*

Ricardo F. Morín
December 26, 2025
Oakland Park, Fl
Author’s Note
This installment continues Chapter XII, “The Fourth Sign,” following the initial discussion of Autocracy (§§ 1–9). It focuses on Venezuela, examining §§ 10–25 in which the earlier framework is applied to a specific national case. The chapter concludes in a separate installment devoted to The Asymmetry of Sanctions (§§ 26–34).
*
Chapter XII: Part 2
*
Venezuela
*
10
To grasp the practical implications of autocracy and its concentration of power, I defer to Rafael Arráiz Lucca’s book, Venezuela: 1830 a nuestros días: Breve historia política [2016]. Here, Arráiz Lucca provides a comprehensive history of Venezuela from independence to today. [1] He covers political, economic, and social changes that have shaped the nation. He explores early struggles and the rise of military strongmen, and has treated Hugo Chávez’s rise to power, his ideology, and the effects of his policies on society. He has also examined the continuing influence of Chávez under Nicolás Maduro. In his view, both Chávez and Maduro have exemplified regimes that have centralized power and suppressed dissent.
11
The country’s political trajectory has been profoundly shaped by its enduring history of military rule. Since independence in 1811, twenty-five military officers have held the presidency, presided over 172 years of governance, and entrenched the military’s influence in the nation’s political fabric. [2] The transition to representative democracy in 1961 marked a significant shift, which ushered in thirty-eight-years of civilian-led stability under the Punto Fijo Pact (see Chapter XI). This civilian era, however, was not free from upheaval. The 1989 Caracazoriots, coupled with the failed coup attempt by Hugo Chávez in 1992, revealed the fragility of civilian democracy and the lingering appeal of military leadership in moments of crisis. [3][4]
12
The Caracazo riots and the subsequent repression had laid bare deep societal fractures that undermined confidence in civilian governance. For many, the chaos and disillusionment rekindled the perception of the military as a force of order and stability, a perception rooted in the nation’s long history of caudillo leadership. Chávez’s rise can be understood as a direct outgrowth of this historical legacy: a charismatic military figure presenting himself as the answer to the failures of civilian politics. The violent repression following the riots, coupled with the systemic inability to address the economic and social inequities they symbolized, paved the way for a return to autocratic tendencies, cloaked in populist rhetoric. This marked the beginning of a new authoritarian era, shaped not only by the fractures of the present but also by the shadows of the past.
13
The presidency of Hugo Chávez continued the tradition of authoritarianism that had been seen earlier during the regime of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez. [5] As in the era of Pérez Jiménez, Chávez relied on oil to finance his policies. [6]
14
For Hugo Chávez, “participatory democracy” aimed at empowering marginalized groups. He created community councils and social missions, which became instruments of his political control—the so-called Bolivarian ideology. Participation therein hinged on one’s loyalty to Chávez, which ultimately led to the marginalization of people opposed to his policies. His blend of populism and authoritarianism framed dissent as being unpatriotic and thus hindered national progress. This approach enabled him to undervalue the power of law; the legislative and judicial branches of government became dependent on the executive.
15
With the endorsement of Nicolás Maduro by Hugo Chávez in 2012, the country slid further into authoritarianism. [7] Opposition parties such as Vente Venezuela, Primero de Justicia, Un Nuevo Tiempo, and Voluntad Popular accused Chávez and Maduro of manipulating the Consejo Nacional Electoral. [8][9][10][11][12]
16
After the death of Chávez, Maduro faced similar accusations in the 2013 and 2018 elections. The Organization of American States, the Lima Group, the International Contact Group, and the Group of Seven concurred. [13][14][15] Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have also questioned his legitimacy. [16][17] One exception is the United Nations’ Security Council debate (press release SC/13719), which urged Venezuelans to resolve their crisis internally. [18][19]
17
Following Venezuela’s 2016 suspension from Mercosur, Latin American responses varied and then changed as political administrations changed. [20][21] Initially, Argentina favored the measures by the Organization of American States to apply diplomatic pressure on Venezuela and sought to address the political and humanitarian crises there. [22] It also recognized Juan Guaidó as the legitimate president, though in 2019, it changed and became an advocate for mediation. At first, Brazil recognized Guaidó and was for sanctions against the Venezuelan government, and then in 2023 asked for mediation. [23] Between 2018–22, Colombia accused the Maduro regime of drug trafficking and of giving support to the guerrilla groups, the National Liberation Army and the Revolutionary Armed Forces; Colombia broke diplomatic relations. [24] Later, in 2022, a new administration reopened diplomatic ties and promoted non-intervention. Chile has consistently urged sanctions against Maduro’s government, and even referred Venezuela to the International Criminal Court (ICC). [25][26] Peru expelled Venezuela’s ambassador: The immediate trigger for the expulsion was Venezuela’s Tribunal Supremo de Justicia’s move to dissolve the opposition-controlled Asamblea Nacional, which Peru saw as a step toward authoritarian control. [27] As all other members of the Lima Group did, Peru regularized the status of Venezuelan migrants. In the beginning, Mexico condemned the human rights abuses in Venezuela and called for the release of all political prisoners, but, in 2018, it shifted to a non-interventional approach and in 2022 offered mediation as the only recourse. [28][29][30]
18
Ahead of the 2024 presidential election, opposition leader María Corina Machado was disqualified after having won her coalition’s primary. [31] The Tribunal Supremo de Justicia based its decision on her alleged support of U.S. sanctions, supposed corruption, and accusations holding her responsible for losses related to the American subsidiary Citgo of the Venezuelan State-owned oil and natural gas company: Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). Machado’s denial of access to the allegations against her was a blatant violation of due process. Her disqualification left Edmundo González Urrutia as the unified opposition candidate. [32]
19
Both campaigns engaged in tactics of intimidation. González’s coalition deployed 200,000 observers across 16,000 voting centers and Maduro’s administration intensified media censorship and repression. After Maduro declared victory, protests resulted in extrajudicial killings, arrests, and crackdowns on independent media. [33]
20
González’s coalition collaborated with international observers, including the Organization of American States, the European Union Electoral Observation Mission, the Carter Center, and the United States Mission to the United Nations, to monitor irregularities. [34][35][36][37] The government, however, withheld disaggregated voting data critical for audits—supposedly because the data had been hacked—and imposed travel restrictions on foreign observers. [38] The Carter Center criticized the elections for failing to meet international standards of transparency, fairness, and impartiality. [39]
21
Maduro accused both Machado and González of having incited unrest and announced investigations into the crimes of “usurpation of functions” and “military insurrection,” each carrying thirty-year prison sentences. On August 8, 2024, González left for Spain after the government had granted him safe passage.
22
To understand Venezuela’s political and institutional landscape, one must examine how global indices assess the state of its democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, the Freedom House’s Global Freedom Index, and the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index all provide distinct metrics illuminating Venezuela’s democratic decline under Nicolás Maduro.
23
The Democracy Index ranks countries with higher scores as more democratic. Freedom House and Transparency International diverge from this by using lower scores to indicate worse outcomes, with lower numbers signifying less freedom and higher corruption.
24
In the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, Venezuela ranked as the least democratic country in South America in 2008; in 2022, it ranked 147th out of a total of 167 countries. [40] Likewise, in 2023, Freedom House’s Global Freedom Index finds that Venezuela scored low both as a democracy and high corruption, while in its Corruption Perceptions Index Venezuela scored 13 out of 100 and was positioned as one of the most corrupt nations globally. [41]
25
Additionally, a report by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for the period from 2012 to 2023 has highlighted the severe corruption to be found in Venezuela. [42] In its 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, out of 180 countries, Venezuela received a score of 13 out of 100, ranking 177th. These indicators present a clear picture of Venezuelan authoritarianism and of the deterioration of its political landscape in recent years.
~
Endnotes
§ 10
- [1] Rafael Arráiz Lucca, Venezuela: 1830 a nuestros días: Breve historia política. (Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 2016), 15-151, 212-37.
§ 11
- [2] José Gregorio Petit Primera, ”Presidentes de Venezuela (1811-2012). Un análisis estadístico-descriptivo,” Revista Venezolana: Análisis de Coyuntura (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, XXII-1, 2016), 47-56.
- [3] The Punto Fijo Pact was a political agreement signed by the three predominant political parties—Acción Democrática (AD), Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), and Unión Republicana Democrática (URD)—at the residence of Rafael Caldera (COPEI): Punto Fijo. The pact aimed to stabilize the country after the fall of dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez [1952-1958] by ensuring democratic alternation of power, institutional continuity, and preventing single-party rule. While it contributed to political stability and a peaceful transition to democracy, critics argue that it also entrenched elite dominance, marginalized smaller parties, and fostered systemic corruption. As a foundational element in Venezuela’s post-dictatorship political landscape, the agreement shaped the nation’s governance for decades. Its legacy, however, is marked by political divisions, as the pact’s structure increasingly excluded some groups and led to dissatisfaction among factions. This period reflects both the challenges and achievements of Venezuela’s efforts to establish a stable and inclusive democracy.
- [4] Rafael Arráiz Lucca, “February 4, 1992: The Day Venezuelans Learned the Name ‘Hugo Chávez,” (Caracas Chronicles, February 04, 2019). https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/02/04/february-4-1992-the-day-venezuelans-learned-the-name-hugo-chavez/
§ 13
- [5] Fredy Rincón Noriega, El Nuevo Ideal Nacional y los planes Económicos- Militares de Pérez Jiménez 1952-1957 (Caracas: Ediciones Centauro, 1981)–Kindle Edition
- Judith Ewell, The Indictment of a Dictator: The Extradition and Trial of Marcos Perez (College Station: A&M University Press, 1981).
- [6] Both leaders have employed centralized power and state control over resources, though their approaches differed. Pérez Jiménez emphasized technocratic and infrastructural development. His policies, as outlined in the Nuevo Ideal Nacional, focused on large-scale construction projects and urban modernization. These initiatives promoted economic growth, but their benefit was directed towards the middle and upper classes. Chávez, on the other hand, pursued a blend of populism and socialism aimed at redistributing oil wealth through extensive social programs for the poor. These policies increased the State’s dependence on oil revenues and left the country vulnerable to market fluctuations.
§ 15
- [7] Margarita López Maya, “The Venezuelan Caracazo of 1989 : Popular
- Protest and Institutional Weakness,” (Latin American Studies: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 35, 117–137. DOI : 10.1017/S0022216X02006673 P https://margaritalopezmaya.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/venezuelan_caracazo_of_1989_popular_protest_and_institutional_weakness-1.pdf
- Javier Corrales, “Chapter 12: Venezuela’s Autocratization, 1999-2021: Variations in Temporalities, Party Systems, and Institutional Controls.”PDF extracted from Archon Fung, et al, When Democracy Breaks: Studies in Democratic Erosion and Collapse,from Ancient Athens to the Present Day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023). https://tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Chapter%2012%20-%20Venezuela%20-%20Corrales.pdf
- [8] “Biography: Maria Corina Machado, National Coordinator, Vente Venezuela” (Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs, Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows Program, 2009. https://worldfellows.yale.edu/person/maria-corina-machado/
- [9] Raul Castillo, “There Once Was a Party: Primero Justicia,” Caracas Chronicles, January 13, 2022. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2022/01/13/there-once-was-a-party-primero-justicia/
- [10] Braulio Polanco, “There Once Was a Party: Un Nuevo Tiempo,”Caracas Chronicles, February 15, 2022. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2022/02/15/there-once-was-a-party-un-nuevo-tiempo/
- [11] Raúl Castillo, “There Once Was a Party: Voluntad Popular,”Caracas Chronicles, September 8, 2022. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2022/09/08/there-once-was-a-party-voluntad-popular/
- [12] The Consejo Nacional Electoral, responsible for overseeing elections in Venezuela, has faced long-standing accusations of partisanship and favoritism. Opposition groups (Vente Venezuela, Primero de Justicia, Un Nuevo Tiempo, Voluntad Popular) have alleged that Chávez and Maduro appointed to it only members who favored the ruling party. For an analysis of the Consejo Nacional Electoral’s role in reinforcing authoritarianism, see Javier Corrales: Autocracy Rising: How Venezuela Transitioned to Authoritarianism (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2023), 3, 28. Also see Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers, The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 276-80, 293-96.
§ 16
- [13] The Lima Group, formed in August 2017, includes: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Guyana, and St. Lucia.
- [14] The International Contact Group (the European Union, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay) advocates for credible elections and have voiced concerns about the Consejo Nacional Electoral’s impartiality.
- [15] Group of Seven (G7)–Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States–has condemned electoral irregularities in Venezuela and called for independent oversight. Allegations of voter registration manipulation by the Consejo Nacional Electoral, has heightened suspicions of vote tampering.
- [16] Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis: Severe Medical and Food Shortages, Inadequate and Repressive Government Response, Human Rights Watch, October 24, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/10/24/venezuelas-humanitarian-crisis/severe-medical-and-food-shortages-inadequate-and
- [17] “Venezuela: New research shows how calculated repression by Maduro government could constitute the crime against humanity of persecution,” Amnesty International, February 10, 2022. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/venezuela-calculated-repression-maduro-government/
- [18] “Venezuelans Must Resolve Crisis Themselves, Security Council Delegates Agree while Differing over Legitimacy of Contending Parties. Briefing on Weekend Incidents Biased, Says Foreign Minister as Speakers for United States, Russian Federation Exchange Barbs,” United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 8472nd Meeting, SC/13719, February 26, 2019. https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13719.doc.htm
- [19] In February 2019, a United Nations Security Council Report debated whether to supervise elections or mediate between Maduro’s government and the opposition. Ultimately, the Council upheld a non-interventionist approach while offering to mediate.
§ 17
- [20] “Mercosur suspends Venezuela over trade and human rights,” BBC, December 2, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38181198
- [21] Mercosur (acronym for the Mercado Común del Sur or the Southern Common Market) is a regional trade bloc founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (it later included Chile). Mercosur’s mission is to promote economic integration and free trade.
- [22] “Integration in South America: A Brief Analysis of the MERCOSUR Case in Light of the European Experience,” The Yale Review of International Studies, July 23, 2018. https://yris.yira.org/column/integration-in-south-america-a-brief-analysis-of-the-mercosur-case-in-light-of-the-european-experience/
- [23] Luis Ferreira Alvarez, “South America’s Political Rebalance: The Potential of a Mercosur-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, July 27, 2016. https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/south-americas-political-rebalance-the-potential-of-a-mercosur-us-free-trade-agreement
- [24] Kelly Shen, et al, “Ripple Effect: How the Venezuelan Crisis is Impacting Colombia’s Economy and Foreign Relations,” The Huntsman Program in International Studies and Business, March 24, 2020. https://huntsman.upenn.edu/news/ripple-effect-how-the-venezuelan-crisis-is-impacting-colombias-economy-and-foreign-relations/
- [25] “The Current Situation in Venezuela: A USIP Fact Sheet,” The United States Institute of Peace, February 18, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/02/current-situation-venezuela
- [26] “Venezuela I: Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I,” International Criminal Court, February 2018. https://www.icc-cpi.int/venezuela-i
- [27] “Venezuela Breaks Diplomatic Relations With Peru,” TeleSur, July 31, 2024. https://www.telesurenglish.net/venezuela-breaks-diplomatic-relations-with-peru/
- [28] “Ariela Ruiz Caro, “The Mexico Dialogue on Venezuela and the End of the Lima Group,” MIRA, Feminisms and Democracy (promoting analysis and solidarity in Latin America),.September 16, 2021. https://www.americas.org/the-mexico-dialogue-on-venezuela-and-the-end-of-the-lima-group/
- [29] EEAS Press Team, “Venezuela: Joint Statement on Venezuela Negotiations in Mexico,” European Union, External Action, November 26, 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuela-joint-statement-venezuela-negotiations-mexico_en
- [30].- Mexico has mediated between Nicolás Maduro’s government and the opposition after the July 28, 2024 presidential election results, with support from Brazil and Colombia.
§ 18
- [31] Vivian Sequera, “Who is Maria Corina Machado, Venezuela opposition leader?,” Reuters, Caracas, July 25, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/maria-corina-machado-venezuela-opposition-candidate-turned-cheerleader-in-chief-2024-07-25/
- [32] Félix Seijas Rodríguez, “Venezuela’s Electoral Landscape Favors the Opposition,” Americas Quarterly, July 25, 2024. https://americasquarterly.org/article/venezuelas-electoral-landscape-favors-the-opposition/
§ 19
- [33] Foro Penal’s “Special Report on Political Repression in Venezuela,” covering July to September 2024. 1. October 2024 Data: “As of September 30, 2024, the number of political prisoners in Venezuela was 1,905.” https://foropenal.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/FP_REPORTE-JUL_AGO_SEP_-Ingles-2024_2401201-comprimido.pdf
- January 2025 Data: In early January 2025, Foro Penal reported 83 new political arrests.” Source: HuffPost article titled “El chavismo llama a la oposición a ‘trabajar’ con Maduro, mientras crece la represión: 83 arrestos ‘políticos’ en 2025.” https://www.huffingtonpost.es/global/el-chavismo-llama-oposicion-trabajar-maduro-crece-represion-83-arrestos-politicos-2025.html
§ 20
- [34] Remarks by Ambassador Francisco O. Mora, “OAS Adopts Resolution on the Situation in Venezuela,” U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States, August 16, 2024. https://usoas.usmission.gov/oas-adopts-resolution-on-the-situation-in-venezuela/
- [35] “Venezuela: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on post-election developments,” Council of The European Union, August 4, 2024. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/08/04/venezuela-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu/
- [36] “Carter Center Statement on Venezuela Election,” Carter Center, July 30, 2024. https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024.html
- [37] “Joint Statement on the Venezuela Elections,” United States Mission to the United Nations, September 12, 2024. https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-the-venezuela-elections/
- [38].- Disaggregated election results enhance transparency by enabling cross-checking against aggregated totals. This method reveals potential errors, facilitates audits, and highlights regional irregularities, strengthening the legitimacy of electoral outcomes.
- [39].- The Organization of American States has criticized Maduro’s government for failing to produce verification of election results.
§ 24
- [40] “Venezuela,” Economist Intelligence Unit, Democratic Index, 2012-23. http://country.eiu.com/Default.aspx?country=Venezuela
- [41] “Venezuela,” Freedom House, Global Freedom Index, 2020-24. https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela
§ 25
- [42] “Our Work In Venezuela,” Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2012-23. https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/venezuela












