Posts Tagged ‘Venezuela’

“The Exercise of Power and Constitutional Title”

July 13, 2026

The question concerning the exercise of public power can arise only after the constitutional title under which that power is exercised has been identified. Once that order of inquiry is altered, the very nature of the constitutional problem likewise changes. Attention ceases to be directed toward the act through which public authority became constitutionally attributable to the Nation and turns instead toward identifying those who effectively exercise power.

What occurs when the inquiry into the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela itself abandons the question of constitutional title?

At first sight, the inversion appears innocuous. The institutions that administer the State, exercise the public force, dispose of public resources, represent the Republic in its international relations, or adopt governmental decisions are identified. The description may attain a high degree of precision. None of those observations, however, determines the constitutional title by which that power is attributable to the Nation.

The constitutional question is displaced. The foundation of public authority ceases to constitute the original object of inquiry. The exercise of power assumes its place.

A recent example illustrates that alteration in the order of inquiry with particular clarity. In an extensive report published by The New York Times, Tyler Pager and Anatoly Kurmanaev describe the effective exercise of power in Venezuela through a detailed reconstruction of the functions attributed to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Delcy Rodríguez, as well as the interim government itself.¹ The report attributes to Marco Rubio control over the public finances, the direction of foreign policy, and decisive influence over ministerial appointments and the timing of future elections, while describing Delcy Rodríguez and the interim government as the authorities responsible for the ordinary conduct of government. None of those descriptions is accompanied by the antecedent constitutional question. The analysis does not examine by what constitutional act Marco Rubio, Delcy Rodríguez, or the interim government itself became constitutionally attributable to the Venezuelan Nation.

The consequence extends beyond the particular case. The effective exercise of power becomes the principal object of analysis while constitutional title ceases to be an object of inquiry. Governmental stability, the administration of public resources, territorial control, foreign policy, or the holding of future elections consequently acquire decisive importance because the analysis has come to be organized within a geopolitical framework. The constitutional question receives no different answer. It simply ceases to be asked.

The difficulty, therefore, does not lie in the description of the facts. It lies in the order of inquiry. So long as the effective exercise of power occupies the place of constitutional title, the antecedent constitutional question remains unexamined.

Once the question of constitutional title has been displaced, the sovereign will of the Nation ceases to govern the Republic constitutionally. Power continues to be exercised in the name of Venezuela, yet the constitutional attribution of that power no longer proceeds demonstrably from the Nation. From that moment forward, the people cease to constitute the foundation of the power exercised over them and become its serf. The Republic thereupon becomes tributary to decisions whose origin no longer resides within the Nation itself. A Republic ceases to be genuinely democratic when public authority continues to be exercised without the Nation being able to demonstrate constitutionally that such authority proceeds from it.

The omission of the constitutional question therefore tends to perpetuate itself. Each new proposal for political transition begins from the effective exercise of the power already in existence rather than from the constitutional act through which the Nation would once again attribute public authority. The political order thus begins to reconstruct itself upon the very constitutional omission that made its restoration necessary. The indeterminacy of constitutional title consequently ceases to constitute a transitory anomaly and risks becoming the permanent condition within which every future solution seeks to unfold.

Epilogue

Every constitutional inquiry necessarily remains open to the passage of time. No line of reasoning can anticipate the particular manner in which history will ultimately unfold. It can, however, identify the constitutional conditions within which that history must proceed so long as the question of constitutional title remains absent from public reasoning.

Future elections may take place sooner or later. Governments may succeed one another. International alignments may change. Effective centers of decision may shift from one nation to another or be redistributed among different political actors. None of those transformations will, of itself, alter the antecedent constitutional question. So long as the Nation has not recovered the capacity publicly to demonstrate the act by which it attributes public authority, the restoration of constitutional government will remain an expectation rather than a constitutional reality.

Time, moreover, does not of itself remedy constitutional omissions. It may prolong them. It may conceal them beneath new institutional forms. It may even transform them into the silent premise upon which entire generations come to understand the exercise of power without perceiving the absence of the constitutional title from which that power ought to derive.

That may well constitute the deepest consequence of a prolonged constitutional rupture. The disappearance of constitutional title ceases to be perceived as an anomaly requiring restoration and gradually comes to be accepted as the ordinary condition of public life. The very horizon of public life ultimately contracts to the administration of the power already in existence. The Nation ultimately grows accustomed to debating who governs without ever again asking from what constitutional source the power exercised in its name proceeds.

A Republic may survive for a long time despite the degradation of its institutions. It may even survive the succession of governments. What is far less likely to survive is the loss of the constitutional question. Upon that question every public authority depends. Once that question disappears from the consciousness of a Nation, the restoration of constitutional order no longer depends solely upon political will. It comes to depend upon the recovery of the constitutional memory of a free and sovereign people.

July 13, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania

Endnote

¹ Tyler Pager and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “How Marco Rubio Is Running Venezuela From Afar,” The New York Times, July 11, 2026; updated July 13, 2026.

Tags:constitutional attribution, constitutional inquiry, constitutional legitimacy, constitutional title, effective power, nation, public authority, Republic, sovereignty, Venezuela
Posted in Constitutional Theory, Constitutional Law, Political Philosophy, Venezuela, Republican Government | Leave a Comment »

“Constitutional Title: Part Two”

July 11, 2026

The Venezuelan constitutional controversy is not fundamentally a dispute over the exercise of governmental power. It is a dispute over the constitutional attribution of authority. By constitutional attribution of authority is meant the constitutional act through which public authority becomes publicly ascertainable and therefore juridically attributable to the sovereign Nation. Until that antecedent question has been constitutionally resolved, proposals concerning transitional governments, constitutional amendment, constitutional reform, constituent power, or any other institutional arrangement remain incapable of establishing the constitutional title from which governmental authority itself derives.

The present analysis therefore proposes neither a governing junta, an interim presidency, a constitutional amendment, a constitutional reform, nor the convocation of a constituent assembly. Each of those proposals may ultimately prove constitutionally sufficient or insufficient. That question cannot be answered in the abstract. Their constitutional validity depends upon antecedent conditions more fundamental than the institutional arrangements themselves. The object of the present analysis is to identify the constitutional conditions by which every proposal intended to restore the constitutional attribution of governmental authority must ultimately be judged.

The constitutional attribution of governmental authority is no longer publicly ascertainable. It has not been demonstrated that the existing constitutional organs retain the constitutional capacity to restore the constitutional conditions under which constitutional title may once again arise. Nor has it been demonstrated that a transitional authority may itself acquire constitutional title before the restoration of those constitutional conditions constitutes the very purpose of its existence. Equally unresolved is whether constituent power may be invoked while simultaneously claiming juridical continuity with the constitutional order established by the Constitution of 1999. More fundamentally, constitutional theory has yet to demonstrate that any extra-constitutional arrangement can avoid reproducing the very constitutional defect it purports to remedy. Under those circumstances, it necessarily remains unresolved whether the constitutional procedures governing amendment, reform, or any other mechanism established by the Constitution may validly be invoked by authorities whose own constitutional title forms part of the very controversy those procedures are expected to resolve. From that constitutional uncertainty arises what may be described as the burden of constitutional demonstration. By that expression is meant the obligation resting upon every claimant to constitutional authority to demonstrate that the constitutional conditions under which public authority may lawfully become publicly ascertainable and therefore juridically attributable to the Nation have in fact been satisfied. That burden necessarily rests upon those who claim the authority to prescribe the constitutional means by which those conditions are to be restored. Until it has been discharged, no institutional proposal may presume the constitutional legitimacy it seeks to establish.

Precisely because those antecedent questions remain unresolved, any proposal intended to restore the constitutional attribution of governmental authority must satisfy conditions arising from the nature of constitutional authority itself. It cannot derive its legitimacy solely from political agreement, military success, diplomatic recognition, or practical necessity. It cannot presume the constitutional title whose constitutional attribution remains unresolved. It cannot exercise powers that presuppose the very authority whose constitutional attribution remains unresolved. Nor can it substitute institutional convenience for the publicly verifiable manifestation of the Nation’s sovereign will.

Those constitutional conditions necessarily govern not only the constitutional sufficiency of every proposal for restoration but also the constitutional position of those entrusted with restoring them. It is the constitutional recognition that the constitutional attribution of public authority, from which constitutional title alone may arise, is too fundamental to depend upon assumptions concerning the good faith of those temporarily exercising public authority. The preservation of the integrity of constitutional title therefore requires objective constitutional safeguards. Those entrusted with restoring the constitutional conditions under which constitutional title may once again arise cannot be permitted to exercise temporary authority under conditions that allow its continued possession to become indistinguishable from the constitutional title whose restoration constitutes the sole justification for its existence. For that reason, the temporary exercise of public authority must remain confined to those acts strictly necessary to restore the constitutional conditions under which the sovereign will of the Nation may once again become publicly ascertainable. Because temporary authority derives its constitutional justification exclusively from the restoration of constitutional conditions, its existence cannot extend beyond the fulfillment of that constitutional purpose. Because constitutional title can arise only through a constitutional act that is publicly ascertainable, the process through which that act is made possible must itself remain transparent, publicly ascertainable, and independently verifiable. Those entrusted with administering that process must therefore remain constitutionally incapable of deriving personal or political advantage from the constitutional title whose restoration they are charged with making possible. Only under such conditions does the burden of constitutional demonstration remain objectively capable of being discharged.

The restoration of the constitutional attribution of governmental authority does not require the impossible expectation of politically neutral actors. Constitutional government presupposes political plurality, and plurality necessarily entails competing interests among those entrusted with the exercise of public authority. Conflict of interest is therefore not an accidental defect of democratic government but an inherent consequence of representative institutions. The constitutional difficulty arises, not because public officials possess political commitments, but because those whose own constitutional title forms part of the controversy cannot alone furnish the constitutional demonstration by which that controversy is to be resolved.

The first objective is therefore neither the replacement of one government by another nor the immediate exercise of governmental power. It is the re-establishment of the constitutional conditions under which the sovereign will of the Nation once again becomes publicly ascertainable through a transparent constitutional process capable of attributing public authority in a manner that is independently verifiable and binding upon all. Only after those antecedent conditions have been restored may governmental authority once again become constitutionally attributable to the Nation.

The present analysis therefore advances no institutional blueprint. It establishes the constitutional conditions by which every institutional proposal must be judged. Whether the eventual solution assumes the form of a constitutional amendment, a constitutional reform, a constituent assembly, a transitional authority, or another institutional arrangement altogether, none may claim constitutional legitimacy until it satisfies those antecedent conditions under which constitutional title may once again arise.

Bala Cynwyd, Pensylvannia
July 11, 2026

Endnote:

The Constitution of 1999 does not contemplate a “constitutional emergency” as an autonomous juridical institution or as a specific mechanism for the substitution or reorganization of public authority. If the concept is employed in a strictly juridical sense, it requires an independent constitutional foundation. If, on the contrary, it is used merely as a doctrinal description of a constitutional crisis, it cannot by itself produce the normative consequences later attributed to it.

Tags:constituent power, constitutional attribution, constitutional authority, constitutional demonstration, constitutional legitimacy, constitutional restoration, constitutional title, public authority, rule of law, sovereignty, transitional government, Venezuela
Posted in Constitutional Theory, Constitutional Law, Rule of Law, Democratic Legitimacy, Political Philosophy | Leave a Comment »

“Constitutional Title”

July 4, 2026

*

Every constitution presupposes a constitutional subject more fundamental than the government it establishes. Before there can be presidents, legislatures, courts, or public officials, there must already exist the Nation from which public authority derives. Governments do not constitute the Nation. The Nation constitutes government through the lawful means prescribed by the constitutional order.

For that reason, constitutions concern themselves with more than the organization of power. They identify the source from which public authority may arise in law and prescribe the constitutional act through which that authority becomes publicly ascertainable, a function that preserves the Nation’s exclusive constitutional authority to constitute public authority. Authority is not created by those who exercise it. It is temporarily entrusted to them by the Nation acting under constitutional forms. Government therefore possesses neither an autonomous existence nor an independent title. Every public office derives from a constitutional act antecedent to itself.

The constitutional significance of an election resides precisely in that antecedent act. Elections do not merely record political preferences, produce governing majorities, or permit the peaceful succession of governments. Their constitutional purpose is to render the sovereign will of the Nation publicly ascertainable through a process whose transparency permits the lawful attribution of public authority. Transparency is therefore neither an administrative virtue nor a procedural safeguard. It is the constitutional condition through which the title to govern becomes publicly distinguishable from the mere possession of power.

Whenever that condition ceases to exist, the object of constitutional inquiry changes with it. The question no longer concerns the constitutional act through which authority became attributable to the Nation, but the government by which authority is presently exercised. Public offices may remain occupied. Legislatures may continue to enact laws. Courts may continue to pronounce judgment. Taxes may continue to be collected. International relations may proceed without interruption. Each describes the continued exercise of public authority. None identifies the constitutional act from which that authority became publicly attributable to the sovereign will of the Nation.

The displacement is easily overlooked because governments are visible whereas constitutional title is not. Political discussion therefore turns almost instinctively toward the recognition of governments, negotiated settlements, transitional authorities, constitutional reforms, sanctions, diplomatic initiatives, and international agreements. Each concerns the exercise, distribution, or succession of political power. None identifies the constitutional act through which the Nation confers title upon those who govern in its name. Without noticing it, the inquiry abandons the constitutional origin of authority and begins instead to examine the political administration of authority already being exercised.

The Venezuelan constitutional controversy illustrates that displacement with unusual clarity. International discussion has largely proceeded by asking which government should replace the existing one and under what political arrangements that transition should occur. Yet every proposal presupposes a condition that remains antecedent to them all. If the constitutional process through which the Nation makes its sovereign will publicly ascertainable has ceased to provide a transparent and verifiable attribution of public authority, no subsequent political arrangement identifies the constitutional source from which the proposed government derives its title.

The participation of foreign States introduces no exception to that condition. Diplomatic recognition, mediation, economic sanctions, military guarantees, political commitments, or negotiated agreements may influence the circumstances within which constitutional decisions are made. They may alter political outcomes, strengthen institutions, or hasten transitions. They remain external to the constitutional order through which the Nation alone confers public authority. A foreign State may recognize a government, encourage a constitutional settlement, or seek to influence political events. It does not participate in the constitutional act through which another Nation lawfully constitutes its own government, nor can it prescribe the juridical process by which that act acquires constitutional effect.

Every proposal for constitutional restoration therefore returns to the same antecedent condition from which it first departed. Before governments may be recognized, replaced, negotiated, or reconstituted, the Nation must first have made its sovereign will publicly ascertainable through the transparent constitutional process from which public authority derives its title.

Toronto, Canada
July 4, 2026

Tags:constitutional order, constitutional title, democracy, elections, legitimacy, nation, political philosophy, public authority, sovereignty, transparency, Venezuela
Posted in Political Philosophy, Constitutional Law | Leave a Comment »

“The Burden of Uncertainty”

July 3, 2026

*

Figure 1. USGS ShakeMap depicting the distribution of ground-shaking intensity produced by the magnitude 7.5 earthquake of Wednesday, June 24, 2026, in north-central Venezuela. The map illustrates the geographical extent and relative intensity of the seismic event rather than structural damage. Courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). ^[1]

Ricardo F. Morín

July 3, 2026

Toronto, Canada

*

Scientific inquiry does not begin with certainty. It begins by identifying the boundaries of what is known, what remains unknown, and why the distinction matters. The absence of sufficient evidence neither confirms nor disproves a hypothesis; it defines the limits of present knowledge and establishes the necessity for further investigation. Nowhere is this principle more consequential than in environmental policy, where decisions made under conditions of uncertainty may shape the integrity of entire ecosystems for generations.

The first obligation of responsible governance is therefore not to defend a predetermined conclusion, but to ensure that the scientific conditions necessary to reach one exist. Where those conditions are absent, the appropriate response is neither affirmation nor dismissal, but verification.

Venezuela presents a circumstance that calls for independent scientific inquiry. The earthquakes of Wednesday, June 24, 2026, brought renewed attention to a question whose importance reaches far beyond those seismic events. They underscore the need to determine whether the scientific knowledge presently available is adequate to evaluate any interaction that may exist between intensive subsurface carbon extraction and the geological dynamics of one of the most tectonically complex regions in the Western Hemisphere. The country contains some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves while also being traversed by active fault systems whose behavior demands continuous observation, precise measurement, and independent scientific verification.

Whether recent seismic activity bears any relationship to large-scale subsurface carbon extraction cannot presently be determined without transparent access to operational records, geological mapping, high-resolution seismic observations, and independent scientific analysis. The necessary evidence must first be established, verified, and subjected to rigorous scrutiny before any responsible conclusion—affirmative or negative—can be sustained.

This absence of verified knowledge is not a procedural inconvenience. It is itself an environmental concern. Carbon extraction necessarily alters the subsurface environment through drilling, reservoir depletion, fluid movement, pressure redistribution, and other engineering interventions. The degree to which those alterations interact with naturally stressed geological systems cannot be assumed. It must be measured. Where extensive extraction occurs within tectonically active regions, uncertainty becomes the principal reason for scientific investigation rather than an excuse to postpone it.

The question therefore extends well beyond the explanation of any individual seismic event. It concerns whether present scientific understanding adequately characterizes the cumulative interaction between industrial intervention and the geological systems upon which entire populations depend. Resolving that question requires continuous seismic monitoring, comprehensive geological characterization, transparent operational reporting, independent verification, and the willingness to revise conclusions as new evidence emerges.

The implications are not confined to Venezuela. They concern the broader governance of carbon extraction throughout the world. Every nation possessing significant hydrocarbon resources situated within geologically sensitive environments confronts the same responsibility: to ensure that economic activity proceeds within the limits established by demonstrable scientific understanding rather than by commercial urgency or geopolitical expediency.

Under conditions of institutional weakness, diminished regulatory independence, or limited transparency, this responsibility becomes even more critical. Scientific uncertainty should never become a refuge for either complacency or speculation. Instead, it imposes a higher standard of public accountability. The legitimacy of environmental regulation depends not upon confidence in predetermined outcomes, but upon confidence in the integrity of the investigative process itself.

This principle transcends the identity of any particular government, corporation, or foreign investor. Whether extraction is undertaken by domestic enterprises, multinational corporations, or state-owned entities, the obligation remains identical. Every operator should be subject to the same independent scientific oversight, the same environmental scrutiny, and the same public disclosure of information necessary to evaluate geological and ecological consequences. Responsible stewardship cannot depend upon the nationality of capital. It depends upon the universality of scientific standards.

When those standards are weakened or subordinated to political or economic priorities, the consequences extend far beyond the extraction site. The risks are borne by landscapes, watersheds, ecosystems, infrastructure, and communities whose stability depends upon geological conditions that cannot be negotiated once altered. Economic benefit may be immediate; environmental consequences may endure for generations.

The responsible extraction of carbon resources therefore demands more than technological capability or financial investment. It requires institutions capable of recognizing that uncertainty is not the absence of responsibility but its beginning. Scientific knowledge is not merely one consideration among many in environmental governance. It is the foundation upon which every legitimate regulatory decision must rest.

The Earth records every intervention with complete fidelity. Whether humanity possesses the wisdom to understand those records before they become irreversible consequences remains one of the defining environmental questions of our time.

[1]. https://earthquake.usgs.gov/data/shakemap/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Tags:carbon extraction, earthquakes, environmental regulation, geoscience, hydrocarbons, public policy, scientific research, seismic activity, sustainability, tectonic faults, transparency, Venezuela
Posted in Environment, Geology, Seismology, Public Policy, Energy, Governance, Venezuela | Leave a Comment »

“Concealed Succession”

July 1, 2026

Ricardo F. Morín
***Ascension 2***
CGI
2005

Author’s Note

This essay examines the political conditions surrounding the final months of the presidency of Hugo Chávez. Rather than revisiting the episode as a matter of historical controversy, the analysis focuses on the structural dynamics that became visible during that transition. The objective is diagnostic. The essay proposes that when political authority becomes inseparable from a single leader, succession may cease to appear as an institutional process and instead emerge through the management of information surrounding the leader’s condition.

Ricardo F. Morín

March 4, 2026

Oakland Park, F

The death of Hugo Chávez did not simply mark the end of a presidency. It exposed the fragility of a political order that had come to depend heavily on the authority of a single figure whose influence extended far beyond the borders of his own country. The ambiguity surrounding the final phase of Chávez’s life revealed how closely the stability of that system had become tied to the fate of one leader. To understand why that moment produced such uncertainty, it is necessary to place it within the longer evolution of revolutionary politics in Latin America during the twentieth century.

During the early decades after the Cuban Revolution, the government led by Fidel Castro promoted a strategy aimed at transforming Latin America through insurgent movements. Across the region guerrilla organizations and clandestine networks attempted to replicate the revolutionary experience of Cuba and to challenge existing political systems.

Venezuela itself became one of the early arenas where these tensions appeared. During the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt, the young democratic government faced a series of military uprisings and insurgent movements that sought to destabilize the constitutional order. Episodes such as the Barcelonazo in 1961, the Carupanazo in 1962, and the Porteñazo in 1962 formed part of that turbulent decade. Although these attempts failed to overturn the Venezuelan State, they revealed the extent to which revolutionary movements inspired by the Cuban example had begun to influence political struggles throughout Latin America.

Over the following decades the strategy of those movements changed. Guerrilla campaigns rarely succeeded in seizing power. Many organizations therefore abandoned armed struggle and entered electoral politics. Former militants reorganized as political parties and pursued their objectives through institutions rather than insurgency.

Leaders such as Gustavo Petro in Colombia and José Mujica in Uruguay illustrate how figures once associated with insurgent movements later obtained power through elections. The ideological ambitions of these movements remained, but their methods adapted to new political conditions.

Hugo Chávez represented another variation of this transformation. Chávez emerged from the Venezuelan military rather than from a guerrilla organization, yet he adopted many of the revolutionary narratives that had circulated in Latin America since the Cold War. After winning the presidency in 1998, he reorganized the Venezuelan State and established close cooperation with the Cuban government.

During the early twenty first century that cooperation expanded into regional frameworks such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, the Union of South American Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. These organizations coordinated diplomatic initiatives among participating governments and promoted the idea that Latin America could operate independently of the United States. Commentators such as Noam Chomsky described this aspiration as part of a broader movement toward a multipolar world.

The Venezuelan State financed much of this cooperation. Revenue from petroleum exports allowed the government in Caracas to provide subsidized energy agreements and financial assistance to partner States. These resources strengthened the regional network associated with the Bolivarian project.

Within this political structure the health of Chávez acquired strategic importance. Chávez was diagnosed with cancer in 2011 and traveled repeatedly to Cuba for treatment. In December 2012 he underwent another surgery in Havana and then disappeared from public view.

After that moment Venezuelan authorities released only intermittent statements about his condition. No verified images of the president appeared for extended periods. Officials asked citizens to assume that the president continued to govern even though the public could no longer observe him performing the duties of the office.

When a population cannot observe its head of State, public reality becomes difficult to verify. Statements replace appearances, and narratives replace observable authority. Under those conditions uncertainty expands because citizens cannot distinguish between political communication and factual information.

Questions about the chronology of Chávez’s death emerged from that uncertainty. The Venezuelan government announced in March 2013 that the president had died from complications related to cancer. Critics questioned whether that announcement corresponded to the actual moment of death. They pointed to the long absence of the president from public life and the limited information that officials released about his medical condition.

Events that followed the announcement reinforced suspicion. Authorities initially declared that Chávez’s body would be embalmed and displayed permanently. Shortly afterward officials abandoned that plan. The government also released no autopsy report or detailed medical record that could clarify the exact circumstances of the president’s death.

Whether the official chronology reflects the full sequence of events remains disputed. What can be observed with certainty is the political environment that surrounded the transition.

When a governing coalition depends heavily on the authority of a single leader, succession threatens the stability of the entire system. In that situation the leader’s illness becomes a political problem rather than a purely medical one. Those who control the State therefore face an incentive to regulate how information about the leader’s condition reaches the public.

The Venezuelan transition of 2013 illustrates the phenomenon described here as concealed succession. The disappearance of Chávez from public life, the limited disclosure about his illness, and the uncertainty surrounding the announcement of his death together produced a political situation in which the transfer of authority could not occur openly.

Seen across several decades, the end of the Chávez presidency also clarifies the evolution of revolutionary movements in Latin America. Armed insurgencies of the 1960s gradually transformed into political parties that competed in elections. Some of those parties later formed governments and created regional frameworks through which they coordinated policy. In the twenty first century those networks increasingly interact with a wider geopolitical environment in which emerging powers encourage alternative centers of influence.

This development forms a continuous trajectory rather than a rupture. Guerrilla organizations became political parties, political parties formed governments, and those governments created regional frameworks that extended their influence. The illness and death of Hugo Chávez exposed how strongly that architecture depended on the authority of a single leader whose position linked several of these layers at once.

When political authority becomes inseparable from the physical presence of a single leader, succession cannot occur transparently. The continuity of the system becomes tied to the management of information surrounding that leader’s condition. In such circumstances the transfer of power no longer appears as an institutional process. It emerges instead through the regulation of visibility and the control of public knowledge. What appeared in Venezuela during the final months of Chávez’s presidency therefore reveals a structural principle of personalized political systems: when the survival of a regime depends on one figure, succession must first be concealed before it can be resolved.

Tags:Concealed Succession, Hugo Chávez, Institutional Fragility, Latin American Left, Political Diagnosis, Political Leadership, Power Transition, Regional Alliances, Revolutionary Movements, Venezuela
Posted in Political Analysis, Latin American Politics, Authoritarian Systems, Leadership and Power, State Formation, Contemporary Political Thought | Leave a Comment »

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series IX”

May 20, 2026

*

“Geometric Allegory” digital painting *2023* by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

Ricardo F. Morín

January 13, 2026

Oakland Park, Fl.

Author’s Note

This installment continues the diagnostic examination of Venezuela’s political condition and focuses on the ethical and institutional consequences that emerge when authority, governance, and accountability are no longer aligned. Rather than advancing prescriptions, it examines how the degradation of human rights, the normalization of violence, and the diffusion of responsibility function as systemic conditions within a prolonged authoritarian context. The inquiry remains situated within a broader historical pattern, attentive to structures rather than events and to consequences rather than intentions. Documented cases are treated as occasions on which the framework’s claims become testable, and the analysis refrains from extending beyond what the evidence supports.

Chapter XVII

The Fourth Issue

On Human Rights

Venezuela’s modern political history has been marked by recurring skepticism toward collective institutions and a persistent substitution of personal authority for shared civic frameworks. Over time, citizens have lost the expectation that freedom can be exercised in daily life rather than merely invoked in public language. In such contexts, human rights do not disappear rhetorically; they lose their operational force. Their absence becomes visible not in formal declarations, but in the diminished capacity of individuals to act without fear, to participate without coercion, and to sustain dignity without dependence.

A society may retain wealth, institutions, and formal declarations while individuals lose the practical ability to move, speak, work, dissent, or plan without fear. In that condition, human rights no longer operate as aspirations stated in public language; they become thresholds that determine whether social and political life remain possible. Where those thresholds are upheld, individuals retain agency within public life. Where they are suspended, social possibility contracts regardless of available resources.

Isolation, whether political, ideological, or institutional, accelerates this contraction. When governments or social groups withdraw from accountability, corruption ceases to be an anomaly and becomes a governing mechanism. In Venezuela, where the State has progressively withdrawn from democratic norms and international oversight, citizens increasingly act as though institutional procedures will not protect them, and arbitrary decisions by officials have ceased to provoke either correction or surprise. From a diagnostic standpoint, the State’s primary responsibility is not moral leadership but the preservation of civic conditions under which individuals can exercise consequential choices. Approaches such as the framework of capabilities articulate this responsibility not as charity, but as an institutional obligation to preserve the material and political preconditions of dignity. ^[1]

Individuals cannot exercise freedom meaningfully where daily life is shaped simultaneously by fear and material precarity: conditions whose prolonged operation in Venezuela has displaced approximately 6.9 million citizens beyond the country’s borders. [3] Protection from arbitrary violence and access to the basic conditions necessary for survival therefore operate together rather than separately within civic life. Political conflict itself does not indicate social failure; plural societies inevitably generate disagreement, competition, and tension. The decisive distinction emerges in how institutions regulate those conflicts: courts no longer rule against the executive; citizens who comply with the law are not thereby protected from detention; State’s agents act knowing that internal review will not follow, The rights enumerated in the 1999 Constitution become unavailable in practice to those who would invoke them. The constitutional text remains present within official language even as its protections become progressively absent from lived civic reality. ^[2]

Endnotes — Chapter XVII

§ 3

[1] Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4–14, 71–72, 114–123.

§ 4

[2] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1971), 111, 337–338, 511, 515, 545.
[3] Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants. As of mid-2025, R4V reports approximately 6.9 million Venezuelans displaced across the seventeen host countries of the regional response. Accessed January 2026.

Chapter XVIII

The Fifth Issue

On the Nature of Violence

Violence shapes a society not only through the harm inflicted on those it reaches, but through what follows or fails to follow: whether perpetrators are identified; whether evidence is preserved and prosecutions proceed; and whether the institutions charged with these tasks are themselves subject to review. Its regulation depends on two interdependent structures: the social contract and governance. The social contract establishes the conditions under which individuals relinquish certain freedoms in exchange for protection and justice. Governance operationalizes that contract by translating authority into predictable, constrained action. When governance fails, whether through incapacity, corruption, or deliberate distortion, violence ceases to be exceptional and becomes systemic.

The distinction between legitimate force and illegitimate violence is not merely rhetorical. The legal-procedural tradition grounds the distinction in law, proportionality, and institutional accountability: force exercised within these constraints differs in kind from force exercised outside them. The critical tradition, while attending more closely to the historical and political conditions under which legitimacy is constituted, similarly distinguishes between power that preserves the capacity for collective action and violence that destroys it. Both traditions, despite their differences, converge on a common diagnostic point: force severed from ethical constraint and institutional oversight ceases to operate as legitimate authority. Historical revolutions demonstrate that when governance collapses entirely, violence may emerge as a substitute rather than a solution. Such substitutions rarely restore order; instead, they entrench instability, break authority into non-accountable centers, and prolong social recovery across generations.

In contemporary Venezuela, violence has become an instrument of political preservation rather than public protection. The pattern is documented rather than inferred. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela has reported, across successive findings since 2020, that state security forces and intelligence services participated in extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, torture, and sexual violence against perceived opponents, and that these acts followed identifiable chains of command rather than individual deviation. During the 2017 protests, more than one hundred deaths were recorded over four months, alongside the deployment of military tribunals against civilians. The 2024 post-electoral repression produced over two thousand detentions within weeks, including minors, under a framework the government termed “Operación Tun Tun.” Earlier emblematic cases, Leopoldo López imprisoned in 2014, Antonio Ledezma detained in 2015, Manuel Rosales arrested the same year, prefigured a pattern in which judicial institutions, including the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, functioned not as safeguards but as mechanisms legitimizing repression through legal form. ^[1] ^[2] ^[3]

Official narratives frame such actions as defenses of national security. Yet when intelligence services monitor opposition figures rather than foreign threats, when the National Guard is deployed against neighborhood protests rather than against external incursion, and when detention without charge becomes a tool applied to citizens rather than to combatants, the citizen approaching a uniformed officer or a courthouse no longer expects protection from harm but calculates the likelihood of becoming its next subject. Citizens no longer experience institutions as safeguards operating under law, but as structures through which uncertainty and exposure are administered. In that condition, legitimacy weakens even when authority remains intact: governance increasingly depends on public performance rather than civic trust; legal procedure detaches itself from protective function; and violence is gradually normalized as an instrument of rule.

The normalization of violence proceeds incrementally and is rarely perceived in real time. What is initially defended as exceptional, curfews, military tribunals for civilians, indefinite pretrial detention, restrictions on assembly, accumulates into the ordinary architecture of governance. Each measure recalibrates expectation: citizens adapt their conduct; institutions adapt their procedures; and the threshold separating legitimate force from arbitrary coercion migrates without formal declaration. Diagnostic vigilance consists in tracking that migration rather than awaiting its terminus.

Where these institutional restraints fail or disappear, abuses are no longer interrupted consistently through judicial review, public documentation, legislative inquiry, or prosecutorial independence. Violations accumulate without reliable correction; officials increasingly operate without expectation of consequence; and citizens gradually adapt themselves to diminished protections. Under such conditions, institutional repetition itself begins to normalize abuse: the same operations recur against successive cohorts of citizens; the same categories of case remain unopened; and the same outcomes continue to receive judicial confirmation. What would once have required justification as an emergency measure no longer requires justification at all.

Endnotes — Chapter XVIII

§ 3

[1] William Newman, “Venezuelan Opposition Leader Leopoldo López Sentenced to Prison Over Protest,” New York Times, September 10, 2015.

[2] “Venezuelan Opposition Politician Manuel Rosales Arrested,” BBC News, October 15, 2015.

[3] “Venezuela Police Raid Arrests Caracas Mayor Antonio Ledezma,” BBC News, February 20, 2015.

Chapter XIX

The Sixth Issue

On the Persistence of Injustice

In political systems where decisions are made without transparent review, where institutional failures carry few consequences for those responsible, and where citizens gradually lose confidence that participation can alter outcomes, injustice acquires durability beyond the intentions of individual leaders. A decade of institutional substitution and electoral exclusion in Venezuela, documented progressively across Series IX, has demonstrated the process. Where decisions are made by a narrowing circle of officials who face no review, the costs of those decisions (economic, legal, and personal) are absorbed by citizens who had no part in making them. Under such conditions, citizens increasingly occupy the position of spectators rather than participants, and governance loses the corrective pressures through which democratic systems ordinarily adjust, restrain, and renew themselves. ^[1]

Apathy is not merely a personal disposition; it is a political condition produced by sustained exclusion from meaningful agency. Where participation carries risk without influence, disengagement becomes rational. The Venezuelan presidential election of July 2024, following the precedent established in 2018 and documented in earlier chapters of Series IX, illustrates the dynamic in its concentrated form. Opposition witnesses collected poll-station tallies documenting a result the official authority refused to recognize; the declared outcome reversed the documented one, and the citizens, jurists, and electoral observers who pressed the discrepancy were detained, exiled, or stripped of standing. Once the witnesses who held the tallies had been detained, the jurists who challenged the proclamation had been exiled, and the observers who documented the discrepancy had been stripped of standing, the official result faced no remaining domestic institution capable of revising it, and what began as a contested outcome settled into the country’s operative reality.

In political systems where elections can be lost by incumbents, where legislatures can refuse executive requests, and where courts can rule against the government that appointed them, justice and freedom are sustained not as fixed possessions but through the ordinary repetition of these adjustments; in systems where each of these outcomes has been foreclosed, the appearance of stability is purchased at the cost of the corrective mechanism itself. When governance forecloses negotiation among competing interests, it must present its decisions as already settled; the appearance of certainty then replaces the slower work of adjustment, and the system loses the capacity to correct itself when conditions change. Effective governance depends on the capacity to absorb conflict without suppressing it. ^[2]

Individual agency remains relevant not as moral heroism but as structural participation. When citizens can still publish what officials would prefer unpublished, still gather without prior authorization, and still petition courts that retain some margin of independence, an official contemplating an arbitrary act must weigh the likelihood that the act will be recorded, contested, and at some later date reviewed; some, facing that weight, do not proceed. ^[3]

The restoration of justice depends on reconstituting conditions under which individuals can act without fear and without illusion. Citizens must be able to criticize public officials without anticipating detention, to document irregularities without expecting retaliation, and to petition courts without assuming in advance that outcomes have already been decided elsewhere. Elections cannot function as ceremonial affirmations whose outcomes are settled before votes are cast. Journalists cannot operate under the expectation that investigation itself may trigger surveillance, prosecution, or exile. Under such conditions, participation ceases to resemble managed exposure and begins again to recover the practical character of civic agency.

The restoration of justice also depends on reconnecting personal responsibility to collective structures rather than isolating it within conscience alone. A judge who privately recognizes procedural abuse but understands that appellate review no longer functions may remain silent despite personal objection. When editors, courts, universities, and professional associations cease defending independent inquiry, journalists who continue documenting irregularities eventually operate without institutional protection. Citizens who recognize electoral manipulation but encounter no reliable mechanism through which evidence can alter outcomes gradually retreat from participation into private disillusionment. Under such conditions, ethical recognition survives individually while corrective capacity disappears collectively. Responsibility becomes internalized as private awareness rather than sustained through institutions capable of transforming recognition into civic consequence.

Endnotes — Chapter XIX

§ 1

[1] Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 55–69.

§ 3

[2] Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999), 123–137, 146–159, 282–287.

§ 4

[3] Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 66–72, 104–110, 124–130.

Tags:accountability, Authoritarian systems, Human Rights, Political Violence, Venezuela
Posted in Human Rights, Political Ethics, Structural Injustice | Leave a Comment »

“A Letter from a President”

May 19, 2026

For decades I wrote to different Presidents of the United States as an American-Venezuelan citizen concerned with the progressive institutional deterioration of Venezuela. Most of those letters never received a response. In 2014, amid protests, detentions, and political fractures that were beginning to transform the country irreversibly, a reply arrived from the White House signed by Barack Obama.

Read today, the letter is less significant for what it explicitly states than for the nature of its language itself. The text recognizes the deterioration of Venezuela’s democratic institutions, mentions the detention of opposition leaders, and calls for dialogue, mediation, and the containment of violence. Yet, as frequently occurs in diplomatic language, precision diminishes as proximity to the consequences such statements might require increases. Viewed retrospectively, that caution also revealed the difficulty of an American administration openly recognizing the degree to which Venezuela had ceased to be merely an internal crisis and was beginning to form part of a broader dispute over hemispheric influence.

The letter appeared to reflect a broader contradiction within American foreign policy: the difficulty of sustaining democratic language while economic dependencies, energy commitments, and geopolitical rivalries increasingly limited the willingness of the United States to confront directly the expansion of foreign influence across Latin America. What for years remained formulated through the language of mediation, dialogue, and regional stability would ultimately reveal a deeper tension between the declared principles of American foreign policy and the progressive strategic reconfiguration of the hemisphere.

Barack Obama’s letter:

Dear Mr. Morin:

Thank you for writing. My Administration continues to be deeply troubled by the ongoing events in Venezuela, and I appreciate hearing from you.

Venezuela’s democratic institutions are failing to protect those with alternative points of view by allowing the detention of opposition leaders and the expulsion of an opposition official from elected office. The focus of the Venezuelan government should be on engaging the Venezuelan people in a real dialogue and addressing their legitimate grievances. I have called for the release of detained protesters, a necessary step toward peace and progress.

While we continue exploring all options to address the situation in Venezuela, our immediate focus is to support any mediation efforts that generate an honest dialogue between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. All parties have an obligation to work together to restrain violence and restore calm. Together with our international partners, the United States continues to examine what more we can do to support that effort.

The United States has strong historical and cultural ties with the Venezuelan people, and we remain committed to our relationship with them. Their fundamental freedoms and universal human rights must be protected and respected.

Again, thank you for sharing your thoughts.

Sincerely,

(Illegible signature of)

Barack Obama

This White House letter was sent on May 7, 2014 through my personal email address.

My response on the same date:

Honorable President Barack Obama:

Thank you for your kind and generous response.

What remains implicit in your response is that the United States maintains economic and strategic commitments that limit any direct confrontation with the Venezuelan government. An intervention intended to remove a power regarded as illegitimate could alter agreements, contracts, and international balances whose stability forms part of an American economy already subjected to considerable strain.

A structural dependency on oil appeared to lie at the center of that dilemma and its unwanted consequences. Yet a country immersed in a growing process of institutional and economic disintegration could eventually cease to satisfy either international demands or the needs of its own population.

Ultimately, regional stability and the strategic security of the United States itself might depend not only upon calls for dialogue, but also upon a clearer recognition of the external forces and political dependencies contributing to Venezuela’s progressive deterioration.

Sincerely yours,

Ricardo F. Morín

Tags:American foreign policy, Barack Obama, diplomatic language, documentary prose, donald-trump, geopolitical tension, hemispheric influence, institutional decline, Latin America, Monroe Doctrine, oil dependency, political correspondence, Ricardo Morin, Silence, Venezuela, White House
Posted in Politics, Diplomacy, Venezuela, Geopolitics, Documentary Essays | 1 Comment »

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series VIII”

May 6, 2026

*

Ricardo F. Morín

January 13, 2026

Oakland Park, Fl.

Author’s Note

This installment continues an ongoing diagnostic examination of Venezuela’s political experience and attends to the conditions under which authority, truth, and institutional responsibility become misaligned. It remains situated within a broader historical inquiry rather than a chronological account and attends to patterns that recur when power is preserved at the expense of governance.

*

Chapter 15 *

The Second Issue

~

On Partial Truths and Repressive Anarchy

*

Partial Truths

Politics as a competition among partial truths is relevant to understanding authoritarian dynamics. This concept suggests that political life is inherently pluralistic, with each perspective capturing a fragment of a larger, complex reality. In a healthy democracy, competing truths, reflecting the distinct values, needs, and experiences of various groups, engage in a transparent constructive exchange. Under authoritarianism, however, a regime’s efforts to monopolize truth suppress the diverse voices essential to balanced political discourse.

In Venezuela, the government exerts rigorous supervision over information, delegitimizes dissent, and often brands opposition perspectives as inimical or dangerous to the State. ^[1] This monopoly on truth distorts public discourse and prevents alternative viewpoints from challenging the regime’s narratives. Rather than fostering a platform for opposition, marginalized communities, and civil society, Venezuela’s political arena is reduced to a singular truth aligned with the interests of the regime and designed to solidify its power.

When politics is viewed as continuous negotiation among competing values, it becomes clear that the Venezuelan regime disrupts this process by discrediting opposition as subversive. The idea that power shapes knowledge further illuminates this dynamic: in Venezuela, State control over media and public information subjugates alternative narratives and creates an environment where only the regime’s version of truth prevails.

This suppression of pluralistic truths invalidates the foundation of democratic governance, which ideally rests upon the coexistence and competition of diverse perspectives. By silencing dissent, the regime transforms politics into a monologue of State propaganda, intensifies authoritarian control, divests citizens of their agency, and ultimately subverts the democratic foundations necessary for a viable social order.

*

Repressive Anarchy

Repressive anarchy reveals a profound contradiction within the structure of power, where the State simultaneously acts as an oppressive force and an agent of disorder. In Venezuela, this tension between repression and anarchy underscores a deeper philosophical conflict between the functions of authority and its dissolution. While traditional autocracies rely on centralized power to enforce order, repressive anarchy signifies the collapse of the State’s capacity to govern, even as it intensifies its coercion of political expression and dissent.

At the heart of repressive anarchy lies the paradox of control without effective governance. The State’s machinery is oriented toward suppressing political freedoms, curtailing opposition, and eliminating pluralism, yet it simultaneously abandons its responsibility to maintain civil order or to protect citizens from economic collapse, crime, and social decay. ^[2] This selective exercise of power exposes an evacuated sovereignty, a State that projects authority through repression while neglecting its essential responsabilities, such as ensuring justice, security, and the rule of law. In practice, the State’s authority becomes repressive in form yet anarchic in outcome, creating a chaotic reality in which power exists without purpose.

This condition challenges classical notions of power and governance. In political theory, the State derives its legitimacy from the social contract, a mutual obligation between the governing and the governed. ^[3] When a State prioritizes repression over administration, it dissolves this contract and replaces trust with fear. Repressive anarchy suggests that when power is severed from its foundational responsibilities, it becomes both self-perpetuating and self-destructive, reducing the State to a coercive mechanism rather than a force for societal good.

This duality contests the Hobbesian assumption that authoritarianism naturally ensures order. ^[4] In Venezuela, the centralization of power under Nicolás Maduro has not produced stability but rather resulted in a disintegration of administrative capacity and of the State’s ability to govern. Unchecked power has not led to unity or security but to fragmentation and chaos; repression, rather than compensating for the State’s failures, exacerbates them, accelerates societal disintegration, and fosters its own insecurity.

Repressive anarchy also reshapes the relationship between fear and freedom. In such systems, fear is not merely a tool of control but a pervasive condition that governs how individuals relate to both the State and one another. ^[5] Fear restricts political participation, forecloses avenues for public discourse, and undermines the possibility of genuine freedom. In this way, repressive anarchy represents not only a failure of governance but also a moral failure, as both individuals and society become burdened under the weight of relentless repression.

Ultimately, repressive anarchy confronts political philosophy with a contradiction that defies conventional solutions. It exposes the limits of coercive power and the inherent vulnerability of autocratic regimes to self-destruction. More importantly, it underscores the need to reconcile authority with effective governance, not as instruments of mere repression, but as ethical systems that uphold the dignity and welfare of the people. The Venezuelan experience demonstrates that when power is severed from both governance and moral responsibility, it fails to impose order and instead engenders institutionally induced disorder that resists international sanctions or punitive measures. ^[6]

Endnotes, Chapter XV

§2

[1] Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2024: Venezuela, Paris, 2024, https://rsf.org/en/country/venezuela; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Venezuela, Washington, DC, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2024; United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, A/HRC/57/CRP.5, Geneva, 2024.

§6

[2] Corrales, Javier and Penfold, Michael, Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011); InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Country Run by Criminal Networks, Bogotá, 2023, https://insightcrime.org; United Nations Development Programme, Governance Indicators: Venezuela Country Profile, New York, 2023.

§7

[3] O’Donnell, Guillermo “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 55–69. (Foundational framework for understanding regimes that retain electoral form while hollowing institutional responsibility.)

§8

[4] Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (1651; Kindle ed.), chap. 17, loc. 103; United Nations Development Programme, “Governance Indicators: Venezuela Country Profile,” New York, 2023.

§9

[5] Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1951).

§10

[6] Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2024: Venezuela, Berlin, 2024, https://www.transparency.org.

*

Chapter XVI

*

The Third Issue

~

The Clarion of Democracy

In a world confronting systemic threats—pandemics, war, environmental instability—the distortion of democratic language by authoritarian regimes introduces a secondary danger: the displacement of shared standards by which political reality is evaluated. When democratic terms are preserved rhetorically but institutionally denuded, they no longer clarify global challenges; they obscure them. ^[1] Under such conditions, the problem is not merely the absence of democracy, but the misuse of its vocabulary.

Within this context, democracy may be examined not as an aspiration, but as a set of operative conditions by which authority is constrained and legitimacy is measured. These conditions do not function symbolically; they function diagnostically. Where they are absent, substituted, or selectively applied, democratic form persists while democratic substance is rendered inoperative.

Among these conditions are the rule of law; free and verifiable elections; the protection of civil liberties and human rights; the separation of powers; judicial independence; sustained civic participation; governmental responsiveness; minority protections; transparency and accountability; and the peaceful transfer of power. These are not abstract ideals but necessary conditions. ^[1] These conditions may be suspended, distorted, or replaced by forms that imitate them without functioning. Governance persists as appearance and thereby operates as subterfuge, while democracy no longer operates.

In Venezuela, the disjunction between democratic language and authoritarian operation has become a characteristic feature of political life. Over the past quarter-century, authority has been progressively centralized within a single-party framework, reinforced by military participation and institutional capture. ^[2] Although electoral and constitutional forms have been retained, their constraining functions have been neutralized, contributing to sustained loss of institutional capacity across political, social, and economic domains.

The judiciary illustrates this substitution with particular clarity. Rather than operating as an independent arbiter, it has increasingly functioned as an administrative extension of executive power; it has legitimized arbitrary detention, restricted political participation, and normalized repression through procedural means. ^[3] As such, the mechanisms of the judiciary are used to authorize repression rather than to constrain power.

When courts align with executive authority rather than constrain it, civic participation and political representation cease to function. Elections, legal claims, and public challenge may continue in form, but they no longer permit citizens to influence power or secure redress.

Endnotes, Chapter XVI

§1-§3

[1] Rosanvallon, Pierre, Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Urbinati, Nadia, Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the People, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.

§4

[2] International Crisis Group, “Venezuela: The Rise of a Militarized State,” Brussels, 2022; Organization of American States, “Report on the Situation in Venezuela,” Washington, 2023.

§5

[3] Foro Penal, “Political Prisoners in Venezuela: Annual Report 2025,” Caracas, 2025; United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, “Opinion No. 44/2023 (Venezuela),” Geneva, 2023; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Democratic Institutions, Rule of Law, and Human Rights in Venezuela,” Washington, DC, 2024.

Tags:Democratic language, Institutional failure, Judicial alignment, Truth monopolization, Venezuela
Posted in Political Diagnosis, Authoritarianism, Democratic Institutions | Leave a Comment »

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series VII”

April 22, 2026

*

Author’s Note

This installment examines how ideological labels, liberal, socialist, democratic, are deployed as instruments of alignment rather than as enforceable commitments. Venezuela is approached not as an exception, but as a case in which administrative practice, international positioning, and partisan abstraction converge to obscure responsibility. What follows traces how power is exercised through method rather than doctrine, how ideological language displaces accountability, and how clarity, rather than consensus, emerges as the first condition for recovery.

Ricardo F. Morín, January 12, 2026, Oakland Park, FL.

Chapter XIII

The Fifth Sign

The Pawned Republic

The Venezuelan economic crisis developed within a political environment in which control over foreign currency, public spending, and State revenues became increasingly concentrated in State-controlled allocation systems and extra-budgetary fiscal mechanisms. After exchange controls were established in 2003, access to foreign currency was centrally allocated through State mechanisms such as CADIVI, and by 2013 even government authorities were publicly acknowledging fraud in the assignment of preferential currency, including allocations to fictitious entities. At the fiscal level, parallel funds such as FONDEN administered substantial appropriations outside substantive parliamentary scrutiny, while public information on State spending and earmarked funds became increasingly unavailable. Under these conditions, the diversion of public resources did not appear as isolated misconduct but as a recurring feature of governance in which formal procedures governing budget approval and reporting remained nominally in place while independent verification and public disclosure diminished. What emerged was not the failure of a declared doctrine, but the consolidation of an administrative method in which access to public resources depended less on transparent procedure than on the concentration of discretionary control.

Debates that oppose socialism to capitalism misidentify the operative field. These terms describe beliefs about ownership and social purpose; they do not describe how economies are administered. Economic stability does not follow from declared purpose but from enforceable limits on taxation, spending, and contract execution. It depends on whether taxation follows rule, whether contracts are enforced without exception, whether budgets are bounded by procedure, and whether authority is exercised within limits enforced through budget law, contract enforcement, and institutional oversight. Where these conditions are absent, ideological designation does not fail; it becomes irrelevant.

As State procurement in sectors such as oil, infrastructure, and food imports became subject to political discretion, auditing functions weakened and oversight bodies lost operational independence. Revenues and contracts controlled by the State were increasingly used to redirect resources through discretionary allocation. Public authority ceased to function as a mediating structure and became an object of appropriation. The result was not episodic corruption but a stable arrangement in which diversion operated as an expected outcome of governance.

The mechanism did not explain action; it displaced its examination. Ideological language did not clarify operations; it rendered them inaccessible. Official discourse invoking class struggle and anti-imperialism redirected public attention from currency allocation, public spending, and procurement practices toward symbolic political conflict. These appeals replaced the examination of procedures with narratives of opposition that carried no capacity for control.

This substitution extended beyond the national sphere. Governments identifying with liberal or democratic traditions supported sanctions presented as instruments of pressure. In practice, these measures intensified economic hardship without altering the internal configuration of power. ^[1] At the same time, States maintaining political and economic alignment with the Venezuelan government, including China, Russia, and Cuba, permitted the attenuation of electoral oversight, judicial independence, and legislative authority and presented inaction as fidelity to principle. ^[2] Across these positions, ideological designation did not guide action. It concealed a convergence: measures that weakened society without altering authority, and positions that preserved authority without regard to how it was exercised.

What is presented as a divide between opposing systems resolves, in operation, into a convergence of practices. External pressure that weakens a population without altering authority, and external tolerance that preserves authority without regard to institutional dismantling, produce the same condition: the isolation of society from judicial, electoral, and legislative means of contesting authority.

Within that condition, the population is not situated between competing models of governance. It is rendered instrumental to positions that do not operate upon the mechanisms that sustain or constrain power. The language of alignment, whether in the form of solidarity, neutrality, or caution, does not alter this configuration when it remains detached from the procedures through which authority is exercised. ^[3]

Where accountability is not enforced, other forms of organization emerge without constraint. Criminal and informal economic networks operating without judicial or regulatory enforcement expand into the space left unregulated. Their growth does not require ideological justification; it follows from the absence of enforceable limits. ^[4] What is described as crisis does not begin with collapse. It begins when constraint is withdrawn from the exercise of power and remains abrogated without consequence.

Endnotes on Chapter XIII

[1] Francisco Rodríguez and Jeffrey Sachs, “Economic Sanctions as Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela,” The Lancet 393, no. 10178 (2019): 2584–2591; Center for Economic and Policy Research, “Sanctions in Venezuela: Economic and Humanitarian Impacts,” 2019.

[2] R. Evan Ellis, “The Maduro Regime’s Foreign Backers: China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 6, 2020; United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” 2022.

[3] Javier Corrales, “Democratic Backsliding Through Electoral Irregularities: The Case of Venezuela,” Perspectives on Politics 18, no. 2 (2020): 311–327.

[4] Insight Crime, “Venezuela’s Criminal Landscape: A Country of Collusion,” 2021; Transparency International, “Venezuela: Corruption Perceptions Index,” 2022.

Chapter XIV

The First Issue

Resisting Partisan Control: Civil Society’s Stance in Venezuela

Democratic life is not secured by a single principle but by the interaction of distinct forms: pluralism, partisanship, nonpartisanship, and antipartisanship. These forms do not resolve into unity. They define how authority is organized, contested, and limited within institutions such as parties, courts, and legislatures.

Pluralism establishes the condition under which difference can appear without being suppressed. Its function is to ensure that multiple positions can enter public space without requiring prior alignment. Where institutions fail to protect participation through electoral access and legal safeguards, participation contracts and representation narrows.

Partisanship organizes competition through structured alignment. Its function depends on a limit: that allegiance to a party does not supersede adherence to the rules governing the contest itself. When that limit dissolves, competition persists in form while its constraints disappear.

Nonpartisanship suspends alignment in order to preserve procedure. Its role is not neutrality in the abstract, but the maintenance of conditions under which decisions remain accountable to rule rather than to affiliation.

Antipartisanship emerges when these arrangements fail. It rejects parties as vehicles of representation, but in doing so it removes the structures through which accountability is exercised. Where this rejection becomes programmatic, it does not remove power. It removes the structures that limit it, leaving power to concentrate without opposition.

In Venezuela, antipartisanship became a governing strategy through the delegitimization of established parties and the centralization of authority in the executive. Public disillusionment with established parties permitted the emergence of a singular political alternative that did not operate outside institutions but reorganized them. Institutional limits were recast as impediments, and their removal was presented as restoration. What was removed, however, was not obstruction but constraint. ^[1]

Under Chávez, this method extended through the redirection of the State resources. Oil revenues were deployed to consolidate political alignment across sectors. Access to State-distributed resources increasingly depended on political alignment, particularly through government programs and public employment, establishing dependence in place of institutional trust. Under Maduro, this structure persisted under contraction: as resources diminished, the requirement of alignment intensified while preserving the same operational logic.

Clientelist practices were not introduced but expanded and centralized. What had been dispersed became systemic. Programs such as the Misiones Bolivarianas, funded through oil revenues and administered through State-aligned structures, illustrate this transformation. Their stated function was social provision; their operation linked access to political identification. In programs such as Barrio Adentro, healthcare delivery was administered through structures coordinated with the governing apparatus. ^[2]Benefits did not follow need alone, but alignment.

Policies of expropriation and currency control further restricted independent economic activity. By reallocating assets through administrative decision, these measures reduced the space within which alternative forms of organization could emerge. Economic contraction followed as a consequence of constrained operation.

The weakening of institutional structures displaced rather than eliminated organized activity. Civil society organizations assumed roles in legal defense, human rights documentation, and service provision where State institutions failed to operate consistently.

Organizations such as Provea, Foro Penal, and Transparencia Venezuela document violations, provide legal defense, and maintain records of administrative conduct. Electoral observation organizations document voting conditions and irregularities despite legal and operational restrictions. Community-based structures such as Mesas Técnicas de Agua coordinate access to basic services such as water supply in the absence of reliable State provision. These activities maintain a verifiable link between documented actions and their consequences, between public claims and records, and between authority and its legal limits. Where institutions no longer secure these relations, they are sustained through practice.

These formations do not constitute an alternative system of governance. They operate within limits imposed upon them, and their continuity remains contingent. Legislative measures increasing oversight of non-governmental organizations have further reduced their operational space.

What persists is not a program but a set of practices that maintain a verifiable link between action and consequence, authority and limit, and decision and verification. Where these relations are sustained, even in restricted form, the possibility of reconstruction remains.

Democratic recovery does not begin with alignment or design. It begins with the reestablishment of constraint upon power and the restoration of procedures through which actions can be examined and limited. Where these conditions are absent, declarations of principle do not fail; they do not operate.

Endnotes on Chapter XIV

[1] Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 19–24, 30–34.

[2] “Barrio Adentro: Complementariedad entre Cuba y Venezuela,” YouTube video, https://youtu.be/y8GXPozsSWQ.

Tags:Authoritarianism, Civil Society, Democratic Backsliding, ideology, Political Accountability, Sanctions, Unmasking Disappointment, Venezuela
Posted in Uncategorized | Leave a Comment »

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series V”

March 25, 2026

*

Author’s Note

This installment continues Chapter XII, “The Fourth Sign,” following the initial discussion of Autocracy (§§ 1–9). It turns to Venezuela and examines §§ 10–25 in which the earlier framework is applied to a specific national case. The chapter concludes in a separate installment devoted to The Asymmetry of Sanctions (§§ 26–34).

Ricardo F. Morín, December 26, 2025, Oakland Park, Florida.

*

Chapter XII: Part 2

*

Venezuela

*

To comprehend the practical implications of autocracy and its concentration of power, I defer to Rafael Arráiz Lucca’s book, Venezuela: 1830 a nuestros días: Breve historia política [2016]. Here, Arráiz Lucca provides a comprehensive history of Venezuela from independence to today. ^[1] He examines political, economic, and social changes that have shaped the nation. He traces early struggles and the rise of caudillos, and has treated Hugo Chávez’s rise to power, his ideology, and the effects of his policies on society. He has also examined the continuing influence of Chávez under Nicolás Maduro. In his view, both Chávez and Maduro have exemplified regimes that have centralized power and suppressed dissent.

The country’s political trajectory has been determined by its enduring history of military rule. Since independence in 1811, twenty-five military officers have held the presidency, presided over 172 years of governance, and entrenched the military’s influence in the nation’s political fabric. ^[2] The transition to representative democracy in 1961 marked a significant shift, which introduced in thirty-eight-years of civilian-led stability under the Punto Fijo Pact (see Chapter XI). This civilian era, however, was not free from upheaval. The 1989 Caracazo riots, coupled with the failed coup attempt by Hugo Chávez in 1992, revealed the fragility of civilian democracy and the persistent appeal of military leadership in moments of crisis. ^[3]^[4]

The Caracazo riots and the subsequent repression had exposed deep societal fractures that undermined confidence in civilian governance. For many, the chaos and disillusionment restored the perception of the military as a force of order and stability, a perception grounded in the nation’s long history of caudillo leadership. Chávez’s rise can be understood as a direct consequence of this historical legacy: a charismatic military figure presenting himself as the answer to the failures of civilian politics. The violent repression following the riots, coupled with the systemic inability to address the economic and social inequities they symbolized, prepared the conditions for a return to autocratic tendencies, concealed within populist rhetoric. This marked the beginning of a new authoritarian era, shaped not only by the fractures of the present but also by legacies of the past.

The presidency of Hugo Chávez continued the tradition of authoritarianism that had characterized the regime of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez. ^[5] As in the era of Pérez Jiménez, Chávez depended upon oil to finance his policies. ^[6]

For Hugo Chávez, “participatory democracy” directed toward empowering marginalized groups. He created community councils and social missions, which became instruments of his political control—the so-called Bolivarian ideology. Participation therein was conditioned upon loyalty to Chávez, which ultimately led to the marginalization of people opposed to his policies. His blend of populism and authoritarianism framed dissent as being unpatriotic and thus hindered national progress. This approach enabled him to diminish the power of law; the legislative and judicial branches of government became dependent on the executive.

With the endorsement of Nicolás Maduro by Hugo Chávez in 2012, the country advanced further toward authoritarianism. ^[7] Opposition parties such as Vente Venezuela, Primero de Justicia, Un Nuevo Tiempo, and Voluntad Popular accused Chávez and Maduro of manipulating the Consejo Nacional Electoral. ^{[8][9][10][11]}^[12]

After the death of Chávez, Maduro faced similar accusations in the 2013 and 2018 elections. The Organization of American States, the Lima Group, the International Contact Group, and the Group of Seven concurred. ^[13][14][15] Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have also questioned his legitimacy. ^[16]^[17] One exception is the United Nations’ Security Council debate (press release SC/13719), which urged Venezuelans to resolve their crisis internally. ^[18][19]

Following Venezuela’s 2016 suspension from Mercosur, Latin American responses varied and then changed as political administrations changed. ^[20][21] Initially, Argentina favored the measures by the Organization of American States to apply diplomatic pressure on Venezuela and sought to address the political and humanitarian crises there. ^[22] It also recognized Juan Guaidó as the legitimate president, though in 2019, it changed and became an advocate for mediation. At first, Brazil recognized Guaidó and was for sanctions against the Venezuelan government, and then in 2023 requested for mediation. ^[23] Between 2018–22, Colombia accused the Maduro regime of drug trafficking and of giving support to the guerrilla groups, the National Liberation Army and the Revolutionary Armed Forces; Colombia severed diplomatic relations. ^[24] Later, in 2022, a new administration restored diplomatic relations and promoted non-intervention. Chile has consistently urged sanctions against Maduro’s government, and even referred Venezuela to the International Criminal Court (ICC). ^[25][26] Peru expelled Venezuela’s ambassador: The immediate trigger for the expulsion was Venezuela’s Tribunal Supremo de Justicia’s move to dissolve the opposition-controlled Asamblea Nacional, which Peru saw as a step toward authoritarian control. ^[27] As all other members of the Lima Group did, Peru regularized the status of Venezuelan migrants. In the beginning, Mexico condemned the human rights abuses in Venezuela and called for the release of all political prisoners, but, in 2018, it adopted a non-interventional approach and in 2022 offered mediation as the only recourse. ^[28]^[29]^[30]

Ahead of the 2024 presidential election, opposition leader María Corina Machado was disqualified after having won her coalition’s primary. ^[31] The Tribunal Supremo de Justicia based its decision on her alleged support of U.S. sanctions, supposed corruption, and accusations holding her responsible for losses related to the American subsidiary Citgo of the Venezuelan State-owned oil and natural gas company: Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). Machado’s denial of access to the allegations against her was a blatant violation of due process. Her disqualification left Edmundo González Urrutia as the unified opposition candidate. ^[32]

Both campaigns engaged in tactics of intimidation. González’s coalition deployed 200,000 observers across 16,000 voting centers and Maduro’s administration intensified media censorship and repression. After Maduro declared victory, protests resulted in extrajudicial killings, arrests, and crackdowns on independent media. ^[33]

González’s coalition collaborated with international observers, including the Organization of American States, the European Union Electoral Observation Mission, the Carter Center, and the United States Mission to the United Nations, to monitor irregularities. ^{[34][35][36][37]} The government, however, withheld disaggregated voting data critical for audits—supposedly because the data had been hacked—and imposed travel restrictions on foreign observers. ^[38] The Carter Center criticized the elections for failing to meet international standards of transparency, fairness, and impartiality. ^[39]

Maduro accused both Machado and González of having incited unrest and announced investigations into the crimes of “usurpation of functions” and “military insurrection,” each carrying thirty-year prison sentences. On August 8, 2024, González left for Spain after the government had granted him safe passage.

To understand Venezuela’s political and institutional landscape, one must examine how global indices assess the state of its democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, the Freedom House’s Global Freedom Index, and the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index all provide distinct metrics illuminating Venezuela’s democratic decline under Nicolás Maduro.

The Democracy Index ranks countries with higher scores as more democratic. Freedom House and Transparency International diverge from this by using lower scores to indicate worse outcomes, with lower numbers signifying less freedom and higher corruption.

In the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, Venezuela ranked as the least democratic country in South America in 2008; in 2022, it ranked 147th out of a total of 167 countries. ^[40] Likewise, in 2023, Freedom House’s Global Freedom Index finds that Venezuela scored low both as a democracy and high corruption, while in its Corruption Perceptions Index Venezuela scored 13 out of 100 and was positioned as one of the most corrupt nations globally. ^[41]

Additionally, a report by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for the period from 2012 to 2023 has highlighted the severe corruption to be found in Venezuela. ^[42] In its 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, out of 180 countries, Venezuela received a score of 13 out of 100, ranking 177th. These indicators present a clear picture of Venezuelan authoritarianism and of the deterioration of its political landscape in recent years.

Endnotes

§ 10

[1] Rafael Arráiz Lucca, Venezuela: 1830 a nuestros días: Breve historia política. (Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 2016), 15-151, 212-37.

§ 11

[2] José Gregorio Petit Primera, ”Presidentes de Venezuela (1811-2012). Un análisis estadístico-descriptivo,” Revista Venezolana: Análisis de Coyuntura (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, XXII-1, 2016), 47-56.
[3] The Punto Fijo Pact was a political agreement signed by the three predominant political parties—Acción Democrática (AD), Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), and Unión Republicana Democrática (URD)—at the residence of Rafael Caldera (COPEI): Punto Fijo. The pact aimed to stabilize the country after the fall of dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez [1952-1958] by ensuring democratic alternation of power, institutional continuity, and preventing single-party rule. While it contributed to political stability and a peaceful transition to democracy, critics argue that it also entrenched elite dominance, marginalized smaller parties, and fostered systemic corruption. As a foundational element in Venezuela’s post-dictatorship political landscape, the agreement shaped the nation’s governance for decades. Its legacy, however, is marked by political divisions, as the pact’s structure increasingly excluded some groups and led to dissatisfaction among factions. This period reflects both the challenges and achievements of Venezuela’s efforts to establish a stable and inclusive democracy.
[4] Rafael Arráiz Lucca, “February 4, 1992: The Day Venezuelans Learned the Name ‘Hugo Chávez,” (Caracas Chronicles, February 04, 2019). https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/02/04/february-4-1992-the-day-venezuelans-learned-the-name-hugo-chavez/

§ 13

[5] Fredy Rincón Noriega, El Nuevo Ideal Nacional y los planes Económicos- Militares de Pérez Jiménez 1952-1957 (Caracas: Ediciones Centauro, 1981)–Kindle Edition
Judith Ewell, The Indictment of a Dictator: The Extradition and Trial of Marcos Perez (College Station: A&M University Press, 1981).
[6] Both leaders have employed centralized power and state control over resources, though their approaches differed. Pérez Jiménez emphasized technocratic and infrastructural development. His policies, as outlined in the Nuevo Ideal Nacional, focused on large-scale construction projects and urban modernization. These initiatives promoted economic growth, but their benefit was directed towards the middle and upper classes. Chávez, on the other hand, pursued a blend of populism and socialism aimed at redistributing oil wealth through extensive social programs for the poor. These policies increased the State’s dependence on oil revenues and left the country vulnerable to market fluctuations.

§ 15

[7] Margarita López Maya, “The Venezuelan Caracazo of 1989 : Popular
Protest and Institutional Weakness,” (Latin American Studies: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 35, 117–137. DOI : 10.1017/S0022216X02006673 P https://margaritalopezmaya.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/venezuelan_caracazo_of_1989_popular_protest_and_institutional_weakness-1.pdf
Javier Corrales, “Chapter 12: Venezuela’s Autocratization, 1999-2021: Variations in Temporalities, Party Systems, and Institutional Controls.”PDF extracted from Archon Fung, et al, When Democracy Breaks: Studies in Democratic Erosion and Collapse,from Ancient Athens to the Present Day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023). https://tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Chapter%2012%20-%20Venezuela%20-%20Corrales.pdf
[8] “Biography: Maria Corina Machado, National Coordinator, Vente Venezuela” (Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs, Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows Program, 2009. https://worldfellows.yale.edu/person/maria-corina-machado/
[9] Raul Castillo, “There Once Was a Party: Primero Justicia,” Caracas Chronicles, January 13, 2022. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2022/01/13/there-once-was-a-party-primero-justicia/
[10] Braulio Polanco, “There Once Was a Party: Un Nuevo Tiempo,”Caracas Chronicles, February 15, 2022. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2022/02/15/there-once-was-a-party-un-nuevo-tiempo/
[11] Raúl Castillo, “There Once Was a Party: Voluntad Popular,”Caracas Chronicles, September 8, 2022. https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2022/09/08/there-once-was-a-party-voluntad-popular/
[12] The Consejo Nacional Electoral, responsible for overseeing elections in Venezuela, has faced long-standing accusations of partisanship and favoritism. Opposition groups (Vente Venezuela, Primero de Justicia, Un Nuevo Tiempo, Voluntad Popular) have alleged that Chávez and Maduro appointed to it only members who favored the ruling party. For an analysis of the Consejo Nacional Electoral’s role in reinforcing authoritarianism, see Javier Corrales: Autocracy Rising: How Venezuela Transitioned to Authoritarianism (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2023), 3, 28. Also see Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers, The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 276-80, 293-96.

§ 16

[13] The Lima Group, formed in August 2017, includes: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Guyana, and St. Lucia.
[14] The International Contact Group (the European Union, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay) advocates for credible elections and have voiced concerns about the Consejo Nacional Electoral’s impartiality.
[15] Group of Seven (G7)–Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States–has condemned electoral irregularities in Venezuela and called for independent oversight. Allegations of voter registration manipulation by the Consejo Nacional Electoral, has heightened suspicions of vote tampering.
[16] Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis: Severe Medical and Food Shortages, Inadequate and Repressive Government Response, Human Rights Watch, October 24, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/10/24/venezuelas-humanitarian-crisis/severe-medical-and-food-shortages-inadequate-and
[17] “Venezuela: New research shows how calculated repression by Maduro government could constitute the crime against humanity of persecution,” Amnesty International, February 10, 2022. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/venezuela-calculated-repression-maduro-government/
[18] “Venezuelans Must Resolve Crisis Themselves, Security Council Delegates Agree while Differing over Legitimacy of Contending Parties. Briefing on Weekend Incidents Biased, Says Foreign Minister as Speakers for United States, Russian Federation Exchange Barbs,” United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 8472nd Meeting, SC/13719, February 26, 2019. https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13719.doc.htm
[19] In February 2019, a United Nations Security Council Report debated whether to supervise elections or mediate between Maduro’s government and the opposition. Ultimately, the Council upheld a non-interventionist approach while offering to mediate.

§ 17

[20] “Mercosur suspends Venezuela over trade and human rights,” BBC, December 2, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38181198
[21] Mercosur (acronym for the Mercado Común del Sur or the Southern Common Market) is a regional trade bloc founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (it later included Chile). Mercosur’s mission is to promote economic integration and free trade.
[22] “Integration in South America: A Brief Analysis of the MERCOSUR Case in Light of the European Experience,” The Yale Review of International Studies, July 23, 2018. https://yris.yira.org/column/integration-in-south-america-a-brief-analysis-of-the-mercosur-case-in-light-of-the-european-experience/
[23] Luis Ferreira Alvarez, “South America’s Political Rebalance: The Potential of a Mercosur-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, July 27, 2016. https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/south-americas-political-rebalance-the-potential-of-a-mercosur-us-free-trade-agreement
[24] Kelly Shen, et al, “Ripple Effect: How the Venezuelan Crisis is Impacting Colombia’s Economy and Foreign Relations,” The Huntsman Program in International Studies and Business, March 24, 2020. https://huntsman.upenn.edu/news/ripple-effect-how-the-venezuelan-crisis-is-impacting-colombias-economy-and-foreign-relations/
[25] “The Current Situation in Venezuela: A USIP Fact Sheet,” The United States Institute of Peace, February 18, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/02/current-situation-venezuela
[26] “Venezuela I: Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I,” International Criminal Court, February 2018. https://www.icc-cpi.int/venezuela-i
[27] “Venezuela Breaks Diplomatic Relations With Peru,” TeleSur, July 31, 2024. https://www.telesurenglish.net/venezuela-breaks-diplomatic-relations-with-peru/
[28] “Ariela Ruiz Caro, “The Mexico Dialogue on Venezuela and the End of the Lima Group,” MIRA, Feminisms and Democracy (promoting analysis and solidarity in Latin America),.September 16, 2021. https://www.americas.org/the-mexico-dialogue-on-venezuela-and-the-end-of-the-lima-group/
[29] EEAS Press Team, “Venezuela: Joint Statement on Venezuela Negotiations in Mexico,” European Union, External Action, November 26, 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuela-joint-statement-venezuela-negotiations-mexico_en
[30].- Mexico has mediated between Nicolás Maduro’s government and the opposition after the July 28, 2024 presidential election results, with support from Brazil and Colombia.

§ 18

[31] Vivian Sequera, “Who is Maria Corina Machado, Venezuela opposition leader?,” Reuters, Caracas, July 25, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/maria-corina-machado-venezuela-opposition-candidate-turned-cheerleader-in-chief-2024-07-25/
[32] Félix Seijas Rodríguez, “Venezuela’s Electoral Landscape Favors the Opposition,” Americas Quarterly, July 25, 2024. https://americasquarterly.org/article/venezuelas-electoral-landscape-favors-the-opposition/

§ 19

[33] Foro Penal’s “Special Report on Political Repression in Venezuela,” covering July to September 2024. 1. October 2024 Data: “As of September 30, 2024, the number of political prisoners in Venezuela was 1,905.” https://foropenal.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/FP_REPORTE-JUL_AGO_SEP_-Ingles-2024_2401201-comprimido.pdf
January 2025 Data: In early January 2025, Foro Penal reported 83 new political arrests.” Source: HuffPost article titled “El chavismo llama a la oposición a ‘trabajar’ con Maduro, mientras crece la represión: 83 arrestos ‘políticos’ en 2025.” https://www.huffingtonpost.es/global/el-chavismo-llama-oposicion-trabajar-maduro-crece-represion-83-arrestos-politicos-2025.html

§ 20

[34] Remarks by Ambassador Francisco O. Mora, “OAS Adopts Resolution on the Situation in Venezuela,” U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States, August 16, 2024. https://usoas.usmission.gov/oas-adopts-resolution-on-the-situation-in-venezuela/
[35] “Venezuela: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on post-election developments,” Council of The European Union, August 4, 2024. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/08/04/venezuela-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu/
[36] “Carter Center Statement on Venezuela Election,” Carter Center, July 30, 2024. https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024.html
[37] “Joint Statement on the Venezuela Elections,” United States Mission to the United Nations, September 12, 2024. https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-the-venezuela-elections/
[38].- Disaggregated election results enhance transparency by enabling cross-checking against aggregated totals. This method reveals potential errors, facilitates audits, and highlights regional irregularities, strengthening the legitimacy of electoral outcomes.
[39].- The Organization of American States has criticized Maduro’s government for failing to produce verification of election results.

§ 24

[40] “Venezuela,” Economist Intelligence Unit, Democratic Index, 2012-23. http://country.eiu.com/Default.aspx?country=Venezuela
[41] “Venezuela,” Freedom House, Global Freedom Index, 2020-24. https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela

§ 25

[42] “Our Work In Venezuela,” Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2012-23. https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/venezuela

Tags:authoritarian governance, constitutional crisis, executive power, institutional decay, legal exemption, Venezuela
Posted in Ethics, Authority, Disapppointment, Judgment | Leave a Comment »

Posts Tagged ‘Venezuela’

Epilogue

Share this:

Share this:

*

Share this:

*

*

Share this:

Author’s Note

Share this:

*

Author’s Note

Chapter XVII

The Fourth Issue

On Human Rights

Chapter XVIII

The Fifth Issue

On the Nature of Violence

Chapter XIX

The Sixth Issue

On the Persistence of Injustice

Share this:

Share this:

*

Author’s Note

*

Chapter 15

*

The Second Issue

~

On Partial Truths and Repressive Anarchy

*

Partial Truths

*

Repressive Anarchy

*

Chapter XVI

*

The Third Issue

~

The Clarion of Democracy

Share this:

*

*

Author’s Note

Chapter XIII

The Fifth Sign

The Pawned Republic

Chapter XIV

The First Issue

Resisting Partisan Control: Civil Society’s Stance in Venezuela

Share this:

*

Author’s Note

*

Chapter XII: Part 2

*

Venezuela

*

Share this:

Pages

Archives

Categories