Ricardo F. Morín An Agreement to Disagree Watercolor, gouache, whiteout and black ink on paper 14″x20″ 2005
Ricardo F. Morín
January 9, 2026
Oakland Park, Fl
Some antagonisms call not for vindication, but for clarity
*
Our exchange revealed not a disagreement to be resolved, but a misalignment that could not be repaired through further argument. What initially appeared as an analytical difference gradually disclosed a deeper divergence in how understanding itself was approached. At that point, explanation no longer clarified and began to obscure.
There are moments in life when antagonistic relationships must be confronted not to prevail, but to discern limits. Not every challenge is an invitation to engage, and not every assertion of authority merits reply. When discourse shifts from inquiry to self-assertion, the task is no longer persuasion, but recognition—of what can be shared, what cannot, and when distance becomes a form of integrity rather than withdrawal.
Disengagement, understood in these terms, is not an abdication of reason, nor a retreat from rigor. It is an acknowledgment that intellectual authority does not arise from moral superiority, from the accumulation of sources, or from the insistence on being recognized as correct. Authority that cannot tolerate limits undermines itself by the very posture it adopts.
Disengagement, then, is neither silence nor concession. It is a turning away that carries weight: liberating and disappointing, real and poignant. It offers no solace, yet affirms life itself by refusing to persist in distortion. What remains is not victory, but truth preserved through restraint.
Authority intolerant of limits succumbs to hubris for its own sake.
Ricardo F. Morín Portrait of a President III Watercolor, gouache, black ink, and white corrector on paper 14″x20″ 2003
Ricardo F. Morín
January 7, 2026
Oakland Park, Fl
1.
The present moment does not register as a crisis of ideology, but as a crisis of sequence. What is being tested is not the content of declared principles, but the order in which authority, review, and justification are made to occur. Decisions are advanced before the conditions that would ordinarily authorize them have been articulated, and coherence is asked to follow action rather than govern it. This inversion does not abolish law, institutions, or legitimacy. It displaces them. What once determined whether action should proceed now intervenes after action has already been declared.
2.
In Venezuela, this inversion becomes visible through the widening separation between legitimacy and enforceable authority. Electoral victory, moral credibility, and international recognition continue to exist, but they no longer determine who is treated as operable. Engagement instead centers on those capable of compelling compliance in the present tense. Authority is identified not through mandate, but through continuity with the administrative, financial, and coercive mechanisms that currently exert control. The effect is not confusion but selection. Those able to deliver immediate outcomes are elevated as interlocutors regardless of ethical record, while those whose legitimacy lacks immediate enforcement capacity are bypassed.
3.
This preference has been articulated through assessment rather than implication. Reporting on a classified briefing presented to Donald Trump indicates that U.S. intelligence concluded that figures drawn from within the existing Maduro apparatus were best positioned to assume control if Maduro were removed. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was identified not because of democratic standing or public credibility, but because of her continuity with the administrative, financial, and extractive mechanisms that continue to function within Venezuela. Her experience overseeing the oil sector and engaging directly with commercial actors was treated as evidence of reliability in practice rather than legitimacy in principle. What was evaluated was not character, but enforceability. Criminal implication did not disqualify; it indicated command of the systems through which compliance could be compelled. Opposition figures whose authority derived from electoral legitimacy but lacked immediate control over those mechanisms were treated as non-operable. The selection privileged negotiability under pressure.
4.
This mode of selection is not confined to a single theater or moment. It recurs wherever authority is exercised ahead of coordination. Operability outweighs normative qualification. Authority is derived from the capacity to transact, enforce, and stabilize outcomes in compressed timeframes. Legitimacy is acknowledged but does not determine engagement. What governs is the ability to act now and to absorb consequence later.
5.
The same inversion appears in Ukraine under different conditions. Public declarations affecting military assistance, diplomatic posture, and negotiation have been issued without prior coordination with allies or institutions tasked with planning and review. These statements do not clarify direction in advance; they compel response after the fact. Allies recalibrate commitments once consequences are already in motion. Planning follows assertion. Coordination adjusts to announcement. The question is not whether support exists, but whether its terms are introduced before or after the processes that would ordinarily govern them.
6.
This ordering is also visible within the American system itself. On multiple occasions over several years, Donald Trump has acted on the basis of assurances issued by Vladimir Putin despite the existence of contrary assessments produced by U.S. intelligence agencies. Those institutions were not dismantled or silenced. Briefings continued. Analysis persisted. What changed was their position in time. Intelligence no longer governed whether action proceeded; it reconciled itself to commitments already made. Verification trailed assertion. Agencies designed to anticipate risk were required to manage consequences they had not authorized.
7.
Once this ordering becomes perceptible, it does not remain confined to decision-makers. Institutions, allies, and adversaries adjust their behavior accordingly. Diplomatic actors treat public declarations as operative even when their durability is uncertain. Agencies tasked with planning model scenarios around positions that may shift without notice. Allies hesitate between waiting for clarification and acting to protect their own exposure. Adversaries are instructed not by declared policy, but by the demonstrated sequence: that commitments may precede review, that reversals may follow assertion, and that coherence cannot be assumed in advance.
8.
What emerges is not paralysis, but recalibration. Systems continue to function by absorbing volatility as a standing condition. Stability is no longer produced by predictability, but by the capacity to adjust rapidly to decisions introduced before their governing terms have been settled. This adaptation does not resolve the inversion; it normalizes it. Governance continues, but its coordinating force weakens. Motion persists without measure.
9.
The consequence of this pattern bears directly on how authority and legitimacy relate to one another. Legitimacy continues to be articulated through elections, alliances, and formal acknowledgment. Authority, however, is exercised through immediacy—through the ability to set terms in motion that others must then accommodate. This does not negate legitimacy; it sidelines it. Authority no longer requires justification in order to operate. Legitimacy survives as language, while authority consolidates through sequence.
10.
When authority is exercised independently of legitimacy, governance may still function, but it ceases to persuade. Decisions are carried forward not because they are accepted, but because they are already underway. Review becomes accommodation. Law becomes explanation after action rather than guidance before it. The danger here is not lawlessness, but displacement. Constraint remains formally intact while losing its capacity to govern timing.
11.
This condition does not resolve into immediate collapse. It endures. Constitutional systems assume cooperation without being able to compel it in advance. They rely on restraint exercised voluntarily, sequentially, and often against immediate interest. When that restraint falters, institutions remain standing but lose coordinating force. Authority fills the gap left by cooperation, often in the name of continuity. What persists is governance without convergence, power without persuasion, and action without settled measure.
“Geometric Allegory,” digital painting 2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)
*
To my parents
*
Acknowledgements
~
I wish to acknowledge Billy Bussell Thompson for his meticulous editorial guidance. His feedback sharpened the structure, precision, and internal discipline of this work.
Preface
“Unmasking Disappointment” follows a line of inquiry present throughout my work: the examination of identity, memory, and the relations that emerge when life unfolds across cultural boundaries. Although I have lived outside Venezuela for more than five decades and became a naturalized citizen of the United States twenty-four years ago, my relationship to the country of my birth remains a persistent point of reference. The distance between these conditions—belonging and removal—forms the backdrop against which this narrative takes shape.
This work belongs to a broader autobiographical project that gathers experiences, observations, and questions accumulated over time. While personal in origin, it does not proceed as confession or memoir. Its method is sequential rather than expressive: individual exposure is situated within historical forces and political structures that have shaped Venezuelan life across generations. The intention is not to reconcile these tensions, but to render them visible through recurrence, record, and consequence.
“Series I” introduces the first thematic clusters of this inquiry. The episodes assembled here do not advance a single thesis, nor do they aim at resolution. They trace points of friction where private experience intersects with public power, and where political narratives exert pressure on ordinary life. Across these encounters, patterns emerge—not as abstractions, but as conditions that alter how authority is exercised, how responsibility is displaced, and how agency is constrained.
The chapters that follow examine the pressures produced by systemic inequality and trace contemporary Venezuelan conditions back to their historical formation. Autocratic rule and popular consent appear not as opposing forces, but as elements that increasingly entangle and weaken one another. Within this entanglement, truth does not disappear; it becomes less evenly accessible and more readily displaced by narrative.
When public discourse is shaped by propaganda and misinformation, authoritarian structures gain resilience. Recovering truth under such conditions does not resolve political conflict, but it clarifies the limits within which political life operates. Agency emerges not as an ideal, but as a condition sustained—or undermined—through practice and consequence.
This work does not propose deterministic explanations or simple remedies. It proceeds by accumulation, drawing attention to patterns that persist despite changing circumstances. What it asks of the reader is not agreement, but attention: to evidence, to sequence, and to the conditions under which political freedom may be meaningfully exercised.
Writing from Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, I remain aware of the distance between the environments in which this work is composed and the conditions it examines. That distance does not confer authority; it imposes responsibility.
Ricardo Federico Morín Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, January 21, 2025
*
Table of Contents
*
Chapter I – A Written Language.
Chapter II – Our Recklessness.
Chapter III – Point of View.
Chapter IV – A Dialogue.
Chapter V – Abstract.
Chapter VI – Chronicles of Hugo Chávez (§§ I-XVII).
Chapter VII – The Allegorical Mode.
Chapter VIII – The Ideal Government and the Power of Virtue.
Chapter IX – The First Sign: On Political and Social Resentment.
Chapter X – The Second Sign: The Solid Pillar of Power: The Military Forces.
Chapter XI – The Third Sign: The Asymmetry of Political Parties.
Chapter XII – The Fourth Sign: Autocracy (§§ 1-9):Venezuela (§§ 10-23), The Asymmetry of Sanctions (§§ 24-32).
Chapter XIII – The Fifth Sign: The Pawned Republic.
Chapter XIV – The First Issue: Partisanship, Non-partisanship, and Antipartisanship.
Chapter XV – The Second Issue: On Partial Truths and Repressive Anarchy.
Chapter XVI – The Third Issue: The Clarion of Democracy.
Chapter XVII – The Fourth Issue: On Human Rights.
Chapter XVIII – The Fifth Issue: On the Nature of Violence.
Chapter XIX – The Ultimate Issue: About the Deliverance of Injustice.
Acknowledgments.
Epilogue.
PostScript.
Appendix: Author’s Note, Prefatory Note. A). Venezuelan Constitutions [1811-1999], Branches, and Departments of Government. B) Evolution of Political Parties: 1840-2024. C) Laws Enacted by the Asamblea Nacional. D) Clarificatory Note on Domestic Coercion, Foreign Presence, and Intervention.
Bibliography.
~
*
Chapter I
*
A Written Language
~
Stability is often sought where it cannot be secured. Experience has shown this repeatedly. Even careful intentions tend to draw one into uncertain terrain, where understanding lags behind consequence. At the desk, as late-afternoon light reaches the page, writing assumes a practical function: it becomes a means of ordering what would otherwise remain unsettled. The act does not resolve vulnerability, but it records it. Whether time alters such conditions remains uncertain; what can be done is to give them form.
What follows moves from the conditions of writing to the conditions it must confront.
*
Chapter II
*
Our Recklessness
~
“Our painful struggle to deal with the politics of climate change is surely also a product of the strange standoff between science and political thinking.” — Hannah Arendt: The Human Condition: Being and Time [1958], Kindle Book, 159.
*
1
The COVID pandemic and the 2023 Canadian wildfires, among other recent events, have made visible conditions that were already in place. These events did not introduce new vulnerabilities as much as they revealed the extent to which existing systems depend on economic incentives and political habits that privilege extraction over preservation. During the period when smoke from the fires reached the northeastern United States, daylight in parts of Pennsylvania was visibly altered and registered the reach of events unfolding at a considerable distance. Such occurrences do not stand apart from prevailing economic arrangements; they coincide with a model that treats natural conditions as commodities and absorbs their degradation as an external cost.
2
The fires in California in 2025, like those that spread across Canada in 2023, do not present themselves as isolated occurrences. They form part of a sequence shaped by environmental neglect, political inertia, and sustained industrial expansion. Conditions such as desertification, resource scarcity, and population displacement no longer appear solely as projected outcomes; they are increasingly registered as present circumstances. Scientific assessments indicate that these patterns are likely to intensify in the absence of structural change. [1][2][3] What is brought into view, over time, is not a singular failure but a system that continues to operate according to priorities that favor immediate yield over long-term continuity.
3
The question of balance does not arise solely as a technical problem. It emerges within a moral and political field shaped by prevailing economic assumptions. The treatment of nature—and more recently of artificial intelligence—as a commodity reflects a trajectory in which matters of shared survival are increasingly translated into market terms. Under such conditions, considerations that once belonged to collective responsibility are recast as variables within systems of calculation.
4
Such patterns place increasing strain on conditions necessary for collective survival. Responses to these conditions vary and range from indifference to urgency, though urgency does not invariably produce clarity. What becomes apparent, across repeated instances, is a tendency for crisis to recur without sustained adjustment. This recurrence parallels the political histories examined in the chapters that follow, where warning and consequence frequently fail to align.
Conversations with my editor, Billy Bussell Thompson, have accompanied the development of this work over time. His attention to research method and to the structure of argument has contributed to the clarification of its scope and direction. These exchanges, often conducted at a distance and without ceremony, formed part of the process through which the present narrative took shape. After an extended period of uncertainty regarding how to approach the subject of Hugo Chávez, the contours of Unmasking Disappointment gradually emerged.
2
Hugo Chávez entered national political life as a leader whose authority was exercised in opposition to political liberalism.[1] While his public discourse emphasized alignment with the poor, the material benefits of power accumulated within a narrow circle. [2] Over the course of his tenure, democratic institutions in Venezuela experienced progressive weakening, and governance assumed increasingly authoritarian forms. These developments become more legible when situated within the historical record and examined through documented practice rather than rhetorical claim.
3
The events that followed Chávez’s rule are marked by disorder and unresolved consequence. Their persistence draws attention to questions of historical accountability and collective responsibility that remain unsettled. Examining the record of autocratic leadership—its ambitions as well as its failures—provides a means of approaching the problem of justice in Venezuela without presuming resolution. Through this examination, enduring tensions come into view as conditions to be understood rather than conclusions to be reached.
~
Endnotes—Chapter III
[1]The term caudillo originates in Spanish and has historically been used to describe a leader who exercises concentrated political and military authority. In the Venezuelan context, the term carries particular resonance and refers to figures associated with the post-independence period of the nineteenth century. Such leaders tended to consolidate power through a combination of personal authority, allegiance from armed factions, and the promise—whether substantive or rhetorical—of maintaining order under conditions of instability. While some were regarded as defenders of local or national causes, others became associated with practices that facilitated authoritarian governance and weakened institutional structures. The concept of the caudillo continues to function within Venezuelan political culture as a descriptive category applied to leadership forms that combine popular support with concentrated power.
A series of conversations between BBT and the author accompanied the examination of Venezuelan politics and history developed in this section. These exchanges formed a transitional space in which reflection gave way to historical inquiry, allowing questions of interpretation, responsibility, and record to be addressed through dialogue rather than exposition.
1
—RFM: “My writing has been concerned with the evolution of Venezuela’s political landscape, with particular attention to the emergence of authoritarian forms of rule. The focus has been less on abstract doctrine than on how specific policies translated into everyday conditions for ordinary Venezuelans.”
2
—BBT: “Examining how authoritarian leadership shapes political conditions is necessary, though the term itself is often contested and applied unevenly. In Chávez’s case, the use of propaganda was not exceptional in form, but it was consistently employed as an instrument of governance. How did official narratives during his tenure circulate, and what effects did they have on public perception over time?”
3
—RFM: “Propaganda is not unique to Chávez; it functions as a recurring instrument across political systems. In Venezuela, official media regularly attributed economic hardship to external interference rather than to domestic policy decisions. At the same time, material conditions deteriorated, with shortages emerging from economic mismanagement and later compounded by external restrictions. Opposition groups also circulated counter-narratives, which in turn elicited responses from the State. These exchanges unfolded within a historical context shaped by civil conflict and Cold War alignments, and produced a fragmented informational environment. Within that environment, responsibility for economic decline was frequently displaced, while public perception was managed through repetition rather than resolution. The social and economic reforms invoked in justification did not, over time, yield the reductions in poverty and inequality that had been promised.”
4
—BBT: “To render Venezuela’s political conditions with some accuracy, attention must be given to how ordinary citizens encountered these dynamics in daily life. How were such conditions navigated in practice, particularly where political discourse intersected with immediate economic necessity?”
5
—RFM: “The economic collapse that followed the decline of the oil-based model intensified poverty and placed sustained pressure on public services. Examined in sequence, this period shows how colonial legacies and authoritarian practices converged in the formation of Chavismo. Episodes such as the 1989 riots known as El Caracazo registered widespread disaffection with established parties and democratic institutions. Under such conditions, the demands of securing basic necessities frequently outweighed engagement with abstract political principles.”
6
—BBT: “Clarity in narrative depends in part on recognizing the assumptions that guide interpretation. When these assumptions are made explicit and examined, the account becomes less directive and more accessible, allowing readers to follow the record without being steered toward a predetermined position.”
7
—RFM: “No narrative proceeds without interpretation, including this one. Writing provides a means of approaching Venezuela’s history—its colonial formation, episodes of authoritarian rule, and periods of political disruption—without foreclosing alternative readings. A coherent account need not be exhaustive; it remains open insofar as it attends to implication and consequence rather than resolution.”
8
—BBT: “The exchange itself underscores the importance of careful narration when approaching Venezuela’s political and social record. Attending to multiple viewpoints does not resolve complexity, but it allows a more coherent account to emerge without reducing that history to a single explanatory frame.”
The exchange marked a transition from reflective inquiry to historical record.
~
*
Chapter V
*
Abstract
*
1
This section examines the sequence through which the political project articulated under Hugo Chávez assumed autocratic form. Rather than attributing this outcome to a single cause, the inquiry proceeds by tracing how leadership decisions unfolded within a convergence of historical conditions, institutional arrangements, economic pressures, and geopolitical alignments. The account does not begin from conclusion, but from record.
2 Attention remains on how authority was exercised and how its effects registered within Venezuelan society. Historical circumstance, institutional design, and external influence are examined not to simplify the record, but to make visible the interdependencies through which power consolidated over time. What emerges is not an explanatory thesis, but a configuration whose coherence can be assessed only through sustained attention to sequence and consequence.
The Monroe Doctrine is often treated as a historical policy. Increasingly, however, it operates as something more elemental: an axiom. In this form, it no longer argues its case. It establishes the conditions under which argument is permitted. An axiom does not persuade. It assumes.
When the Monroe Doctrine functions axiomatically, it ceases to appear as a contingent claim about hemispheric order and becomes an unspoken premise about who may decide, when intervention is justified, and what forms of consent are considered sufficient. What requires examination is not the doctrine as written, but the axiom as it now circulates.
The Monroe Axiom asserts unilateral authority while presenting itself as regional responsibility. It presumes that stability in the Western Hemisphere is inseparable from U.S. primacy, and that this primacy does not require reciprocal authorization. Consent is not sought; necessity is interpreted. Decision precedes deliberation.
Attempts to rehabilitate the Monroe Doctrine by assigning it a benevolent purpose do not alter its structure. Such revisions change tone rather than authorization. A claim of unilateral authority does not become mutual through intention. Benevolence operates as an assurance offered after power has been exercised, not as a limit that operates before it. Political fatigue may explain acquiescence, but it does not supply authorization. What is endured is not thereby endorsed.
In its contemporary articulation, the axiom rarely declares dominance openly. Instead, it presents itself as reluctant, unavoidable, or benevolent. Intervention is framed not as choice, but as consequence. Exhaustion replaces consent. Democracy is invoked not as a process to be preserved, but as an outcome promised in advance. Once inevitability replaces argument, the axiom becomes self-sealing. Opposition is no longer disagreement; it is reclassified as denial of reality.
The Monroe Axiom fails the test of reciprocity. A principle that justifies intervention outward but rejects it when reversed is not a principle. It is asymmetry protected by habit. When unilateral authority no longer feels obliged to justify itself, normative language ceases to clarify and begins to anesthetize.
Hegemony does not normally operate through open domination. It operates through consent. Power becomes durable not because it is feared, but because it is accepted as legitimate. The central mechanism is not repression, but agreement: the willingness of ordinary people to recognize an authority as natural, necessary, or unavoidable.
In this condition, governance no longer depends primarily on force. It depends on institutions, economic structures, technical systems, and narratives that shape what appears normal and reasonable. Over time, these arrangements narrow the range of what can be questioned. Authority no longer needs to justify itself repeatedly. It comes to define the terms under which justification is allowed.
What emerges is a form of rule in which the primary objective of the system is no longer the public good, but its own continuity. Stability becomes the overriding value. Order is treated as a substitute for accountability. The preservation of existing arrangements takes precedence over the purposes those arrangements were meant to serve.
Such systems do not usually collapse through confrontation. They weaken when consent begins to withdraw. The decisive change occurs when people no longer believe the narratives that sustain authority, no longer accept the inevitability of existing structures, and no longer participate willingly in their maintenance. At that point, power is forced to justify itself again. And once justification becomes necessary, hegemony has already begun to fail.
*
On Self-Authorizing Executive Judgment
*
As hegemonic justification weakens, authority relocates from consensual legitimacy to executive judgment. What an axiom enables at the level of doctrine, executive practice completes at the level of justification. Authority no longer presents itself as procedurally derived. It presents itself as self-authorizing. Decisions are framed as judgments rather than as actions subject to institutional review. The language of prudence—stability, timing, coordination—functions not as an articulated framework, but as a justificatory surface applied after the fact.
In this mode, power does not describe a process by which decisions were tested, constrained, or evaluated. It describes an internal certainty. Judgment is treated as sufficient warrant. Review is recast as delay. Constraint is reframed as irresponsibility. The executive becomes both actor and auditor, collapsing the distinction between discretion exercised within a republic and sovereignty asserted by an individual. What persists is not the absence of the law, but a reordering of when the law is permitted to speak.
This transformation does not reject democratic language. It inhabits it. At that point, justification itself is treated as unnecessary. Authority no longer explains itself to institutions. It explains itself only to itself.
This displacement does not stop at intervention. It extends into how moral authority itself is articulated in relation to executive power.
What once appeared as rhetorical excess has now been confirmed as formal executive communication. In a documented text exchange with Norway’s prime minister, later shared by the Norwegian government, Donald Trump explicitly linked his failure to receive the Nobel Peace Prize to a withdrawal of moral restraint and a reassertion of territorial entitlement. He stated that because Norway had “decided not to give me the Nobel Peace Prize for having stopped 8 wars,” he no longer felt obliged “to think purely of peace,” and could now focus on what was “good and proper for the United States of America.” From that premise, he dismissed Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland as historically arbitrary, asserted U.S. equivalence of claim, and concluded that “the world is not secure unless we have complete and total control of Greenland.”
This is not a metaphorical slippage of tone; it is an axiomatic substitution enacted in plain language. Moral recognition is converted into a precondition for continued restraint. Legal sovereignty is reframed as folklore. Collective security obligations under NATO are inverted into a debt relationship owed to U.S. executive initiative. The structure of justification no longer proceeds from treaty, law, or institutional reciprocity, but from unilateral narrative authority. The episode does not illustrate a policy position; it reveals a mode of reasoning in which executive power ceases to argue its case and instead declares the conditions under which argument itself will be recognized.
*
On Recognition Substitution and Jurisdictional Drift
A recent procedural illustration of this logic can be observed in the treatment of Venezuela’s 2024 electoral outcome. That election produced a determinate locus of constitutional legitimacy grounded in publicly documented tallies, corroborated by international observation, and reinforced by prior external recognition of the opposition coalition represented by María Corina Machado’s party. These elements together constituted a juridical fact: an authority derived from electoral procedure rather than from bilateral negotiation or executive preference.
Subsequent engagement by the United States executive branch with Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s acting executive did not contest that electoral outcome. It displaced it operationally. This displacement did not arise from a competing evidentiary claim about the vote count or from a legally articulated challenge to the election’s validity. It arose from an external strategic preference for transactional stability over constitutional continuity. Recognition was thereby detached from electoral legitimacy and reassigned on the basis of expedient functionality.
This maneuver reflects a category error with institutional consequences. Diplomatic leverage authorizes negotiation, pressure, and conditional engagement. Policy discretion authorizes the selection of strategies aligned with national interests. Neither authorizes the redefinition of the internal locus of sovereignty within another State. By treating these domains as interchangeable, executive U.S. policy practice converted foreign-policy discretion into a surrogate sovereignty-assigning authority. What was presented as pragmatic statecraft functioned procedurally as jurisdictional substitution.
The displacement cannot be stabilized by invoking realism. Realism explains why States behave instrumentally. It does not supply a legal warrant for nullifying electoral outcomes. The American executive branch did not demonstrate that the 2024 Venezuelan election failed to generate a legitimate authority. It demonstrated only that the authority produced by that election was operationally inconvenient for the strategy being pursued by the American administration. In institutional terms, this constitutes not correction but procedural override of another country’s sovereignty.
The structural consequence extends beyond Venezuelan governance. When electoral legitimacy can be superseded by bilateral endorsement, elections cease to function as determinative acts and become advisory signals contingent on foreign approval. Sovereignty is no longer derived from domestic mandate but from external recognition calibrated to strategic utility. Authority migrates from constitutional process to diplomatic transaction.
This transformation does not announce domination. It normalizes it. Recognition becomes an instrument for reallocating jurisdiction. Intervention becomes a method for reassigning legitimacy.
In this register, moral authority no longer functions as an external constraint on power. Distinction ceases to operate as a limit placed upon authority and is converted into an accessory of it. When moral standing is derived from proximity to executive certainty, independence dissolves without coercion. What appears as endorsement is, structurally, a transfer of judgment from the moral sphere into the political one.
The failure of the Monroe Axiom is not confined to its original doctrinal form. It persists because the axiom no longer needs to appear as doctrine at all. Its logic now circulates in a different register—one that does not argue for unilateral authority, but presupposes it by altering the terms under which legitimacy is evaluated.
In this register, political conflict is no longer treated as a relation among agents operating under shared constraints. It is reclassified as a condition to be managed rather than a position to be answered. Once this shift occurs, reciprocity no longer functions as a test of legitimacy. Action is justified not by reversibility, but by asserted necessity.
Within this framework, intervention is no longer judged against reversible standards. It is judged against urgency. Delay becomes negligence. Restraint becomes complicity. The language of limits gives way to the language of care, and coercive force is presented not as domination, but as treatment. The axiom is not rejected. It is rendered unnecessary.
This shift produces a decisive asymmetry. Where reciprocity once constrained legitimacy, diagnosis now authorizes action. The governing question is no longer whether an act could be defended, word for word, if positions were reversed, but whether the condition has been declared terminal. Once that declaration is made, consent becomes secondary, proportionality becomes implicit, and accountability is deferred to an undefined recovery phase.
This transformation has a structural consequence. When political communities are redescribed as incapacitated, authority no longer justifies itself in relation to equals, but in relation to asserted necessity. Measures that would otherwise require justification are absorbed into ordinary administration.
Under this logic, action is no longer constrained by standards that must remain reversible. Authority proceeds by classification rather than justification. Once legitimacy is grounded in declared condition, the criteria for ending intervention no longer operate in advance.
It is under this displaced logic that material claims can be advanced without appearing as seizures, and control can be asserted without being named as such. What follows is not an exception to the axiom, but one of its most concrete expressions.
Under this displaced logic, ownership itself becomes conditional. Infrastructure developed in Venezuela by foreign companies is treated not as investment made under Venezuelan law, but as continuing possession by the United States. What was built within Venezuelan territory, regulated by Venezuelan authority, and later nationalized through Venezuelan law is recast as something that never fully belonged to Venezuela.
Under this logic, nationalization is no longer interpreted as a sovereign act. What had been established within Venezuelan territory, regulated by Venezuelan authority, and later incorporated into Venezuelan law is reclassified as an asset whose ownership is said to precede that authority. Past participation is invoked not as historical involvement, but as proof of continuing entitlement. Time is not treated as a boundary, but as confirmation.
Once this redefinition is accepted, the decline of Venezuela’s oil industry is no longer understood as a domestic failure affecting Venezuelans. It is described as damage done to U.S. interests. Mismanagement inside Venezuela is translated into harm inflicted on the United States. Venezuela’s inability to maintain its own industry becomes evidence that it should no longer control it.
From there, the reasoning shifts again. The claim is then restated in corrective terms. Control is framed as the reestablishment of a prior condition rather than the initiation of a new one. What is transferred is described as something that never fully ceased to belong elsewhere. Performance replaces consent as the measure of legitimacy. Ownership becomes conditional, evaluated against outcomes rather than jurisdiction.
The argument then adopts the language of vulnerability. Disruption within Venezuela is described as exposure elsewhere. Energy production is treated as a condition of stability rather than as an object of agreement. What had been governed through jurisdiction is presented as a requirement of continuity. Under this framing, intervention is aligned with prevention. Choice becomes indistinguishable from obligation.
In this sequence, ownership is no longer treated as a settled legal condition. Jurisdiction is referenced, but only insofar as outcomes meet external expectations. Control persists while its legal basis becomes contingent.
Claims initially framed as interests are restated as standing expectations. Those expectations are then treated as conditions that must be met in advance of consent.
Venezuela’s transition and Ukraine’s survival now constitute a single test: whether power can be constrained without illusion, and whether the United States can act coherently even when its president cannot perceive coherence himself.
This text does not argue for a policy or predict an outcome. It marks the threshold at which coherence ceases to be discretionary and becomes a condition of survival.
The United States cannot act in one theater in a way that invalidates the principles it claims to defend in another. If sovereignty, territorial integrity, institutional continuity, and legal accountability are treated as binding in Ukraine, they cannot become flexible, provisional, or strategically inconvenient in Venezuela. And the reverse must also hold: if those principles are treated as binding in Venezuela, they cannot be relaxed, reinterpreted, or selectively applied in Ukraine. Once that line is crossed in either direction, coherence collapses—not only rhetorically, but structurally. Power ceases to stabilize outcomes and instead begins to manage decay.
This is not a moral claim; it is a functional one. Modern power does not fail because it lacks force, but because it loses internal consistency. When the same instruments—sanctions, indictments, military pressure, diplomatic recognition—are applied according to circumstance rather than principle, they no longer constrain adversaries. They instruct them. Russia and China do not need to prevail militarily if they can demonstrate that legality itself is selective, contingent, and subject to reinterpretation by whoever holds advantage in the moment.
For this reason, no transition can rest on personalization. Trust between leaders is not a substitute for verification, nor can rapport replace institutions. This vulnerability is well known in personality-driven diplomacy and has been particularly visible under Donald Trump in his repeated misreading of Vladimir Putin. Yet the deeper danger is not psychological; it is procedural. Policy that depends on who speaks to whom cannot survive stress. Only policy that remains legible when personalities are removed can endure.
Nor can outcomes be declared before institutions exist to carry them. Territorial control without civilian authority is not stability. Elections conducted without enforceable security guarantees are not legitimacy. Resource access without escrow, audit, and legal review is not recovery, but extraction under a different name. When the United States accepts results without structures, it postpones collapse rather than preventing it.
Equally corrosive is legal improvisation. Law applied after action—indictments justified retroactively, sanctions reshaped to accommodate faits accomplis—does not constrain power; it performs it. Once legality becomes explanatory rather than directive, it loses its disciplining force. Adversaries learn that rules are narrative instruments, not boundaries.
Finally, there can be no tolerance for proxy preservation. A transition that leaves intact militias, shadow financiers, or coercive intermediaries is not a transition at all. It is a redistribution of risk that guarantees future rupture. External backers may be delayed, constrained, or audited, but they cannot be placated through ambiguity without undermining the entire process.
The test is stark and unforgiving. If an action taken in either Venezuela or Ukraine could not be defended, word for word, if taken in the other—or if a compromise tolerated in one would be condemned if replicated in the other—then the axiom has already been broken.
What must therefore remain true, in both places at once, is this: power must submit to the same standard it invokes—without exception, without personalization, and without retreat into expediency disguised as realism.
*
Authority Where Legitimacy Has Not Yet Converged
*
This section does not assess democratic legitimacy or political merit. It observes how authority is presently constituted and enforced when coherence is under stress.
A question posed during a press conference—regarding the opposition coalition led by María Corina Machado and the electoral victory of Edmundo González Urrutia—elicited a dismissive response from President Donald Trump. Asked why a transitional leadership would not center on that coalition, he replied that there was “no respect for her,” implying an absence of authority within the country.
Taken at face value, the remark appears personal. Read diagnostically, it exposes a more consequential distinction: legitimacy does not presently translate into authority inside Venezuela. The same distinction—between legitimacy and enforceable authority—has shaped Ukraine’s resistance to Russian invasion, where legitimacy was established internally but had to be defended materially against external aggression.
Electoral victory, international recognition, and moral credibility confer legitimacy. They do not, by themselves, confer enforceable power. Authority, as it exists on the ground, flows from the capacity to compel compliance—whether through control of coercive institutions, resource chokepoints, or the operational machinery of the state. In Ukraine, that authority is exercised defensively to preserve an already legitimate sovereign order against external aggression. In Venezuela, it persists independently of electoral outcome, sustained by institutions and mechanisms detached from legitimacy.
In this sense, the question raised by Trump’s remark is not whether Machado’s coalition is legitimate, but what presently lends authority within the country—and who is capable of enforcing decisions, preventing fragmentation, or compelling compliance. The answer is neither rhetorical nor normative. It is about how authority is currently constituted and exercised under present conditions.
Recent commentary surrounding U.S. engagement with Venezuelan actors has made this distinction operational rather than abstract. The marginalization of María Corina Machado has not turned on questions of democratic legitimacy, electoral mandate, or international recognition. It has turned on her unwillingness to participate in transactional arrangements with the existing technocratic and financial strata that currently exercise control within the State. In contrast, figures such as the Vice President Delcy Rodríguez are treated as viable interlocutors precisely because they command enforceable authority through continuity with those mechanisms—coercive, financial, and administrative—that persist independent of legitimacy. Criminality, in this logic, is not disqualifying. It is evidence of control. What is being selected for is not moral credibility, but negotiability under pressure.
This distinction matters because transitions that confuse legitimacy with authority tend to collapse into disorder or entrenchment. Authority negotiated without legitimacy produces repression. Legitimacy asserted without authority produces paralysis. Durable transition requires that the two converge—but they do not begin from the same place, nor do they converge through the same means.
In Ukraine, legitimacy and authority are aligned but strained by external aggression; in Venezuela, authority persists in the absence of legitimacy. Treating these conditions as morally or procedurally equivalent obscures the obligations they impose. When support is conditioned more heavily where legitimacy is intact than where it is absent, coherence gives way to ethical imbalance.
Trump’s comment does not clarify U.S. strategy. It does, however, expose the fault line along which policy now risks fracturing: whether authority is assessed and transformed in relation to legitimacy, or accommodated independently of it in the name of order. The choice is not neutral. It determines whether power reinforces or undermines the principles it invokes.
The distinction between legitimacy and authority does not negate the requirement of coherence. It sharpens it. When coherence is abandoned selectively, collapse is no longer an accident of transition but a consequence of duplicity.
Observations On Perception 