Constitutional Authority and Venezuela Ricardo F. Morín 2026
The constitutions of Venezuela and the United States frame petroleum as the material interest between two distinct constitutional orders.
Ricardo F. Morín September 6, 2026
I have written to the President of the United States and to my representatives in Congress about recent United States actions involving Venezuela, its petroleum resources, sovereign revenues, reconstruction, and political transition.
I am publishing that correspondence because the questions raised by these actions belong in the public record.
My purpose is neither partisan nor dependent upon support for any Venezuelan political faction. The same standard should apply to every American administration and to every government exercising authority in Venezuela.
The question at the center of this inquiry can be stated plainly: who has the legal authority to make these decisions?
Under Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution, sovereignty resides in the Venezuelan people. The institutions of the State exercise powers that come from that sovereignty; the institutions themselves are not sovereign. Venezuela’s Constitution also places its hydrocarbon and mineral deposits within the public domain of the Republic and declares them inalienable and imprescriptible. This raises a further question: what constitutional power does any Venezuelan administration have to make long-term commitments involving those resources?
There is a separate American question. What authority does the United States government have under the Constitution and federal law to acquire rights involving another nation’s sovereign resources and revenues? What has Congress authorized? What has Congress funded? Which commitments belong to private investors, and which powers are being exercised by the United States government?
Private investment does not answer these questions. A corporation can invest money and enter into contracts. Corporate participation, however, cannot give either government constitutional powers that it does not otherwise possess.
THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD
The official record has become unusually specific.
In a Fact Sheet dated August 31, 2026, the White House states that an agreement involving North American Blue Energy Partners, or NABEP, gives the United States government “powerful governance rights, economic ownership, and guaranteed low-cost off-take,” meaning rights to purchase Venezuelan oil at favorable terms.
The same Fact Sheet explains what some of those rights are. It states that the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital received a 35 percent ownership stake in NABEP’s corporate parent. It states that the Department of State received the right to purchase 20 percent of the oil produced at production cost and the first opportunity to purchase the remaining 80 percent.
The governmental rights extend beyond ownership and oil purchases. According to the Fact Sheet, the United States government can veto the appointment of any member of NABEP’s board of directors, and a majority of the board must be United States citizens. The Fact Sheet also states that the United States government’s agreement with NABEP is governed by United States law and is subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts.
The White House further states that what it calls Venezuela’s “interim authorities” granted NABEP 100-year concessions covering 17 oil fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves. I use “interim authorities” here only because that is the White House’s description. Its use should not be read as my own determination of the constitutional status or authority of the Venezuelan officials involved.
The White House describes two related but distinct relationships. Its August 31 Fact Sheet states that Venezuela’s “interim authorities” granted NABEP the 100-year concessions. The September 2 release, meanwhile, states that the United States government’s agreement is with the private company, not with Venezuela’s interim government, and that no political process formed part of those negotiations. The later statement identifies the counterparty to the United States agreement; it does not, on its face, withdraw the earlier statement about who granted NABEP the Venezuelan concessions.
The August 31 Fact Sheet describes NABEP’s proposed investment of as much as $100 billion in Venezuelan oil infrastructure as private investment and says that the agreement will cost American taxpayers nothing.
That distinction matters. Private investment is not the same thing as public spending. Money invested by a private company is not a congressional appropriation. But private financing does not turn governmental powers into private acts. A United States government ownership stake, government purchasing rights, authority over board appointments, control or monitoring of revenues, and other rights exercised by federal agencies remain governmental actions. Their legal authority must be established separately.
A White House release dated September 2 again describes the agreement as giving the United States government “powerful governance rights, economic ownership, and guaranteed low-cost off-take.” The same release places the agreement within the Administration’s broader program of “stabilization, reconstruction and democratic transition.”
Another official document raises a related question.
Executive Order 14373, issued January 9, 2026, states that specified Venezuelan oil revenues held by the United States remain property of the Government of Venezuela rather than property of the United States. Section 4(b) is expressly titled “Custodial Nature of United States Possession” and states that the United States will hold these funds “solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.”
Section 4(c)(ii) further provides that the funds are to be held pending sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela.
In ordinary terms, the United States holds the revenues but does not own them, while a United States cabinet officer is given responsibility for determining their sovereign disposition on behalf of Venezuela. Section 5 further directs the Treasury to identify the funds as sovereign property of the Government of Venezuela “held in custody by the United States.” The Treasury is also directed to comply with instructions from the Secretary of State concerning transfers or disbursements of those funds.
The Order states the legal authority upon which it relies. It invokes the Constitution, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code.
The Order also expressly contemplates a continuing role for Congress. Section 6(b) authorizes recurring and final reports to Congress concerning the national emergency under the reporting provisions of the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Section 7(b) states that implementation of the Order must be consistent with applicable law and is “subject to the availability of appropriations.”
Those provisions are part of the record and should not be overlooked. They identify legal authorities asserted by the Executive Branch and recognize statutory reporting and appropriations constraints. They do not, by themselves, answer the broader question of how far those authorities extend or establish the legal basis for every governmental action associated with Venezuela’s resources, reconstruction, or political transition.
This creates a question that deserves a clear answer: what authority do the laws invoked by the Executive Order actually confer upon American officials to determine the disposition of sovereign Venezuelan property that the United States itself acknowledges it does not own?
The official documents establish what the Executive Branch says it has undertaken and identify some of the authority it relies upon. They do not, by themselves, establish that every action described in them is constitutionally or statutorily authorized.
That distinction is the reason for this inquiry.
One set of questions must be answered under American law: what powers do the Constitution and federal statutes give the Executive Branch, what has Congress authorized or funded, and where are the limits of those powers?
Another set must be answered under Venezuelan law: did the Venezuelan officials entering these arrangements have the constitutional power to make them?
Neither question can answer the other. American recognition cannot give Venezuelan officials powers that Venezuela’s own Constitution does not give them. Venezuelan consent cannot give the United States government powers that the American constitutional system does not give it.
These are the questions addressed in the correspondence reproduced below.
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS
White House Fact Sheet, August 31, 2026 President Donald J. Trump Announces Historic Oil Agreement to Secure American Energy Dominance and Drive Venezuela’s Economic Recovery
The Fact Sheet and September 2 release tell us how the Executive Branch describes the agreement. They are not substitutes for the complete agreement itself. Unless and until that agreement is made public, we can establish what the Executive Branch says the agreement contains, but we cannot independently examine all of its terms.
CORRESPONDENCE TO CONGRESS
September 6, 2026
The following is reproduced as sent.
Ref. Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela
Dear Member of Congress:
I write as an American citizen concerned about a constitutional question that should transcend political affiliation: the authority under which the Executive Branch is assuming governmental, financial, and proprietary powers concerning Venezuela, its sovereign assets, and its natural resources.
My concern is not whether the present policy toward Venezuela is politically desirable. Nor is it a defense of Nicolás Maduro or of any Venezuelan political faction. It concerns the limits of governmental authority under the constitutions of both nations and the corresponding responsibility of Congress.
Recent official statements describe a United States role in the stabilization, reconstruction, and democratic transition of Venezuela. The White House has also announced arrangements giving agencies of the United States government substantial economic and governance rights associated with Venezuelan petroleum resources, including rights connected with concessions reportedly granted by Venezuela’s interim authorities.
These actions raise a question that cannot be answered exclusively under American law.
Article 5 of the Constitution of Venezuela places sovereignty in the Venezuelan people. The organs exercising public power emanate from that sovereignty and are subject to it. The government administering the State is therefore not itself the sovereign.
That distinction becomes especially consequential where national resources are concerned. Venezuela’s Constitution places hydrocarbon and mineral deposits within the public domain of the Republic and declares them inalienable and imprescriptible. Whatever authority a Venezuelan government possesses over those resources must consequently derive from the Venezuelan constitutional order. Effective control of governmental institutions cannot by itself establish unlimited constitutional competence to dispose of them.
Recognition by the United States cannot answer that question. Neither can participation by private enterprise. A private corporation may possess contractual rights, but it cannot confer sovereign authority upon a Venezuelan administration or upon the government of the United States. Nor can foreign recognition substitute for constitutional authority originating in the Venezuelan people.
There is a separate American constitutional question. Congress possesses powers concerning appropriations, war, foreign commerce, and oversight that cannot simply be presumed to have passed to the Executive because an asserted foreign-policy objective is considered urgent or advantageous. The involvement of private capital likewise does not eliminate the need to determine the legal authority for governmental rights, commitments, military involvement, administration of foreign sovereign property, or governmental direction accompanying that investment.
I therefore respectfully ask Congress to establish, through its constitutional powers of inquiry and oversight, the legal foundation for what has already occurred.
In particular, Congress should require public identification of the constitutional and statutory authority asserted for every significant United States governmental interest acquired in connection with Venezuelan resources; determine whether Congress authorized or appropriated funds for governmental activities associated with Venezuela’s stabilization, reconstruction, or political transition; obtain and examine the operative agreements rather than relying upon descriptions of them; determine the legal basis upon which United States officials purport to exercise governance, financial, custodial, or proprietary rights involving Venezuelan sovereign assets; and examine whether the Venezuelan parties purporting to authorize these arrangements possessed the constitutional competence to do so.
This inquiry should also address the antecedent question of Venezuelan popular sovereignty. If any undertaking purports to exercise a power that the Venezuelan Constitution reserves to the people, the validity of that authority cannot logically be established merely by pointing to the signature of those presently exercising governmental control.
The principle at stake should apply irrespective of political party. No Democratic or Republican President should acquire powers over another nation’s sovereign resources merely because the United States possesses sufficient economic or military power to make an arrangement effective in practice.
Effective power and lawful authority are different things.
I therefore ask Congress not simply whether current policy toward Venezuela is beneficial, but whether each exercise of American governmental power has been lawfully authorized, whether the Venezuelan constitutional authority upon which it depends actually exists, and whether Congress has permitted executive action to move beyond powers the Constitution assigns to it.
The answer should be established publicly and documentarily, before arrangements of extraordinary duration become accepted as accomplished facts.
Respectfully,
Ricardo F. Morín
LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
September 6, 2026
The following is reproduced as sent.
Ref. Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela
President Donald J. Trump The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I write concerning the constitutional foundations of the United States government’s present actions involving Venezuela, particularly those affecting its petroleum resources, sovereign revenues, reconstruction, and political transition.
This is not a partisan objection, nor is it an argument for the restoration of Nicolás Maduro. It concerns a principle that should bind every American administration regardless of party: the power of the United States does not itself create the legal authority to exercise sovereign powers belonging to another nation.
Your Administration has publicly described a program of stabilization, reconstruction, and democratic transition for Venezuela. It has also announced substantial United States governmental economic and governance rights associated with Venezuelan petroleum resources.
The fundamental constitutional question begins in Venezuela rather than in Washington.
Under Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution, sovereignty resides in the Venezuelan people. Governmental institutions exercise authority emanating from popular sovereignty; governmental institutions do not possess that sovereignty.
The distinction is essential. Effective possession of governmental institutions does not make an administration synonymous with the Nation, nor does recognition by the United States transfer Venezuelan sovereignty to the administration presently exercising governmental control.
Venezuela’s constitutional treatment of natural resources makes the question still more consequential. Hydrocarbon and mineral deposits are constitutionally characterized as public-domain property of the Republic and as inalienable and imprescriptible. The authority of any administration to make commitments concerning those resources must therefore be established from the Venezuelan constitutional order itself.
Private enterprise cannot supply missing sovereign authority. A corporation may invest capital or undertake contractual obligations, but corporate participation cannot confer upon either government a constitutional power that the Venezuelan constitutional order has not granted.
Nor does describing an arrangement as privately financed resolve the separate question of American governmental authority. Where agencies of the United States acquire governance rights, economic interests, control over revenues, rights concerning petroleum production, or responsibilities associated with another nation’s reconstruction and political transition, the source and limits of those United States governmental powers remain matters of constitutional importance.
Executive Order 14373 recognizes that Venezuelan oil revenues held by the United States remain sovereign Venezuelan property rather than property of the United States. That recognition makes the underlying question unavoidable: by what authority may American officials determine the disposition, governance, or economic use of property whose sovereign character the United States itself acknowledges?
I respectfully ask your Administration to make public the complete legal basis for these United States governmental actions, including the constitutional and statutory authority asserted by the United States; the operative agreements creating governmental rights or obligations; the legal basis for the authority claimed by the Venezuelan parties entering those agreements; and the basis for concluding that the agreements are compatible with Venezuelan constitutional sovereignty and applicable international law.
The question is not whether the United States believes that these arrangements will benefit Venezuela. Constitutional government does not derive its legitimacy from a foreign government’s assessment that the arrangements will be beneficial.
Nor should military, economic, or diplomatic predominance be permitted to settle a constitutional question that precedes the exercise of military, economic, or diplomatic power.
The Venezuelan people are the source of Venezuelan sovereignty. Neither an American President nor a Venezuelan administration can substitute itself for the Venezuelan people. Recognition by the United States cannot create Venezuelan constitutional competence, and private investment cannot convert effective control into sovereign authority.
This principle should not depend upon who occupies the White House. The same limitation should bind this Administration and every succeeding administration.
I therefore respectfully ask that the constitutional authority for United States actions already undertaken be disclosed and examined before additional commitments concerning Venezuela’s resources, reconstruction, or governmental transition are made irreversible in practice.
The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform that act.
Respectfully,
Ricardo F. Morín
LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Ref. Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela
September 6, 2026
The following is reproduced as sent.
The Honorable Marco Rubio Secretary of State U.S. Department of State Washington, DC 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I write concerning the constitutional and statutory authority underlying actions you have taken with respect to Venezuela in two distinct capacities: as a signatory to the recently announced petroleum agreement, and as the official whom Executive Order 14373 designates to determine the purposes for which Venezuelan sovereign revenues held by the United States may be disposed.
This is not a partisan objection, nor an argument for restoring Nicolás Maduro. It concerns a principle that should bind every administration regardless of party: the power of the United States does not itself create the legal authority to exercise sovereign powers belonging to another nation.
Executive Order 14373 presents the contradiction directly. The Order identifies the specified funds as property of the Government of Venezuela and states that the United States holds them “solely in a custodial and governmental capacity,” and not as a market participant. Yet it provides that those funds are to be held pending sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to comply with your instructions concerning their disbursement or transfer.
Custody does not confer sovereignty. An Executive Order may assign functions within the Executive Branch, but it cannot, by its own terms, create an authority greater than the constitutional and statutory authority from which it derives. Executive Order 14373 identifies IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, and 3 U.S.C. §301 among its sources of authority, but the Order does not establish how those authorities confer upon a United States cabinet officer Venezuelan sovereign competence to determine governmental purposes for the disposition of property that the Order itself recognizes as belonging to Venezuela. The assertion of that power therefore does not resolve the antecedent question of lawful authority to exercise it.
A related defect arises from the petroleum agreement announced by the White House. The White House describes that agreement as giving the United States government governance rights, economic ownership, and guaranteed rights to purchase Venezuelan oil in connection with concessions covering approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves. Article 12 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that hydrocarbon deposits within the territory and specified maritime areas belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are therefore inalienable and imprescriptible. Article 5 provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.
These provisions do not mean that every commercial interest in petroleum once lawfully produced is itself constitutionally inalienable. They establish the antecedent constitutional question: the authority to create concessions and governmental rights concerning resources belonging to the Republic must itself derive from the Venezuelan constitutional order.
The participation of a private company does not cure that defect. A private contractual act cannot substitute for sovereign competence, nor can a private entity confer upon the United States governmental rights that depend upon authority the Venezuelan constitutional order has not lawfully supplied. The relevant question is not whether private investment may participate in Venezuelan petroleum development, but whether the concessions and governmental rights upon which this arrangement depends were created through constitutionally competent Venezuelan authority.
Effective control of governmental institutions does not itself establish constitutional competence. United States recognition cannot create that competence, and the participation or consent of a private party cannot replace it. Under Article 5, the source of Venezuelan sovereignty remains the Venezuelan people.
Accordingly, the publicly disclosed instruments do not establish the lawful authority necessary for the United States to exercise the sovereign functions described above. Executive assertion cannot supply Venezuelan constitutional competence, and private agreement cannot convert effective control into sovereign authority. If the United States maintains that enacted law and the Venezuelan constitutional order nevertheless authorize these actions, the operative agreements and the specific provisions upon which that position rests should be made public and subjected to examination against the constitutional limitations described here.
The Venezuelan people are the source of Venezuelan sovereignty. Neither a United States official nor a private enterprise can substitute itself for them.
The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.
Respectfully,
Ricardo F. Morín
LETTER TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR
September 6, 2026
The following is reproduced as sent.
Ref. Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela
The Honorable Pete Hegseth Secretary of War U.S. Department of War Washington, DC 20301
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I write concerning the constitutional and statutory authority underlying your Department’s participation in the recently announced petroleum arrangement involving Venezuela, including the 35 percent equity interest that the White House states has been granted to the Office of Strategic Capital.
This is not a partisan objection, nor an argument for restoring Nicolás Maduro. It concerns a principle that should bind every administration regardless of party: the possession of governmental power does not itself establish that its exercise has been lawfully authorized.
The White House states that North American Blue Energy Partners granted your Department’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity stake in its corporate parent, representing what the White House describes as potentially hundreds of billions of dollars in value and dividends for the United States. The fact that a private company purports to grant such an interest does not itself confer statutory authority upon a federal office to accept, hold, administer, or benefit from it.
The statutory framework governing the Office of Strategic Capital makes the defect particularly significant. Section 149 of title 10 defines “capital assistance” as a loan, loan guarantee, or technical assistance and defines an eligible investment by reference to such capital assistance. Its capital-assistance program provides for loans and loan guarantees, together with technical assistance, subject to the conditions Congress prescribed.
Congress subsequently considered the very authority implicated here. The House included in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 a provision that would have provided equity-investment authority for the Office of Strategic Capital. The final congressional agreement did not include that provision. Congress enacted additional authorities for the Office while leaving the proposed equity-investment authority unenacted.
The publicly identified statutory framework therefore does not authorize the 35 percent equity holding described by the White House. An executive office cannot treat its general investment-related responsibilities as equivalent to a specific power to acquire and hold equity where the governing statute defines the forms of capital assistance Congress authorized and Congress considered, but did not enact, an express equity-investment authority. The White House’s assertion that the interest was obtained at no cost to the American taxpayer does not cure that statutory defect. Absence of a purchase price is not an authorization to accept and hold property.
The White House further states that the United States government possesses veto power over appointments to the company’s board of directors and that a majority of the board must consist of United States citizens. It characterizes the interests obtained by the United States as governance rights. These governmental rights cannot derive their legal authority merely from the willingness of a private company to confer them. A private agreement cannot enlarge the statutory powers of a federal agency.
A further and independent defect arises under the constitutional order of Venezuela. Article 12 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that the country’s hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are therefore inalienable and imprescriptible. Article 5 provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.
These provisions do not make every commercial interest in lawfully produced petroleum constitutionally inalienable. They establish that the authority underlying concessions and governmental rights concerning the Republic’s hydrocarbon resources must itself arise within the Venezuelan constitutional order.
The participation of North American Blue Energy Partners does not answer that antecedent question. A private entity may possess contractual rights, investment interests, and commercial capacity; it does not thereby possess sovereign competence to create governmental authority that Venezuelan law has not supplied, nor can its contractual grant enlarge the statutory authority Congress has conferred upon an office of the United States.
Neither effective control of Venezuelan governmental institutions nor recognition by the United States can itself create Venezuelan constitutional competence. Likewise, neither private capital nor a purported private grant can cure the absence of governmental authority on the United States side.
Accordingly, the public legal record does not establish lawful authority for the Office of Strategic Capital to accept and hold the equity interest described by the White House. If the Department maintains that a separate enacted authority defeats that conclusion, the specific statutory provision and the operative agreements upon which that position rests should be made public. The same applies to the Venezuelan authority underlying the concessions and governmental rights upon which the arrangement depends.
The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.
Respectfully,
Ricardo F. Morín
OFFICIAL PUBLIC CONTACT CHANNELS
The letters above record what I have written. The source documents allow readers to examine the underlying government statements for themselves.
Readers may reach their own conclusions. Anyone who independently decides to communicate with the federal government may write in their own words, adapt my correspondence, reproduce it, disagree with it, or take a different position.
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PUBLIC POSITION
The constitutional question does not depend upon whether someone believes the present policy is good or bad for the United States or Venezuela. It should not depend upon which political party controls the government.
The question is more basic: does the government have the legal authority to do what it is doing?
The White House has made consequential claims in public documents. It describes United States government rights involving an ownership stake, oil purchases, appointments to a corporate board, Venezuelan revenues, and a broader program of stabilization, reconstruction, and democratic transition.
Those actions should be measured against the powers that the United States Constitution and federal law actually give the government.
A second question must be answered under Venezuela’s Constitution. The United States cannot give Venezuelan officials powers that Venezuela’s own Constitution does not give them. Nor can a private corporation do so.
Under Venezuela’s Constitution, the Venezuelan people are the source of Venezuelan sovereignty. A foreign government cannot supply that sovereignty, and neither can a private company.
None of this determines in advance what the answers must be. It establishes the questions that should be answered.
Government action should not become lawful merely because the government has enough power to carry it out. Nor should an unresolved question of authority disappear simply because an arrangement has already been put into effect.
That is why I am placing the correspondence and the documents on which it is based before the public.
Observations On Perception 