Posts Tagged ‘religion’

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series XI”

June 15, 2026

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“Geometric Allegory” digital painting 2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

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Ricardo F. Morín

June 7, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania

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This series constitutes a referential corpus in the Appendix.   Its components are organized for consultation rather than sequential reading, and are presented in comparative rubrics that record institutional continuities, modifications, and reconfigurations across the constitutional texts.  

Corpus definition:   This corpus is limited to constitutions that were formally adopted and entered into force.   Constitutional projects, draft constitutions, proposed reforms that were not ratified, and other constitutional texts that did not acquire legal force are excluded.   The corpus therefore follows the constitutional order as constituted in law rather than the broader history of constitutional proposals.   The corpus functions more like an archive than an argument.   It attempts to establish a stable descriptive record of what each constitution contained and how it differed from its immediate predecessor.   The consequence is that the corpus remains open to multiple lines of inquiry without privileging any one of them.

Rubric codes:    Each rubric carries a permanent identifier in the form FAMILY-MEMBER, capitalized and hyphenated: for example POW-LEG for the legislative power, or REG-SLA for slavery.    The family prefixes group rubrics by kind:   FND (foundations of the State), CIV (civic status and participation), POW (public powers), ECO (fiscal, economic, and public works), RTS (rights and guarantees), REG (special regimes and institutions), and CON (constitutional self-regulation).   These codes denote identity, not sequence:   the order in which rubrics appear within any entry implies no precedence, and each constitution presents only the rubrics that pertain to it, in whatever arrangement best suits its text.

Append-only vocabulary:   A code, once assigned, is never reassigned or reused.    A rubric absent from a given constitution is simply omitted, signifying silence rather than oversight; a rubric that lapses from constitutional life is retired in place and marked with the span of charters to which it applied—thus REG-SLA (1811–1854) is not carried forward after abolition, and its code is never reoccupied.    Matters introduced by later charters enter as new members appended to the appropriate family.   Comparison therefore proceeds by matching codes across the twenty-five constitutions, not by position on the page.

Citation:    References are anchored first on the article number—continuous within each text and therefore collision-proof—followed by the text’s own structural division as a secondary locator, named as that charter employs it (Capítulo and Sección in the 1811 constitution; Título and Sección in 1821). Spanish citations follow the CIDEP recension linked at the close of each entry.

Terms:   ”Constitution,” “charter,” and “corpus” refer throughout to the documents under study; “entry” and “installment” refer to the published pieces of this appendix.    The rubric apparatus describes the former.


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A-1). VENEZUELAN CONSTITUTIONS 1811-1999

19th-Century Constitutions:

1. The 1811 Constitution (Constitución Federal para los Estados de Venezuela) was adopted on December 21, 1811, by the Confederación Federal de Estados Venezolanos [the Federal Confederation of Venezuelan States], and was repealed following its collapse on July 21, 1812.   It was promulgated shortly after the declaration of Venezuelan independence [July 5, 1811] and established a federal union of autonomous states under a common national framework.

  • DOC-PRE—Preamble (translated by the author in a contemporary register):

“ENACTED by the Representatives of Margarita, Mérida, Cumaná, Barinas, Barcelona, Trujillo, and Caracas, assembled in General Congress

IN THE NAME OF ALMIGHTY GOD

We, the People of the States of Venezuela, exercising our sovereignty and seeking to establish among ourselves the best administration of justice, to promote the general welfare, to ensure domestic tranquility, to provide for our common defense, to uphold our liberty and political independence, to preserve pure and inviolate the sacred religion of our forebears, to secure in perpetuity for our posterity the enjoyment of these blessings, and to draw ourselves together in the most steadfast union and sincere friendship, have solemnly resolved to confederate and to form and establish the following Constitution, by which these States shall be governed and administered.”

  • FND-TER—Territory:

The 1811 Constitution defined Venezuela as a confederation of sovereign provinces that retained full authority over their internal government and administration, except where powers were expressly delegated to the national government (Preliminar; Bases del Pacto Federativo).  It affirmed that any territories later admitted—whether by division of existing provinces or by subsequent accession—would enter the Union on the same basis of reserved sovereignty (Preliminar; Arts. 128-32).  Congress was granted exclusive authority over:  foreign relations, common defense, trade regulation, war-making, and national taxation (Preliminar).  The charter also imposed strict limits on provincial action:  without prior congressional consent, no province could conclude special treaties or alliances, impose tonnage or custom-duties, raise or maintain armed forces in peacetime, or initiate war (Arts. 119-23).  Provincial laws had to be submitted to Congress to avoid conflicts with federal statutes, and Congress held exclusive competence to admit or separate provinces and to dispose of national territory and property (Art. 124; Arts. 128-32).  Finally, the Union guaranteed to each province a republican form of government, protection of its sovereignty, and—upon formal request—the suppression of internal violence.   And in this way, a framework was established for mutual guarantees and collective securities among the provinces (Arts. 133-4; Preliminar).

  • POW-LEG—Congress (Legislative):

The 1811 Constitution vested legislative authority in the General Congress of Venezuela, composed of a House of Representatives and a Senate (Art. 1, Cap. II).  Laws could originate in either chamber (Art. 21), though legislation concerning taxation could only be initiated in the House of Representatives (Art. 22).  Enactment of any law required three readings in each chamber on different days (Art. 23).  Once passed, laws were submitted to the Executive for promulgation, with procedures established for cases involving objections (Arts. 24–5).  Each chamber regulated its internal proceedings, enforced discipline, and exercised exclusive authority over its members (Arts. 18, 26–28).   Representatives were elected every four years by a multi-tiered electoral system involving parish and chapter assemblies (Arts. 3, 6–8); senators served six-year terms and were elected by the provincial legislatures (Arts. 11–13).  The Senate judged impeachments brought by the House of Representatives (Arts. 16, 29), and both chambers held shared prerogatives concerning internal order and legislative conduct (Arts. 16, 18).   Congress convened annually in a designated capital city, with limited provisions for extending or relocating sessions (Art. 20).   Congress held legislative authority over military affairs, taxation, commerce, currency, the postal system, foreign policy, infrastructure, naturalization, bankruptcy, and the establishment of lower courts (Art. 30).  The legislative branch embodied the principle of separation of powers and functioned as part of the confederal structure based on the pact among sovereign provinces (Preliminar; Bases del Pacto Federativo).

  • ECO-TES—Treasury:

Article 108 of Chapter III, Section V designated provincial executive authorities to act on behalf of the Poder Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] in matters not expressly delegated by the Congreso General [General Congress] to other officials in the Armada [Navy], Ejército [Army], or Tesorería Nacional [National Treasury] (Art. 108, Cap. III, Secc. V).   The Constitution contained no additional provisions concerning the structure, functions, or oversight of the Tesorería Nacional, nor did it establish a separate fiscal department.  The Tesorería Nacional was mentioned only nominally (Art. 71, Cap. II, Secc. VII).

  • POW-EXE—Executive:
  • Note on terminology:   in cases where the structure of executive power differs, each constitution described in this appendix uses ‘executive’ or ‘president’ according to its constitutional context.    ‘Executive’ refers to the branch of government that includes the president and the ministerial countersignatures required for the validity of executive acts.    ‘President of the republic’, or simply ‘the president’, designates the individual in whom executive power is vested.

Under the 1811 Constitution, the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] resided permanently in the capital city and was entrusted to a Three-Member Executive Council [the Poder Ejecutivo] chosen every four years (Arts. 72, 75).   Candidates had to be born on the American continent (or be Spaniards, who had been there from 1810), had to have lived in the Union during the previous decade, and had to be freeholders of property (Arts. 73, 74).   The electors met on 16 November of the electoral year, wrote three names on their ballots (at least one from another province), and forwarded the tallies to the President of the Senate (Arts. 76–79); if no slate obtained an absolute majority of electors, the Cámara de Representantes voted on the nine highest candidates, and, if no majority was reached, it fell to the Senado to elect the candidate (Arts. 81–82).   Executive acts required the countersignature of the State’s ministers—Interior and Justice, Finance, War and Navy, and Foreign Affairs—, who were appointed by the Executive and bore responsibility for official measures (Arts. 105, 107–108).   The Three-Member Executive Council—with Senate consent—oversaw the appointment of military, civil, and judicial officers; negotiated treaties; granted pardons for political offenses; convoked Congress in ordinary and extraordinary sessions; ensured the execution of laws; and presented an annual account of revenues, expenditures, and general administration (Arts. 86, 88, 92–94, 100–104).  The Three-Member Executive Council could be suspended under strict conditions.   If the Executive or any of its members was accused and convicted by the Senate of treason, corruption, or usurpation, they were to be removed from office and subjected to the penalties established in Article 58 (Arts. 89, 91, 109).

  • POW-JUD—Judiciary:

The 1811 Constitution vested the judicial power of the Confederation in a Supreme Court of Justice located in the capital of the Confederation, along with subordinate and lower courts created by Congress (Cap. IV, Secc. 1, Art. 110).   The Executive appointed all justices (Art. 111).   Congress set their number and required that appointees be licensed lawyers, citizens of good standing, and at least thirty years of age for the Supreme Court and twenty-five for the other courts (Art. 112).   Justices received fixed salaries that could not be reduced during their tenure (Arts. 113–114).   The Judicial Branch exercised jurisdiction over cases concerning the Constitution, treaties, diplomatic agents, maritime matters, and intergovernmental conflicts, including disputes between provinces, or between Venezuelan and foreign parties (Secc. 2, Art. 115).   The Supreme Court exercised appellate jurisdiction in most matters and original jurisdiction in cases involving ambassadors or provinces (Art. 116).    It required jury trials in ordinary criminal cases, to be held in the province of the offense or, if committed abroad, in a location designated by law (Art. 117).   The Court also examined and approved lawyers nationwide, including those credentialed abroad (Art. 118).

  • CON-AMD—Amending the Constitution:

The 1811 Constitution permitted amendments when two-thirds of both Cámaras del Congreso [Chambers of Congress] or of the Legislaturas Provinciales [Provincial Legislatures] separately proposed and reciprocally approved a reform or alteration, which would then be incorporated into the Constitution (Cap. VI, Art. 135).  The constitutional provisions remained in effect until such reciprocal approval was finalized (Art. 136).   Each province was to express its decision—whether to accept, reject, or propose modifications to the Constitution—through specially convened asambleas [assemblies], by electores de capítulo [chapter electors] appointed for that purpose, or by votantes parroquiales [parish voters] forming primary assemblies for the election of representatives (Cap. VII, Art. 137).   Once the text had been read before the provincial body and modifications adopted by majority vote, its observance was to be solemnly sworn, followed within three days by elections of national representatives conducted by the designated electors (Art. 138).  The municipalities reported the results to the respectivos gobiernos provinciales [respective provincial governments], which then transmitted them to Congress upon its assembly (Art. 139).   Provinces rejoining the Confederation were to observe the same procedures; if prevented from doing so at the time by urgent or insurmountable causes, they could fulfill the requirement later through formal petitions addressed to Congress or the Poder Ejecutivo [Executive] (Art. 140).

  • CIV-SUF—Suffrage:

The 1811 Constitution granted suffrage to varones libres [free-born males], who were at least 21 years old, or if younger, married, and who resided in the parroquia [parish] where they cast their vote (Cap. II, Secc. 2, Art. 26).   In provincial capitals, voters were required to hold property or assets valued at 600 pesos for an unmarried man, or 400 pesos for a married man; in smaller towns, the thresholds were 400 pesos for singles and 200 pesos for married men (Art. 26).  Alternatively, voters qualified if they held a degree in the liberal or mechanical arts or owned or leased productive land of equivalent value to those assigned for the respective cases of single or married (Art. 26).  The Constitution disenfranchised those declared insane, deaf and dumb, publicly bankrupt, indebted to the treasury, vagrants, persons under serious criminal indictment, and married persons living apart without legal cause (Art. 27).   Parish assemblies appointed one parish elector for every 1,000 inhabitants every two years, and these assemblies were presided over by municipal authorities (Arts. 20–24, 40).   Parish electors were required to reside within the electoral district and to meet higher property qualifications, including ownership or assets valued at 6,000 pesos if unmarried or 4,000 pesos if married in Caracas, with proportionally lower requirements in other cities (Art. 28).  Public officials, who earned at least 300 pesos annually, were permitted to vote in parish assemblies, and those earning at least 1,000 pesos could vote in electoral congregations, but they were barred from legislative office, unless they resigned their posts and incomes (Art. 29).   Municipal authorities maintained official lists of eligible voters and electors and convened election assemblies on scheduled dates.   If municipal authorities failed in convening these assemblies, the citizens gathered on the appointed day to hold elections; however, municipal authorities were prohibited from conducting any other business during these meetings (Arts. 30–38).   Public voting stood as a governing principle, while electors presided over parish assemblies and resolved any disputes concerning voter qualifications or electoral procedures, which were subject to final appeal before the provincial legislature (Arts. 41–42).

  • CIV-CIT—Citizenship:

The 1811 Constitution contained no discrete naturalization clause and no grant of citizenship to foreigners by term of residence.  Political membership was framed around free-born men (hombres libres) and exercised through the residence, property, and occupational qualifications of the electoral provisions (Art. 26 ff.).   Foreigners “of any nation” were to be received in the State and to enjoy the same security of person and property as citizens, provided they respected the Catholic religion and recognized the independence and sovereignty of the constituted authorities (Art. 169)—a guarantee of civil protection, not of citizenship.   Durational requirements appeared only as conditions of office and presupposed existing citizenship rather than conferring it:   five years’ standing as a citizen to sit in the House of Representatives (Art. 15), and ten years’ domicile for the Senate (Art. 49) and the Executive (Art. 73), the latter also requiring birth in Spanish America, with an exception for peninsular Spaniards resident in Venezuela who had sworn and supported independence (Art. 74).   A formal mechanism of naturalization (carta de naturaleza) would first appear in 1821.

  • RTS-GAR—Rights:

The 1811 Constitution declared that all legitimate political authority originated with the people, in whom sovereignty resided by its very nature and in its first instance (Prelim., Bases del Pacto Federativo).    It set forth a broad catalogue of individual guarantees:   every citizen had the right to liberty, equality, property, and security; deprivation of liberty or punishment had to occur strictly according to law; no one could be declared guilty except by lawful judgment; and no one could be compelled to testify against himself or his close relatives (Arts. 1, 2, 7, 8, 11).   The Constitution protected an individual’s home from arbitrary intrusion.   Also protected was private correspondence, and private papers; it prohibited ex post facto laws, excessive bail, disproportionate penalties, confiscation, torture, and inherited civic or legal privileges—particularly aristocratic distinctions or feudal entitlements (Arts. 3, 9, 10, 13).    It also mandated that ordinary criminal trials not initiated by congressional accusation would be conducted by jury, once trial by jury had been established by law, and held in the province where the offense was committed (Art. 117).   Citizens had the right to publish opinions, to bear arms, to move freely among the provinces, to petition the government, and to pursue any lawful occupation.   Foreigners could reside in the country and enjoy civil rights under the same conditions as citizens, provided they respected the Catholic religion and Venezuelan independence (Arts. 4, 5, 6, 12).    Property could be expropriated only by a law that declared a public necessity and provided just compensation to the owner; no tax or public contribution could be imposed without the consent of the people through their representatives (Arts. 14, 15).   Along with these guarantees, the Constitution imposed obedience to the law, service to the public and national defense, and loyalty to the Republic (Arts. 16, 17).   Any law contravening the rights set forth in the Constitution was declared “absolutely null and void” (Art. 18).

  • REG-MIL—The Military:

The 1811 Constitution treated national defense as a civic duty (Art. 178).    Congress could raise regular forces only when necessary and could raise militias to suppress insurrections, or repel invasions (Art. 71).    Supreme command of land and naval forces was vested in the Three-Member Executive Council (Art. 86); provincial governors acted solely as administrative agents (Art. 108).    The 1811 Constitution defined a well-regulated and trained militia composed of citizens as the most secure safeguard of a free state.   During peacetime, only a limited permanent force could be maintained with prior authorization from Congress (Art. 178).    It affirmed the subordination of military authority to civil power by declaring that citizens not engaged in active service were not subject to military jurisdiction (Art. 176).   It further required civil authorization for quartering troops in private homes (Art. 177), and affirmed the right of citizens to possess lawful arms (Art. 179).   The Constitution did not provide for provincial armies and imposed no standing military obligations beyond lawful service when summoned (Art. 178).

  • REG-REL—Religion:

The 1811 Constitution declared the Roman Catholic Church as the sole religion of the Confederation and did not recognize any other faith (Cap. I, Art. 1).   This provision retained the exclusive public status of Catholicism already established under colonial law (Recop. Leyes de Indias, Lib. I, Tit. I, Ley 1).

  • REG-SLA—Slavery:

The 1811 Constitution did not abolish slavery but incorporated the prohibition of the slave trade previously decreed by the Junta Suprema de Caracas [Supreme Junta of Caracas] on 14 August 1810 (Capítulo IX, Art. 202; Gaceta de Caracas, No. 20, 21 Aug. 1810).   Prior to the promulgation of the 1821 Constitution [October 6], the Congreso de Cúcuta [Congress of Cúcuta] enacted the Ley de Libertad de los Vientres [Law of the Freedom of the Womb] on 21 July 1821, which established that children born to enslaved mothers from that date onward were to be considered free (Ley del 21 de julio de 1821 sobre la libertad de los nacidos de madres esclavas, Colección de Leyes y Decretos del Congreso de Colombia, 1821, Tomo I, pp. 31–34).    These children were required to remain in the service of the enslaver until the age of eighteen and were subject to reimbursement for maintenance costs, as determined by local juntas de manumisión [manumission boards]. These boards were authorized to register eligible births, manage emancipation funds, and supervise the process of coartación (gradual self-purchase).

  • CON-FIN—Final Provisions:

The 1811 Constitution directed provincial governments to establish schools and integrate indigenous peoples into civic life; it prohibited their compulsory services and recognized communal land ownership (Art. 180).   Federal officials’ salaries were to be paid from a common treasury, with no disbursements without legal authorization; direct taxes had to be proportional to population, and provinces were prohibited from granting preferential commercial advantages to their own ports (Arts. 188–189).   The Constitution designated January 1, 1811, as the commencement of the Era Colombiana [the Colombian Era], a new civic calendar marking the beginning of the independent republican order (Art. 223).

  • DOC-CLO—Closing Statement (translated by the author in a contemporary register):

“Article 228.    Until a civil and criminal code is drafted—decreed by the Supreme Congress on the eighth of March last and suited to the form of Government established in Venezuela—the Code that has governed us until now remains in full force in all matters that do not directly or indirectly conflict with the provisions of this Constitution.

The Supreme Legislator of the Universe has seen fit to inspire in our hearts the sincerest friendship and union, both among ourselves and with the other inhabitants of the Colombian Continent who wish to join us in defending our Religion, our natural Sovereignty, and our Independence.   We, therefore, the people of Venezuela—having freely ordained the foregoing Constitution, which sets out the rules, principles, and objects of our Confederation and perpetual alliance, and invoking God Himself as witness to the sincerity of our intentions while humbly imploring His powerful assistance—do solemnly bind ourselves to observe and fulfill inviolably each and every provision it contains, so that we may forever enjoy the blessings of liberty and the imprescriptible rights that His generous beneficence has granted us, from the moment this Constitution is ratified in the manner it prescribes.

We further declare our intention to amend and revise these resolutions at any time, in keeping with the will of the majority of the peoples of Colombia who may choose to form a national Body for the defence and preservation of their liberty and political independence.   Any such amendments and adjustments shall be made in due course, by plurality and mutual agreement among ourselves, on all matters directly affecting the general interests of those peoples, as agreed through their lawful Representatives assembled in a General Congress of Colombia, or of any considerable part thereof, and ratified by the constituents.

In the meantime, each and every province that has taken part in forming this Union mutually guarantees to the others the integrity of their respective territories and essential rights, pledging their lives, their fortunes, and their honor to that end.    We entrust the inviolability and preservation of this Constitution to the fidelity of the Legislative Bodies, the Executive Powers, the Judges, and all officers of the Union and of the Provinces, and to the vigilance and virtue of the fathers of families, mothers, wives, and citizens of this State.

Issued at the Federal Palace of Caracas, on the twenty-first of December, in the year of Our Lord eighteen hundred and eleven, the first year of our Independence.

  • Note:

The original Spanish text of the 1811 Constitution is available at CIDEP (Recopilación de Leyes y Decretos de Venezuela):   https://cidep.online/files/constituciones/1811.pdf


2. The 1821 Constitution (Constitución de la República de Colombia, commonly referred to as the Constitution of Cúcuta) was adopted by the General Congress of Colombia in Cúcuta on August 30, 1821, ratified the same day, and promulgated by President Simón Bolívar on October 6, 1821.   It replaced the Ley Fundamental de la República de Colombia [December 17, 1819], which provisionally established the union of Venezuela and New Granada (present day Colombia and Panama).   The new constitutional framework established a unified government for these two regions, with the incorporation of the territory of Quito (modern-day Ecuador) envisioned but not realized until 1822.

  • DOC-PRE—Preamble (translated by the author in a contemporary register):

“IN THE NAME OF GOD, AUTHOR AND LEGISLATOR OF THE UNIVERSE

We, the Representatives of the Peoples of Colombia, assembled in General Congress, in fulfillment of the wishes of our constituents—to establish the fundamental rules of their union and to create a form of government that secures for them the blessings of liberty, security, property, and equality, insofar as this is possible for a nation just beginning its political life and still fighting for its independence—do ordain and establish the following

CONSTITUTION”

  • FND-TER—Territory:

The 1821 Constitution declared that Colombia’s territory comprised the lands of the former Virreinato de la Nueva Granada (Viceroyalty of New Granada) and the Capitanía General de Venezuela (Captaincy General of Venezuela) (Art. 6) and any town liberated thereafter would enter the Republic with equal rights and representation (Art. 7).   It ordered a hierarchical division into Departments, Provinces, Cantons, and Parishes (Art. 8) and instructed Congress to create six or more Departments (Art. 150).    Each Department was led by an Intendente, the President’s “natural and immediate agent,” who was appointed for a three-year term with powers set by law (Arts. 150-2).    Every Province was placed under a Governor, subordinate to the Intendente, and held office also for three years; if the Intendente resided in a Province, he served concurrently as its Governor (Arts. 153-4).    The existing colonial-era cabildos, transitioning into municipal councils of the cantons, continued to govern local affairs, while Congress determined their number, boundaries, and functions (Art. 155).   Following the 1821 constitutional mandate, Congress’s Ley de División Territorial of October 8, 1821, divided the nation into the Departments of Venezuela (capital:   Caracas), Cundinamarca (capital:   Bogotá), and Quito (capital:   Quito).

  • POW-LEG—Congress (Legislative):

The 1821 Constitution enumerated twenty-six legislative powers—from annual budgets and public credit to war, peace, education, and extraordinary wartime authority (Art. 55 §§ 1–26; new).    It fixed the opening of regular sessions on 2 January for ninety days, extendable by thirty, barred adjournment or relocation without bicameral consent, and empowered the Executive to resolve venue deadlocks (Arts. 68–70; new).   Each chamber established internal rules for conducting sessions, debates, and deliberations; kept daily journals with roll-call votes upon request; and retained the power to enforce order or impose penalties for disrespect, obstruction, or threats to its proceedings or members (Arts. 56–63; new).    Members, elected by the nation, enjoyed indemnity and personal immunity but could not hold executive, judicial, or administrative office deemed incompatible with legislative service (Arts. 64–67; new).    Legislative bills had to be read on three different days in their chamber of origin—first for introduction, second for discussion, and third for approval—unless urgency was formally declared (Arts. 41–43).    Revenue bills could only originate in the Chamber of Representatives (Art. 42).   Once approved by both chambers, bills were submitted to the Executive, who had ten days to return objections, or two days in urgent cases; if no response was given within the deadline, or if both chambers reaffirmed the bill by a two-thirds vote, it became law without requiring Executive signature (Arts. 46–50; new).   Legislative acts were issued in duplicate, dated, accompanied by an explanation of their grounds, and archived in the chamber of origin (Arts. 51–54; new).    In election years, Congress tallied the national ballots for President, Vice-President, and departmental Senators (Art. 71; new).    The House impeached high officials (Art. 89), and the Senate tried them, with conviction requiring agreement by two-thirds of the senators present (Art. 101).    Procedural features retained from the 1811 charter included the bicameral structure, the origination of tax bills in the lower chamber, the three-reading rule, and specified voting thresholds, including two-thirds majorities for expulsion or censure (cont. 1811 Cap. II §§ 1, 4–10, 59–62).

  • ECO-TES—Treasury:

The 1821 Constitution, consistent with the 1811 charter, did not establish a specific treasury department (continu. 1811 Art. 108).   Congress was vested with exclusive authority over the annual budget, management of national property, imposition of taxes and customs duties, and contracting of public debt (Tít. VII, Art. 55 §§ 1–4; new).   The President was required to submit annual reports to Congress detailing revenue, expenditures, and fiscal resources (Tít. IX, Art. 129).   Fiscal administration was assigned to the Secretario de Hacienda [Secretary of the Treasury], one of five ministerial offices established under the Executive (Tít. IX, Art. 136), with the President authorized to distribute functions among the secretaries in accordance with congressional law (Tít. IX, Art. 137).   The Constitution did not define mechanisms for oversight, financial jurisdiction, or audit within the treasury system.

  • POW-EXE—Executive:

The 1821 Constitution vested executive authority in a single Presidente de la República [President of the Republic], elected for a four-year term with the possibility of one immediate re-election, assisted by a Vicepresidente [Vice President], and provisionally replaced in cases of dual vacancy by the Presidente del Senado [President of the Senate] (Arts. 105–112; continu. 1811 Arts. 62–63; cf. 1811: plural executive body).   This arrangement replaced the three-member Consejo Ejecutivo [Three-Member Executive Council] established in 1811.   The Constitution established a Consejo de Gobierno [Council of Government] composed of the Vicepresidente, one member of the Alta Corte de Justicia [High Court of Justice], and the five Secretarios de Estado [State Ministers]; the President was required to consult this Council on matters such as declarations of war, treaties, senior appointments, emergency measures, and other issues of gravity, though he was not bound to follow its opinion.   The Council’s deliberations were to be recorded and submitted annually to the Senate (Arts. 133–135; new; cf. 1811: no equivalent consultative body).   The President directed the general administration of the Republic and exercised extraordinary powers during foreign invasion or civil unrest, either with prior authorization from Congress or, if Congress was in recess, on his own initiative, provided he convened Congress immediately and limited his actions to what was strictly necessary (Art. 128; new; cf. 1811:    no express emergency powers clause).   The Constitution established five Secretarías de EstadoInterior, Relaciones Exteriores, Hacienda, Guerra, and Marina—whose holders served as mandatory countersignatories of presidential acts; no executive act could acquire legal force without the signature of the competent Minister (Arts. 136–138; new; cf. 1811 Arts. 91–92: no explicit requirement of countersignature).   Congress held the authority to modify the number of ministries, while the Executive assigned their functions by regulation (Art. 137; new).   The President further commanded the armed forces, enforced laws, supervised elections, promulgated legislation, nominated diplomatic and military officials with Senate approval, and submitted annual reports to Congress on political, military, and fiscal matters (Arts. 113–117, 119–123, 129; new; cf. 1811 Arts. 64, 84, 86: powers previously distributed across other bodies).   Several of these provisions extended or reaffirmed earlier principles established in 1811, including the supremacy of civil power, administrative leadership, joint responsibility through ministerial countersignature, protection from arbitrary detention, and the lawful delegation of executive functions (Arts. 113–114, 124–127, 136–138; continu. 1811 Arts. 19–20, 64, 84, 86, 91–92).

  • POW-JUD—Judicial:

The 1821 Constitution preserved the Alta Corte de Justicia [High Court of Justice] and fixed a minimum of five members and reaffirmed eligibility criteria of thirty years of age, active legal practice, and qualification as an elector (Arts. 140–141; continu. 1811 Arts. 110–114).   For each vacancy, the President submitted a list of three candidates; from this, the Cámara de Representantes [Chamber of Representatives] selected a shortlist, and the Senado [Senate] made the final appointment.   During congressional recess, the Executive could provisionally fill vacancies (continu. 1811 Art. 142).   The Court retained jurisdiction over foreign relations—including embassies, consulates, diplomatic agents, and the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores [Minister of Foreign Affairs]—as well as treaty interpretation and conflicts among higher tribunals, with further jurisdictional details to be defined by law (continu. 1811 Arts. 143–144).   Justices held offices during good conduct and received fixed, non-reducible salaries (continu. 1811 Arts. 145–146).   The Constitution also authorized Congress to establish tribunales superiores [superior courts] throughout the Republic and to assign their jurisdictions to facilitate timely administration of justice (Art. 147; new).   Judges of these courts were to be appointed by the Executive from ternas [lists of three candidates] submitted by the High Court and received the same tenure protections as the high justices (Art. 148; new).   Tribunales inferiores [lower tribunals] remained governed by transitional legislation until Congress completed judicial reorganization (continu. 1811 Art. 149).    The Constitution also included a provision for Congress to gradually introduce trial by jury in forms and cases it deemed appropriate (Art. 175; new).

  • CON-AMD—Amending the Constitution:

The 1821 Constitution introduced staggered renewal of the Senado [Senate] to prevent constitutional amendments by a Congress that had not undergone partial replacement (Tít. II, Secc. 7, Art. 94; new).   Senators were divided into two classes within each departamento [department], with the first class serving four years and the second serving the full eight-year term (Art. 94; new).    A lottery held during the Senate’s first session determined which senators would be subject to early replacement (Art. 94; new).   Amendments required a two-thirds vote in both the Cámara de Representantes [Chamber of Representatives] and the Senado (Tít. IV, Secc. 1, Art. 190; new).   However, no amendment could be proposed until at least half the members of both chambers were renewed through regular elections (Art. 190; new).    The Constitution excluded from amendment the fundamental provisions defining national unity and the form of government, as established in Tít. I, Art. 1 and Tít. II, Art. 2 (Art. 190; new).   A full constitutional revision could only take place through a general convention, which could not be convened until ten years had passed or until the national territory had been completely liberated (Tít. VIII, Art. 191; new).   Existing laws remained in force insofar as they did not conflict with the Constitution or with laws enacted under its authority (Tít. VII, Art. 188; continu. 1811 Art. 108).

  • CIV-SUF—Suffrage:

The 1821 Constitution retained the system of indirect suffrage by parroquia [parish] and electoral assemblies established in 1811 (1821 Tít. III; cont. 1811 Cap. II), but introduced a more elaborate and hierarchical electoral structure:   asambleas parroquiales [parish assemblies] convened every four years in every parish regardless of population (Art. 12; new), presided over by local judges and four reputable witnesses (Art. 13; new), and were responsible for appointing electores parroquiales [parish electors] in open sessions (Arts. 18, 24–25; new).    Voting eligibility required Colombian nationality, either marriage or age over twenty-one, and property or occupational qualifications:    ownership of real estate worth at least 100 pesos or independent engagement in a trade, profession, or commerce (Art. 15; new).   Although the 1821 text included literacy as a condition, its enforcement lapsed unfulfilled when Gran Colombia dissolved, and a literacy qualification entered Venezuelan electoral law separately in 1840 (Ley de Reforma Electoral, Gaceta de Venezuela, 16 de mayo de 1840; sesiones del Congreso Nacional, 1840).    Disqualifications in the 1821 charter included criminal conviction or pending criminal charges, declared insolvency by competent authority, vagrancy, or engaging in corrupt practices such as buying or selling votes (Arts. 16–17; new).   Each parish vote was recorded and sealed for transmission to cantonal councils, which compiled the tallies and declared electors by the highest number of votes or, in the case of a tie, by drawing lots (Arts. 26–28; new), then they forwarded results to the provincial capital (Art. 29; new).   Electors were distributed among cantons based on population—one per 4,000 inhabitants plus one extra for every additional 3,000 inhabitants, with a minimum of one per canton (Art. 20; new)—and had to meet stricter criteria than parish voters:    they had to be literate, at least twenty-five years old, and either own property worth 500 pesos, earn 300 pesos annually, the profit of equivalent value, or hold a scientific degree or profession (Art. 21; new).    These electors formed the asambleas electorales provinciales [provincial electoral assemblies], which met every four years (Art. 31; new) to elect representatives, departmental senators, and the President and Vice-President (Arts. 30, 34; new).   Votes for each office were recorded in separate registers (Art. 35; new). The results of presidential, vice-presidential, and senatorial elections were sent from parish assemblies to departmental capitals, and from there transmitted to the Senado [Senate] for final verification and proclamation (Arts. 36–38; new).    Results of elections for representatives were certified by local authorities and submitted directly to the Cámara de Representantes [Chamber of Representatives] for review (Art. 39; new).    Citizens thus continued to vote in parish assemblies to choose parish electors, who then participated in provincial assemblies to elect members of the lower house; senators were selected by departmental assemblies from lists submitted by the provincial legislatures, and the President and Vice-President were elected by a majority of the departmental assemblies from a list of candidates proposed by Congress (Arts. 30–34; new).

  • CIV-CIT—Citizenship:

The 1821 Constitution retained the provisions of the 1811 charter on citizenship (continu. 1811 Art. 7).   It recognized as citizens all free-born men within Colombian territory or abroad to Colombian parents (Art. 4.1; continu. 1811 Art. 7).    It also granted citizenship to foreign-born residents at the time of independence and remained loyal to the Republic (Art. 4.2; new).   It allowed naturalization by carta de naturaleza (Art. 4.3; new).    In addition, the Constitution codified civic obligations and required its obedience by citizens who had to respect authorities, to pay taxes, and—when necessary—to offer their property or lives in defense of the Republic (Art. 5; new).

  • RTS-GAR—Rights:

The 1821 Constitution reaffirmed rights first recognized in 1811.    It upheld freedom of expression, permitted citizens to write, print, and publish their thoughts without prior censorship (Art. 156; continu. 1811 Art. 4).   It also preserved the right to petition public authorities and to seek legal remedies against violations of property, honor, or reputation (Art. 157; continu. 1811 Art. 5).   The Constitution guaranteed the presumption of innocence and due process (Arts. 158–159; new).    In cases of in flagrante delicto, any citizen could perform the arrest, which had to be brought immediately before a judge (Art. 160; new).   Warrants had to specify the grounds for arrest, be issued by a competent authority, and be delivered in writing to the detainee (Arts. 161–162; new).    Detainees had the right to communicate freely, unless a judge imposed a restriction of three days at a maximum; both arresting officers and jailers faced penalties for violating these safeguards (Arts. 163–164; new).    If the grounds for detention ceased, the authorities had to release the detainee or admit him to bail, and the court was required to disclose the testimony of witnesses within three days (Art. 165; new).   Criminal trials had to be conducted by established courts; the Constitution barred ex post facto laws and prohibited self-incrimination and testifying against a spouse or close relatives (Arts. 166–168; new).   It protected the inviolability of the home except by judicial order (Art. 169; new), and guaranteed the privacy of correspondence and personal papers unless otherwise provided by law (Art. 170; new).   Judicial decisions had to be reasoned and could be appealed up to three times; judges were forbidden to rule in cases involving their self-interest (Arts. 171–172; new).   The Constitution stated that the infamy of a criminal offense could not extend to the offender’s family (Art. 173; new) and prohibited the military trial of civilians, including the militia, during peacetime (Art. 174; new).    Troops could not be quartered in private homes without consent during peacetime (Art. 176; new).   It affirmed the right to property, labor, commerce, and industry, and permitted expropriation only when justified by public necessity and then compensated accordingly (Arts. 177–179; new).    It also abolished hereditary privileges and noble titles (Arts. 179, 181–182; new).    Acceptance of foreign honors required prior congressional authorization (Art. 182; new).   Foreign residents received equal protection under the law (Art. 183; new), and the Constitution allowed foreigners, who distinguished themselves in the war of independence, to hold office, even if they did not meet the ordinary citizenship criteria (Art. 184; new).

  • REG-MIL—The Military:

The 1821 Constitution preserved the military framework set in 1811, including congressional control over national defense, reliance on a trained militia over a standing army, civil supremacy over military authority, and presidential command subject to legislative oversight (continu. 1811 Arts. 71, 86, 108, 176–179).   It introduced a new provision authorizing the President to assume extraordinary powers during foreign invasion or domestic insurrection, either with prior congressional approval or—if Congress was in recess—on his own initiative, provided he convened the legislature immediately and limited such powers to circumstances of urgent necessity (Art. 128; new).

  • REG-REL—Religion:

The 1821 Constitution maintained Roman Catholicism as the sole public faith and upheld the obligation of public authorities to protect it (Art. 2; continu. 1811 Art. 1).    It additionally required the respect of the citizens and resident foreigners to it (Art. 2; new).

  • REG-SLA—Slavery:

The 1821 Constitution did not abolish slavery but retained the prohibition of the slave trade previously codified in 1811 (Tít. IX, Art. 124; continu. 1811 Cap. IX, Art. 202).   It empowered Congress to enact laws concerning the condition of enslaved persons and manumission under its general authority to legislate on all matters “conducive to the wellbeing of the general public” [todo lo que conduzca a la felicidad general] (Tít. VII, Art. 55 §26; new), without any further provision.

  • ECO-INF—Infrastructure (1821 only):

The 1821 Constitution codified the State’s responsibility to promote public education, support the advancement of science and the arts, and regulate commerce and agriculture (Tít. IX, Arts. 160–161; new).   It also required Congress and the Executive to enact laws aimed at improving national industry and general prosperity (Art. 161; new).   To support these objectives, the Executive had to submit to Congress an annual report of national income and expenditures, which served as a fiscal mechanism to finance public functions (Tít. VII, Art. 129; new).   The Constitution further mandated the publication of the national budget to ensure transparency in the administration of public funds.   These provisions replaced the more general statements on education and commerce found in the 1811 charter (1821: Tít. IX, Arts. 160–161; Tít. VII, Art. 129; new. 1811: Arts. 108, 133, 135).

  • CON-FIN—Final Provisions:

The 1821 Constitution was formally adopted by the General Congress of Colombia and signed by its president, vice president, and all present deputies at the Villa del Rosario de Cúcuta on 30 August 1821 (Acta de Sanción, Villa del Rosario, 30 de agosto de 1821).   And it was promulgated and executed by the Executive on October 6, 1821, bearing the signature of President Simón Bolívar and the countersignatures of the Minister of Navy and War [Secretario de Marina y Guerra], Pedro Briceño Méndez, the Minister of Finance and Foreign Affairs [Secretario de Hacienda y Relaciones Exteriores], Pedro Gual, and the Minister of Interior and Justice [Secretario de Interior y Justicia], Diego B. Urbaneja.

  • Note:

The original Spanish text of the 1821 Constitution is available at CIDEP (Recopilación de Leyes y Decretos de Venezuela):   https://cidep.online/files/constituciones/1821.pdf


“Ritual: A Philosophy of Necessity”

September 20, 2025

Ricardo Morín
New York Series, Nº 5
54″ x 84″
Oil on canvas
1992

Preface

This essay seeks to define rituals without reliance on metaphors, abstractions, or moral judgments.   The method of this essay begins with etymology, then traces its biological foundation, and follows the extension of ritual into human conduct.   Ritual is treated as repetition with form, carried out by necessity to contain forces uncontrollable by command or intention.

The analysis will distinguish ritual from belief and superstition.    Belief attributes power beyond immediate function.   Superstition arises when belief assigns causality where none exists.    Ritual is not a belief, but only a procedure.   Its function is to regulate life through ordered repetition.

The chapters that follow address the principal domains in which ritual operates.   In sexuality, ritual prevents destabilization by giving desire a form through which it can move without collapse.   In distrust, friendship, enmity, and love, ritual contains states that resist control and makes them livable.   In governance, ritual holds ideological differences within limits that preserve continuity of community.

Ritual is necessary for existence.   It does not eliminate instinct, emotion, or conflict.   It gives them form and allows life to continue without disintegration.   This necessity is not external, but generated by life itself.   Where forces exceed control, ritual provides order.

*

Ricardo Morin. September 12, 2025, Bala Cynwyd, Pa.

I

The word ritual comes from the Latin ritus (a prescribed act performed in an ordered manner).    Its essence is repetition.   To speak of ritual is not to speak of tradition or abstraction, but of a necessity carried out for primal longing.

The biological basis of ritual is clear.   In many species, conflictive instinctive drives are contained by repeated actions which reduce uncertainty.    Birds perform dances before mating.   Wolves display submission to prevent attack.    Primates groom one another to ease tension.    These actions do not alter the external world.    They do not ensure mating, nor prevent danger, nor eliminate aggression.   They work by regulating behavior in ways preventing destabilization.    They arise from necessity:   without them, reproduction, survival, or cohesion could be placed at risk.

Human conduct extends this biological principle.    The handshake is a repeated act signaling non-aggression between strangers.   A funeral orders grief into sequence and allows the bereaved to endure loss.    A meal shared among people affirms cooperation and reduces the possibility of conflict.   Not one of these actions are effective because of a belief in causality.    They are effective because they are the product of repetition and recognition within the group.   They are necessary because without them, mistrust, grief, or rivalry would remain uncontained.

Instinct and emotion generate uncontrolled command or intention.   Repetition gives them form without elimination.    Herein lies the necessity:    life produces forces beyond control, and ritual provides their procedure without collapse.    Thus further inquiry rests here.

II

Belief begins where an act or event is taken to hold power beyond its immediate function.    To believe is to attribute meaning not evident in the act itself.   Belief provides orientation, but also creates vulnerability.

From belief grows superstition.   Superstition occurs when a gesture, a sign, or an accident is taken to determine good or bad luck.   Breaking glass is said to bring harm.   A number is said to bring luck.    The act or sign is given power it does not possess.    Superstition is belief that’s misdirected.   It relies on the conviction that external hidden forces govern external events and become accessible through signs and gestures.

Ritual does not depend on belief that an act can change fate or invoke hidden power.   Its effectiveness does not rest on what is imagined but on what is enacted.   A handshake obviates mistrust because it is repetition and recognition, not because of its magic.   A funeral allows provides ordered sequence and allows grief, but it does not alter death.   A meal shares cooperation through its mutuality, not because it calls luck.

The distinction is exact.   If ritual is the form, desire is the current that moves within it. Religious traditions have often cast desire as a deficit, a disorder, or a temptation to be repressed.   But desire is neither deficit nor disorder; it is vitality itself:   an energy that presses toward expression.   Ritual does not restrict this force; restriction belongs to fear and suffering.    Ritual contains fear and keeps excess within the limits of endurance and necessity.   Fasting, for example, does not abolish hunger but holds it in rhythm; it makes appetite a measure rather than a punishment.    By contrast, a prohibition that denies the legitimacy of desire transforms vitality into anxiety altogether.    In this way, ritual and desire are not opposed but interdependent:   the former is the channel, the latter the stream.

III

Sexual drive is pervasive in human life.    Left without form, it destabilizes both the individual and the community.    Its power lies in persistence.   Command cannot dismiss desire.   Desire presses for expression.    Every culture has developed rituals to contain and to regulate it.

Yet the grounds of sexual ritual are not repression but replication.    Nurture marks the human condition from birth:    in lactation, nurture consists in being fed, held, and sustained through another’s body.    In this original state, intimacy secures survival.    Later, desire repeats the structure.    The quest for union is both a return to that first condition of dependence and a transformation of it into adulthood.    Sexual ritual prolongs that first experience:    it carries within it the imprint of nurture.    It is not a matter of shame or judgment, but of continuity.

Courtship is the model.   Repeated gestures mark the approach to intimacy.   Ceremonies (words, gifts, dances) structure the encounter.   Desire is not eliminated, but gives form to sexuality and allows it to proceed without immediate conflict.    Marriage extends the process and establishes rules for its conduct within a recognizable frame.   Ritual transforms a disruptive force into a relation that can be carried within order.

Different cultural examples exemplify the variety of this process.    In Japan, tea ceremonies and formal visits have structured the first stages of marital negotiation.    In Victorian England, the presence of chaperones functioned as a mode of surveillance and set boundaries for courtship.   Among the Navajo in North America, the Kinaaldá ceremony marks a girl’s transition into womanhood and links individual desire and fertility with the continuation of the community.   In each case, ritual does not extinguish instinct but channels it into social life.

When desire cannot be enacted without risk, individuals turn to patterned acts that provide release without collapse.    Monastic traditions across cultures developed rituals of celibacy, which are supported by prayer, fasting, and other disciplines, containing sexual force.   In everyday life, other people turn to imagery (fantasy, dream, or artistic representation) and stage symbolically acts they long for but cannot realize.   Still others establish habits (exercise, meditation, or creative work) that redirect sexual energy into manageable outlets.   Longing, however, is not erased.   Its structure makes sure that desire moves within set limits without becoming overwhelming.

Obsession arises when desire remains unresolved and intrudes upon thought; it repeats itself without relief and it threatens stability.   Ritual is a way to contain obsession.    Through repetition, it acknowledges the force and gives it shape.    Though not eliminated, it has boundaries.

Ritual in the sphere of sexuality is not an option but a necessity.   It provides form where instinct would exceed measure.

IV

Reason alone does not govern human beings.   Emotional states persist in ways that resist control.   Distrust, friendship, enmity, and love cannot be removed by decree or maintained by thought.   Each requires ritual to provide continuity and containment.

Words alone cannot erase suspicion.    Distrust is one of the most persistent of these states. Suspicion cannot be erased by emotion.   Suspicion lingers and destabilizes interaction.   Ritual reduces its scope.   A greeting, an oath, or a contract are ceremonial acts repeated across encounters; they establish a minimum ground on which cooperation can occur.   These acts do not eliminate suspicion, but they allow engagement to proceed in spite of it.

Friendship depends on feelings, but feelings without form fade.   Ritual gives duration to friendship.    Shared meals, recurring visits, exchanges of favors, and so forth, are patterned acts that affirm a relation.   By themselves, they do not create friendship, but without them friendship weakens.   Rituals sustain that which cannot be commanded—the persistence of trust and attachment across time.

Enmity is no less powerful.    Unbounded hostility escalates until destruction follows.   Rituals channel hostility into limited form:    a duel, a contest, a formal debate—each provides a frame in which enmity can be expressed without collapse.   Even in war, treaties operate as ritual forms that restrict violence to recognizable limits.    Without them, conflict loses proportion.

Love in itself is unstable.   It begins in impulse and only lasts with repetition.   Daily gestures, renewed promises, anniversaries, and continuous acts of care provide a form to sustain it.    These rituals do not guarantee permanence, but they give a structure to love within which it can endure.    Without these rituals, love dissipates.

In all these states, ritual serves the same function.    It gives order where the force cannot be controlled directly.   It does not remove distrust, friendship, sexuality, enmity, or love.    It makes them livable.

V

Governance is the state where human forces are amplified by scale.    Distrust, enmity, and competing loyalties appear not only among individuals but among groups.    Ideological differences cannot be eliminated; they can be managed.   Ritual provides the procedure by which this is done.

One example is Parliamentary procedure.    Debate, order of speaking, and voting are repeated acts that permit conflict to be expressed without dissolution.    The forms themselves do not create agreement.   They provide limits within which disagreement can persist.

Civic ceremonies perform a related function.   Inaugurations, public oaths, and national commemorations do not change political conditions in of themselves.    Their repetition affirms the continuity of authority and gives recognition to transitions of power.   The acts are symbolic only in appearance; their real function is procedural stability.

Elections are more direct.   They do not remove ideological division.   They provide a repeated method for channeling conflict into outcomes recognizable by opposing sides.   Without elections, or when their results are not acknowledged, division tends toward rupture.

Ritual is necessity.    Governance depends on it.   Across species, ritual arises from the need to manage forces that exceed direct control.   Human conduct continues this principle.

In ancient Athens, the assembly and the use of the lot allowed opposition to be expressed without dissolving civic order.    Later, parliaments and councils provided ritual structures for negotiation between absolute monarchs and subjects.    In modern democracies, constitutions and electoral cycles maintain continuity by repeating forms that regulate the transfer of power.   When such rituals fail, the outcome is predictable.    Governance is a ritual that makes ideological differences livable.    Without ritual, politics reduces itself to domination and resistance, a cycle that cannot sustain order.


Annotated Bibliography

  • Arendt, Hannah: On Revolution. New York: Viking, 1963. (Arendt emphasizes the role of civic procedures in sustaining governance; this underlies Chapter V’s claim that ritual makes ideological difference livable.)
  • Douglas, Mary: Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. London: Routledge, 1966. (Douglas’s work on ritual boundaries informs Chapter IV’s discussion of distrust, enmity, and the management of instability through repeated acts.)
  • Durkheim, Émile: The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Free Press, 1995. (Durkheim argues that ritual is the foundation of social cohesion, an idea reflected in Chapter I’s claim that rituals regulate behavior and prevent destabilization.)
  • Freud, Sigmund: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. New York: Basic Books, 2000. (Freud’s psychoanalytic discussion of sexual drive and obsession parallels Chapter III’s treatment of private rituals and the containment of unresolved desire.)
  • Geertz, Clifford: The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973. (Geertz treats ritual as “models of” and “models for” reality; his ethnographic analysis supports the essay’s extension of ritual from sexuality to governance in Chapters IV and V.)
  • Habermas, Jürgen: Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996. (Habermas shows how ritualized procedures in discourse and law preserve governance under conflict; his thesis supports the essay’s treatment of parliamentary debate and elections.)
  • Jung, Carl Gustav: Symbols of Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. (Jung traces how instinctual drives, especially sexuality, become ritualized in both individual psychology and collective culture; his analysis complements Chapter III.)
  • Turner, Victor: The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure. Chicago: Aldine, 1969. (Turner’s analysis of liminality informs Chapter III and IV, where sexuality, friendship, and enmity are shown to require ritual frames to carry disruptive forces without collapse.)

“Bound and Unbound:

August 31, 2025

The Articulation of Desire and Sin


*

Cover design by Ricardo Morín
00032
Oil On Linen
18 by 24 by 3/4 inches
2009

Author’s Note

This essay considers how cultures have spoken about desire through the language of sin, pathology, and identity. The aim is not to defend or condemn, but to observe how words have carried judgments across time and how those judgments still shape our understanding. The reflections that follow are an attempt to restore clarity, to see desire as part of life’s vitality rather than as a distortion imposed by inherited vocabularies.

Abstract

Historically, desire has been articulated through terms such as sexuality, fetishism, morality, and religion. Over time, these words shifted from description to judgment, producing a confusion between nature and culture. Evidence from animal behavior, biology, and public health demonstrates that variation in desire is neither anomaly nor pathology. By grounding ethics in dignity and consent rather than shame, desire can be recognized as a natural expression of vitality rather than a source of suspicion.

The Burden of Words

Our most familiar words already betray the history of our confusion. Sexuality, from the Latin sexus, once indicated simple biological differentiation; only in the nineteenth century did it expand into a comprehensive category, enveloping desire, identity, and conduct (Laqueur 1990). Fetishism, from the Portuguese feitiço (“charm” or “sorcery”), was first applied to African religious objects before being imported into European science, where it came to signify irrational sexual attachment (Foucault 1978). Morality, from mores (“customs”), originally described communal practices but hardened into prescriptions against desire, particularly under Christian influence. Religion, from religare (“to bind”), once meant binding communities into shared ritual but eventually came to bind individuals to guilt and suspicion about their own bodies. Here the meaning of Bound and Unbound comes into view: words that once bound desire to order and judgment now carry within them the possibility of unbinding, of returning desire to the realm of vitality rather than suspicion. Each of these terms began in description and shifted into judgment. When we use them today, we inherit their distortions.

The Articulation of Desire and Sin

Culture has long gazed upon desire not as part of life’s ordinary richness but as a threat to be monitored. Theologies cast it as sin; medical texts classified it as pathology; social codes framed it as danger (Foucault 1978). This does not clarify, it distorts. Sexuality becomes at once overexposed and diminished: in public, it is the subject of rules and prohibitions; in private, it collapses into unrealistic expectations that either inhibit expression or exaggerate it into fetish. What should be natural is turned into a negotiation with shame.

Nature provides a more honest account. Same-sex interactions have been documented in over four hundred species (Bagemihl 1999). Rams form lasting male–male bonds, often rejecting female partners. Dolphins employ genital contact across sexes to cement alliances (de Waal 2005). Swans, gulls, and penguins engage in same-sex pairings that rear offspring as successfully as heterosexual pairs (Roughgarden 2013). Among bonobos, sexual contact occurs across nearly every configuration and functions as a mechanism of peacekeeping and social cohesion (de Waal 2005). Even in insects, behaviors that humans describe as “homosexual” occur routinely as part of dominance rituals or sheer abundance of sexual drive. None of this destabilizes the species; rather, it integrates sexuality into the fabric of survival and affiliation.

Humans display similar variation. Chromosomal conditions such as Klinefelter syndrome (XXY) or Turner syndrome (XO) illustrate that biological sex is not a rigid binary but a spectrum (LeVay 2016). Hormonal influences during gestation shape attraction and behavior before culture applies its labels (Hrdy 1981). Neuroscientific studies suggest correlations between hypothalamic structures and orientation, though no single cause accounts for desire (LeVay 2016). What emerges is not a fixed order but a continuum. The insistence on strict categories—heterosexual or homosexual, normal or deviant—is not nature’s doing but culture’s imposition.

Yet culture continues to conflate desire with identity and narrows it into fixed roles. These categories can be politically useful, but they risk obscuring the fluidity of experience that biology reveals. When identity becomes prescriptive, individuals live their own vitality under suspicion, measuring themselves against cultural ideals that deny variation. The result is estrangement: desire filtered through shame.

An alternative frame already exists. The World Health Organization defines sexual health as “a state of physical, emotional, mental, and social well-being” that includes the possibility of safe and pleasurable experiences (WHO 2006). The World Association for Sexual Health has gone further, affirming sexual pleasure as a fundamental human right (WAS 2019). Such frameworks do not police desire; they protect individuals against coercion and exploitation. They suggest that the role of culture is not to dictate what desires are permissible but to ensure dignity and consent. Once these conditions are secured, desire resumes its natural role: a source of intimacy, bonding, creativity, and balance (Gruskin et al. 2019).

To confront nature’s complexity is to resist its reduction into morality plays of vice and virtue. Desire does not require validation from cultural obsession, nor does it deserve condemnation from inherited vocabularies of sin. It is an aspect of life, as ordinary and vital as hunger or sleep. To acknowledge it without fear is to reclaim joy. By lifting the burden of shame, we return desire to its proper place in the living order: not an aberration requiring defense, but a manifestation of vitality—one that connects us to each other and to the exuberance of nature itself.

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Annotated Bibliography

  • Bagemihl, Bruce: Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. (A landmark survey documenting same-sex behaviors in more than 450 species. Bagemihl’s research undermines claims that homosexuality is “unnatural” and illustrates the diversity of sexual expression across the animal kingdom. It is essential for grounding sexuality in biological rather than cultural terms.)
  • de Waal, Frans: Our Inner Ape: A Leading Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We Are. New York: Riverhead Books, 2005. (Drawing on primate studies, de Waal emphasizes sex as a social tool among bonobos and chimpanzees, used for alliance-building and conflict resolution. His work demonstrates that sexual behavior is not confined to reproduction but serves broader social and evolutionary functions.)
  • Foucault, Michel: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon, 1978. (In this foundational text on the cultural construction of sexuality, Foucault argues that sexuality is not a timeless natural category but a discourse shaped by power and institutions. Provides the conceptual framework for understanding how morality and pathology have distorted natural instincts.)
  • Gruskin, Sofia, et al. “Sexual Health, Sexual Rights and Sexual Pleasure.” Global Public Health, 2019, 14(10): 1361–1372. (This article situates sexual pleasure within global public health frameworks. It underscores that fulfillment and pleasure are inseparable from health and rights, reinforcing the need for ethics based on dignity rather than prohibition.)
  • Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer: The Woman That Never Evolved. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. (Hrdy reinterprets female primate behavior and shows active strategies in mating and alliance formation. Her work dismantles the myth of female passivity and demonstrates that sexual agency is integral to evolutionary success.)
  • Laqueur, Thomas: Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. (Laqueur traces the cultural and historical shift from the “one-sex” model of antiquity to the modern “two-sex” binary. His work shows how scientific language helped construct cultural categories of sexuality and gender, making him central to the etymological and historical analysis of desire.
  • LeVay, Simon: Gay, Straight, and the Reason Why: The Science of Sexual Orientation. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. (LeVay synthesizes research on brain structures, genetics, and prenatal influences and argues that sexual orientation emerges from a complex interaction of biological factors. Useful for contextualizing the continuum of human desire.)
  • Roughgarden, Joan: Evolution’s Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People. Rev. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013. (Roughgarden challenges traditional Darwinian views of sexual selection, highlighting diversity in gender and sexuality across species. She bridges nonhuman variation and human experience and offers a scientific argument against binary understandings of sexuality.)
  • World Health Organization (WHO): “Defining Sexual Health.” Geneva: WHO, 2006. (This report defines sexual health as a state of well-being that includes the possibility of safe and pleasurable sexual experiences, free of coercion or violence. It offers authoritative language to argue that sexual fulfillment is a health matter, not a moral one.)
  • World Association for Sexual Health (WAS): “Declaration on Sexual Pleasure.” Mexico City: WAS, 2019.(This report affirms sexual pleasure as a fundamental human right. This declaration situates pleasure within global health and rights discourse, supporting the essay’s call for ethics rooted in dignity rather than shame.)

“The Mirage of Exceptionalism”

August 19, 2025

Ricardo Morin
The Mirage of Exceptionalism
(Template Series)
1st out of six
Each 30″x 22″ = 66″h x 66″ overall
Watercolor on paper
2005

To the paradox that divides in the very act of seeking unity.

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By Ricardo Morin
August 18, 2025, Bala Cynwyd, PA

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Across traditions, faith has sought to articulate humanity’s highest aspirations. Scriptures, rituals, and doctrines were meant to give form to gratitude, humility, and reverence for creation. Yet time and again, these same legacies have been drawn into the service of division. The paradox lies in how beliefs that profess universal truth harden into claims of exceptional status and turn revelation into rivalry.

The Abrahamic faiths—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—rooted themselves in texts anchored in antiquity. This permanence can inspire continuity, but when transposed into political life, belief risks becoming dogma, and dogma exclusion. What began as a celebration of humanity and its creator becomes instead an engine of contention.

Exceptionalism is not confined to any single tradition. It arises wherever uniqueness is mistaken for superiority, wherever the memory of a chosen people or a sacred covenant becomes a license to deny the dignity of others. Creationism, visions of Heaven, doctrines of righteousness—all contain the seeds of inspiration, but also of antagonism when set against rival paths.

In this sense, exceptionalism is less about the divine than about the human need to define boundaries. By exalting one path as singular, communities cast shadows on others. They forget that the multiplicity of belief might reveal instead the vastness of what humanity seeks to comprehend. The question is not whether one tradition is more luminous than another, but whether clarity itself can be hoarded without dimming the shared horizon of human dignity.

The tragedy of conflating exceptionalism with uniqueness is that it mistakes a gift for a weapon. To be unique is not to be superior; to inherit a tradition is not to monopolize truth. Religions, when true to their essence, point toward a mystery larger than themselves. When they lapse into rivalry, they obscure it.

The challenge before us is whether humanity can learn to let religions serve as languages of gratitude rather than banners of conquest. If belief is to celebrate creation, it must embrace the unity of humanity rather than sabotage it. Otherwise, the promise of transcendence is reduced to a struggle for dominance, and what was meant to honor the creator becomes instead a mirror of our most destructive instincts.

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Annotated Bibliography

  • Armstrong, Karen. The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism. New York: Ballantine Books, 2001. (Armstrong explores how traditions across Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have produced militant forms of fundamentalism. She shows how claims of absolute truth often distort original spiritual intent and feed conflict instead of unity.)
  • Girard, René: Violence and the Sacred. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. (Girard argues that societies often channel violence into ritualized sacrifice. His insights illuminate how religious exceptionalism, rather than reducing violence, can redirect it toward outsiders deemed threatening to communal “uniqueness.”)
  • Küng, Hans: Christianity and the World Religions: Paths of Dialogue with Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. New York: Doubleday, 1986. (Küng advocates for dialogue across faiths, stressing that no single religion can claim monopoly on truth. His work directly challenges exceptionalist claims and encourages the search for shared ethical ground.)
  • Said, Edward W.: Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. New York: Vintage, 1997. (Said critiques the portrayal of Islam as uniquely threatening, showing how narratives of exceptionalism become entrenched in political and cultural discourse. His analysis highlights how external perceptions reinforce divisions.)
  • Taylor, Charles: A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007. (Taylor examines how modernity has shifted the role of religion and has complicated claims of universality. He shows how belief persists in pluralist societies, while exceptionalist frameworks struggle to adapt within a diverse human landscape.)

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Edited by Billy Bussell Thompson, August 18, 2025, NY, NY.