlin, weakening the principle of deterrence.     Rather than establishing a clear stance against authoritarian expansion, its ambiguity allowed regimes like Putin’s to interpret the lack of firmness as an opportunity to act with impunity.     Figures such as Marco Rubio have advocated for an unequivocal stance that would reinforce U.S. strategic credibility, while the inconsistency in the Trump administration’s foreign policy contributed to the perception that the West was divided and hesitant.

This weakening of democratic leadership has not occurred in a vacuum.     The globalization of authoritarianism is a phenomenon in which autocratic regimes not only directly challenge democracies but also back one another to evade sanctions, subvert international pressure, and consolidate their internal rule.     The invasion of Ukraine must be understood within this framework:     it is not just a regional conflict or a reaction to NATO, but a calculated move within a broader strategy to weaken global democracy.

For decades, critics like Chomsky have been instrumental in highlighting the effects of U.S. dominance on global politics.     His analysis has allowed us to understand how U.S. hegemony has influenced numerous conflicts.     However, the evolution of authoritarianism raises questions that require expanding this perspective.     The greatest threat to democracy is no longer exclusively U.S. power, but the consolidation of a global autocratic model advancing through coordinated strategies.

Blaming the U.S. for every geopolitical crisis may overlook a crucial shift:     authoritarian regimes have moved from being a reaction to Washington’s influence to becoming an active strategy to replace the Western democratic model.     Recognizing this shift does not absolve the U.S. of its failures in foreign policy, but it does demand an understanding that countering authoritarianism requires more than constant criticism of its hegemony.     It requires recognizing that democracy faces a coordinated and unprecedented threat.

Chomsky’s vision of a multipolar world is, in theory, appealing.     However, what would this imply in practice if the actors filling the void left by the U.S. are not interested in preserving democracy?     The real challenge is not merely containing Putin’s territorial ambitions but preventing his model of governance—based on dismantling democratic institutions—from gaining traction in the West.

Chomsky remains one of the most incisive critics of U.S. foreign policy, and his work has been fundamental in understanding the effects of power on international relations.     His analysis has shed light on the flaws of interventionism and the dynamics of global hegemony.     The world, however, has changed, and so have the challenges facing democracies.     Today, the crisis in Ukraine is no longer limited to a debate over NATO, U.S. intervention, or Western hypocrisy.     It is part of a broader struggle between democracy and autocracy, a struggle that does not end at Ukraine’s borders but extends to the very political institutions of the West.

If we fail to recognize this shift, we risk not only losing Ukraine but also underestimating the scope of the threats facing democracies worldwide.     Neutrality is no longer an option when the challenge is the survival of free societies.     Beyond the mistakes of the West, the rise of authoritarianism demands a response that goes beyond constant criticism of U.S. hegemony and instead embraces the active defense of democratic values wherever they are under threat.

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Ricardo Federico Morín Tortolero

February 28, 2025; Oakland Park, Florida