Posts Tagged ‘Congress’

“Unmasking Disappointment: Series XIX”

October 5, 2026

“Geometric Allegory” digital painting (2023) by Ricardo Morín (American visual artist, born in Venezuela, 1954)

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Scope and Use

This entry forms part of the constitutional corpus presented in the Appendix, comprising the constitutions of Venezuela organized for consultation rather than sequential reading.  Comparison proceeds through permanent rubric codes whose identities remain constant throughout the corpus; absent rubrics signify constitutional silence, while retired rubrics are not reassigned.  Citations are anchored first on the article number and follow the CIDEP recension linked at the close of the entry.  The corpus definition, editorial methodology, and citation convention are set forth in the Scope and Use note introducing the nineteenth-century constitutions in Unmasking Disappointment: Series XI.

17) The Constitution of 1928

The 1928 Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela], dated 22 May 1928 at the Palacio Federal Legislativo [Federal Legislative Palace], Caracas, was ordered executed at the Palacio Federal [Federal Palace], Caracas, on 23 May 1928 by President Juan Vicente Gómez. (CIDEP 1928, p. 23, closing and execution formulas).

DOC-PRE—Preamble

(modern Latinate English translation by the author from the CIDEP recension)

“The Congress of the United States of Venezuela, in the name of Almighty God, and in exercise of the authority conferred upon it by Article 133 of the Federal Pact in force, decrees the present Constitution.”

(CIDEP 1928, p. 3, preamble).

FND-TER—Territory

The Nación Venezolana [Venezuelan Nation] consists of all Venezuelans united in a political pact under the name Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela]; it is permanently and irrevocably free and independent of foreign domination or protection.  The territory is that belonging to the Capitanía General de Venezuela [Captaincy General of Venezuela] before the political transformation of 1810, with modifications resulting from treaties.  No part may be ceded, transferred, leased or otherwise alienated to a foreign power, even temporarily. (Arts. 1–2; cont., 1925, Arts. 1–2).

The national territory is divided into Estados [States], the Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies].  The twenty Estados [States] are Anzoátegui, Apure, Aragua, Bolívar, Carabobo, Cojedes, Falcón, Guárico, Lara, Mérida, Miranda, Monagas, Nueva Esparta, Portuguesa, Sucre, Táchira, Trujillo, Yaracuy, Zamora and Zulia. (Arts. 3–4; cont., 1925, Arts. 3–4).

State boundaries follow the provincial boundaries established by the Law of 28 April 1856, subject to the creation of the Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies], the Constitution of 5 August 1909 and the 1917 agreement between Aragua and Carabobo.  Neighbouring Estados [States] may alter their common boundary through agreements approved by their respective legislatures, including reciprocal territorial compensation or cession. (Art. 5; cont., 1925, Art. 5).

The Distrito Federal [Federal District] comprises the departments Libertador and Vargas.  The text places Caracas and the outlying parishes El Recreo, El Valle, La Vega, Antímano, Macarao and Macuto in Libertador.  A special law organizes the district and determines its municipal powers so that federal political action is not obstructed. (Art. 6; cont., 1925, Art. 6).

Caracas is the capital and seat of federal government, subject to Art. 100, powers 24(b) and 25. (Art. 7; cont., 1925, Art. 7).

Amazonas and Delta Amacuro are Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], organized by special laws.  Their boundaries, and those of the Distrito Federal [Federal District] with neighbouring Estados [States], may be modified by agreements concluded by the Poder Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive Power] and the respective state governments and approved by the Congreso [Congress] and the respective Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies]. (Art. 8; cont., 1925, Art. 8).

A Territorio Federal [Federal Territory] may become a Estado [State] upon attaining the population required for one deputy and proving to the Congreso [Congress] that it can maintain every branch of public service and meet the necessary expenditure. (Art. 9; cont., 1925, Art. 9).

The Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies] comprise the Venezuelan islands in the Caribbean Sea except Margarita and Coche, which constitute Nueva Esparta.  Their government and administration belong directly to the executive until the law elevates them to the category of Territorios Federales [Federal Territories]. (Art. 10; cf. 1925, Art. 10:  “except the island of Margarita, which constitutes the Estado [State] of Nueva Esparta”).

The Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] decides boundary disputes between Estados [States], and those arising between them and the Distrito Federal [Federal District] or Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], through the procedure prescribed by law. (Art. 11; cf. 1925, Art. 11:  “Existing disputes between the Estados [States] concerning their boundaries, and those subsequently arising from the same cause”).

POW-LEG—Congress

The Poder Legislativo [Legislative Power] is exercised by the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela], consisting of the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] and Cámara del Senado [Senate].  Both Diputados [Deputies] and Senadores [Senators] serve three-year terms. (Art. 55; cf. 1925, Art. 55:  “composed of two Chambers, one of Diputados [Deputies] and the other of Senadores [Senators]”).

Each Estado [State] elects Diputados [Deputies] directly under its Ley de Elecciones [Electoral Law], one per 35,000 inhabitants and one additional deputy for an excess of 15,000.  A Estado [State] with fewer than 35,000 inhabitants elects one deputy.  An equal number of Suplentes [Alternates] is elected to fill vacancies in the order of election. (Art. 56; cont., 1925, Art. 56).

The Diputados [Deputies] serve three years and are renewed in their entirety. (Art. 56, final paragraph; cont., 1925, Art. 56, final paragraph).

A deputy must be Venezuelan by birth and have completed twenty-one years of age.  The Distrito Federal [Federal District] and Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] attaining the prescribed population elect Diputados [Deputies] directly under the formalities fixed by law.  The population basis excludes indígenas no reducidos [unreduced Indigenous people]. (Arts. 57–58; cont., 1925, Arts. 57–58).

The Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] may give a voto de censura [vote of censure] to Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers] whose acts it considers to warrant it.  The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] is not obliged to remove them until the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] declares that legal grounds exist for putting them on trial.  Other powers may be assigned by law. (Art. 59; cont., 1925, Art. 59).

Each state Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] elects, from outside its own membership, two principal Senadores [Senators] and two Suplentes [Alternates], the latter filling vacancies in election order.  A senator must be Venezuelan by birth and over thirty years of age. (Arts. 60–61; cont., 1925, Arts. 60–61).

Art. 60 ends with the order for filling vacancies.  The senatorial term is stated in Art. 55. (Arts. 55, 60; cf. 1925, Art. 60:  “The Senadores [Senators] shall serve for three years and shall be renewed in their entirety.”).

The Cámara del Senado [Senate] may authorize the transfer of the remains of illustrious Venezuelans to the Panteón Nacional [National Pantheon] after twenty-five years from their death; consent to national officials accepting gifts, offices, honours or rewards from foreign governments; and consent to military promotions from Coronel [Colonel] and naval promotions from Capitán de Navío [Naval Captain], inclusive. (Art. 62(1–3); cont., 1925, Art. 62(1–3)).

The Cámara del Senado [Senate] also has the powers assigned to it by law. (Art. 62(4); cont., 1925, Art. 62(4)).

The Cámaras Legislativas [Legislative Chambers] meet annually in the capital on 19 April or the nearest possible day, without prior convocation.  Ordinary sessions last ninety days and cannot be extended; every day and hour within that period is available for ordinary sessions.  Extraordinary sessions convened by the executive address the matters specified in the convocation and connected legislation requiring amendment. (Art. 63; cont., 1925, Art. 63).

Opening sessions require two-thirds of the membership; those present without that number form a Comisión Preparatoria [Preparatory Commission] and take measures to secure attendance.  Subsequent sessions require an absolute majority.  Sessions are public unless the respective Chamber resolves that they shall be secret. (Arts. 64–65; cont., 1925, Arts. 64–65).

Each Chamber adopts its Reglamento Interior y de Debates [Rules of Internal Procedure and Debate], disciplines infringements, controls order in its building, corrects or punishes disorderly spectators, removes impediments to its lawful functions, executes its exclusive resolutions, determines the qualifications of its members and receives their resignations.  Both Chambers sit in the same town and open and close sessions on the same day and hour; suspension or relocation requires the other Chamber’s consent, with disagreements decided in joint session. (Arts. 66–67; cont., 1925, Arts. 66–67).

During sessions, any public office is incompatible with membership of either Chamber.  Remuneration is fixed by law and may be increased only for the following term. (Arts. 68–69; cont., 1925, Arts. 68–69).

Legislative inmunidad [immunity] runs from thirty days before 19 April until thirty days after the close of sessions.  Members cannot be imprisoned, arrested, confined, detained or obstructed in their functions, even upon committing an offence during that period.  Where the alleged offence carries a pena corporal [penalty restricting personal liberty], the sumario [preliminary criminal investigation] is stayed during immunity, while investigative steps continue.  Members need not answer claims, take oaths or answer judicial interrogatories during the same period, which is excluded from procedural time limits.  The Chambers cannot waive this immunity. (Art. 70; cont., 1925, Art. 70).

Art. 70(1) states the exclusion of Art. 32(15)(c) with the qualification “with respect to the duration of the sumario [preliminary criminal investigation]”. (Art. 70(1); cf. 1925, Art. 70(1):  “without the provision contained in letter c), guarantee 15, Article 32 of this Constitution applying in this case”).

Members are not responsible for opinions expressed in their Chambers.  They cannot make contracts with the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] on their own or another’s behalf, or pursue others’ claims before it. (Arts. 71–72; cont., 1925, Arts. 71–72).

When the list of senatorial Suplentes [Alternates] is exhausted or reduced by death or another permanent vacancy, the respective Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] fills it for the remainder of the legislative term.  State constitutions and the Ley Orgánica del Distrito Federal [Organic Law of the Federal District] determine how vacancies in the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] are filled. (Art. 73; cf. 1925, Art. 73:  “for the remainder of the replaced member’s or members’ term”).

The Chambers act separately but sit jointly when the Constitution or laws require it, or when one invites the other and the latter agrees and fixes the meeting time.  Their separate acts as co-legislators are Leyes [Laws]; acts adopted jointly, or separately on matters exclusive to one Chamber, are Acuerdos [Resolutions].  The presiding officer of the Cámara del Senado [Senate] presides over the Congreso [Congress], and that of the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] serves as its vice-president. (Arts. 74–76; cont., 1925, Arts. 74–76).

In joint session the Congreso [Congress] conducts the elections assigned to it, receives the resignation of the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic], examines the annual Mensaje [Message], approves or disapproves ministerial Memorias y Cuentas [Reports and Accounts], admits qualifying Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] as Estados [States], and examines Créditos Adicionales [Additional Appropriations] for compliance with the constitutional procedure. (Art. 77; cont., 1925, Art. 77).

As co-legislators the Chambers decree national taxes and loans, regulate national debt, create and suppress national offices, legislate on federal administration and currency, and authorize the disposal of nationally owned immovable property.  Compulsory circulation of banknotes or any paper representation of value is prohibited, and the patrón de oro [gold standard] must be maintained.  Weights and measures follow the metric decimal system. (Art. 78(1–4, 7–8); cont., 1925, Art. 78(1–4, 7–8)).

Treaties and diplomatic conventions require legislative approval before ratification or exchange.  The approving law receives the Ejecútese [Let it be executed] only when the other party’s acceptance is established; official publication follows ratification and exchange.  Contracts for railways, aerial haulage cables, telegraphic or wireless communications, immigration and other authorized matters of national interest require legislative approval.  concesiones mineras [mining concessions] and titles to tierras baldías [ungranted public lands] granted under their respective laws are exempt from that approval. (Art. 78(5–6); cont., 1925, Art. 78(5–6)).

The Chambers enact the Ley de Presupuesto General de Rentas y Gastos Públicos [General Revenue and Public Expenditure Budget Law], fixing federal salaries and expenditure for the fiscal year.  Outside that law, they cannot order another specified expenditure through a special law or resolution.  They examine and approve the Censo Nacional [National Census], prescribe the special administration of Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], and increase the population basis for electing Diputados [Deputies] when the approved census requires it. (Art. 78(9–12); cont., 1925, Art. 78(9–12)).

General laws govern civil pensions, retirement benefits and montepíos militares [military survivors’ pension funds] payable by the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury].  The budget supplies aggregate appropriations, distributed by the executive through the competent minister under the law.  The Chambers decree war, require peace negotiations, legislate on recruitment and replacement of land and sea forces, grant amnistías [amnesties], and legislate on the security of ports and coasts. (Art. 78(13–17); cont., 1925, Art. 78(13–17)).

Legislative powers include the Censo electoral [Electoral Register], Instrucción Pública [Public Instruction], Hacienda Nacional [National Public Finance Administration], air, maritime and river navigation, docks, Correos [Postal Services], Telégrafos [Telegraphs], wireless communications, railways, national roads and motor traffic, tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], salinas [saltworks], pearl fishing and mines, together with the subjects listed in Art. 15(4) and other matters of federal competence. (Art. 78(18–19); cont., 1925, Art. 78(18–19)).

A bill may originate in either Chamber upon presentation by at least three of its members, or through the minister responsible for a proposal from the executive.  After admission it receives three discussions separated by at least one day.  The other Chamber follows the same procedure and returns any amendments.  If disagreement persists after written reasons from the originating Chamber, joint session decides disputed and connected articles by majority vote and may adopt a different wording. (Arts. 79–82; cont., 1925, Arts. 79–82).

Rejected bills cannot be presented again until the following year or later.  Bills left pending at the close of sessions require a new presentation and all discussions in a subsequent year.  An amending law must reproduce its entire text and repeal the previous law in full; repeal follows the same formalities as enactment. (Arts. 83–84, 86–87; cont., 1925, Arts. 83–84, 86–87).

The legislative formula is the name of the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] followed by “Decrees:”.  Enacted texts are prepared in duplicate without alterations, signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of the Congreso [Congress], and dated with final approval.  One copy goes to the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] for countersignature with the competent ministers and official publication.  Printing errors require corrected republication or a ministerially certified errata notice. (Arts. 85, 88–89; cont., 1925, Arts. 85, 88–89).

A law takes effect on its stated date or, if none is stated, upon official publication.  Legislative power cannot be delegated.  Legislation is not retroactive except where it imposes a lesser penalty.  Procedural laws apply immediately to pending cases; in criminal cases, evidence already taken is assessed under the law in force when it was offered insofar as that benefits the accused. (Arts. 90–92; cont., 1925, Arts. 90–92).

ECO-TES—Treasury

The federal authorities have competence over Aduanas [Customs Houses], import duties and duties on foreign goods passing through to foreign destinations.  The Impuesto Territorial [Territorial Tax] remains payable at Aduanas [Customs Houses] until abolished by law and enters the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury].  Exports are free of tax.  Federal revenues include estampillas o timbres fiscales [fiscal stamps or revenue stamps], cigarettes, tobacco, registration, inheritance, matches, spirits, liquors and other taxes established as national taxes by law. (Art. 15(14, 17); cont., 1925, Art. 15(14, 17)).

The Situado Constitucional [Constitutional Revenue Allocation] equals twelve per cent of total revenue, calculated for each fiscal year from receipts in the immediately preceding calendar year and included annually in the national expenditure budget.  It is distributed among the Estados [States], Distrito Federal [Federal District] and Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] in proportion to population. (Art. 17(4)(1); cf. 1925, Art. 17(4)(1):  “The sum thus fixed shall be distributed among all the Estados [States] in proportion to their population”).

Art. 17(4)(1) states the twelve-per-cent allocation without the initial three-year provision for a fixed annual sum. (Art. 17(4)(1); cf. 1925, Art. 17(4)(1):  “in the sum of ten million bolívares per year […] After this Constitution has been in force for three years”).

State revenues also include the tax on papel sellado [stamped paper], consumption taxes and contributions established by their Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies].  papel sellado [stamped paper] cannot be demanded for assessment or payment of national taxes, or used to collect prohibited contributions.  Estados [States] cannot create Aduanas [Customs Houses], levy import or export duties, tax foreign goods in transit abroad, invade national or municipal tax subjects, tax interstate transit, tax goods before they are offered for consumption, prohibit consumption of goods from elsewhere, discriminate against such goods, require federal tax officials to collect state taxes, or impose payment in personal labour or its monetary equivalent. (Art. 17(4)(2–3); cont., 1925, Art. 17(4)(2–3)).

Municipal revenue powers carry the restrictions in Art. 17(4)(3).  patentes [business licence taxes] on agriculture, livestock raising and the catching of edible fish are prohibited at municipal, state and national levels.  Estados [States] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] cannot contract loans abroad. (Arts. 18(3), 24; cont., 1925, Arts. 18(3), 24).

No tax may be collected without legal authorization.  Expenditure from the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] requires an appropriation in the Ley de Presupuesto General de Rentas y Gastos Públicos [General Revenue and Public Expenditure Budget Law] or a previously decreed Crédito Adicional [Additional Appropriation].  Officials who contravene this rule are civilly liable to the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] for the amounts paid. (Art. 48; cf. 1925, Art. 48:  “in the Presupuesto General de Gastos Públicos [General Public Expenditure Budget]”).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic], in the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers], may decree Créditos Adicionales [Additional Appropriations] when a budget chapter is insufficient or an expense was not foreseen, provided available funds cover them without impairing ordinary expenditure, which takes precedence.  The Congreso [Congress] examines compliance with these conditions.  Ministers account for funds handled; the minister responsible for national revenues prepares the budget bill in consultation with the others. (Arts. 100(30), 77(6), 109; cont., 1925, Arts. 100(30), 77(6), 109).

Each Estado [State] retains ownership of its salinas [saltworks], tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], their products, ostrales de perlas [pearl-oyster beds] and mines, while administration belongs to the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive].  The resulting revenue, including sales of tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], enters the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury].  salinas [saltworks] are inalienable.  tierras baldías [ungranted public lands] on maritime, river and lake islands cannot be alienated, and their use cannot directly or indirectly transfer ownership. (Art. 15(18); cont., 1925, Art. 15(18)).

concesiones mineras [mining concessions] are temporary.  Laws governing the sale, lease or gratuitous grant of tierras baldías [ungranted public lands] must establish a derecho de preferencia [right of preference] for occupants. (Art. 15(18); cf. 1925, Art. 15(18):  “that concesiones mineras [mining concessions] shall not be perpetual”).

The occupant-preference clause occurs in Art. 15(18) of the 1928 recension; it does not occur in Art. 15(18) of the 1925 recension.

POW-EXE—Executive

Federal administration not assigned by the Constitution to another authority belongs to the Poder Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive Power], exercised by the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela].  The laws determine the federal employees and agents through whom administration operates; assistance may be required from state governments in constitutionally permitted cases. (Arts. 93–94; cf. 1925, Art. 93:  “in conjunction with the Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers]”).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] must be Venezuelan by birth, over thirty, of estado seglar [lay status] and in possession of all civil and political rights. (Art. 95; cont., 1925, Art. 95).

Arts. 95–99 provide for the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] and ministerial substitution; they contain no office of Vicepresidente de la República [Vice-President of the Republic]. (Arts. 95–99; cf. 1925, Art. 95:  “There shall also be a Vicepresidente de la República [Vice-President of the Republic], who must meet the same conditions required for the President.”).

Within the first fifteen days of its installation in the year beginning the constitutional term, the Congreso [Congress] elects the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic].  The election sitting is fixed at least five days in advance and the notice is officially published.  The oath is taken before the Congreso [Congress], or before the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] if circumstances prevent the former. (Arts. 96, 99; cf. 1925, Art. 96:  “to elect the Presidente y Vicepresidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President and Vice-President of the United States of Venezuela]”).

A temporary presidential absence is filled by the Ministro del Despacho [Cabinet Minister] designated by the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic].  Upon a permanent vacancy, the Congreso [Congress] elects a replacement for the remainder of the term.  Until that person takes office, the minister already acting continues; if none is acting, the Gabinete [Cabinet] chooses a minister by majority vote.  If the Congreso [Congress] is not in ordinary session, the acting minister convenes extraordinary sessions. (Art. 97; cf. 1925, Art. 98:  “Temporary and permanent absences of the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] shall be filled by the Vicepresidente de la República [Vice-President of the Republic]”).

Absence from the capital within national territory is not a temporary absence from office.  From any place in the country, the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] may instruct ministers concerning resolutions to be issued in the capital and receive foreign diplomatic ministers. (Art. 98; cf. 1925, Art. 98:  “is not obliged to leave the exercise of office merely through absence from the capital”).

Federal constitutional terms last seven years and are counted from 19 April 1922.  Presidential service runs from the oath until 19 April in the year when the term ends.  On that date the executive is delivered to a member or alternate of the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] designated by that Court under Art. 120(17), pending the accession of the elected successor. (Arts. 54, 103, 120(17); cf. 1925, Art. 103:  “the Presidente de la Corte Federal y de Casación [President of the Federal and Cassation Court] shall take charge of the executive power”).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] appoints and removes Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers], receives foreign diplomatic ministers, signs official letters to heads of state, administers the Distrito Federal [Federal District] and Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], and may designate a Ministro del Despacho [Cabinet Minister] to exercise the presidency temporarily and resume office during the constitutional term. (Art. 100(1–6); cf. 1925, Art. 100(6):  “To call the Vicepresidente de la República [Vice-President of the Republic] to exercise the presidency when he considers it appropriate”).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] orders the Constitution and laws executed and published; issues implementing Decretos [Decrees] and Reglamentos [Regulations] in the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] without altering the laws’ spirit, purpose or reason; negotiates legislatively authorized loans through the appropriate minister with Gabinete [Cabinet] approval; regulates public or private health, postal, telegraph and telephone services in the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers]; and orders the census and submits it for legislative approval. (Art. 100(7–11); cont., 1925, Art. 100(7–11)).

Through the appropriate ministers, the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] issues patentes de navegación [navigation licences] and nationality certificates, appoints national officials whose selection belongs to no other official and removes them, and administers national revenues.  In the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers], the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] creates and funds necessary public services during legislative recess.  With Gabinete [Cabinet] approval, the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] orders the Ministerio Público Federal [Federal Public Ministry] to prosecute officials where grounds exist and convenes the Congreso [Congress] extraordinarily.  War is declared after the Congreso [Congress] has decreed it. (Art. 100(12–19); cont., 1925, Art. 100(12–19)).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] conducts diplomatic negotiations personally or through the competent minister, and concludes treaties through chosen plenipotentiaries with Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] approval and subsequent legislative approval.  Treaties cannot impair Arts. 37–39 and must provide for arbitramento [arbitration] of differences over interpretation or execution.  Authorized contracts of national interest are made through the competent ministers with Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] approval and submitted to the Congreso [Congress].  Entry of foreigners may be prohibited and expulsion ordered in cases permitted by international law or national legislation. (Art. 100(20–22); cont., 1925, Art. 100(20–22)).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] directs war, commands the Ejército [Army] and Armada [Navy] personally or appoints their commander, organizes the Ejército [Army] and Milicia Nacional [National Militia] under the law, and fixes the strength of land and sea forces. (Art. 100(23); cont., 1925, Art. 100(23)).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] decrees suspension of garantías constitucionales [constitutional guarantees] in the cases specified in Art. 36.  During civil or international war, additional powers permit requesting state assistance, temporarily relocating federal powers, ordering prosecution for traición a la Patria [treason against the Nation], reorganizing Estados [States] controlled by rebels or participating in rebellion, and issuing patentes de corso [letters of marque] and authorizing represalias [reprisals]. (Art. 100(24); cont., 1925, Art. 100(24)).

During an official visit with some or all Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers] to Estados [States] or Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], the seat of the Poder Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive Power] is the place where the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] is located; the visit decree regulates routine administration in Caracas.  The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] may use the fuerza pública [public force] to end armed conflict between Estados [States] after good offices fail, exercise functions delegated by state constitutions, grant indultos [pardons], and order the issue of titles granting or leasing tierras baldías [ungranted public lands] and concesiones mineras [mining concessions]. (Art. 100(25–29); cf. 1925, Art. 100(25):  “together with all or some of the Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers] and the Secretario general [Secretary-General]”).

The annual Mensaje [Message] is presented personally or through a minister within the first ten days of ordinary sessions and accounts for acts of administration and the condition of the Republic. (Art. 101, first paragraph; cf. 1925, Art. 101:  “and shall indicate the improvements which, in his judgment, it would be appropriate to adopt in the legislation in force”).

In the final year of the presidential term, the Mensaje [Message] is presented on 19 April or left signed with the acting president for transmission when the Congreso [Congress] meets. (Art. 101, final paragraph; new).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] is responsible only for traición a la Patria [treason against the Nation] and ordinary offences. (Art. 102; cf. 1925, Art. 102:  “The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] or whoever acts in his stead is responsible only for traición a la Patria [treason against the Nation] and ordinary offences.”).

The Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers] are the legally required organs through which presidential powers are exercised.  The law fixes their functions and organizes their departments.  Presidential decrees require countersignature by the competent ministers, who issue the resolutions and orders within the presidential powers.  Without that requirement presidential dispositions have no effect, except ministerial appointments and designation of an acting minister under Art. 100(6).  A freely appointed and removable Gobernador del Distrito Federal [Governor of the Federal District] is the presidential organ for administration of the Distrito Federal [Federal District]. (Arts. 104–105; cf. 1925, Art. 104:  “The President’s acts shall have no effect without that requirement.”).

A Ministro del Despacho [Cabinet Minister] must be Venezuelan by birth, over thirty and in possession of civil and political rights.  Decisions are taken in the Gabinete [Cabinet] when the Constitution or laws require it or the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] convenes it because of the matter’s importance.  Otherwise, the competent minister or ministers countersign or execute the presidential decision. (Arts. 106–107; cf. 1925, Art. 106:  “To be a Ministro del Despacho [Cabinet Minister] and Secretario general [Secretary-General]”).

Arts. 104–107 contain the ministerial provisions without the office of Secretario general [Secretary-General] provided in the antecedent charter. (Arts. 104–107; cf. 1925, Art. 105:  “The Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] shall also have a Secretario general [Secretary-General]”).

Ministers’ acts must conform to the Constitution and laws.  Their personal responsibility is not excused by presidential orders, even written orders; responsibility for acts resolved in the Gabinete [Cabinet] is joint.  Ministers submit reasoned and documented Memorias y Cuentas [Reports and Accounts] within the first ten days of annual sessions.  Ministers may speak in the Chambers and must attend when summoned to provide information. (Arts. 108, 109 (first paragraph), 110; cont., 1925, Arts. 108, 109 (first paragraph), 110).

In the final presidential year, ministers present their Memorias y Cuentas [Reports and Accounts] on 19 April or, if the Cámaras Legislativas [Legislative Chambers] have not yet assembled, leave them with the acting president for transmission when the Congreso [Congress] meets. (Art. 109, final paragraph; new).

POW-JUD—Judiciary

The Poder Judicial [Judicial Power] resides in the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] and the other courts established by law.  Jueces Federales [Federal Judges] are appointed for a fixed period and cannot be removed during it except in cases prescribed by law. (Arts. 116–117; cont., 1925, Arts. 116–117).

The Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] consists of seven Vocales [Members of the Court], Venezuelans by birth, over thirty and lawyers of the Republic, serving seven years.  At the end of their term they remain until their replacements take office.  The Court acts in Salas [Divisions of the Court], whose membership is fixed by law. (Art. 118; cf. 1925, Art. 118:  “who shall hold office for seven years”).

The Congreso [Congress] elects each of the seven Vocales [Members of the Court] separately by absolute majority during the first thirty days of sessions in the year beginning the constitutional term.  At the same sitting it elects seven numbered Suplentes [Alternates], who fill temporary and permanent vacancies in that order.  The Court fills incidental absences under the law.  The Congreso [Congress] completes a depleted list of Suplentes [Alternates], placing the new appointees at its end; successive excuses from service without resignation are treated as incidental absences. (Art. 119; cf. 1925, Art. 119:  “Incidental absences shall be filled as the law provides.”).

The Court hears accusations against the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] or acting president, Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers], the Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation], the Gobernador del Distrito Federal [Governor of the Federal District] and its own members, and against state presidents and other high state officials designated by state law.  It hears civil and criminal cases involving diplomatic officials where international law permits, and criminal cases concerning Venezuelan diplomatic agents’ misconduct abroad. (Art. 120(1–4); cont., 1925, Art. 120(1–4)).

Its jurisdiction includes the recurso de casación [appeal in cassation], other appeals assigned by law, causas de presas [prize cases], disputes among the specified political officials and federal or state entities, and conflicts of judicial competence where no other authority exists to decide them. (Art. 120(5–8); cont., 1925, Art. 120(5–8)).

The Court declares the nulidad [nullity] of national or state laws conflicting with the Constitution, limiting nullity to the conflicting provisions unless their connection with the rest requires invalidation of the whole law.  It determines which national or state law, or which conflicting provisions of one law, must prevail.  It annuls legislative or executive acts violating state rights or autonomy and state or municipal acts violating the specified restrictions on revenue powers. (Art. 120(9–11); cont., 1925, Art. 120(9–11)).

The Court annuls executive Decretos [Decrees] and Reglamentos [Regulations] that alter the spirit, reason or purpose of laws, and acts within Arts. 42–43 issued by national authorities, authorities of the Distrito Federal [Federal District] or high state officials.  A ministerial resolution concerning execution, interpretation or lapse of a federal contract requires the procedure in Art. 120(13). (Art. 120(12); cont., 1925, Art. 120(12)).

In juicio contencioso [contentious proceedings], the Court decides disputes between the Nation and contractors or concessionaires concerning nullity, lapse, termination, scope, interpretation or performance of federal contracts, concesiones mineras [mining concessions] and grants of tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], including refusals of titles claimed as due.  Matters reserved by the law applicable at the time to executive decision without judicial recourse remain excepted.  Subject to treaties and statutory conditions, the Court gives foreign judgments enforceable effect and hears statutory claims for damages and other monetary claims against the Nation. (Art. 120(13–15); cont., 1925, Art. 120(13–15)).

The Court decides the boundary disputes specified in Art. 11. (Art. 120(16); cf. 1925, Art. 120(16):  “To decide boundary disputes arising between the Estados [States] of the Union under Article 11.”).

On 19 April at the beginning of each federal term, the Court designates a principal member or alternate to take charge of the executive under Art. 103.  A principal member leaves the Court upon taking executive office.  The person designated continues until the elected Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] takes office, even if the Court is renewed in the meantime. (Art. 120(17); new).

Other matters of federal competence may be assigned to the Court by the Constitution and laws. (Art. 120(18); cont., 1925, Art. 120(17)).

For accusations under Art. 120(1–2), the Court summarily decides whether there are grounds for formación de causa [commencement of criminal proceedings], considering the evidence submitted and evidence it orders obtained.  An affirmative decision suspends the official during the case; a negative decision ends proceedings.  Ordinary offences pass to the competent ordinary court, while political offences remain before the Court through final judgment.  The Court sends the Congreso [Congress] an annual report of its work and proposed legislative reforms. (Arts. 121–122; cont., 1925, Arts. 121–122).

Federal judicial competence includes the Court’s assigned cases, ordinary justice in the Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies], and Tribunales Federales [Federal Courts] acting even within Estados [States] in cases involving the Nation, military proceedings, tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], mines, salinas [saltworks], federal taxation and other cases determined by law.  The law may entrust federal judicial functions to Tribunales de los Estados [State Courts]. (Art. 15(7); cf. 1925, Art. 15(7), final clause:  “in the cases just mentioned”).

The Ministerio Público Federal [Federal Public Ministry] represents the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] before federal and state courts when required by the Constitution and laws.  It is headed by the Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation], freely appointed and removable by the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic], with subordinate appointments governed by law.  It supervises lawful application in criminal cases and cases involving the Fisco Nacional [National Fisc], public order or public morals; supplies legal opinions to the executive or the Court; exercises the Ministerio Fiscal [Prosecutorial Office] in Art. 120(1–3) cases; and represents the Nation in litigation.  The Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation] follows lawful executive instructions transmitted through the competent ministry. (Arts. 111–115; cont., 1925, Arts. 111–115).

At the request of the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive], the Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation] brings accusations before the competent authority against federal officials whose conduct gives grounds for prosecution. (Art. 114(3); cont., 1925, Art. 114(3)).

POW-SUB—Subnational Government

The Estados [States] recognize one another’s autonomy and political equality and retain soberanía [sovereignty] not delegated by the Constitution.  Their first duty and that of the Federation is preservation of national independence and integrity.  They cannot break national unity, ally with foreign powers, request their protection or cede territory to them.  National and state government is republican, federal, democratic, elective, representative, responsible and alternating. (Arts. 12–13; cont., 1925, Arts. 12–13).

The Estados [States] are divided into Distritos [Districts] with autonomía municipal [municipal autonomy], independent of state political power in their administrative affairs within constitutional restrictions.  During foreign or internal war, a state executive may assume district administration under the state constitution. (Art. 14; cont., 1925, Art. 14).

The Estados [States] adopt constitutions and laws organizing their public powers, elect those powers under their constitutions and laws, and may delegate specified functions to the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic].  They may retain or change their names.  They administer civil and criminal justice through their own courts except in matters reserved to federal judges; their judgments are reviewed only by the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] through the remedies and with the effects prescribed by law. (Art. 17(1–3, 5); cont., 1925, Art. 17(1–3, 5)).

The Municipalidades [Municipalities] organize police, food supplies, cemeteries, municipal ornamentation, civil architecture, street lighting, aqueducts, urban tramways and other municipal services.  They administer ejidos [municipal common lands] and other municipal lands, which cannot thereafter be alienated except for construction. (Art. 18(1–2); cont., 1925, Art. 18(1–2)).

Hygiene services follow federal health laws and regulations and remain “under the inspection of the federal sanitary service”. (Art. 18(1); cf. 1925, Art. 18(1):  “under the supreme inspection of the federal sanitary service”).

The Estados [States] must comply with and execute the federal Constitution, laws and lawful federal orders.  The Estados [States] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] give full faith and execution to public and judicial acts from federal authorities, other Estados [States] and the Distrito Federal [Federal District]. (Arts. 16, 19; cf. 1925, Art. 19:  “emanating from federal authorities or the other Estados [States]”).

Federal judges, public prosecutors, administrative and revenue officials, and forces assigned to borders, public peace, garrisons, arsenals, coasts and ports may operate within the Estados [States].  Their jurisdiction is limited to their functions; they have no special personal jurisdiction or privilege distinguishing them from other residents.  Estados [States] cannot impose duties incompatible with their federal service.  The federal government may build the works needed for its administration. (Arts. 20–21; cont., 1925, Arts. 20–21).

The Estados [States] must prevent recruitment or levies intended to attack another nation’s peace, liberty or independence, or disturb internal peace.  They cannot make war on one another and must remain neutral in disputes among other Estados [States] until required to act by the federal government. (Arts. 22–23; cont., 1925, Arts. 22–23).

Two or more Estados [States] may unite to form a single Estado [State], while retaining the freedom to recover their autonomy.  In either case they notify the federal executive, the Congreso [Congress] and the other Estados [States]. (Art. 25; cf. 1925, Art. 25:  “but always retaining the freedom to recover their status as Estados [States]”).

Official acts and documents of the Nation, Estados [States], Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] must carry the calendar date and the years of Independence, counted from 19 April 1810, and Federation, counted from 20 February 1859. (Art. 26; cf. 1925, Art. 26:  “of the Nation and of the Estados [States]”).

Poder Público [Public Power] is distributed among federal, state and municipal authorities within constitutional limits.  The Poder Federal [Federal Power] is divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. (Art. 51; cont., 1925, Art. 51).

CON-AMD—Amending the Constitution

Total or partial reform is declared by the Congreso [Congress] in ordinary sessions upon requests from three-quarters of the state Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies], likewise meeting in ordinary sessions.  Amendments and additions may address only points upon which a majority of Estados [States] agree. (Art. 123; cont., 1925, Art. 123).

Amendments and additions follow the procedure for enacting laws.  Once the Congreso [Congress] approves them, its presiding officer submits them to the Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] for final ratification. (Arts. 124–125; cont., 1925, Arts. 124–125).

The Congreso [Congress] may also initiate amendments or additions under the procedure in Arts. 124–125; they are enacted upon ratification by two-thirds of the state Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies].  Whether the initiative originated in the Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] or the Cámaras Legislativas [Legislative Chambers], the final state votes return to the Congreso [Congress] for scrutiny. (Arts. 126–127; cf. 1925, Art. 126:  “by the procedure indicated in the preceding Article”).

CIV-SUF—Suffrage

The right of sufragio [suffrage] makes Venezuelans over twenty-one who are not subject to interdicción [judicial interdiction] or a criminal conviction involving inhabilitación política [political disqualification] electors and eligible for public office, subject to constitutional restrictions and statutory requirements of competence or capacity for particular offices. (Art. 32(12); cont., 1925, Art. 32(12)).

State constitutions must provide direct, secret voting for Concejos Municipales [Municipal Councils], Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] and Diputados [Deputies], using the Censo electoral [Electoral Register] under federal law.  Diputados [Deputies] are directly elected; Senadores [Senators] are chosen by the state Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] from outside their membership.  The Congreso [Congress] elects the members and alternates of the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court]. (Arts. 17(1), 56, 58, 60, 119; cont., 1925, Arts. 17(1), 56, 58, 60, 119).

The Congreso [Congress] elects the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic]. (Art. 96; cf. 1925, Art. 96:  “to elect the Presidente y Vicepresidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President and Vice-President of the United States of Venezuela]”).

The constitutional age requirement is completion of twenty-one years for a deputy and age over thirty for a senator.  The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] must be over thirty, Venezuelan by birth, of estado seglar [lay status] and in possession of civil and political rights. (Arts. 57, 61, 95; cont., 1925, Arts. 57, 61, 95).

Troops must remain in barracks during electoral periods. (Art. 47; cont., 1925, Art. 47).

CIV-CIT—Citizenship

Venezuelan nacionalidad [nationality] belongs by birth and is acquired by naturalización [naturalization].  Those born in national territory and children of Venezuelan parents, wherever born, are Venezuelan by birth. (Arts. 27–28; cont., 1925, Arts. 27–28).

Art. 29(1) includes adult children born abroad to a father and mother who are Venezuelan by naturalización [naturalization], if they establish domicile in the country and declare their intention to be Venezuelan. (Art. 29(1); cf. 1925, Art. 29(1):  “of a father or mother who are Venezuelan by naturalización [naturalization]”).

This comparison records the conjunction printed in each CIDEP recension; it does not establish whether the variant originated in the enacted instrument or in its reproduction.

The remaining categories are persons born in the Ibero-American republics who establish residence and declare their intention to be Venezuelan; foreigners obtaining a carta de naturaleza [certificate of naturalization] under the law; and a foreign woman married to a Venezuelan while the marriage subsists, or who, within one year after its dissolution, declares her intention to remain Venezuelan. (Art. 29(2–4); cont., 1925, Art. 29(2–4)).

The declarations under Art. 29(1), (2) and (4) are made before the Registrador Principal [Principal Registrar] for the jurisdiction where the person establishes domicile.  The declaration is entered in the Protocolo [Register] and copied to the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] for official publication after the procedures required by law.  nacionalidad [nationality] is not acquired before that publication. (Art. 30; cf. 1925, Art. 30:  “The declarations of intention referred to in the preceding Article”).

Venezuelans must defend the country and obey the Constitution, laws and lawful implementing orders.  They cannot undertake service against Venezuela and, if they do, are punishable as traitors under the law.  The law fixes foreigners’ rights and duties, which cannot exceed those of Venezuelans.  Foreigners participating in Venezuelan political contests incur the same responsibilities as Venezuelans and the measures specified by the charter. (Arts. 31, 37–38; cont., 1925, Arts. 31, 37–38).

Neither nationals nor foreigners may claim compensation from the Nation, Estados [States] or Municipalidades [Municipalities] for damage, loss or expropriation not carried out by legitimate authorities acting in their public capacity. (Art. 39; cont., 1925, Art. 39).

RTS-GAR—Rights

Life is inviolable, and no law or authority may establish or impose the pena de muerte [death penalty].  Property is subject to lawful contributions and taking for works of public utility through juicio contradictorio [adversarial proceeding] and indemnización previa [prior compensation], under the law.  Owners must obey legislation on public hygiene, conservation of forests and waters, and comparable community requirements. (Art. 32(1–2); cf. 1925, Art. 32(2):  “a prior juicio contradictorio [adversarial proceeding] and compensation”).

Postal and telegraphic correspondence and private papers are inviolable; seizure requires a competent judicial order and legal formalities, preserving secrecy for domestic and private matters unrelated to the case.  The home may be entered only to prevent the commission or completion of an offence, execute lawful judicial decisions or carry out lawful sanitary visits. (Art. 32(3–4); cont., 1925, Art. 32(3–4)).

Personal liberty includes abolition of reclutamiento forzoso [compulsory recruitment], with military service governed by law; permanent prohibition of slavery and freedom for any enslaved person entering the country; liberty to do what harms no one else; and freedom from obligations not legally imposed or prohibitions not established by law. (Art. 32(5); cont., 1925, Art. 32(5)).

Thought may be expressed orally, in writing or through the press, subject to legal penalties for injuria [insult], calumnia [calumny], difamación [defamation], ultraje [outrage] and instigación a delinquir [incitement to commit offences].  Propaganda of communism is prohibited. (Art. 32(6); cf. 1925, Art. 32(6):  “the offences of injuria [insult], calumnia [calumny], difamación [defamation] or ultraje [outrage]”).

Persons may travel without a passport, change domicile subject to legal formalities, leave and return to the Republic, and take and bring their property.  Work and industry are free subject to public order and public morals.  Industrial monopolies are prohibited, subject to the temporary privileges expressly permitted by Art. 32(8). (Art. 32(7–8); cont., 1925, Art. 32(7–8)).

Unarmed public or private assembly is free from coercion by the authorities; association remains subject to statutory restrictions and prohibitions.  Petitions to public officials or official bodies carry a right to timely reply.  Officials who violate their duties may be accused before competent courts.  Freedom of teaching is guaranteed. (Art. 32(9–11, 13); cont., 1925, Art. 32(9–11, 13)).

No person may be imprisoned for debt not arising from an offence or tried by specially created tribunals or commissions instead of their Jueces naturales [legally competent judges] under pre-existing law.  Arrest or detention requires a información sumaria [preliminary evidentiary inquiry] establishing an offence carrying a pena corporal [penalty restricting personal liberty] and a written order stating the reason, unless the person is caught in fraganti [in the act of committing the offence].  The sumario [preliminary criminal investigation] may not extend beyond thirty days after detention. (Art. 32(15)(a–c); cont., 1925, Art. 32(15)(a–c)).

No person may be held incommunicado or compelled to swear or undergo criminal interrogation against themselves, their ascendants, relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity, or their spouse.  Detention must end when a final judicial decision destroys its grounds or sufficient fianza [bail] is furnished in cases where provisional release is permitted by law. (Art. 32(15)(d–f); cont., 1925, Art. 32(15)(d–f)).

Criminal punishment requires personal notification of the charges and a hearing in the legal form.  A pena corporal [penalty restricting personal liberty] cannot exceed twenty years.  penas infamantes [infamous penalties] and perpetual penalties, including those not restricting personal liberty, are prohibited.  No person may be tried twice for the same offence. (Art. 32(15)(g–i); cont., 1925, Art. 32(15)(g–i)).

All are subject to the same laws, equal legal protection throughout national territory, and equal duties, services and contributions; exemptions require legal authorization.  Titles of nobility, hereditary distinctions and offices paying beyond the duration of service cannot be granted.  Official address is limited to ciudadano [citizen] and usted [you, in formal address], except diplomatic formulas. (Art. 32(16); cont., 1925, Art. 32(16)).

Enumeration of rights does not deny other rights belonging to citizens.  Federal laws, state constitutions and laws, and municipal ordinances impairing guaranteed rights are null, as declared by the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court].  Persons issuing, signing, executing or ordering rights-violating measures are punishable under the law, subject to the exception for competent official measures in the circumstances of Art. 36. (Arts. 33–35; cont., 1925, Arts. 33–35).

During international war, civil war or imminent danger of either, the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] in the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] declares the circumstance and suspends garantías constitucionales [constitutional guarantees] nationally or in the area specified, until peace is restored.  Life remains inviolable and infamous punishments remain prohibited.  confiscación [confiscation] is prohibited except as reciprocal represalias [reprisals] against nationals of an enemy country that has first confiscated Venezuelans’ property. (Art. 36(1–2); cont., 1925, Art. 36(1–2)).

Nationals or foreigners opposing the preservation or restoration of peace may be arrested, subjected to confinamiento [confinement to a specified locality] or expelled.  These measures cease with the circumstances giving rise to them, except that the executive may leave an expulsion of foreigners in force. (Art. 36(3); cont., 1925, Art. 36(3)).

soberanía [sovereignty] resides in the people and is exercised through public powers.  Defined functions limit those powers, and excess constitutes usurpation.  The law regulates nulidad [nullity] for acts exceeding authority; decisions exacted by force or by a public gathering in a subversive attitude are null.  Officials incur individual responsibility for excess of authority or breach of the law governing their office, subject to Art. 102, and remain punishable for other offences. (Arts. 40–44; cont., 1925, Arts. 40–44).

One person cannot hold more than one remunerated public office; acceptance of the second constitutes resignation from the first.  Exceptions cover alternates before replacing a principal and employment in academies, hospitals, incidental courts and educational institutions.  The law regulates the oath taken by national officials upon assuming office. (Arts. 46, 53; cf. 1925, Art. 46:  “except for public-education teachers, employees in academies or hospitals, and incidental judges”).

REG-MIL—The Military

The Ejército [Army], Armada [Navy] and Aviación Militar [Military Aviation] belong to federal competence.  Estados [States] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] may maintain only police and prison guards, except forces organized on federal orders.  The Ejército [Army] is formed from contingents drawn proportionately to population from the Estados [States], Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies].  The law regulates milicias ciudadanas [citizen militias] and may establish enganches por contrato [contractual enlistment].  All war matériel in or introduced into the country belongs to the Nation. (Art. 15(8); cont., 1925, Art. 15(8)).

Civil and military authority cannot be exercised simultaneously by one official except the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic], or a civil official given military functions by law during war.  The fuerza armada [armed force] may not deliberate; it is passive and obedient.  Armed bodies may seek requisitions or assistance only through civil authorities in the manner fixed by law.  Troops remain in barracks during elections, and commanders violating these rules are punishable. (Arts. 45, 47; cont., 1925, Arts. 45, 47).

reclutamiento forzoso [compulsory recruitment] is abolished and military service follows the law.  The Cámara del Senado [Senate] consents to promotions from Coronel [Colonel] and Capitán de Navío [Naval Captain], inclusive.  The Congreso [Congress] legislates on formation and replacement of land and sea forces. (Arts. 32(5)(a), 62(3), 78(15); cont., 1925, Arts. 32(5)(a), 62(3), 78(15)).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] directs war, commands the Ejército [Army] and Armada [Navy] personally or through an appointed commander, organizes the Ejército [Army] and Milicia Nacional [National Militia], and fixes the numbers of land and sea forces. (Art. 100(23); cont., 1925, Art. 100(23)).

REG-REL—Religion

Religious liberty is guaranteed under the supreme inspection of all forms of worship by the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] in accordance with law, preserving Patronato Eclesiástico [Ecclesiastical Patronage].  The Nation exercises that right under the Law of 28 July 1824.  The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] must possess estado seglar [lay status]. (Arts. 32(14), 52, 95; cont., 1925, Arts. 32(14), 52, 95).

ECO-INF—Infrastructure

Federal legislation governs civil, commercial, criminal and procedural matters; banks and credit institutions; social provision; Sanidad [Public Health]; conservation and development of forests, waters and other natural resources; labour; marcas de fábrica [trademarks]; literary, artistic and industrial property; public registration; expropiación por causa de utilidad pública [expropriation for public utility]; immigration; naturalización [naturalization]; admission and expulsion of foreigners; and regulation of constitutional guarantees. (Art. 15(4); cont., 1925, Art. 15(4)).

The federal authorities legislate on Instrucción Pública [Public Instruction].  Elementary primary instruction is compulsory and instruction in official institutions is free.  National census and statistical work requires state and municipal cooperation; population-based acts use the latest census approved by the Congreso [Congress].  Art. 15(10) expressly includes the Nation, Estados [States], Distrito Federal [Federal District] and Territorios Federales [Federal Territories]. (Art. 15(9–10); cf. 1925, Art. 15(10):  “both of the Nation and of the Estados [States]”).

Air, maritime and river navigation, docks and landing works are federal matters.  Navigation of rivers and other navigable waters requiring no special works cannot be restricted by taxes or privileges.  Correos [Postal Services], Telégrafos [Telegraphs], Teléfonos [Telephones] and wireless communications likewise belong to federal competence. (Art. 15(13, 15); cont., 1925, Art. 15(13, 15)).

National roads are those passing through a Estado [State], the Distrito Federal [Federal District] or a Territorio Federal [Federal Territory] and extending beyond its boundaries.  Federal competence also covers aerial haulage cables and railways even within one Estado [State].  Urban tramways and urban haulage cables are conceded and regulated by the respective Municipalidades [Municipalities]. (Art. 15(16); cont., 1925, Art. 15(16)).

Federal competence extends to necessary public works throughout national territory without restricting the right of Estados [States] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] to undertake works on their own account.  Federal administrative works within Estados [States] may include forts, docks, warehouses, shipyards, penitentiaries and estaciones de cuarentenas [quarantine stations]. (Arts. 15(19), 21; cont., 1925, Arts. 15(19), 21).

Statutory privilegios temporales [temporary exclusive privileges] may protect intellectual property, patentes de invención [patents of invention] and marcas de fábrica [trademarks], and may authorize railways, aerial navigation enterprises, canals, tramways, telephone or telegraph lines and wireless systems for a limited period.  The works must be constructed or installed at the concessionaire’s expense, without guaranteed returns or subsidies from the Nation or Estados [States]. (Art. 32(8); cont., 1925, Art. 32(8)).

Public-interest contracts cannot be transferred, wholly or partly, to foreign governments.  They incorporate a clause assigning unresolved disputes to competent Venezuelan courts under Venezuelan law and excluding foreign claims.  Such contracts cannot be concluded with, or transferred to, companies not legally domiciled in Venezuela. (Art. 50; cont., 1925, Art. 50).

CON-FIN—Final Provisions

The presidential period begun on 19 April 1922 continues, and the incumbent Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] remains for its remainder.  Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] retain their mandates for the remainder of their three-year terms.  Once the Constitution takes effect, the Congreso [Congress] elects seven principal Vocales [Members of the Court] and seven Suplentes [Alternates] to serve until the election prescribed by Art. 119 in the next constitutional period. (Art. 128; cf. 1925, Art. 128:  “the current Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] and Vicepresidente de la República [Vice-President of the Republic] and the Vocales [Members of the Court] of the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] shall continue in office”).

Existing state constitutions continue in force until the respective Estados [States] repeal them. (Art. 129; cf. 1925, Art. 129:  “The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] shall provisionally organize the Estados [States] of the Union while they enact their new Constitutions”).

The transitional provisions contain no counterpart to the 1925 direction to fill the office of Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation] under Art. 113. (Arts. 128–129 (transitional provisions); cf. 1925, Art. 128, final sentence:  “With respect to the Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation], the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] shall fill the office under the provisions of Article 113.”).

The transitional provisions contain no counterpart to the 1925 waiver by the Estados [States] of rights to balances of their situados constitucionales [constitutional revenue allocations] through fiscal year 1924–1925, inclusive, and the Nation’s reciprocal waiver of claims against the Estados [States] through the same fiscal year. (Arts. 128–129 (transitional provisions); cf. 1925, Art. 130:  “The Estados [States] waive in favour of the Nation any right that may belong to them concerning balances of their situados constitucionales [constitutional revenue allocations] through fiscal year 1924–1925, inclusive.  Reciprocally, the Nation waives in favour of the Estados [States] any claim it has against them through that fiscal year, inclusive.”).

Following scrutiny of the state ratifications, the Constitution is promulgated with the presidential Ejecútese [Let it be executed] and takes effect on the day of publication in the Gaceta Oficial [Official Gazette]. (Art. 130; cf. 1925, Art. 131:  “shall be promulgated and enter into force as soon as, after the Congreso [Congress] has scrutinized the votes of the state Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies], it is found that they have ratified it”).

The Constitution dated 24 June 1925, ordered complied with and published on 1 July 1925, is repealed.  The 1928 constitutional text closes with the date 22 May 1928; the execution formula signed J. V. Gómez is dated 23 May 1928. (Art. 131; closing and execution formulas).

Recension

Centro para la Integración y el Derecho Público [Centre for Integration and Public Law] (CIDEP).


18) The Constitution of 1929

The 1929 Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela] was declared sanctioned by the Congreso [Congress] in its agreement of 29 May 1929, issued at the Palacio Federal Legislativo [Federal Legislative Palace], Caracas, following the unanimous ratification by the Asambleas Legislativas de los Estados [State Legislative Assemblies] recorded in that agreement.  Its execution was ordered at the Palacio Federal [Federal Palace], Caracas, on the same date by President Juan Bautista Pérez. (CIDEP 1929, p. 3, prefatory agreement; p. 23, execution formula).

Historical reference

Following the conclusion of President Juan Vicente Gómez’s 1922–1929 term, President Juan Bautista Pérez exercised the presidency in an acting capacity from 19 April 1929 and became constitutional President on 30 May 1929.  During Pérez’s presidency, which ended on 13 June 1931, Gómez held military command as Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Nacional [Commander-in-Chief of the National Army].

Source: Manuel Rodríguez Campos, “Pérez, Juan Bautista,” Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar:

https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/p/perez-juan-bautista/

DOC-PRE—Preamble

(modern Latinate English translation by the author from the CIDEP recension)

“The Congress of the United States of Venezuela, in the name of Almighty God and in exercise of the authority conferred upon it by Article 126 of the Federal Pact in force, the present Constitution.”

(CIDEP 1929, p. 3, preamble).

The CIDEP preamble (p. 3) contains no enactment verb.

FND-TER—Territory

The Nación Venezolana [Venezuelan Nation] consists of all Venezuelans united in a political pact under the name Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela]; it is permanently and irrevocably free and independent of foreign domination or protection.  The territory is that belonging to the Capitanía General de Venezuela [Captaincy General of Venezuela] before the political transformation of 1810, with modifications resulting from treaties.  No part may be ceded, transferred, leased or otherwise alienated to a foreign power, even temporarily. (Arts. 1–2; cont., 1928, Arts. 1–2).

The national territory is divided into Estados [States], the Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies].  The twenty Estados [States] are Anzoátegui, Apure, Aragua, Bolívar, Carabobo, Cojedes, Falcón, Guárico, Lara, Mérida, Miranda, Monagas, Nueva Esparta, Portuguesa, Sucre, Táchira, Trujillo, Yaracuy, Zamora and Zulia. (Arts. 3–4; cont., 1928, Arts. 3–4).

State boundaries follow the provincial boundaries established by the Law of 28 April 1856, subject to the creation of the Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies], the Constitution of 5 August 1909 and the 1917 agreement between Aragua and Carabobo.  Neighbouring Estados [States] may alter their common boundary through agreements approved by their respective legislatures, including reciprocal territorial compensation or cession. (Art. 5; cont., 1928, Art. 5).

The Distrito Federal [Federal District] comprises the departments Libertador and Vargas.  The text places Caracas and the outlying parishes El Recreo, El Valle, La Vega, Antímano, Maracao and Macuto in Libertador.  A special law organizes the district and determines its municipal powers so that federal political action is not obstructed. (Art. 6; cf. 1928, Art. 6:  “Macarao and Macuto”).

The CIDEP recension prints the parish name Maracao in Art. 6; the 1928 recension prints Macarao.  The printed forms are retained here.

Caracas is the capital and seat of federal government, subject to Art. 100, powers 23(b) and 24. (Art. 7; cf. 1928, Art. 7:  “subject to the provisions of subparagraph b), power 24 of Article 100, and power 25 of the same Article”).

Amazonas and Delta Amacuro are Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], organized by special laws.  Their boundaries, and those of the Distrito Federal [Federal District] with neighbouring Estados [States], may be modified by agreements concluded by the Poder Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive Power] and the respective state governments and approved by the Congreso [Congress] and the respective Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies]. (Art. 8; cont., 1928, Art. 8).

A Territorio Federal [Federal Territory] may become a Estado [State] upon attaining the population required for one deputy and proving to the Congreso [Congress] that it can maintain every branch of public service and meet the necessary expenditure. (Art. 9; cont., 1928, Art. 9).

The Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies] comprise the Venezuelan islands in the Caribbean Sea except Margarita and Coche, which constitute Nueva Esparta.  Their government and administration belong directly to the executive until the law elevates them to the category of Territorios Federales [Federal Territories]. (Art. 10; cont., 1928, Art. 10).

The Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] decides boundary disputes between Estados [States], and those arising between them and the Distrito Federal [Federal District] or Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], through the procedure prescribed by law. (Art. 11; cont., 1928, Art. 11).

POW-LEG—Congress

The Poder Legislativo [Legislative Power] is exercised by the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela], consisting of the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] and Cámara del Senado [Senate].  Both Diputados [Deputies] and Senadores [Senators] serve three-year terms. (Art. 55; cont., 1928, Art. 55).

Each Estado [State] elects Diputados [Deputies] directly under its Ley de Elecciones [Electoral Law], one per 35,000 inhabitants and one additional deputy for an excess of 15,000.  A Estado [State] with fewer than 35,000 inhabitants elects one deputy.  An equal number of Suplentes [Alternates] is elected to fill vacancies in the order of election. (Art. 56; cont., 1928, Art. 56).

Art. 56 ends with the provision for Suplentes [Alternates]; the three-year term remains in Art. 55. (Arts. 55–56; cf. 1928, Art. 56, final paragraph:  “The Diputados [Deputies] shall serve for three years and shall be renewed in their entirety.”).

A deputy must be Venezuelan by birth and have completed twenty-one years of age.  The Distrito Federal [Federal District] and Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] attaining the prescribed population elect Diputados [Deputies] directly under the formalities fixed by law.  The population basis excludes indígenas no reducidos [unreduced Indigenous people]. (Arts. 57–58; cont., 1928, Arts. 57–58).

The Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] may give a voto de censura [vote of censure] to Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers] whose acts it considers to warrant it.  The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] is not obliged to remove them until the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] declares that legal grounds exist for putting them on trial.  Other powers may be assigned by law. (Art. 59; cont., 1928, Art. 59).

Each state Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] elects, from outside its own membership, two principal Senadores [Senators] and two Suplentes [Alternates], the latter filling vacancies in election order.  A senator must be Venezuelan by birth and over thirty years of age. (Arts. 60–61; cont., 1928, Arts. 60–61).

The Cámara del Senado [Senate] may authorize the transfer of the remains of illustrious Venezuelans to the Panteón Nacional [National Pantheon] after twenty-five years from their death; consent to national officials accepting gifts, offices, honours or rewards from foreign governments; and consent to military promotions from Coronel [Colonel] and naval promotions from Capitán de Navío [Naval Captain], inclusive. (Art. 62(1–3); cont., 1928, Art. 62(1–3)).

Art. 62 contains three numbered powers. (Art. 62; cf. 1928, Art. 62(4):  “4. Such other powers as the laws assign to it.”).

The Cámaras Legislativas [Legislative Chambers] meet annually in the capital on 19 April or the nearest possible day, without prior convocation.  Ordinary sessions last ninety days and cannot be extended; every day and hour within that period is available for ordinary sessions.  Extraordinary sessions convened by the executive address the matters specified in the convocation and connected legislation requiring amendment. (Art. 63; cont., 1928, Art. 63).

Opening sessions require two-thirds of the membership; those present without that number form a Comisión Preparatoria [Preparatory Commission] and take measures to secure attendance.  Subsequent sessions require an absolute majority.  Sessions are public unless the respective Chamber resolves that they shall be secret. (Arts. 64–65; cont., 1928, Arts. 64–65).

Each Chamber adopts its Reglamento Interior y de Debates [Rules of Internal Procedure and Debate], disciplines infringements, controls order in its building, corrects or punishes disorderly spectators, removes impediments to its lawful functions, executes its exclusive resolutions, determines the qualifications of its members and receives their resignations.  Both Chambers sit in the same town and open and close sessions on the same day and hour; suspension or relocation requires the other Chamber’s consent, with disagreements decided in joint session. (Arts. 66–67; cont., 1928, Arts. 66–67).

During sessions, any public office is incompatible with membership of either Chamber.  Remuneration is fixed by law and may be increased only for the following term. (Arts. 68–69; cont., 1928, Arts. 68–69).

Legislative inmunidad [immunity] runs from thirty days before 19 April until thirty days after the close of sessions.  Members cannot be imprisoned, arrested, confined, detained or obstructed in their functions, even upon committing an offence during that period.  Where the alleged offence carries a pena corporal [penalty restricting personal liberty], the sumario [preliminary criminal investigation] is stayed during immunity, while investigative steps continue.  Members need not answer claims, take oaths or answer judicial interrogatories during the same period, which is excluded from procedural time limits.  The Chambers cannot waive this immunity. (Art. 70; cont., 1928, Art. 70).

Art. 70(1) states the exclusion of Art. 32(15)(c) with the qualification “with respect to the duration of the sumario [preliminary criminal investigation]”. (Art. 70(1); cont., 1928, Art. 70(1)).

Members are not responsible for opinions expressed in their Chambers.  They cannot make contracts with the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] on their own or another’s behalf, or pursue others’ claims before it. (Arts. 71–72; cont., 1928, Arts. 71–72).

When the list of senatorial Suplentes [Alternates] is exhausted or reduced by death or another permanent vacancy, the respective Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] fills it for the remainder of the legislative term.  State constitutions and the Ley Orgánica del Distrito Federal [Organic Law of the Federal District] determine how vacancies in the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] are filled. (Art. 73; cont., 1928, Art. 73).

The Chambers act separately but sit jointly when the Constitution or laws require it, or when one invites the other and the latter agrees and fixes the meeting time.  Their separate acts as co-legislators are Leyes [Laws]; acts adopted jointly, or separately on matters exclusive to one Chamber, are Acuerdos [Resolutions].  The presiding officer of the Cámara del Senado [Senate] presides over the Congreso [Congress], and that of the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] serves as its vice-president. (Arts. 74–76; cont., 1928, Arts. 74–76).

In joint session the Congreso [Congress] conducts the elections assigned to it, receives the resignation of the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic], examines the annual Mensaje [Message], approves or disapproves ministerial Memorias y Cuentas [Reports and Accounts], admits qualifying Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] as Estados [States], and examines Créditos Adicionales [Additional Appropriations] for compliance with the constitutional procedure. (Art. 77; cont., 1928, Art. 77).

The reference governing examination of Créditos Adicionales [Additional Appropriations] is Art. 100(29). (Art. 77(6); cf. 1928, Art. 77(6):  “the procedures indicated in power 30 of Article 100”).

As co-legislators the Chambers decree national taxes and loans, regulate national debt, create and suppress national offices, legislate on federal administration and currency, and authorize the disposal of nationally owned immovable property.  Compulsory circulation of banknotes or any paper representation of value is prohibited, and the patrón de oro [gold standard] must be maintained.  Weights and measures follow the metric decimal system. (Art. 78(1–4, 7–8); cont., 1928, Art. 78(1–4, 7–8)).

Treaties and diplomatic conventions require legislative approval before ratification or exchange.  The approving law receives the Ejecútese [Let it be executed] only when the other party’s acceptance is established; official publication follows ratification and exchange.  Contracts for railways, aerial haulage cables, telegraphic or wireless communications, immigration and other authorized matters of national interest require legislative approval.  concesiones mineras [mining concessions] and titles to tierras baldías [ungranted public lands] granted under their respective laws are exempt from that approval. (Art. 78(5–6); cont., 1928, Art. 78(5–6)).

The Chambers enact the Ley de Presupuesto General de Rentas y Gastos Públicos [General Revenue and Public Expenditure Budget Law], fixing federal salaries and expenditure for the fiscal year.  Outside that law, they cannot order another specified expenditure through a special law or resolution.  They examine and approve the Censo Nacional [National Census], prescribe the special administration of Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], and increase the population basis for electing Diputados [Deputies] when the approved census requires it. (Art. 78(9–12); cont., 1928, Art. 78(9–12)).

General laws govern civil pensions, retirement benefits and montepíos militares [military survivors’ pension funds] payable by the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury].  The budget supplies aggregate appropriations, distributed by the executive through the competent minister under the law.  The Chambers decree war, require peace negotiations, legislate on recruitment and replacement of land and sea forces, grant amnistías [amnesties], and legislate on the security of ports and coasts. (Art. 78(13–17); cont., 1928, Art. 78(13–17)).

Legislative powers include the Censo electoral [Electoral Register], Instrucción Pública [Public Instruction], Hacienda Nacional [National Public Finance Administration], air, maritime and river navigation, docks, Correos [Postal Services], Telégrafos [Telegraphs], wireless communications, railways, national roads and motor traffic, tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], salinas [saltworks], pearl fishing and mines, together with the subjects listed in Art. 15(4) and other matters of federal competence. (Art. 78(18–19); cont., 1928, Art. 78(18–19)).

A bill may originate in either Chamber upon presentation by at least three of its members, or through the minister responsible for a proposal from the executive.  After admission it receives three discussions separated by at least one day.  The other Chamber follows the same procedure and returns any amendments.  If disagreement persists after written reasons from the originating Chamber, joint session decides disputed and connected articles by majority vote and may adopt a different wording. (Arts. 79–82; cont., 1928, Arts. 79–82).

Rejected bills cannot be presented again until the following year or later.  Bills left pending at the close of sessions require a new presentation and all discussions in a subsequent year.  An amending law must reproduce its entire text and repeal the previous law in full; repeal follows the same formalities as enactment. (Arts. 83–84, 86–87; cont., 1928, Arts. 83–84, 86–87).

The legislative formula is the name of the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] followed by “Decrees:”.  Enacted texts are prepared in duplicate without alterations, signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of the Congreso [Congress], and dated with final approval.  One copy goes to the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] for countersignature with the competent ministers and official publication.  Printing errors require corrected republication or a ministerially certified errata notice. (Arts. 85, 88–89; cont., 1928, Arts. 85, 88–89).

A law takes effect on its stated date or, if none is stated, upon official publication.  Legislative power cannot be delegated.  Legislation is not retroactive except where it imposes a lesser penalty.  Procedural laws apply immediately to pending cases; in criminal cases, evidence already taken is assessed under the law in force when it was offered insofar as that benefits the accused. (Arts. 90–92; cont., 1928, Arts. 90–92).

The publication named in Arts. 88–90 is the Gaceta Oficial de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Official Gazette of the United States of Venezuela]. (Arts. 88–90; cf. 1928, Art. 90:  “from its publication in the Gaceta Oficial [Official Gazette]”).

ECO-TES—Treasury

The federal authorities have competence over Aduanas [Customs Houses], import duties and duties on foreign goods passing through to foreign destinations.  The Impuesto Territorial [Territorial Tax] remains payable at Aduanas [Customs Houses] until abolished by law and enters the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury].  Exports are free of tax.  Federal revenues include estampillas o timbres fiscales [fiscal stamps or revenue stamps], cigarettes, tobacco, registration, inheritance, matches, spirits, liquors and other taxes established as national taxes by law. (Art. 15(14, 17); cont., 1928, Art. 15(14, 17)).

The Situado Constitucional [Constitutional Revenue Allocation] equals twelve per cent of total revenue, calculated for each fiscal year from receipts in the immediately preceding calendar year and included annually in the national expenditure budget.  It is distributed among the Estados [States], Distrito Federal [Federal District] and Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] in proportion to population. (Art. 17(4)(1); cont., 1928, Art. 17(4)(1)).

State revenues also include the tax on papel sellado [stamped paper], consumption taxes and contributions established by their Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies].  papel sellado [stamped paper] cannot be demanded for assessment or payment of national taxes, or used to collect prohibited contributions.  Estados [States] cannot create Aduanas [Customs Houses], levy import or export duties, tax foreign goods in transit abroad, invade national or municipal tax subjects, tax interstate transit, tax goods before they are offered for consumption, prohibit consumption of goods from elsewhere, discriminate against such goods, require federal tax officials to collect state taxes, or impose payment in personal labour or its monetary equivalent. (Art. 17(4)(2–3); cont., 1928, Art. 17(4)(2–3)).

Municipal revenue powers carry the restrictions in Art. 17(4)(3).  patentes [business licence taxes] on agriculture, livestock raising and the catching of edible fish are prohibited at municipal, state and national levels.  Estados [States] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] cannot contract loans abroad. (Arts. 18(3), 24; cont., 1928, Arts. 18(3), 24).

No tax may be collected without legal authorization.  Expenditure from the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] requires an appropriation in the Ley de Presupuesto General de Rentas y Gastos Públicos [General Revenue and Public Expenditure Budget Law] or a previously decreed Crédito Adicional [Additional Appropriation].  Officials who contravene this rule are civilly liable to the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] for the amounts paid. (Art. 48; cont., 1928, Art. 48).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic], in the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers], may decree Créditos Adicionales [Additional Appropriations] when a budget chapter is insufficient or an expense was not foreseen, provided available funds cover them without impairing ordinary expenditure, which takes precedence.  The Congreso [Congress] examines compliance with these conditions.  Ministers account for funds handled; the minister responsible for national revenues prepares the budget bill in consultation with the others. (Arts. 100(29), 77(6), 109; cont., 1928, Arts. 100(30), 77(6), 109).

Each Estado [State] retains ownership of its salinas [saltworks], tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], their products, ostrales de perlas [pearl-oyster beds] and mines, while administration belongs to the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive].  The resulting revenue, including sales of tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], enters the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury].  salinas [saltworks] are inalienable.  tierras baldías [ungranted public lands] on maritime, river and lake islands cannot be alienated, and their use cannot directly or indirectly transfer ownership. (Art. 15(18); cont., 1928, Art. 15(18)).

concesiones mineras [mining concessions] are temporary.  Laws governing the sale, lease or gratuitous grant of tierras baldías [ungranted public lands] must establish a derecho de preferencia [right of preference] for occupants. (Art. 15(18); cont., 1928, Art. 15(18)).

POW-EXE—Executive

Federal administration not assigned by the Constitution to another authority belongs to the Poder Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive Power], exercised by the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela].  The laws determine the federal employees and agents through whom administration operates; assistance may be required from state governments in constitutionally permitted cases. (Arts. 93–94; cont., 1928, Arts. 93–94).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] must be Venezuelan by birth, over thirty, of estado seglar [lay status] and in possession of all civil and political rights. (Art. 95; cont., 1928, Art. 95).

Within the first fifteen days of its installation in the year beginning the constitutional term, the Congreso [Congress] elects the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic].  The election sitting is fixed at least five days in advance and the notice is officially published.  The oath is taken before the Congreso [Congress], or before the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] if circumstances prevent the former. (Arts. 96, 99; cont., 1928, Arts. 96, 99).

A temporary presidential absence is filled by the Ministro del Despacho [Cabinet Minister] designated by the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic].  Upon a permanent vacancy, the Congreso [Congress] elects a replacement for the remainder of the term.  Until that person takes office, the minister already acting continues; if none is acting, the Gabinete [Cabinet] chooses a minister by majority vote.  If the Congreso [Congress] is not in ordinary session, the acting minister convenes extraordinary sessions. (Art. 97; cont., 1928, Art. 97).

Absence from the capital within national territory is not a temporary absence from office.  From any place in the country, the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] may instruct ministers concerning resolutions to be issued in the capital and receive foreign diplomatic ministers. (Art. 98; cont., 1928, Art. 98).

Federal constitutional terms last seven years.  Presidential service runs from the oath until 19 April in the year when the term ends.  On that date the executive is delivered to a member or alternate of the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] designated by that Court under Art. 120(17), pending the accession of the elected successor. (Arts. 54, 103, 120(17); cont., 1928, Arts. 54, 103, 120(17)).

Art. 54 fixes the beginning of the federal periods at 19 April 1929. (Art. 54; cf. 1928, Art. 54:  “shall be counted from 19 April 1922 and shall last seven years”).

For the current constitutional period, the Congreso [Congress] elects a Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Nacional [Commander-in-Chief of the National Army].  The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] must exercise the powers numbered 1, 4, 17, 18, 23, 25 and 27 in Art. 100 in agreement with that officer: appointment and removal of ministers, administration of the Distrito Federal [Federal District], extraordinary convocation of the Congreso [Congress], declaration of war, suspension of guarantees and the listed wartime measures, armed intervention in conflict between Estados [States], and indultos [pardons]. (Art. 128; new).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] appoints and removes Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers], receives foreign diplomatic ministers, signs official letters to heads of state, administers the Distrito Federal [Federal District] and Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], and may designate a Ministro del Despacho [Cabinet Minister] to exercise the presidency temporarily and resume office during the constitutional term. (Art. 100(1–6); cont., 1928, Art. 100(1–6)).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] orders the Constitution and laws executed and published; issues implementing Decretos [Decrees] and Reglamentos [Regulations] in the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] without altering the laws’ spirit, purpose or reason; negotiates legislatively authorized loans through the appropriate minister with Gabinete [Cabinet] approval; regulates public or private health, postal, telegraph and telephone services in the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers]; and orders the census and submits it for legislative approval. (Art. 100(7–11); cont., 1928, Art. 100(7–11)).

Through the appropriate ministers, the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] issues patentes de navegación [navigation licences] and nationality certificates, appoints national officials whose selection belongs to no other official and removes them, and administers national revenues.  In the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers], the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] creates and funds necessary public services during legislative recess.  With Gabinete [Cabinet] approval, the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] orders the Ministerio Público Federal [Federal Public Ministry] to prosecute officials where grounds exist and convenes the Congreso [Congress] extraordinarily.  War is declared after the Congreso [Congress] has decreed it. (Art. 100(12–19); cont., 1928, Art. 100(12–19)).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] conducts diplomatic negotiations personally or through the competent minister, and concludes treaties through chosen plenipotentiaries with Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] approval and subsequent legislative approval.  Treaties cannot impair Arts. 37–39 and must provide for arbitramento [arbitration] of differences over interpretation or execution.  Authorized contracts of national interest are made through the competent ministers with Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] approval and submitted to the Congreso [Congress].  Entry of foreigners may be prohibited and expulsion ordered in cases permitted by international law or national legislation. (Art. 100(20–22); cont., 1928, Art. 100(20–22)).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] decrees suspension of garantías constitucionales [constitutional guarantees] in the cases specified in Art. 36.  During civil or international war, additional powers permit requesting state assistance, temporarily relocating federal powers, ordering prosecution for traición a la Patria [treason against the Nation], reorganizing Estados [States] controlled by rebels or participating in rebellion, and issuing patentes de corso [letters of marque] and authorizing represalias [reprisals]. (Art. 100(23); cont., 1928, Art. 100(24)).

During an official visit with some or all Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers] to Estados [States] or Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], the seat of the Poder Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive Power] is the place where the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] is located; the visit decree regulates routine administration in Caracas.  The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] may use the fuerza pública [public force] to end armed conflict between Estados [States] after good offices fail, exercise functions delegated by state constitutions, grant indultos [pardons], and order the issue of titles granting or leasing tierras baldías [ungranted public lands] and concesiones mineras [mining concessions]. (Art. 100(24–28); cont., 1928, Art. 100(25–29)).

The annual Mensaje [Message] is presented personally or through a minister within the first ten days of ordinary sessions and accounts for acts of administration and the condition of the Republic. (Art. 101, first paragraph; cont., 1928, Art. 101, first paragraph).

In the final year of the presidential term, the Mensaje [Message] is presented on 19 April or left signed with the acting president for transmission when the Congreso [Congress] meets. (Art. 101, final paragraph; cont., 1928, Art. 101, final paragraph).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] is responsible only for traición a la Patria [treason against the Nation] and ordinary offences. (Art. 102; cont., 1928, Art. 102).

The Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers] are the legally required organs through which presidential powers are exercised.  The law fixes their functions and organizes their departments.  Presidential decrees require countersignature by the competent ministers, who issue the resolutions and orders within the presidential powers.  Without that requirement presidential dispositions have no effect, except ministerial appointments and designation of an acting minister under Art. 100(6).  A freely appointed and removable Gobernador del Distrito Federal [Governor of the Federal District] is the presidential organ for administration of the Distrito Federal [Federal District]. (Arts. 104–105; cont., 1928, Arts. 104–105).

A Ministro del Despacho [Cabinet Minister] must be Venezuelan by birth, over thirty and in possession of civil and political rights.  Decisions are taken in the Gabinete [Cabinet] when the Constitution or laws require it or the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] convenes it because of the matter’s importance.  Otherwise, the competent minister or ministers countersign or execute the presidential decision. (Arts. 106–107; cont., 1928, Arts. 106–107).

Ministers’ acts must conform to the Constitution and laws.  Their personal responsibility is not excused by presidential orders, even written orders; responsibility for acts resolved in the Gabinete [Cabinet] is joint.  Ministers submit reasoned and documented Memorias y Cuentas [Reports and Accounts] within the first ten days of annual sessions.  Ministers may speak in the Chambers and must attend when summoned to provide information. (Arts. 108, 109 (first paragraph), 110; cont., 1928, Arts. 108, 109 (first paragraph), 110).

In the final presidential year, ministers present their Memorias y Cuentas [Reports and Accounts] on 19 April or, if the Cámaras Legislativas [Legislative Chambers] have not yet assembled, leave them with the acting president for transmission when the Congreso [Congress] meets. (Art. 109, final paragraph; cont., 1928, Art. 109, final paragraph).

POW-JUD—Judiciary

The Poder Judicial [Judicial Power] resides in the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] and the other courts established by law.  Jueces Federales [Federal Judges] are appointed for a fixed period and cannot be removed during it except in cases prescribed by law. (Arts. 116–117; cont., 1928, Arts. 116–117).

The Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] consists of seven Vocales [Members of the Court], Venezuelans by birth, over thirty and lawyers of the Republic, serving seven years.  At the end of their term they remain until their replacements take office.  The Court acts in Salas [Divisions of the Court], whose membership is fixed by law. (Art. 118; cont., 1928, Art. 118).

The Congreso [Congress] elects each of the seven Vocales [Members of the Court] separately by absolute majority during the first thirty days of sessions in the year beginning the constitutional term.  At the same sitting it elects seven numbered Suplentes [Alternates], who fill temporary and permanent vacancies in that order.  The Court fills incidental absences under the law.  The Congreso [Congress] completes a depleted list of Suplentes [Alternates], placing the new appointees at its end; successive excuses from service without resignation are treated as incidental absences. (Art. 119; cont., 1928, Art. 119).

The Court hears accusations against the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] or acting president, Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers], the Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation], the Gobernador del Distrito Federal [Governor of the Federal District] and its own members, and against state presidents and other high state officials designated by state law.  It hears civil and criminal cases involving diplomatic officials where international law permits, and criminal cases concerning Venezuelan diplomatic agents’ misconduct abroad. (Art. 120(1–4); cont., 1928, Art. 120(1–4)).

Its jurisdiction includes the recurso de casación [appeal in cassation], other appeals assigned by law, causas de presas [prize cases], disputes among the specified political officials and federal or state entities, and conflicts of judicial competence where no other authority exists to decide them. (Art. 120(5–8); cont., 1928, Art. 120(5–8)).

The Court declares the nulidad [nullity] of national or state laws conflicting with the Constitution, limiting nullity to the conflicting provisions unless their connection with the rest requires invalidation of the whole law.  It determines which national or state law, or which conflicting provisions of one law, must prevail.  It annuls legislative or executive acts violating state rights or autonomy and state or municipal acts violating the specified restrictions on revenue powers. (Art. 120(9–11); cont., 1928, Art. 120(9–11)).

The Court annuls executive Decretos [Decrees] and Reglamentos [Regulations] that alter the spirit, reason or purpose of laws, and acts within Arts. 42–43 issued by national authorities, authorities of the Distrito Federal [Federal District] or high state officials.  A ministerial resolution concerning execution, interpretation or lapse of a federal contract requires the procedure in Art. 120(13). (Art. 120(12); cont., 1928, Art. 120(12)).

In juicio contencioso [contentious proceedings], the Court decides disputes between the Nation and contractors or concessionaires concerning nullity, lapse, termination, scope, interpretation or performance of federal contracts, concesiones mineras [mining concessions] and grants of tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], including refusals of titles claimed as due.  Matters reserved by the law applicable at the time to executive decision without judicial recourse remain excepted.  Subject to treaties and statutory conditions, the Court gives foreign judgments enforceable effect and hears statutory claims for damages and other monetary claims against the Nation. (Art. 120(13–15); cont., 1928, Art. 120(13–15)).

The Court decides the boundary disputes specified in Art. 11. (Art. 120(16); cont., 1928, Art. 120(16)).

On 19 April at the beginning of each federal term, the Court designates a principal member or alternate to take charge of the executive under Art. 103.  A principal member leaves the Court upon taking executive office.  The person designated continues until the elected Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] takes office, even if the Court is renewed in the meantime. (Art. 120(17); cont., 1928, Art. 120(17)).

Other matters of federal competence may be assigned to the Court by the Constitution and laws. (Art. 120(18); cont., 1928, Art. 120(18)).

For accusations under Art. 120(1–2), the Court summarily decides whether there are grounds for formación de causa [commencement of criminal proceedings], considering the evidence submitted and evidence it orders obtained.  An affirmative decision suspends the official during the case; a negative decision ends proceedings.  Ordinary offences pass to the competent ordinary court, while political offences remain before the Court through final judgment.  The Court sends the Congreso [Congress] an annual report of its work and proposed legislative reforms. (Arts. 121–122; cont., 1928, Arts. 121–122).

Federal judicial competence includes the Court’s assigned cases, ordinary justice in the Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies], and Tribunales Federales [Federal Courts] acting even within Estados [States] in cases involving the Nation, military proceedings, tierras baldías [ungranted public lands], mines, salinas [saltworks], federal taxation and other cases determined by law.  The law may entrust federal judicial functions to Tribunales de los Estados [State Courts]. (Art. 15(7); cont., 1928, Art. 15(7)).

The Ministerio Público Federal [Federal Public Ministry] represents the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] before federal and state courts when required by the Constitution and laws.  It is headed by the Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation], freely appointed and removable by the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic], with subordinate appointments governed by law.  It supervises lawful application in criminal cases and cases involving the Fisco Nacional [National Fisc], public order or public morals; supplies legal opinions to the executive or the Court; exercises the Ministerio Fiscal [Prosecutorial Office] in Art. 120(1–3) cases; and represents the Nation in litigation.  The Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation] follows lawful executive instructions transmitted through the competent ministry. (Arts. 111–115; cont., 1928, Arts. 111–115).

At the request of the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive], the Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation] brings accusations before the competent authority against officials whose conduct gives grounds for prosecution. (Art. 114(3); cf. 1928, Art. 114(3):  “an accusation against federal officials who give grounds for being prosecuted”).

POW-SUB—Subnational Government

The Estados [States] recognize one another’s autonomy and political equality and retain soberanía [sovereignty] not delegated by the Constitution.  Their first duty and that of the Federation is preservation of national independence and integrity.  They cannot break national unity, ally with foreign powers, request their protection or cede territory to them.  National and state government is republican, federal, democratic, elective, representative, responsible and alternating. (Arts. 12–13; cont., 1928, Arts. 12–13).

The Estados [States] are divided into Distritos [Districts] with autonomía municipal [municipal autonomy], independent of state political power in their administrative affairs within constitutional restrictions.  During foreign or internal war, a state executive may assume district administration under the state constitution. (Art. 14; cont., 1928, Art. 14).

The Estados [States] adopt constitutions and laws organizing their public powers, elect those powers under their constitutions and laws, and may delegate specified functions to the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic].  They may retain or change their names.  They administer civil and criminal justice through their own courts except in matters reserved to federal judges; their judgments are reviewed only by the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] through the remedies and with the effects prescribed by law. (Art. 17(1–3, 5); cont., 1928, Art. 17(1–3, 5)).

The Municipalidades [Municipalities] organize police, food supplies, cemeteries, municipal ornamentation, civil architecture, street lighting, aqueducts, urban tramways and other municipal services.  They administer ejidos [municipal common lands] and other municipal lands, which cannot thereafter be alienated except for construction. (Art. 18(1–2); cont., 1928, Art. 18(1–2)).

Hygiene services follow federal health laws and regulations and remain “under the supreme inspection of the federal sanitary service”. (Art. 18(1); cf. 1928, Art. 18(1):  “under the inspection of the federal sanitary service”).

The Estados [States] must comply with and execute the federal Constitution, laws and lawful federal orders.  The Estados [States] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] give full faith and execution to public and judicial acts from federal authorities, other Estados [States] and the Distrito Federal [Federal District]. (Arts. 16, 19; cont., 1928, Arts. 16, 19).

Federal judges, public prosecutors, administrative and revenue officials, and forces assigned to borders, public peace, garrisons, arsenals, coasts and ports may operate within the Estados [States].  Their jurisdiction is limited to their functions; they have no special personal jurisdiction or privilege distinguishing them from other residents.  Estados [States] cannot impose duties incompatible with their federal service.  The federal government may build the works needed for its administration. (Arts. 20–21; cont., 1928, Arts. 20–21).

The Estados [States] must prevent recruitment or levies intended to attack another nation’s peace, liberty or independence, or disturb internal peace.  They cannot make war on one another and must remain neutral in disputes among other Estados [States] until required to act by the federal government. (Arts. 22–23; cont., 1928, Arts. 22–23).

Two or more Estados [States] may unite to form a single Estado [State], while retaining the freedom to recover their autonomy.  In either case they notify the federal executive, the Congreso [Congress] and the other Estados [States]. (Art. 25; cont., 1928, Art. 25).

Official acts and documents of the Nation, Estados [States], Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] must carry the calendar date and the years of Independence, counted from 19 April 1810, and Federation, counted from 20 February 1859. (Art. 26; cont., 1928, Art. 26).

Poder Público [Public Power] is distributed among federal, state and municipal authorities within constitutional limits.  The Poder Federal [Federal Power] is divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. (Art. 51; cont., 1928, Art. 51).

CON-AMD—Amending the Constitution

Total or partial reform is declared by the Congreso [Congress] in ordinary sessions upon requests from three-quarters of the state Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies], likewise meeting in ordinary sessions.  Amendments and additions may address only points upon which a majority of Estados [States] agree. (Art. 123; cont., 1928, Art. 123).

Amendments and additions follow the procedure for enacting laws.  Once the Congreso [Congress] approves them, its presiding officer submits them to the Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] for final ratification. (Arts. 124–125; cont., 1928, Arts. 124–125).

The Congreso [Congress] may also initiate amendments or additions under the procedure in Arts. 124–125; they are enacted upon ratification by two-thirds of the state Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies].  Whether the initiative originated in the Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] or the Cámaras Legislativas [Legislative Chambers], the final state votes return to the Congreso [Congress] for scrutiny. (Arts. 126–127; cont., 1928, Arts. 126–127).

CIV-SUF—Suffrage

The right of sufragio [suffrage] makes Venezuelans over twenty-one who are not subject to interdicción [judicial interdiction] or a criminal conviction involving inhabilitación política [political disqualification] electors and eligible for public office, subject to constitutional restrictions and statutory requirements of competence or capacity for particular offices. (Art. 32(12); cont., 1928, Art. 32(12)).

State constitutions must provide direct, secret voting for Concejos Municipales [Municipal Councils], Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] and Diputados [Deputies], using the Censo electoral [Electoral Register] under federal law.  Diputados [Deputies] are directly elected; Senadores [Senators] are chosen by the state Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] from outside their membership.  The Congreso [Congress] elects the members and alternates of the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court]. (Arts. 17(1), 56, 58, 60, 119; cont., 1928, Arts. 17(1), 56, 58, 60, 119).

The Congreso [Congress] elects the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic]. (Art. 96; cont., 1928, Art. 96).

The constitutional age requirement is completion of twenty-one years for a deputy and age over thirty for a senator.  The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] must be over thirty, Venezuelan by birth, of estado seglar [lay status] and in possession of civil and political rights. (Arts. 57, 61, 95; cont., 1928, Arts. 57, 61, 95).

The Congreso [Congress] elects both the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] and the Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Nacional [Commander-in-Chief of the National Army] for the period 1929–1936 immediately after enactment of the Constitution; both swear the oath before it. (Arts. 128–129; new).

Troops must remain in barracks during electoral periods. (Art. 47; cont., 1928, Art. 47).

CIV-CIT—Citizenship

Venezuelan nacionalidad [nationality] belongs by birth and is acquired by naturalización [naturalization].  Those born in national territory and children of Venezuelan parents, wherever born, are Venezuelan by birth. (Arts. 27–28; cont., 1928, Arts. 27–28).

Art. 29(1) includes adult children born abroad to a father or mother who are Venezuelan by naturalización [naturalization], if they establish domicile in the country and declare their intention to be Venezuelan. (Art. 29(1); cf. 1928, Art. 29(1):  “of a father and mother who are Venezuelan by naturalización [naturalization]”).

This comparison records the conjunction printed in each CIDEP recension; it does not establish whether the variant originated in the enacted instrument or in its reproduction.

The remaining categories are persons born in the Ibero-American republics who establish residence and declare their intention to be Venezuelan; foreigners obtaining a carta de naturaleza [certificate of naturalization] under the law; and a foreign woman married to a Venezuelan while the marriage subsists, or who, within one year after its dissolution, declares her intention to remain Venezuelan. (Art. 29(2–4); cont., 1928, Art. 29(2–4)).

The declarations under Art. 29(1), (2) and (4) are made before the Registrador Principal [Principal Registrar] for the jurisdiction where the person establishes domicile.  The declaration is entered in the Protocolo [Register] and copied to the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] for official publication after the procedures required by law.  nacionalidad [nationality] is not acquired before that publication. (Art. 30; cont., 1928, Art. 30).

Venezuelans must defend the country and obey the Constitution, laws and lawful implementing orders.  They cannot undertake service against Venezuela and, if they do, are punishable as traitors under the law.  The law fixes foreigners’ rights and duties, which cannot exceed those of Venezuelans.  Foreigners participating in Venezuelan political contests incur the same responsibilities as Venezuelans and the measures specified by the charter. (Arts. 31, 37–38; cont., 1928, Arts. 31, 37–38).

Neither nationals nor foreigners may claim compensation from the Nation, Estados [States] or Municipalidades [Municipalities] for damage, loss or expropriation not carried out by legitimate authorities acting in their public capacity. (Art. 39; cont., 1928, Art. 39).

RTS-GAR—Rights

Life is inviolable, and no law or authority may establish or impose the pena de muerte [death penalty].  Property is subject to lawful contributions and taking for works of public utility through juicio contradictorio [adversarial proceeding] and indemnización previa [prior compensation], under the law.  Owners must obey legislation on public hygiene, conservation of forests and waters, and comparable community requirements. (Art. 32(1–2); cont., 1928, Art. 32(1–2)).

Postal and telegraphic correspondence and private papers are inviolable; seizure requires a competent judicial order and legal formalities, preserving secrecy for domestic and private matters unrelated to the case.  The home may be entered only to prevent the commission or completion of an offence, execute lawful judicial decisions or carry out lawful sanitary visits. (Art. 32(3–4); cont., 1928, Art. 32(3–4)).

Personal liberty includes abolition of reclutamiento forzoso [compulsory recruitment], with military service governed by law; permanent prohibition of slavery and freedom for any enslaved person entering the country; liberty to do what harms no one else; and freedom from obligations not legally imposed or prohibitions not established by law. (Art. 32(5); cont., 1928, Art. 32(5)).

Thought may be expressed orally, in writing or through the press, subject to legal penalties for injuria [insult], calumnia [calumny], difamación [defamation], ultraje [outrage] and instigación a delinquir [incitement to commit offences].  Propaganda of communism is prohibited. (Art. 32(6); cont., 1928, Art. 32(6)).

Persons may travel without a passport, change domicile subject to legal formalities, leave and return to the Republic, and take and bring their property.  Work and industry are free subject to public order and public morals.  Industrial monopolies are prohibited, subject to the temporary privileges expressly permitted by Art. 32(8). (Art. 32(7–8); cont., 1928, Art. 32(7–8)).

Unarmed public or private assembly is free from coercion by the authorities; association remains subject to statutory restrictions and prohibitions.  Petitions to public officials or official bodies carry a right to timely reply.  Officials who violate their duties may be accused before competent courts.  Freedom of teaching is guaranteed. (Art. 32(9–11, 13); cont., 1928, Art. 32(9–11, 13)).

No person may be imprisoned for debt not arising from an offence or tried by specially created tribunals or commissions instead of their Jueces naturales [legally competent judges] under pre-existing law.  Arrest or detention requires a información sumaria [preliminary evidentiary inquiry] establishing an offence carrying a pena corporal [penalty restricting personal liberty] and a written order stating the reason, unless the person is caught in fraganti [in the act of committing the offence].  The sumario [preliminary criminal investigation] may not extend beyond thirty days after detention. (Art. 32(15)(a–c); cont., 1928, Art. 32(15)(a–c)).

No person may be held incommunicado or compelled to swear or undergo criminal interrogation against themselves, their ascendants, relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity, or their spouse.  Detention must end when a final judicial decision destroys its grounds or sufficient fianza [bail] is furnished in cases where provisional release is permitted by law. (Art. 32(15)(d–f); cont., 1928, Art. 32(15)(d–f)).

Criminal punishment requires personal notification of the charges and a hearing in the legal form.  A pena corporal [penalty restricting personal liberty] cannot exceed twenty years.  penas infamantes [infamous penalties] and perpetual penalties, including those not restricting personal liberty, are prohibited.  No person may be tried twice for the same offence. (Art. 32(15)(g–i); cont., 1928, Art. 32(15)(g–i)).

All are subject to the same laws, equal legal protection throughout national territory, and equal duties, services and contributions; exemptions require legal authorization.  Titles of nobility, hereditary distinctions and offices paying beyond the duration of service cannot be granted.  Official address is limited to ciudadano [citizen] and usted [you, in formal address], except diplomatic formulas. (Art. 32(16); cont., 1928, Art. 32(16)).

Enumeration of rights does not deny other rights belonging to citizens.  Federal laws, state constitutions and laws, and municipal ordinances impairing guaranteed rights are null, as declared by the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court].  Persons issuing, signing, executing or ordering rights-violating measures are punishable under the law, subject to the exception for competent official measures in the circumstances of Art. 36. (Arts. 33–35; cont., 1928, Arts. 33–35).

During international war, civil war or imminent danger of either, the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] in the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] declares the circumstance and suspends garantías constitucionales [constitutional guarantees] nationally or in the area specified, until peace is restored.  Life remains inviolable and infamous punishments remain prohibited.  confiscación [confiscation] is prohibited except as reciprocal represalias [reprisals] against nationals of an enemy country that has first confiscated Venezuelans’ property. (Art. 36(1–2); cont., 1928, Art. 36(1–2)).

Nationals or foreigners opposing the preservation or restoration of peace may be arrested, subjected to confinamiento [confinement to a specified locality] or expelled.  These measures cease with the circumstances giving rise to them, except that the executive may leave an expulsion of foreigners in force. (Art. 36(3); cont., 1928, Art. 36(3)).

soberanía [sovereignty] resides in the people and is exercised through public powers.  Defined functions limit those powers, and excess constitutes usurpation.  The law regulates nulidad [nullity] for acts exceeding authority; decisions exacted by force or by a public gathering in a subversive attitude are null.  Officials incur individual responsibility for excess of authority or breach of the law governing their office, subject to Art. 102, and remain punishable for other offences. (Arts. 40–44; cont., 1928, Arts. 40–44).

One person cannot hold more than one remunerated public office; acceptance of the second constitutes resignation from the first.  Exceptions cover alternates before replacing a principal and employment in academies, hospitals, incidental courts and educational institutions.  The law regulates the oath taken by national officials upon assuming office. (Arts. 46, 53; cont., 1928, Arts. 46, 53).

REG-MIL—The Military

The Ejército [Army], Armada [Navy] and Aviación Militar [Military Aviation] belong to federal competence.  Estados [States] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] may maintain only police and prison guards, except forces organized on federal orders.  The Ejército [Army] is formed from contingents drawn proportionately to population from the Estados [States], Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories] and Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies].  The law regulates milicias ciudadanas [citizen militias] and may establish enganches por contrato [contractual enlistment].  All war matériel in or introduced into the country belongs to the Nation. (Art. 15(8); cont., 1928, Art. 15(8)).

Civil and military authority cannot be exercised simultaneously by one official except the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic], or a civil official given military functions by law during war.  The fuerza armada [armed force] may not deliberate; it is passive and obedient.  Armed bodies may seek requisitions or assistance only through civil authorities in the manner fixed by law.  Troops remain in barracks during elections, and commanders violating these rules are punishable. (Arts. 45, 47; cont., 1928, Arts. 45, 47).

reclutamiento forzoso [compulsory recruitment] is abolished and military service follows the law.  The Cámara del Senado [Senate] consents to promotions from Coronel [Colonel] and Capitán de Navío [Naval Captain], inclusive.  The Congreso [Congress] legislates on formation and replacement of land and sea forces. (Arts. 32(5)(a), 62(3), 78(15); cont., 1928, Arts. 32(5)(a), 62(3), 78(15)).

For the current constitutional period, the Congreso [Congress] elects a Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Nacional [Commander-in-Chief of the National Army], who commands the Ejército [Army], Aviación [Aviation] and Marina [Navy] and fixes the numbers of land and sea forces.  The separate military-command power formerly numbered 23 is not present in Art. 100; its remaining powers from suspension of guarantees onward are numbered 23–29. (Arts. 100, 128; cf. 1928, Art. 100(23):  “To direct war and command the Ejército [Army] and Armada [Navy] personally, or appoint whoever is to do so”).

The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] exercises Art. 100(1, 4, 17, 18, 23, 25, 27) in agreement with the Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Nacional [Commander-in-Chief of the National Army].  Both offices are elected immediately after enactment for 1929–1936 and take their oaths before the Congreso [Congress]. (Arts. 128–129; new).

Art. 128 names powers 1, 4, 17, 18, 23, 25 and 27 of “Article 100 of the Constitution”.  Art. 128 separately assigns military command to the Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Nacional [Commander-in-Chief of the National Army]. (Art. 128; new).

In Art. 100 of 1929, powers 23, 25 and 27 concern suspension of guarantees and the stated wartime measures, force in armed conflict between Estados [States], and indultos [pardons], respectively. (Art. 100(23, 25, 27); cont., 1928, Art. 100(24, 26, 28)).Art. 100: powers 23, 25 and 27 in the two recensionsPower1928, Art. 1001929, Art. 10023cf. 1928, Art. 100(23):  “To direct war and command the Ejército [Army] and Armada [Navy] personally, or appoint whoever is to do so […]”“To decree the suspension of guarantees in the cases provided in Article 36 […]”25cf. 1928, Art. 100(25):  “To undertake an official visit, together with all or some of the Ministros del Despacho [Cabinet Ministers], to specified Estados [States] of the Union and Territorios Federales [Federal Territories]. […]”“To use the fuerza pública [public force] to end an armed conflict between two or more Estados [States] when the intervention of his good offices has been ineffective.”27cf. 1928, Art. 100(27):  “To exercise, with respect to the Estados [States], the functions they delegate to him in their respective Constitutions.”“To grant indultos [pardons].”

REG-REL—Religion

Religious liberty is guaranteed under the supreme inspection of all forms of worship by the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] in accordance with law, preserving Patronato Eclesiástico [Ecclesiastical Patronage].  The Nation exercises that right under the Law of 28 July 1824.  The Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] must possess estado seglar [lay status]. (Arts. 32(14), 52, 95; cont., 1928, Arts. 32(14), 52, 95).

ECO-INF—Infrastructure

Federal legislation governs civil, commercial, criminal and procedural matters; banks and credit institutions; social provision; Sanidad [Public Health]; conservation and development of forests, waters and other natural resources; labour; marcas de fábrica [trademarks]; literary, artistic and industrial property; public registration; expropiación por causa de utilidad pública [expropriation for public utility]; immigration; naturalización [naturalization]; admission and expulsion of foreigners; and regulation of constitutional guarantees. (Art. 15(4); cont., 1928, Art. 15(4)).

The federal authorities legislate on Instrucción Pública [Public Instruction].  Elementary primary instruction is compulsory and instruction in official institutions is free.  National census and statistical work requires state and municipal cooperation; population-based acts use the latest census approved by the Congreso [Congress].  Art. 15(10) expressly includes the Nation, Estados [States], Distrito Federal [Federal District] and Territorios Federales [Federal Territories]. (Art. 15(9–10); cont., 1928, Art. 15(9–10)).

Air, maritime and river navigation, docks and landing works are federal matters.  Navigation of rivers and other navigable waters requiring no special works cannot be restricted by taxes or privileges.  Correos [Postal Services], Telégrafos [Telegraphs], Teléfonos [Telephones] and wireless communications likewise belong to federal competence. (Art. 15(13, 15); cont., 1928, Art. 15(13, 15)).

National roads are those passing through a Estado [State], the Distrito Federal [Federal District] or a Territorio Federal [Federal Territory] and extending beyond its boundaries.  Federal competence also covers aerial haulage cables and railways even within one Estado [State].  Urban tramways and urban haulage cables are conceded and regulated by the respective Municipalidades [Municipalities]. (Art. 15(16); cont., 1928, Art. 15(16)).

Federal competence extends to necessary public works throughout national territory without restricting the right of Estados [States] and Municipalidades [Municipalities] to undertake works on their own account.  Federal administrative works within Estados [States] may include forts, docks, warehouses, shipyards, penitentiaries and estaciones de cuarentenas [quarantine stations]. (Arts. 15(19), 21; cont., 1928, Arts. 15(19), 21).

Statutory privilegios temporales [temporary exclusive privileges] may protect intellectual property, patentes de invención [patents of invention] and marcas de fábrica [trademarks], and may authorize railways, aerial navigation enterprises, canals, tramways, telephone or telegraph lines and wireless systems for a limited period.  The works must be constructed or installed at the concessionaire’s expense, without guaranteed returns or subsidies from the Nation or Estados [States]. (Art. 32(8); cont., 1928, Art. 32(8)).

Public-interest contracts cannot be transferred, wholly or partly, to foreign governments.  They incorporate a clause assigning unresolved disputes to competent Venezuelan courts under Venezuelan law and excluding foreign claims.  Such contracts cannot be concluded with, or transferred to, companies not legally domiciled in Venezuela. (Art. 50; cont., 1928, Art. 50).

CON-FIN—Final Provisions

The Congreso [Congress] elects the Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Nacional [Commander-in-Chief of the National Army] for the current constitutional period, with military command and the agreement requirement specified in Art. 128.  The elections of the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic] and that commander for 1929–1936 take place as soon as the Constitution is enacted, and both take their oaths before the Congreso [Congress]. (Arts. 128–129; new).

Current officials in the other branches of the Poder Federal [Federal Power] continue until the end of the terms for which they were elected. (Art. 130; cf. 1928, Art. 128:  “as soon as this Constitution enters into force, the Congreso [Congress] shall elect the seven principal Vocales [Members of the Court] and seven Suplentes [Alternates] who are to compose it”).

Existing state constitutions continue until the respective Estados [States] repeal them. (Art. 131; cont., 1928, Art. 129).

After scrutiny establishes ratification by the state Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies], promulgation takes place with the Ejecútese [Let it be executed] of the Encargado del Poder Ejecutivo [Acting Head of the Executive Power].  The Constitution takes effect on the day of publication in the Gaceta Oficial de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Official Gazette of the United States of Venezuela]. (Art. 132; cf. 1928, Art. 130:  “with the Ejecútese [Let it be executed] of the Presidente de la República [President of the Republic]”).

The 1928 Constitution is repealed.  Art. 133 dates both its adoption and publication to 23 May 1928.  The 1929 agreement, constitutional closing and execution formula all bear 29 May 1929; the execution formula is signed J. B. Pérez. (Art. 133; prefatory agreement, closing and execution formulas).

The date printed for adoption in Art. 133 differs from the closing date of 22 May in the CIDEP 1928 recension.  Both printed dates are recorded in this edition.

Recension

Centro para la Integración y el Derecho Público [Centre for Integration and Public Law] (CIDEP).


“Unmasking Disappointment: Series XV”

September 7, 2026

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“Geometric Allegory” digital painting 2023 by Ricardo Morin (American visual artist born in Venezuela–1954)

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Scope and Use

This entry forms part of the constitutional corpus presented in the Appendix, which comprises the twenty-five constitutions of Venezuela and is arranged for consultation rather than continuous reading.  Comparison proceeds through permanent rubric codes whose identity remains constant throughout the corpus; an absent rubric denotes constitutional silence, while a retired rubric is never reassigned.  Citations begin with the article number and follow the CIDEP recension linked at the end of the entry.  The complete definition of the corpus, its method, and its citation convention appear in the Scope and Use note that introduces the nineteenth-century constitutions, beginning with “Unmasking Disillusion: Series XI”: https://observationsonthenatureofperception.com/2026/06/15/unmasking-disillusion-series-xi/

Recensional note:  The quotations and article numbers have been collated against the electronic transcriptions published by CIDEP.  Only manifest transcription errors whose retention would misrepresent the antecedent have been normalized, including “Estada de Los Andes” and “no venta” in Articles 1 and 30 of the 1881 text; “Estado Caraboba,” normalized as “Estado Carabobo,” in Article 1 of the 1891 text; and the reference to “paragraph 23” of Article 13, restored as “paragraph 20,” in Article 81 of the 1891 text.  None of these normalizations alters the constitutional substance.  The marker cont. denotes substantive continuity notwithstanding orthographic, punctuation, or inflectional variation; cf. is reserved for changes that modify, remove, add, or redistribute constitutional content; and new identifies a provision without an antecedent in the immediately preceding Constitution.  At each point marked cf., the language producing the distinction is preserved according to the respective constitutional text.

Translation convention

Institutional names and constitutional terms are retained in italicized Castilian and followed by their contemporary English equivalents in brackets.  Constitutional quotations, including the Preámbulo [Preamble] and every antecedent introduced by cf., are rendered in contemporary Latinate English.  Comparative citations introduced by cf. are italicized as complete units.

Ricardo F. Morín

September 7, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania


9). La Constitución de 1891

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891], formally the Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela], was adopted by the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] at Caracas on 9 April 1891 and promulgated by Presidente [President] Raimundo Andueza Palacio on 16 April 1891.

DOC-PRE—Preámbulo [Preamble]:

“The Congress of the United States of Venezuela, having considered and examined the petitions addressed by the nine States of the Venezuelan Federation through their respective Legislatures, requesting the reform of Article 118 of the Constitution of 1881; and considering: That not only does the majority required for that reform exist, but the vote of the autonomous Entities upon the matter is unanimous; and, That in this case reform is obligatory, and the National Legislature must undertake it in accordance with Articles 46 and 50 of the Compact of Union. Decrees:”

Although the Preámbulo [Preamble] identified Article 118 as the subject of the reform requested by the Estados [States], the enacted Constitución [Constitution] also altered the territorial organization established by Article 1 and extended the ordinary legislative session from sixty to seventy days in Article 30.

FND-TER—Territorio [Territory]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] provided that the Estados [States] declared independent and united by the Constitución de 28 de marzo de 1864 [Constitution of 28 March 1864], and known on 27 April 1881 as Apure, Bolívar, Barquisimeto, Barcelona, Carabobo, Cojedes, Cumaná, Falcón, Guzmán Blanco, Guárico, Guayana, Guzmán, Maturín, Nueva Esparta, Portuguesa, Táchira, Trujillo, Yaracuy, Zamora, and Zulia, were constituted as nine major political entities (Art. 1; cf. 1881, Art. 1: “The States that the Constitution of 28 March 1864 declared independent and united to form the Venezuelan Federation, and which are now denominated Apure, Bolívar, Barquisimeto, Barcelona, Carabobo, Cojedes, Cumaná, Falcón, Guzmán Blanco, Guárico, Guayana, Guzmán, Maturín, Nueva Esparta, Portuguesa, Táchira, Trujillo, Yaracuy, Zamora, and Zulia, are constituted as nine major political entities, namely:”).

Those nine political entities were Estado Bermúdez [State of Bermúdez], composed of Barcelona, Cumaná, and Maturín; Estado Miranda [State of Miranda], composed of Bolívar, Guzmán Blanco, Guárico, and Nueva Esparta; Estado Carabobo [State of Carabobo], composed of Carabobo and Nirgua; Estado Zamora [State of Zamora], composed of Cojedes, Portuguesa, and Zamora; Estado Lara [State of Lara], composed of Barquisimeto and Yaracuy, except the Departamento Nirgua [Department of Nirgua]; Estado de Los Andes [State of the Andes], composed of Guzmán, Trujillo, and Táchira; Estado Bolívar [State of Bolívar], composed of Guayana and Apure; Estado Zulia [State of Zulia]; and Estado Falcón [State of Falcón] (Art. 1; cf. 1881, Art. 1: “State of Oriente, composed of Barcelona, Cumaná, and Maturín; State of Guzmán Blanco, composed of Bolívar, Guzmán Blanco, Guárico, and Nueva Esparta; State of Carabobo, composed of Carabobo and Nirgua; South-Western State, composed of Cojedes, Portuguesa, and Zamora; North-Western State, composed of Barquisimeto and Yaracuy, except the Department of Nirgua; State of the Andes, composed of Guzmán, Trujillo, and Táchira; State of Bolívar, composed of Guayana and Apure; State of Zulia, by itself; and State of Falcón, also by itself.”).

Those entities were constituted in order to continue forming a single free, sovereign, and independent Nación [Nation] under the name Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela] (Art. 1; cont. 1881, Art. 1).

The limits of the major Estados [States] remained those assigned to the former provinces by the Ley de 28 de abril de 1856 [Law of 28 April 1856], which had established the last territorial division, until that division should be reformed (Art. 2; cont. 1881, Art. 2).

The exterior limits of the Estados Unidos de la Federación Venezolana [United States of the Venezuelan Federation] remained those corresponding in 1810 to the former Capitanía General de Venezuela [Captaincy General of Venezuela] (Art. 3; cont. 1881, Art. 3).

The Estados [States] grouped into major political entities were denominated Secciones [Sections]. The Secciones [Sections] were equal among themselves; the constitutions governing their internal organization had to accord with the federal principles established by the Constitución [Constitution]; and undelegated soberanía [sovereignty] resided in the Estado [State], subject only to the limitations arising from the compact of association (Art. 4; cont. 1881, Art. 4).

POW-LEG—Congreso [Congress]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] vested the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] in two Cámaras [Chambers], one of Senadores [Senators] and the other of Diputados [Deputies] (Art. 18; cont. 1881, Art. 18). The Estados [States] determined the manner of electing the Diputados [Deputies] (Art. 19; cont. 1881, Art. 19). Each Estado [State] elected one Diputado [Deputy] for every thirty-five thousand inhabitants and another for any remainder of at least fifteen thousand, together with an equal number of suplentes [substitutes] (Art. 20; cont. 1881, Art. 20). The Diputados [Deputies] served four-year terms and were renewed in their entirety (Art. 21; cont. 1881, Art. 21). The Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] examined the annual account presented by the Presidente [President], could adopt a vote of censure against the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State], and heard charges against the officer exercising the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive], the Ministros [Ministers], other national officers, and senior public officers of the Estados [States] in the cases prescribed by the Constitución [Constitution] (Arts. 22–24; cont. 1881, Arts. 22–24).

Each Legislatura estatal [State Legislature] elected three principal Senadores [Senators] and an equal number of suplentes [substitutes]. The Senadores [Senators] had to be Venezuelan by birth and at least thirty years of age, served four-year terms, and were renewed in their entirety (Arts. 25–27; cont. 1881, Arts. 25–27). The Senado [Senate] tried and determined the proceedings initiated in the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] and remained assembled for that purpose when a proceeding had not concluded during the legislative session (Arts. 28–29; cont. 1881, Arts. 28–29).

The Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] assembled annually in the capital on 20 February, or on the earliest possible day thereafter, without prior convocation. Its sessions lasted seventy days and could be extended to ninety by decision of the majority (Art. 30; cf. 1881, Art. 30: “The National Legislature shall assemble each year in the capital of the United States on 20 February, or on the earliest possible day thereafter, without need of prior convocation. Sessions shall last sixty days and may be extended to ninety at the judgment of the majority.”). The Cámaras [Chambers] opened their sessions with at least two thirds of their members; after opening, they could continue with two thirds of those who had installed them, provided that number did not fall below half of all appointed members (Arts. 31–32; cont. 1881, Arts. 31–32). The Cámaras [Chambers] acted separately but assembled as Congreso [Congress] when the Constitución [Constitution] or the laws so required, or when either Cámara [Chamber] considered a joint session necessary; sessions were public or secret as each Cámara [Chamber] resolved (Arts. 33–34; cont. 1881, Arts. 33–34).

Each Cámara [Chamber] adopted its rules, corrected infractions, maintained order in the house of its sessions, disciplined spectators, removed impediments to the free exercise of its functions, executed its exclusive resolutions, determined the qualifications of its members, and heard their resignations (Art. 35; cont. 1881, Art. 35). Neither Cámara [Chamber] could suspend its sessions or change its place of meeting without the consent of the other; upon disagreement, the Cámaras [Chambers] assembled jointly and the decision of the majority prevailed (Art. 36; cont. 1881, Art. 36). The exercise of any public function was incompatible during the sessions with the office of Senador [Senator] or Diputado [Deputy]; the law fixed their indemnities, and an increase could not take effect before the period following the complete renewal of the Cámaras [Chambers] that enacted it (Art. 37; cont. 1881, Art. 37). Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] enjoyed immunity from 20 January until thirty days after the sessions ended, consisting in the suspension of all civil or criminal proceedings, although a criminal investigation concerning an act punishable by corporal penalty could continue through the summary stage (Art. 38; cont. 1881, Art. 38). The Congreso [Congress] was presided over by the Presidente del Senado [President of the Senate], while the Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados [President of the Chamber of Deputies] served as Vicepresidente [Vice-President] (Art. 39; cont. 1881, Art. 39). miembros de las Cámaras [members of the Chambers] incurred no responsibility for opinions or speeches delivered therein (Art. 40; cont. 1881, Art. 40). A Senador [Senator] or Diputado [Deputy] who accepted an office or commission from the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] thereby vacated his legislative seat (Art. 41; cont. 1881, Art. 41). Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] could neither contract with the Gobierno Nacional [National Government] nor prosecute the claims of others before it (Art. 42; cont. 1881, Art. 42).

The Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] exercised authority over disputes among Estados [States], the Distrito Federal [Federal District], customs, seaports and maritime coasts, national postal services, national codes, currency, national symbols, national offices, the national debt, public borrowing, the census and national statistics, the armed force, war and peace, treaties, public-works contracts, budgets, national prosperity and the advancement of the sciences and arts, weights and measures, amnesties, the Territorios [Territories], the procedure and penalties governing trials before the Senado [Senate], the population basis for the Diputados [Deputies], admission of foreigners to public service, military retirement and montepíos [survivors’ pensions], the responsibility of national and Estado [State] officers, military ranks and promotions, and election of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] (Art. 43; cont. 1881, Art. 43). It could also enact the necessary general laws, while no law in conflict with the Constitución [Constitution] could be promulgated or executed (Art. 44; cont. 1881, Art. 44).

Bills and decrees could be introduced by members of either Cámara [Chamber], were subject to admission and three debates separated by at least one day, passed from one Cámara [Chamber] to the other, and followed the procedures governing amendments, insistence, rejection, pending bills, repeal, publication, nondelegation, and retroactivity (Arts. 45–60; cont. 1881, Arts. 45–60).

ECO-HAC—Hacienda [Public Finance]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] empowered the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] to organize all matters concerning the aduanas [customs houses], whose revenues formed the Tesoro de la Unión [Treasury of the Union] until replaced by other revenues; to determine all matters concerning the national debt; to borrow upon the credit of the Nación [Nation]; and to establish the annual budgets of public expenditure (Art. 43, nos. 3, 10, 11, and 18; cont. 1881, Art. 43, nos. 3, 10, 11, and 18). No expenditure could be made from the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] unless Congreso [Congress] had expressly appropriated a sum for it in the annual budget. Those who violated that rule were civilly liable to the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] for the sums paid, and ordinary expenses took precedence over extraordinary expenses in every disbursement of public funds (Art. 105; cont. 1881, Art. 105). Offices collecting national contributions and offices making payments had to remain separate, and the former could make no payments other than the salaries of their respective employees (Art. 106; cont. 1881, Art. 106). If no budget was enacted for a fiscal period, the budget for the immediately preceding period remained in force (Art. 107; cont. 1881, Art. 107). Exports from Venezuela were free of duty (Art. 101; cont. 1881, Art. 101).

POW-EXE—Ejecutivo [Executive]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] established a Consejo Federal [Federal Council] composed of one Senador [Senator] and one Diputado [Deputy] from each political entity, together with one additional Diputado [Deputy] for the Distrito Federal [Federal District], elected by Congreso [Congress] every two years from the respective representations of the Estados [States] and Distrito Federal [Federal District] (Art. 61 and §; cont. 1881, Art. 61 and §). The Consejo Federal [Federal Council] elected from among its members the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] and the person who would replace him upon a temporary or absolute vacancy. An election of a person who was not a member of the Consejo [Council] was void and without effect (Art. 62; cont. 1881, Art. 62). The miembros del Consejo [members of the Council] and the Presidente [President] served two-year terms and could not be reelected for the immediately succeeding period, although they resumed their legislative seats upon completing their service (Art. 63; cont. 1881, Art. 63). The Consejo Federal [Federal Council] resided in the Distrito Federal [Federal District], exercised the functions assigned by the Constitución [Constitution], required an absolute majority of its members to act, adopted its internal rules, and annually appointed the member who would preside over its sessions (Art. 64; cont. 1881, Art. 64).

The Presidente [President] appointed and removed the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State]; presided over the Gabinete [Cabinet]; received diplomatic representatives; signed official letters addressed to foreign sovereigns and presidents; executed the laws and decrees of the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature]; promulgated resolutions and decrees approved by the Consejo Federal [Federal Council]; organized the Distrito Federal [Federal District]; issued navigation patents to national vessels; reported annually to Congreso [Congress] on the exercise of the powers conferred by Article 66; and performed the other functions assigned by national law (Art. 65; cont. 1881, Art. 65).

With the deliberative vote of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council], the Presidente [President] defended the Nación [Nation] against external attack; administered terrenos baldíos [public lands], mines, and saltworks by delegation from the Estados [States]; convened the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] in ordinary and extraordinary sessions; appointed diplomatic representatives and consuls; directed negotiations and concluded treaties subject to legislative approval; concluded contracts of national interest subject to legislative approval; appointed, removed, and suspended finance officers; declared war with prior authorization from Congreso [Congress]; exercised the powers conferred in the event of foreign war; employed the public force to restore constitutional order when an armed uprising threatened the institutions of the Nación [Nation]; employed the public force to end armed collision among Estados [States] and compel submission of their disputes to arbitration; directed the war and appointed the commander of the Ejército [Army]; organized the national force in time of peace; granted general or individual pardons; and defended the territory designated for the Distrito Federal [Federal District] when invasion was feared (Art. 66; cont. 1881, Art. 66).

The Presidente [President] was assisted in the conduct of business by the number of Ministros [Ministers] established by law, which determined their functions and duties and organized their departments (Art. 67; cont. 1881, Art. 67). A Ministro [Minister] had to be at least twenty-five years of age and either Venezuelan by birth or a national of five years’ standing (Art. 68; cont. 1881, Art. 68). The Ministros [Ministers] were the necessary organs of the Presidente [President], and every presidential act required their countersignature before it could be executed by authorities, officers, or private persons (Art. 69; cont. 1881, Art. 69). Ministros [Ministers] had to conform their acts to the Constitución [Constitution] and the laws; even a written presidential order did not absolve them of personal responsibility (Art. 70; cont. 1881, Art. 70). Matters other than the internal administration of the departments were determined by the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers], whose responsibility was collective and joint (Art. 71; cont. 1881, Art. 71). Within the first five sessions of each year, the Ministros [Ministers] reported upon their departments, presented the annual budget and the general account for the preceding year, appeared before the Cámaras [Chambers] when summoned, and supplied the written or oral reports demanded of them, except for matters reserved in diplomatic negotiations (Arts. 72–74; cont. 1881, Arts. 72–74). Ministros [Ministers] were responsible for treason against the Nación [Nation], violation of the Constitución [Constitution] or laws, misappropriation of public funds, expenditures exceeding appropriations, bribery in matters within their office or in appointments, and failure to comply with decisions of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] (Art. 75; cont. 1881, Art. 75).

The Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] was exercised by the Consejo Federal [Federal Council], the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] or the person acting in his stead, together with the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State], who were its organs. The Presidente [President] had to be Venezuelan by birth (Art. 86 and §; cont. 1881, Art. 86). The functions of the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] could not be exercised outside the Distrito Federal [Federal District], except in the circumstance prescribed by Article 66, no. 10, attribution 5. When the Presidente [President], with the approval of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council], assumed command of the Ejército [Army] or left the Distrito [District] on business of public interest, he could exercise no other functions and was replaced by the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] pursuant to Article 62 (Art. 87; cont. 1881, Art. 87).

The Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] was directed to negotiate with the Gobiernos de América [Governments of the Americas] concerning compacts of alliance or confederation (Art. 116; cont. 1881, Art. 116).

POW-JUD—Poder Judicial [Judicial Power]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] established an Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] composed of one Vocal [Member] for each Estado de la Federación [State of the Federation]. Its Vocales [Members] had to be Venezuelan by birth and at least thirty years of age (Art. 76; cont. 1881, Art. 76). Congreso [Congress] elected one principal Vocal [Member] and one substitute for each Estado [State] from lists of candidates prepared by the respective Estado [State] delegations in Congreso [Congress] (Art. 77; cont. 1881, Art. 77). The law determined the functions of the Vocales [Members] and other officers of the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] (Art. 78; cont. 1881, Art. 78). Principal Vocales [Members] and their suplentes [substitutes] served four-year terms and, while in office, could not accept an appointment from the Ejecutivo [Executive] without first resigning and obtaining lawful acceptance of the resignation; violation entailed four years’ disqualification from public office in Venezuela (Art. 79; cont. 1881, Art. 79).

The Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] had jurisdiction over civil and criminal proceedings involving diplomatic officers in the cases permitted by the Derecho de Gentes [Law of Nations]; proceedings that the Presidente [President] ordered to be brought against his Ministros [Ministers]; proceedings concerning ministerial responsibility; proceedings against diplomatic agents accredited abroad; civil proceedings against the Nación [Nation] when the law so provided; jurisdictional disputes among officers of different Estados [States]; political matters voluntarily submitted by the Estados [States]; determination of the governing law when national laws conflicted with one another or with Estado [State] laws; disputes arising from contracts or negotiations concluded by the Presidente de la Federación [President of the Federation]; prize causes; and other matters assigned by law (Art. 80; cont. 1881, Art. 80).

The Constitución [Constitution] also established a Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] as a tribunal of the Estados [States], composed of one Vocal [Member] for each Estado [State], with four-year terms (Art. 81; cont. 1881, Art. 81). Vocales [Members] of the Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] had to be practicing attorneys with at least six years of professional practice, Venezuelan, and over thirty years of age (Art. 82; cont. 1881, Art. 82). Every four years, each Legislatura estatal [State Legislature] prepared a list of attorneys equal in number to the Estados de la Federación [States of the Federation], from which the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] elected the Vocal [Member] corresponding to each Estado [State] (Art. 83; cont. 1881, Art. 83). After those elections, the Consejo Federal [Federal Council] compiled and published a general list of the remaining attorneys, from which absolute vacancies were filled by lot; temporary vacancies were filled as prescribed by law (Art. 84; cont. 1881, Art. 84).

The Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] heard criminal and responsibility proceedings against senior officers of the Estados [States], applying the laws of the respective Estado [State] and, in the absence of a law of responsibility, the general legislation of the República [Republic]; determined the recurso de casación [appeal in cassation] in the manner prescribed by law; reported annually to the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] on impediments to uniform civil and criminal legislation; and resolved jurisdictional conflicts among judicial officers of different Estados [States] and, within a single Estado [State], when no authority existed to resolve them (Art. 85; cont. 1881, Art. 85).

The tribunals of justice of the Estados [States] were independent, and proceedings initiated before them terminated within the respective Estado [State], subject only to review by the Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] in the cases permitted by law (Art. 89; cont. 1881, Art. 89). The law could also create such other national tribunals as were necessary (Art. 111; cont. 1881, Art. 111).

POW-SUB—Gobierno subnacional [Subnational Government]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] constituted the former Estados [States] as nine larger political entities, styled the Estados [States] of Bermúdez, Miranda, Carabobo, Zamora, Lara, Los Andes, Bolívar, Zulia, and Falcón, which continued to form one nation under the denomination Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela] (Art. 1; cf. 1881, Art. 1: “The States that the Constitution of 28 March 1864 declared independent and united to form the Venezuelan Federation … are constituted as nine great political entities, namely:”). The territorial division established by the Ley de 28 de abril de 1856 [Law of 28 April 1856] determined the boundaries of those entities until amended by law (Art. 2; cont. 1881, Art. 2). The entities formed by the aggregation of former Estados [States] were denominated Secciones [Sections], declared equal among themselves, required to enact constitutions consonant with the federal principles established by the Constitución [Constitution], and retained the soberanía [sovereignty] not delegated, subject only to the limitations arising from the compact of association (Art. 4; cont. 1881, Art. 4).

The Estados [States] composing the Federación Venezolana [Venezuelan Federation] reciprocally recognized their respective autonomías [autonomies], declared themselves equal as political entities, and retained in full the sovereignty not expressly delegated by the Constitución [Constitution] (Art. 12; cont. 1881, Art. 12). The Constitución [Constitution] enumerated the obligations of the Estados [States], including organization according to the principles of popular, elective, federal, representative, alternative, and responsible government; enactment of constitutions consonant with the federal compact; preservation of sectional independence and the integrity of the Federación [Federation]; abstention from foreign political or diplomatic relations; cession of territory required for the Distrito Federal [Federal District] and other national purposes; recognition of specified federal powers and administrations; compliance with, and enforcement of, the Constitución [Constitution], federal laws, and federal judicial acts; organization of their tribunals; establishment of direct and public suffrage; provision of primary education and instruction in arts and trades; contribution of the contingent to the national public force; neutrality in disputes among Estados [States]; submission of interstate controversies to Congreso [Congress] or the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court]; recognition of federal jurisdiction over specified proceedings against the executive authorities of the Estados [States]; participation in the distribution of specified revenues; and the other duties enumerated in Article 13 (Art. 13; cont. 1881, Art. 13).

All matters not expressly attributed to the Administración General de la Nación [General Administration of the Nation] fell within the competence of the Estados [States] (Art. 88; cont. 1881, Art. 88). The tribunals of justice of the Estados [States] were declared independent, and proceedings initiated within an Estado [State] terminated there, subject only to review by the Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] in the cases permitted by law (Art. 89; cont. 1881, Art. 89). Every act of Congreso [Congress] or the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] that violated the rights guaranteed to the Estados [States] or assailed their independence had to be declared void by the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] upon petition of a majority of the Legislaturas estatales [State Legislatures] (Art. 90; cont. 1881, Art. 90).

The Gobierno de la Federación [Government of the Federation] could maintain no resident officers exercising jurisdiction or authority within the Estados [States] other than the Estados [States]’ own officers. Officers of the Hacienda [Public Finance] and personnel assigned to forces garrisoning national fortresses, parks created by law, naval stations, and authorized ports were excepted; their jurisdiction was confined to their respective offices and precincts, without exempting them from the general laws of the Estado [State] in which they resided (Art. 97; cont. 1881, Art. 97).

The Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could station neither forces nor military commanders exercising command within an Estado [State] without the consent of its government (Art. 98; cont. 1881, Art. 98). Neither the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] nor the Ejecutivos de los Estados [Executives of the States] could intervene by armed force in the domestic contests of an Estado [State], although they could tender their good offices toward a peaceful settlement (Art. 99; cont. 1881, Art. 99).

CON-AMD—Reforma de la Constitución [Constitutional Amendment]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] authorized its amendment by the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] upon application by the Legislaturas estatales [State Legislatures], but only upon the points on which a majority of the Estados [States] concurred (Art. 118; cf. 1881, Art. 118: “This Constitution may be amended in whole or in part by the National Legislature if a majority of the Legislatures of the States should so request. The decision of the majority renders the amendment obligatory; but the amendment shall never extend beyond the points upon which the applications concur.”). It further provided that one or more points could be amended when two thirds of the members of the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature], acting separately and according to the procedure established for the enactment of laws, so resolved. An amendment adopted by that method had to be submitted to the Legislaturas de los Estados [State Legislatures] and was enacted only as to the point or points ratified by a majority of them (Art. 118; new).

CIV-SUF—Sufragio [Suffrage]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] made male Venezuelans over twenty-one years of age eligible for office, subject only to the exceptions established by the Constitución [Constitution] (Art. 7; cont. 1881, Art. 7). It guaranteed freedom of suffrage in popular elections, restricted only by minority under eighteen years of age (Art. 14, no. 11; cont. 1881, Art. 14, no. 11). It required the Estados [States] to establish direct and public suffrage in popular elections, render it obligatory, and secure it through the electoral census. Each vote had to be cast in full and public session of the respective electoral board, entered in the register prescribed by law, and signed by the elector or, if impeded or unable to write, by another at his request; without that formality, the vote was not deemed cast (Art. 13, no. 22; cont. 1881, Art. 13, no. 22).

The Diputados [Deputies] were elected by popular vote in the proportion established by the Constitución [Constitution], with an equal number of suplentes [substitutes] (Art. 20; cont. 1881, Art. 20). Each Legislatura estatal [State Legislature] elected three principal Senadores [Senators] and an equal number of suplentes [substitutes] (Art. 25; cont. 1881, Art. 25). The Consejo Federal [Federal Council] elected from among its members the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] and the person who would replace him upon temporary or absolute vacancy (Art. 62; cont. 1881, Art. 62). During periods of popular elections, the fuerza pública nacional y la de los Estados [national and State public forces] remained strictly confined to barracks throughout the electoral period (Art. 108; cont. 1881, Art. 108).

CIV-CIT—Ciudadanía [Citizenship]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] recognized as Venezuelans all persons born within the territory of Venezuela, irrespective of their parents’ nationality; children of a Venezuelan mother or father born in another territory who established domicile in the country and manifested their will to become Venezuelan; foreigners who had obtained a carta de nacionalidad [letter of naturalization]; and persons born in any of the Repúblicas hispanoamericanas [Spanish-American Republics] or the Antillas españolas [Spanish Antilles] who established residence in the República [Republic] and manifested their will to become its citizens (Art. 5; cont. 1881, Art. 5). Venezuelans who established domicile and acquired nationality in a foreign country did not thereby lose their Venezuelan status (Art. 6; cont. 1881, Art. 6). Male Venezuelans over twenty-one years of age were eligible for public office, subject only to the exceptions established by the Constitución [Constitution] (Art. 7; cont. 1881, Art. 7). Venezuelans were bound to serve the Nación [Nation] according to law, sacrificing their property and lives if necessary for its defense (Art. 8; cont. 1881, Art. 8). In every Estado [State] of the Unión [Union], they enjoyed the rights and immunities inherent in their status as citizens of the Federación [Federation] and were subject there to the same duties as native-born and domiciled inhabitants (Art. 9; cont. 1881, Art. 9).

Foreigners enjoyed the same civil rights as Venezuelans and the same security of person and property as nationals. They could resort to diplomatic channels only in accordance with public treaties and in cases permitted by law (Art. 10; cont. 1881, Art. 10). The law determined the rights incident to condición de extranjero [alien status], according as foreigners were domiciled or transient (Art. 11; cont. 1881, Art. 11).

RTS-GAR—Derechos [Rights]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] guaranteed Venezuelans the inviolability of life, abolishing capital punishment irrespective of the law prescribing it; property, subject only to legislatively imposed contributions, judicial decision, and expropriation for public works after indemnification and adversarial proceedings; the inviolability and secrecy of correspondence and other private papers; the inviolability of the domestic home, except to prevent the commission of a crime in accordance with law; personal liberty, including abolition of forced recruitment, perpetual proscription of slavery, freedom for slaves who entered Venezuelan territory, and the principle that no person is bound to do what the law does not command or prevented from doing what it does not prohibit; freedom of thought expressed orally or through the press without prior censorship, subject to judicial actions for calumny, insult, or injury to a third party; freedom of transit, change of domicile, departure from and return to the República [Republic] with one’s property; freedom of industry, with protection for discoveries and productions; freedom of peaceful, unarmed assembly and association; the right of petition and of obtaining a determination; freedom of suffrage in popular elections, restricted only by minority under eighteen years of age; freedom of instruction, with an obligation upon the public power to establish primary education and instruction in arts and trades without charge; religious freedom; individual security, with the guarantees enumerated in Article 14, no. 14; and equality before the law, including the prohibition of titles of nobility and hereditary honors and the official forms of address ciudadano [citizen] and usted [you] (Art. 14; cont. 1881, Art. 14).

The enumeration of guarantees did not restrict the power of the Estados [States] to accord their inhabitants additional guarantees (Art. 15; cont. 1881, Art. 15). Estado [State] laws prescribed penalties for violations of those guarantees and established procedures for making them effective (Art. 16; cont. 1881, Art. 16). Persons who issued, signed, executed, or ordered the execution of decrees, orders, or resolutions violating any guarantee accorded to Venezuelans were declared culpable and punished according to law, and every ciudadano [citizen] was competent to accuse them (Art. 17; cont. 1881, Art. 17).

All usurped authority was without effect, and its acts were void. Any decision procured by the direct or indirect requisition of the armed force or by an assembly of the people in a subversive posture was likewise void by operation of law and without effect (Art. 102; cont. 1881, Art. 102).

The Derecho de Gentes [Law of Nations] formed part of national legislation and governed especially in cases of civil war. Civil war could be concluded by treaties among the belligerents, who were required to observe the humanitarian usages of Christian and civilized nations; the guarantee of life remained inviolable in every case (Art. 117; cont. 1881, Art. 117).

REG-MIL—La fuerza armada [Armed Force]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] empowered the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] annually to fix the size of the naval and land forces, enact the ordinances of the Ejército [Army], prescribe rules for forming and replacing those forces, enact laws governing military retirement and montepíos [survivors’ pensions], and determine the manner of conferring military ranks and promotions (Art. 43, nos. 13, 14, 26, and 28; cont. 1881, Art. 43, nos. 13, 14, 26, and 28).

With the deliberative vote of the Consejo Federal [Federal Council], the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] organized the national force in time of peace, directed the war, appointed the commander of the Ejército [Army], declared war with prior authorization from Congreso [Congress], exercised the powers conferred in case of foreign war, employed the public force to restore constitutional order upon an armed uprising against the institutions of the Nación [Nation], employed the public force to terminate armed collision among Estados [States] and compel submission of their disputes to arbitration, and defended the territory designated for the Distrito Federal [Federal District] when invasion was feared (Art. 66, nos. 9–16; cont. 1881, Art. 66, nos. 9–16).

The national public force was divided into naval and land forces and consisted of the milicia ciudadana [citizen militia] organized by the Estados [States] pursuant to their laws (Art. 91; cont. 1881, Art. 91). The force placed at the charge of the Federación [Federation] consisted of a contingent, proportioned to population, supplied by each Estado [State] through the call to service of citizens required to render it under their internal laws (Art. 92; cont. 1881, Art. 92). In time of war, that contingent could be augmented by bodies of the milicia ciudadana [citizen militia] up to the number of men necessary to satisfy “the national requisition” (Art. 93; cf. 1881, Art. 93: “In case of war, the contingent may be augmented by bodies of the citizen militia up to the number of men necessary to satisfy the requisition of the National Government.”). The Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could replace the commanders of the public force supplied by the Estados [States] in the cases and with the formalities prescribed by national military law, whereupon it requested replacements from the respective Estados [States] (Art. 94; cont. 1881, Art. 94). Military and civil authority could never be exercised by the same person or corporation (Art. 95; cont. 1881, Art. 95).

All existing instruments of war belonged to the Gobierno Nacional [National Government], without prohibiting the Estados [States] from acquiring those required for their internal defense (Art. 97; cont. 1881, Art. 97).

The Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could station neither forces nor military commanders exercising command within an Estado [State] without the consent of its government (Art. 98; cont. 1881, Art. 98). Neither the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] nor the Ejecutivos de los Estados [Executives of the States] could intervene by armed force in the domestic contests of an Estado [State], although they could tender their good offices toward a peaceful settlement (Art. 99; cont. 1881, Art. 99). During periods of popular elections, the fuerza pública nacional y la de los Estados [national and State public forces] remained strictly confined to barracks throughout the electoral period (Art. 108; cont. 1881, Art. 108). The armed force could not deliberate; it was “passive and obedient,” and no armed body could make requisitions or demand aid except through the civil authorities and in the manner prescribed by law (Art. 113; cont. 1881, Art. 113).

In cases of civil war, the provisions of the Derecho de Gentes [Law of Nations] incorporated into national legislation governed; belligerents could conclude treaties to terminate the war, were required to observe humanitarian usages, and could not violate the guarantee of life (Art. 117; cont. 1881, Art. 117).

REG-REL—Religión [Religion]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] guaranteed religious freedom (Art. 14, no. 13; cont. 1881, Art. 14, no. 13). It further provided that, the Nación [Nation] being in possession of the derecho de patronato eclesiástico [right of ecclesiastical patronage], that right would be exercised as prescribed by the governing law (Art. 96; cont. 1881, Art. 96).

CON-FIN—Disposiciones finales [Final Provisions]:

The Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] entered into force on the date of its official promulgation in each Estado [State]. It further directed that, in all public acts and official documents, the date of the Federación [Federation] be reckoned from 20 February 1859 and that of the Ley [Law] from 28 March 1864 (Art. 119; cont. 1881, Art. 119). The constitutional period for offices within the Administración General de la República [General Administration of the Republic] continued to be reckoned from 20 February 1882, the date upon which the amended Constitución [Constitution] was put into operation (Art. 120; cf. 1881, Art. 122: “The new constitutional period shall begin to be reckoned, for offices within the General Administration of the Republic, on 20 February 1882, when the present period terminates.”). For all civil and political acts of the Estados de la Federación [States of the Federation], the population basis was that determined by the latest census approved by the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature] (Art. 121; cf. 1881, Art. 123: “For all acts in the civil and political life of the States of the Federation, their population basis is that determined by the census approved on 6 June 1874, until amended.”). The Constitución de 27 de abril de 1881 [Constitution of 27 April 1881] was repealed (Art. 122; cf. 1881, Art. 124: “The Federal Constitution enacted in 1874 is repealed.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] was adopted at Caracas, in the Palacio del Cuerpo Legislativo Federal [Palace of the Federal Legislative Body], on 9 April 1891, signed by the members of Congreso [Congress] there recorded, and ordered executed and observed at the Palacio Federal [Federal Palace] in Caracas on 16 April 1891 by Presidente [President] Raimundo Andueza Palacio and his Ministros [Ministers].

Note: the original text of the Constitución de 1891 [Constitution of 1891] may be consulted through CIDEP (Recopilación de Leyes y Decretos de Venezuela [Compilation of the Laws and Decrees of Venezuela]): https://cidep.online/files/constituciones/1891.pdf


10). La Constitución de 1893

La Constitución de 1893 [The Constitution of 1893] (Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela]) was adopted by the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente [National Constituent Assembly] at Caracas on 12 June 1893 and promulgated by Presidente [President] Joaquín Crespo on 21 June 1893.

DOC-PRE—Preámbulo [Preamble]:

“We, the representatives of the people of Venezuela, assembled as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to the convocation contained in the Executive Decree of 1 January of the present year, invoking the favor and inspiration of the Supreme Legislator of the Universe, decree the following: CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF VENEZUELA”

FND-TER—Territorio [Territory]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] declared that the Estados [States] of Los Andes, Bermúdez, Bolívar, Carabobo, Falcón, Lara, Miranda, Zamora, and Zulia continued united as the Nación [Nation] under the denomination Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela] (Art. 1; cf. 1891, Art. 1: “The States that the Constitution of 28 March 1864 declared independent and united … are constituted as nine great political entities, namely: the State of Bermúdez … the State of Miranda … the State of Carabobo … the State of Zamora … the State of Lara … the State of Los Andes … the State of Bolívar … the State of Zulia, by itself, and the State of Falcón, likewise by itself.”).

The boundaries of those Estados [States] were to be determined by those assigned to the former provinces by the Ley de 28 de abril de 1856 [Law of 28 April 1856], except that the former Departamento Nirgua [Department of Nirgua] formed part of the Estado Carabobo [State of Carabobo] (Art. 2; cf. 1891, Art. 2: “The boundaries of these great States are determined by those assigned to the former provinces by the Law of 28 April 1856, which fixed the last territorial division, until that division is amended.”).

The territory of the Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela] was the same as that belonging in 1810 to the Capitanía General de Venezuela [Captaincy General of Venezuela] (Art. 3; cont. 1891, Art. 3).

Two or more Estados [States] could unite to form a single Estado [State] if their respective Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] so resolved. The former Estados [States] that the Constitución de 28 de marzo de 1864 [Constitution of 28 March 1864] had declared independent and that the Constitución de 27 de abril de 1881 [Constitution of 27 April 1881] had converted into Secciones [Sections] could recover the status of Estados [States] if two thirds of their Distritos [Districts], acting through their representatives in the Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly], so petitioned and their population exceeded one hundred thousand inhabitants. In the absence of that population, they could petition to separate from one Estado [State] and be annexed to another, provided that the Estado [State] from which they separated retained the requisite base of one hundred thousand inhabitants. In either case, notice was given to Congreso [Congress], the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive], and the other Estados [States] of the Federación [Federation], and the law regulated the procedure (Art. 4; new).

POW-LEG—Congreso [Congress]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] vested the legislative authority of the Nación [Nation] in the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela], composed of a Cámara del Senado [Chamber of the Senate] and a Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] (Arts. 18–19; cf. 1891, Art. 18: “The National Legislature shall be composed of two Chambers, one of Senators and the other of Deputies.”; cf. 1891, Art. 19: “The States shall determine the manner of conducting the election of Deputies.”).

Each Estado [State] elected one Diputado [Deputy] for every thirty-five thousand inhabitants and one additional Diputado [Deputy] for every excess of not less than fifteen thousand, with an equal number of suplentes [substitutes]; the Distrito Federal [Federal District] likewise elected its Diputados [Deputies] under the same rules (Arts. 20 and 23; cf. 1891, Art. 20: “To constitute the Chamber of Deputies, each State shall appoint by popular election, in conformity with paragraph 22 of Article 13 of this Constitution, one Deputy for every thirty-five thousand inhabitants and one additional Deputy for an excess of not less than fifteen thousand.”).

Diputados [Deputies] had to be Venezuelan by birth; their election was popular and conducted under paragraph 24 of Article 13; they served four-year terms, were renewed in their entirety, and their vacancies were filled according to law for the remainder of the term (Arts. 21–24 and sole paragraph to Art. 24; cf. 1891, Art. 21: “The Deputies shall serve four years in their offices and shall be renewed in their entirety.”).

The Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] of each Estado [State] elected three principal Senadores [Senators] and three suplentes [substitutes]; Senadores [Senators] had to be Venezuelan by birth and at least thirty years of age, served four-year terms, and were renewed in their entirety (Arts. 26–29; cf. 1891, Art. 25: “To constitute this Chamber, each State, through its respective Legislature, shall elect three principal Senators and, to fill vacancies that may occur, an equal number of substitutes.”; cf. 1891, Art. 26: “To be a Senator, a person must: 1. Be Venezuelan by birth; and 2. Be thirty years of age.”; cf. 1891, Art. 27: “The Senators shall serve four years in their offices and shall be renewed in their entirety.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] prescribed the annual meeting of the Cámaras Legislativas [Legislative Chambers] in the capital of the Unión [Union] on 20 February, or on the nearest possible day, without prior convocation; sessions of seventy days, extendable to ninety; quorum requirements; public and secret sessions; the internal powers of each Cámara [Chamber]; the rule that neither Cámara [Chamber] could suspend its sessions or change its place of meeting without the consent of the other; incompatibility between legislative office and other public functions during the sessions; legislative indemnities; immunity; the presidency of Congreso [Congress]; nonliability for opinions or speeches; and the prohibition against Senadores [Senators] and Diputados [Deputies] contracting with the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] or prosecuting the claims of others before it (Arts. 30–43; cf. 1891, Art. 30: “The National Legislature shall meet each year in the capital of the United States on 20 February, or on the nearest possible day, without need of prior convocation.”; cf. 1891, Art. 34: “The sessions shall be public, and secret when the Chamber so resolves.”; cf. 1891, Art. 38: “Senators and Deputies, from 20 January of each year until thirty days after the termination of the sessions, shall enjoy immunity.”; cf. 1891, Art. 40: “The members of the Chambers are not responsible for the opinions they express or the speeches they deliver therein.”; cf. 1891, Art. 42: “Nor may Senators and Deputies contract with the National Government or prosecute the claims of others before it.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] enumerated the powers of Congreso [Congress] over national taxes, aduanas [customs houses], ports, postal and telegraph offices, national codes, currency, national symbols, national offices, the national debt, public borrowing, statistics and the census, the armed force, war, treaties, contracts of national interest, the budget, amnesties, the Territorios [Territories], elections, official responsibility, military retirement and montepíos [survivors’ pensions], military ranks and promotions, and laws of a general character (Arts. 44–46; cf. 1891, Art. 43: “The National Legislature has the following powers:”; cf. 1891, Art. 44: “In addition to the preceding enumeration, the National Legislature may enact such laws of a general character as may be necessary …”).

The Constitución [Constitution] prescribed the introduction, debate, amendment, approval, promulgation, repeal, and publication of laws; required that a law amending another be drafted in full; provided that bills rejected during the sessions of one year could not be introduced anew except during those of another; declared the power of Congreso [Congress] to enact law nondelegable; and provided that no legislative provision would have retroactive effect, except in matters of judicial procedure and when imposing a lesser penalty (Arts. 47–59; cf. 1891, Art. 45: “The laws and decrees of the National Legislature may be introduced by members of either Chamber …”; cf. 1891, Art. 46: “… it shall receive three debates, with an interval of at least one day between each …”; cf. 1891, Art. 50: “A law amending another shall be drafted in full, and the prior law shall be repealed in all its parts.”; cf. 1891, Art. 52: “Bills rejected in one Legislature may not be introduced anew except in another.”; cf. 1891, Art. 58: “Laws shall not be in force until published with the prescribed solemnity.”; cf. 1891, Art. 59: “The power conferred to enact law is not delegable.”; cf. 1891, Art. 60: “No legislative provision shall have retroactive effect, except in matters of judicial procedure and when imposing a lesser penalty.”).

ECO-HAC—Hacienda [Public Finance]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] empowered the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] to decree national taxes and organize all matters concerning the aduanas [customs houses], determine all matters concerning the national debt and its interest, authorize borrowing upon the credit of the Nación [Nation], and frame the general budget of public revenues and expenditures, which in no case could fail to receive an annual vote (Art. 44, nos. 2, 9, 10, and 17; cf. 1891, Art. 43, nos. 3, 10, 11, and 18: “To organize all matters concerning the Customs Houses, whose revenues shall constitute the treasury of the Union until replaced by other revenues”; “To determine all matters concerning the National Debt”; “To borrow upon the credit of the Nation”; “To frame annually the budgets of public expenditure.”).

The Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] was charged with administering terrenos baldíos [public lands], mines, and saltworks pursuant to law; negotiating the loans authorized by Congreso [Congress] in strict conformity with its provisions; and supervising and safeguarding the collection of national revenues (Art. 76, nos. 5, 15, and 16; cf. 1891, Art. 66, nos. 2, 10, and 7: “To administer the public lands, mines, and saltworks of the States by their delegation”; “To exact contributions in advance and negotiate the loans authorized by the National Legislature”; “To appoint officers of the Public Finance whose appointment is not attributed to another authority.”).

The Consejo de Gobierno [Council of Government] was required to supervise the lawful administration and application of national revenues, submitting annually to Congreso [Congress] such reports and observations as were warranted; to ensure the proper delivery of the sums assigned to the Estados [States] under Article 13, no. 32; and to ensure the detailed fortnightly publication of the movements of the Treasury (Art. 85, no. 4; new).

Within the first ten days of the second month of the Cámaras [Chambers]’ sessions, the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State] were required to present the general budget of revenues and expenditures and the general account for the preceding year (Art. 97; cf. 1891, Art. 73: “Within the same period, they shall present to the National Legislature the budget of public expenditures and the general account for the preceding year.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] declared exports from Venezuela free and prohibited every duty upon them; prohibited any expenditure from the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] for which Congreso [Congress] had not expressly appropriated a sum in the general budget of public expenditures; rendered violators civilly liable to the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] for the sums paid; required ordinary expenses to take precedence over extraordinary expenses; and required offices collecting national contributions and offices making payments to remain separate, the former making no payment other than the salaries of their respective employees (Arts. 136, 138, and 139; cf. 1891, Art. 101: “Exports from Venezuela are free, and no duty burdening them may be imposed.”; cf. 1891, Art. 105: “No expenditure shall be made from the National Treasury for which Congress has not expressly appropriated a sum in the annual budget …”; cf. 1891, Art. 106: “Offices collecting national contributions and offices making payments shall always remain separate …”).

POW-EXE—Ejecutivo [Executive]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] assigned the Administración general de la Nación [General Administration of the Nation], insofar as it was not conferred upon another authority, to the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive], exercised by the Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] in union with the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of State] and the Consejo de Gobierno [Council of Government] in the powers conferred upon it by the Constitución [Constitution] (Art. 60; cf. 1891, Art. 86: “The National Executive is exercised by the Federal Council, the President of the United States of Venezuela or the person acting in his stead, in union with the Ministers of State, who are its organs.”). funciones ejecutivas [executive functions] could not be exercised outside the Distrito Federal [Federal District], except in the constitutional circumstance of the temporary transfer of the Poder General [General Power]; when the Presidente [President] assumed command of the Ejército [Army] or left the Distrito Federal [Federal District] in exercise of the constitutional power, he was replaced by the presiding member of the Consejo de Gobierno [Council of Government] (Arts. 61–62; cf. 1891, Art. 87: “The functions of the National Executive may not be exercised outside the Federal District, except in the case provided in number 5, attribution 10, Article 66 of the Constitution. When the President, with the approval of the Council, assumes command of the Army or leaves the District because matters of public interest so require, he may exercise no other functions and shall be replaced by the Federal Council pursuant to Article 62 of this Constitution.”).

The Presidente [President] was elected by the citizens of the Estados [States] and the Distrito Federal [Federal District] through direct and secret voting; he had to be Venezuelan by birth and at least thirty years of age (Art. 63; cf. 1891, Art. 62: “The Federal Council elects from among its members the President of the United States of Venezuela and, in the same manner, the person who shall replace him upon temporary or absolute vacancies occurring during his term.”; cf. 1891, paragraph to Art. 86: “To be President of the United States of Venezuela, a person must be Venezuelan by birth.”). The Cámaras [Chambers] assembled as Congreso [Congress] conducted the scrutiny; the Constitución [Constitution] regulated missing returns, the absence of an absolute majority, the failure of Congreso [Congress] to organize, and the subsidiary intervention of the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] (Arts. 64–69; new).

Temporary or absolute vacancies in the Presidencia [Presidency] were filled by the presiding member of the Consejo de Gobierno [Council of Government]; if an absolute vacancy occurred during the first two years of the term, elections were to be called to complete the remainder. The presidential term ran for four years from 20 February; the Presidente [President] was ineligible for the immediately succeeding term, a restriction also applicable to any person who had exercised the Presidencia [Presidency] during the last year of the prior term and to relatives specified by the Constitución [Constitution]. His salary could not be altered during the term, and the Presidente [President] was answerable for treason against the Nación [Nation], violation of the Constitución [Constitution] or laws, and common crimes (Arts. 70–75; cf. 1891, Arts. 62–63: “The members of the Federal Council serve two years, as does the President of the United States of Venezuela.”).

The Presidente [President] directly exercised the powers enumerated in Article 76; with the consultative vote of the Consejo de Gobierno [Council of Government], those in Article 77; and, after a deliberative vote of that Consejo [Council], those in Article 78. They included execution of the laws and decrees of Congreso [Congress]; appointment and removal of Ministros [Ministers] and officers; administration of the Distrito Federal [Federal District], terrenos baldíos [public lands], mines, and saltworks; negotiation of loans; supervision of revenues; executive regulation of the laws; external defense; extraordinary convocation of Congreso [Congress]; diplomatic relations; war; organization and direction of the national force; pardons; restoration of constitutional order; termination of armed collisions among Estados [States]; contracts of national interest; and exclusion of foreigners prejudicial to public order (Arts. 76–78; cf. 1891, Arts. 65–66: “The following are powers of the President of the United States of Venezuela:”; “Apart from the preceding powers, which belong exclusively to the President of the United States of Venezuela, he shall exercise the following with the deliberative vote of the Federal Council:”).

The Consejo de Gobierno [Council of Government] consisted of nine principal Vocales [Members] and their suplentes [substitutes], elected by Congreso [Congress] for the same four-year term as the Presidencia [Presidency]. Its members had to possess the qualifications required of the Presidente [President]; the Consejo [Council] elected its own officers, deliberated with the attendance of at least two thirds of its members, and exercised the consultative, deliberative, administrative, and fiscal functions established by the Constitución [Constitution]. The Consejeros [Councillors] were answerable for treason against the Nación [Nation], bribery, violation of the Constitución [Constitution] or laws, and common crimes (Arts. 79–89; cf. 1891, Arts. 61–64: “There shall be a Federal Council composed of one Senator and one Deputy from each of the political entities, and one additional Deputy for the Federal District.”).

The Presidente [President] had for the conduct of business the Ministros [Ministers] prescribed by law. Ministros [Ministers] had to be at least twenty-five years of age and Venezuelan by birth; they constituted the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] for matters within its competence and were the legal, sole, and necessary organs of the Presidente [President], whose acts were without effect absent the corresponding ministerial countersignature. They were required to conform their acts to the Constitución [Constitution] and laws, render accounts and reports to the Cámaras [Chambers], present the budget and general account, and answer in the cases enumerated by the Constitución [Constitution] (Arts. 90–99; cf. 1891, Arts. 67–75: “The President of the United States of Venezuela shall have for the conduct of business the Ministers prescribed by law.”).

POW-JUD—Poder Judicial [Judicial Power]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] vested the Poder Judicial de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Judicial Power of the United States of Venezuela] in the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court], the Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation], and the other Tribunales y Juzgados [Tribunals and Courts] established by law. Judicial officers were answerable in the cases determined by law and for treason against the Nación [Nation], bribery, violation of the Constitución [Constitution] or laws, and common crimes (Arts. 100–101; cf. 1891, Arts. 76–85 and 111: “The law shall create and designate such other national tribunals as may be necessary.”).

The Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] consisted of nine Vocales [Members], each with a substitute. A Vocal [Member] had to be Venezuelan by birth and at least thirty years of age. Each Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] transmitted to Congreso [Congress] a nonaria [list of nine nominees] selected from outside its membership, from which Congreso [Congress] elected the corresponding principal Vocal [Member] and substitute; the Constitución [Constitution] regulated replacements, increases or decreases in the number of Estados [States], election every six years, and incompatibility with offices filled by executive appointment (Arts. 102–109; cf. 1891, Arts. 76–79: “The High Federal Court shall be composed of as many Members as there are States of the Federation.”).

The Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] heard accusations and proceedings against the person charged with the Presidencia [Presidency], the Consejeros [Councillors], the Ministros [Ministers], and members of both Cortes [Courts]; proceedings involving diplomatic officers and agents; civil proceedings against the Nación [Nation]; political or jurisdictional controversies among officers of different Estados [States]; conflicts of laws; the nullity of national or district acts emanating from usurped authority or from decisions obtained by force; prize causes; controversies arising from contracts concluded by the Presidente [President]; and the presidential scrutiny in the prescribed circumstances (Art. 110; cf. 1891, Art. 80: “The following matters fall within the competence of the High Federal Court:”).

The Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] was a tribunal of the Estados [States] and consisted of nine Vocales [Members] serving six-year terms. Its Vocales [Members] had to be attorneys of the República [Republic] with six years of practice, Venezuelan by birth, and over thirty years of age; each Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly] elected one principal, one substitute, and a senaria [list of six nominees] for replacements. The Corte [Court] heard proceedings against senior Estado [State] officers, the nullity of Estado [State] acts emanating from usurped authority or from decisions obtained by force, the recurso de casación [appeal in cassation], and jurisdictional disputes, and reported to Congreso [Congress] on impediments to legislative uniformity (Arts. 111–115; cf. 1891, Arts. 81–85: “The Court of Cassation referred to in paragraph 20, Article 13, of this Constitution is a Tribunal of the States; it shall be composed of as many Members as there are States of the Federation, and they shall serve four years.”).

POW-SUB—Gobierno subnacional [Subnational Government]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] declared the Estados [States] composing the Unión Venezolana [Venezuelan Union] autonomous and equal as political entities (Art. 13; cf. 1891, Art. 12: “The States composing the Venezuelan Federation reciprocally recognize their respective autonomies, declare themselves equal as political entities, and retain in full the sovereignty not expressly delegated by this Constitution.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to organize according to the principles of popular, elective, federal, representative, alternative, and responsible government (Art. 13, no. 1; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 1).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to recognize in their respective constitutions the autonomía [autonomy] of the Municipio [Municipality] and its independence from the political power of the Estado [State] in all matters concerning its economic and administrative order (Art. 13, no. 2; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 2: “To establish the fundamental rules of their internal order and government in complete conformity with the principles of this Constitution.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to defend themselves against all violence injuring their independence or the integrity of the Nación [Nation] (Art. 13, no. 3; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 3: “To defend themselves against all violence injuring sectional independence or the integrity of the Venezuelan Federation.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] neither to alienate any part of their territory to a foreign Power, nor implore its protection, nor establish or cultivate political relations with other nations (Art. 13, no. 4; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 4: “Neither to alienate any part of their territory to a foreign Power, nor implore its protection, nor establish or cultivate political or diplomatic relations with other nations, the latter being reserved to the Federal Power.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] neither to incorporate or ally themselves with another nation nor separate from Venezuela in diminution of its nationality or territory (Art. 13, no. 5; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 5).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to cede to the Nación [Nation], for the Distrito Federal [Federal District], unpopulated land not exceeding one hundred square kilometers upon which the capital city of the Unión [Union] would be built; in the interim, the Distrito Federal [Federal District] comprised the city of Caracas and its outlying parishes of El Recreo, El Valle, La Vega, Antímano, Macarao, and Macuto (Art. 13, no. 6; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 6: “To cede to the Nation the land required for the Federal District.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to cede to the Gobierno de la Nación [Government of the Nation] the territory necessary to erect forts, warehouses, shipyards, and other buildings indispensable to the Administración General [General Administration] (Art. 13, no. 7; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 7: “To cede to the Government of the Federation the territory necessary to erect forts, warehouses, shipyards, penitentiaries, and other buildings indispensable to the General Administration.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to leave to the Gobierno de la Unión [Government of the Union] the unrestricted administration of the Territorios [Territories] of Colón and Amazonas, and provided that the Territorios [Territories] of Delta and Goagira would be reincorporated into the Estados [States] to which they had belonged before their erection as Territorios [Territories] (Art. 13, no. 8; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 8: “To leave to the Government of the Federation the administration of the territories of ‘Amazonas’ and ‘Goagira’ and of the islands belonging to the Nation until it becomes expedient to elevate them to another status.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to reserve to the Poder General [General Power] all legislative and executive jurisdiction concerning maritime, coastal, and river navigation and national roads (Art. 13, no. 9; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 9).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] not to restrict by taxation the navigation of rivers and other navigable waters that had not required artificial canalization (Art. 13, no. 10; new).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] not to subject to contributions, before being offered for consumption, products or articles burdened by national taxes or exempted from taxation by law (Art. 13, no. 11; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 10).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] not to impose contributions upon livestock, goods, or merchandise of any kind in transit to another Estado [State] (Art. 13, no. 12; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 11).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] neither to prohibit consumption of the livestock, articles, and other products of other Estados [States] nor burden their consumption with taxes greater or lesser than those paid by their local equivalents (Art. 13, no. 13; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 12: “Neither to prohibit consumption of the products of other States nor burden foreign production with general or municipal taxes greater than those paid by locally produced goods.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] not to establish Aduanas [Customs Houses] for the collection of import duties, since only national Aduanas [Customs Houses] would exist (Art. 13, no. 14; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 13: “Not to establish maritime or inland Customs Houses for the collection of taxes, since there shall be only national Customs Houses.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to reserve to each Estado [State] the right to dispose of its natural products (Art. 13, no. 15; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 14).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to cede to the Gobierno de la Unión [Government of the Union] the administration of mines, saltworks, and terrenos baldíos [public lands] for the purposes expressed in the article (Art. 13, no. 16; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 15: “To cede to the Government of the Federation the administration of mines, public lands, and saltworks, so that the former may be governed by a uniform system of exploitation and the latter applied for the benefit of the peoples.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to respect the properties, parks, and castles of the Nación [Nation] (Art. 13, no. 17; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 16).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to comply with and ensure compliance with and execution of the Constitución y leyes de la Unión [Constitution and laws of the Union] and the decrees and orders issued by the Poderes nacionales [national Powers] in exercise of their lawful attributes and powers (Art. 13, no. 18; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 17: “To comply with and ensure compliance with and execution of the Constitution and laws of the Federation, and the decrees and orders issued by the Federal Power and the Tribunals and Courts of the Federation in exercise of their lawful attributes and powers.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to accord full faith to, and ensure compliance with and execution of, the public acts and judicial proceedings of the other Estados [States] (Art. 13, no. 19; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 18).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to organize their Tribunales y Juzgados [Tribunals and Courts] for the fullest administration of justice and to maintain uniform substantive civil, commercial, and criminal legislation and uniform laws of civil and criminal procedure (Art. 13, no. 20; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 19: “To organize their Tribunals and Courts for the administration of justice in the State, and to maintain for all of them uniform substantive civil and criminal legislation and uniform laws of civil and criminal procedure.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States], through the Asamblea Legislativa [Legislative Assembly], to transmit to Congreso [Congress] the corresponding list for principal and substitute Vocales [Members] of the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court], and to elect Vocales [Members] of the Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] (Art. 13, no. 21; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 20: “To present Members for the Court of Cassation and submit to the decisions of this Supreme Tribunal of the States.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to submit to the decisions of the Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] as Supremo Tribunal de los Estados [Supreme Tribunal of the States] (Art. 13, no. 22; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 20: “To present Members for the Court of Cassation and submit to the decisions of this Supreme Tribunal of the States.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to inscribe extradition as a political principle in their respective constitutions (Art. 13, no. 23; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 21: “To inscribe criminal extradition as a political principle in their respective Constitutions.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to establish direct and secret suffrage in popular elections (Art. 13, no. 24; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 22: “To establish direct and public suffrage in popular elections, render it obligatory, and secure it through the electoral census.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] did not reproduce the prohibition upon the Estados [States] assigning duties to national officers except in their capacity as citizens of the Estado [State] and insofar as those duties were compatible with national public service (cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 25: “Not to impose duties upon national officers except in their capacity as citizens of the State and insofar as those duties are not incompatible with national public service.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to establish primary instruction without charge and as obligatory, and instruction in arts and trades without charge (Art. 13, no. 25; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 23: “To establish primary education and education in arts and trades.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to reserve to the Poderes de la Unión [Powers of the Union] the authority to enact the Código de Instrucción Pública Nacional [Code of National Public Instruction] (Art. 13, no. 26; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 24: “To reserve to the powers of the Federation the laws and measures necessary for the creation, preservation, and advancement of general schools, colleges, or universities devoted to instruction in the sciences.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to furnish, without arms, the contingent proportionally incumbent upon them to compose the national public force in time of peace, as decreed annually by each Congreso Nacional [National Congress] (Art. 13, no. 27; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 26: “To furnish the contingent proportionally incumbent upon them to compose the national public force in time of peace or war.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] not to permit enlistments or levies whose object was or could be to assail liberty or independence, or disturb the public order of the Nación [Nation], other Estados [States], or another nation (Art. 13, no. 28; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 27).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] neither to declare nor wage war against another Estado [State] under any circumstance, and to maintain strict neutrality in all disputes arising among other Estados [States] (Art. 13, no. 29; cf. 1891, Art. 13, nos. 28–29: “To maintain strict neutrality in disputes arising in other States”; “Neither to declare nor wage war under any circumstance by one State against another.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to defer and submit to the decision of the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court] every controversy arising between two or more Estados [States] when they could not by themselves and through peaceful means arrive at a settlement (Art. 13, no. 30; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 30: “To defer and submit to the decision of Congress or the High Federal Court every controversy arising between two or more States when they cannot by themselves and through peaceful means arrive at a settlement.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to recognize the competence of the Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] to hear proceedings instituted for treason against the Nación [Nation] or violation of the Constitución y leyes de la Unión [Constitution and laws of the Union] against those exercising the highest executive authority within the Estados [States] (Art. 13, no. 31; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 31: “To recognize the competence of Congress and the Court of Cassation to hear proceedings instituted for treason against the Nation or violation of the Constitution and laws of the Federation against those exercising executive authority within the States.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to receive as their own revenue the total produced in all Aduanas [Customs Houses] of the República [Republic] by the tax collected as a transit contribution and the total produced by mines, terrenos baldíos [public lands], and saltworks administered by the Poder Federal [Federal Power] (Art. 13, no. 32; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 32: “To receive as the States’ own revenue two thirds of the total produced in all Customs Houses of the Republic by the tax collected as a transit contribution, and two thirds of the revenue produced by mines, public lands, and saltworks administered by the Federal Power.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required that revenue to be distributed fortnightly among all Estados [States] of the Federación [Federation] in proportion to their respective populations (Art. 13, no. 33; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 32: “and to distribute that revenue among all States of the Federation in proportion to their respective populations.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that, if one or more of the taxes referred to in Article 13, no. 32 were abolished or reduced by law, Congreso [Congress] would establish the manner of returning to the Estados [States] the portion of revenue thereby eliminated (Art. 13, no. 34; new).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to keep away from their borders persons who sought asylum in an Estado [State] for political reasons whenever the interested Estado [State] so requested (Art. 13, no. 35; cont. 1891, Art. 13, no. 34).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] neither to coin money, nor issue paper money, nor make anything other than gold or silver coin valid for the payment of debts (Art. 13, no. 36; new).

All matters not expressly attributed to the Administración general de la Nación [General Administration of the Nation] fell within the competence of the Estados [States] (Art. 116; cont. 1891, Art. 88).

The Constitución [Constitution] declared the Tribunales de Justicia [Tribunals of Justice] in the Estados [States] independent and provided that proceedings initiated therein would terminate within the same Estados [States], subject only to review by the Corte de Casación [Court of Cassation] in the cases permitted by law (Art. 121; cont. 1891, Art. 89).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that every act of the Cámaras Legislativas [Legislative Chambers] or the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive] violating the rights guaranteed to the Estados [States] or assailing their autonomía [autonomy] had to be declared void by the Alta Corte Federal [High Federal Court], even if the declaration of nullity was requested by only one Asamblea Legislativa estatal [State Legislative Assembly] (Art. 123; cf. 1891, Art. 90: “Every act of Congress or the National Executive that violates the rights guaranteed to the States by this Constitution or assails their independence shall be declared void by the High Court whenever a majority of the Legislatures so requests.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the Gobierno Nacional [National Government] would have no resident officers exercising jurisdiction or authority within the Estados [States] other than the Estados [States]’ own officers, subject to the exceptions enumerated in Article 131 (Art. 131; cf. 1891, Art. 97: “The Government of the Federation shall have no resident officers exercising jurisdiction or authority within the States other than the States’ own officers.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could station neither forces nor commanders exercising command within an Estado [State] without the permission of the government of the Estado [State] in which the force was to be stationed (Art. 134; cont. 1891, Art. 98).

The Constitución [Constitution] declared that the Nación [Nation] and the Estados [States] would promote the immigration and colonization of foreigners in conformity with their respective laws (Art. 146; cont. 1891, Art. 114).

The Constitución [Constitution] required all public acts and official documents of the Nación [Nation] and the Estados [States] to cite the date of Independencia [Independence] from 5 July 1811 and that of the Federación [Federation] from 20 February 1859 (Art. 158; cf. 1891, Art. 119: “In all public acts and official documents, the date of the Federation shall be cited from 20 February 1859, and that of the Law from 28 March 1864.”).

CON-AMD—Reforma de la Constitución [Constitutional Amendment]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] permitted amendments and additions but prohibited the Congreso Nacional [National Congress] from decreeing them outside ordinary sessions or without the request of three quarters of the Asambleas Legislativas estatales [State Legislative Assemblies], likewise assembled in ordinary sessions. It also prohibited their entry into force before renewal of the Poderes Públicos de la Nación [Public Powers of the Nation] that had requested or enacted them (Art. 151; cf. 1891, Art. 118: “This Constitution may be amended by the National Legislature if the Legislatures of the States should so request; but the amendment shall never extend beyond the points upon which a majority of the States concur.”).

Amendments or additions had to proceed under the procedure established for the enactment of laws. Once adopted by the Legislatura Nacional [National Legislature], the Presidente del Congreso [President of Congress] had to submit them to the Asambleas Legislativas estatales [State Legislative Assemblies] for definitive ratification (Arts. 152–153; cf. 1891, Art. 118: “but in this second case, the adopted amendment shall be submitted to the Legislatures of the States and shall be enacted as to the point or points ratified by a majority of them.”).

Congreso [Congress] could initiate amendments or additions and adopt them under the same procedure, but they were not deemed enacted without ratification by three quarters of the Asambleas Legislativas estatales [State Legislative Assemblies] (Art. 154; cf. 1891, Art. 118: “an amendment may also be made upon one or more points when two thirds of the members of the National Legislature, acting separately and according to the procedure established for the enactment of laws, so resolve.”).

Irrespective of the initiating organ, the definitive vote of the Estados [States] had to return to the Congreso Nacional [National Congress], which was charged with scrutinizing it and ordering promulgation of the enacted amendment or addition (Art. 155; new).

CIV-SUF—Sufragio [Suffrage]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] guaranteed freedom of suffrage, subject to attainment of twenty-one years of age and to interdiction declared by a final judgment of the competent Tribunales [Tribunals] (Art. 14, no. 11; cf. 1891, Art. 14, no. 11: “Freedom of suffrage in popular elections, subject to no restriction other than minority under eighteen years of age.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] required the Estados [States] to establish direct and secret suffrage in popular elections (Art. 13, no. 24; cf. 1891, Art. 13, no. 22: “To establish direct and public suffrage in popular elections, render it obligatory, and secure it through the electoral census.”). Principal and substitute Diputados [Deputies] were popularly elected under that rule; the Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies] elected the Senadores [Senators]; and the citizens of the Estados [States] and the Distrito Federal [Federal District] elected the Presidente [President] by direct and secret voting (Arts. 22, 26, and 63; cf. 1891, Arts. 20, 25, and 62: “To constitute the Chamber of Deputies, each State shall appoint by popular election, in conformity with paragraph 22 of Article 13 of this Constitution”; “To constitute this Chamber, each State, through its respective Legislature, shall elect three principal Senators”; “The Federal Council elects from among its members the President of the United States of Venezuela.”).

During electoral periods, the fuerza pública nacional o la de los Estados [national or State public force] was required to remain confined to barracks throughout the period of popular elections (Art. 140; cf. 1891, Art. 108: “During electoral periods, the national or State public force shall remain strictly confined to barracks throughout the period of popular elections.”).

CIV-CIT—Ciudadanía [Citizenship]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] distinguished Venezuelans by birth from Venezuelans by naturalization. Venezuelans by birth included persons born within the territory, irrespective of their parents’ nationality; specified children born abroad to a father or mother who was Venezuelan by birth; and legitimate children born abroad or at sea to a Venezuelan father exercising a diplomatic mission or attached to a Legación de la República [Legation of the Republic]. Venezuelans by naturalization included specified children born outside the country to naturalized Venezuelans; persons born in the Repúblicas hispanoamericanas [Spanish-American Republics] or the Antillas españolas [Spanish Antilles] who established residence and manifested their will to become Venezuelan; and foreigners who obtained a carta de naturaleza o de ciudadanía [letter of naturalization or citizenship] pursuant to law (Art. 5; cf. 1891, Art. 5: “The following are Venezuelans:”).

Male Venezuelans over twenty-one years of age were eligible for office, subject to the exceptions expressed in the Constitución [Constitution]. All Venezuelans were bound to serve the Nación [Nation] according to law, even to the sacrifice of their property and lives when necessary for its defense. In every Estado [State] and in the Distrito Federal [Federal District], they enjoyed the same rights and were subject to the same duties as native-born domiciled inhabitants (Arts. 6–8; cf. 1891, Arts. 7–9: “Male Venezuelans over twenty-one years of age are eligible for office, subject only to the exceptions contained in this Constitution.”).

Foreigners enjoyed the same civil rights as nationals and could exercise them, in substance, form, procedure, and remedies, upon the same terms. The Nación [Nation] recognized no obligations or liabilities in their favor other than those established for nationals in like cases; the Gobierno [Government] would conclude no treaties derogating from those principles, and the law would determine the rights and duties of foreigners not domiciled in the country (Arts. 9–12; cf. 1891, Arts. 10–11: “Foreigners shall enjoy the same civil rights as Venezuelans.”).

RTS-GAR—Derechos [Rights]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] guaranteed Venezuelans the effective enjoyment of the rights enumerated in Article 14 (Art. 14; cf. 1891, Art. 14: “The Nation guarantees Venezuelans:”).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed the inviolability of life and abolished capital punishment, irrespective of the law prescribing it (Art. 14, no. 1; cont. 1891, Art. 14, no. 1).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed property with all its franchises, rights, and privileges, subject only to legislatively imposed contributions and to appropriation for works of public utility after indemnification and adversarial proceedings (Art. 14, no. 2; cf. 1891, Art. 14, no. 2: “Property with all its attributes, franchises, and privileges; it shall be subject only to contributions decreed by the legislative authority, to judicial decision, and to appropriation for public works after indemnification and adversarial proceedings.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed the inviolability of correspondence and other private papers, which could be seized only by order of the competent judicial authority and with the formalities of law, while the secrecy of domestic and private matters was invariably preserved (Art. 14, no. 3; cf. 1891, Art. 14, no. 3: “The inviolability and secrecy of correspondence and other private papers.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed the inviolability of the domestic home, which could be entered only to prevent the commission of a crime and in conformity with law (Art. 14, no. 4; cont. 1891, Art. 14, no. 4).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed personal liberty, abolished forced recruitment for military service, perpetually proscribed slavery, declared free any slaves who entered Venezuelan territory, recognized the right of every person to do or perform whatever did not injure another, and provided that no person was bound to do what the law did not command or prevented from doing what it did not prohibit (Art. 14, no. 5; cf. 1891, Art. 14, no. 5: “Personal liberty, and by virtue thereof: 1. Forced recruitment for military service is abolished; 2. Slavery is perpetually proscribed; 3. Slaves who enter the territory of Venezuela are free; and 4. No person is bound to do what the law does not command or prevented from doing what it does not prohibit.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed the free expression of thought orally or through the press, preserved to the injured party, in cases of calumny or insult, recourse before the competent Tribunales de Justicia [Tribunals of Justice], and prohibited the arrest or imprisonment of the accused before the condemnatory judgment of a competent tribunal (Art. 14, no. 6; cf. 1891, Art. 14, no. 6: “Freedom of thought expressed orally or through the press, the latter without any restriction subjecting it to prior censorship. In cases of calumny, insult, or injury to a third party, the injured party retains recourse before the competent Tribunals of Justice in conformity with the general laws.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed freedom to travel without a passport, change domicile in conformity with legal formalities, leave the República [Republic], and return to it, taking one’s property abroad and bringing it back (Art. 14, no. 7; cont. 1891, Art. 14, no. 7).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed freedom of industry and, consequently, ownership of discoveries and productions, with the laws granting proprietors a temporary privilege or prescribing the manner of indemnification should they agree to publication (Art. 14, no. 8; cont. 1891, Art. 14, no. 8).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed freedom of unarmed assembly and association, publicly or privately, without any act of inspection or coercion by the authorities (Art. 14, no. 9; cont. 1891, Art. 14, no. 9).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed freedom of petition, with the right to obtain a determination from any officer, authority, or corporation; when a petition was submitted by several persons, the first five were answerable for the authenticity of the signatures and all for the truth of the facts (Art. 14, no. 10; cont. 1891, Art. 14, no. 10).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed freedom of suffrage, subject to no restriction other than minority under twenty-one years of age and interdiction declared by a final judgment of the competent Tribunales [Tribunals] (Art. 14, no. 11; cf. 1891, Art. 14, no. 11: “Freedom of suffrage in popular elections, subject to no restriction other than minority under eighteen years of age.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed freedom of instruction in its full extent and required the Poder Público [Public Power] to establish primary education and instruction in arts and trades without charge (Art. 14, no. 12; cont. 1891, Art. 14, no. 12).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed religious freedom (Art. 14, no. 13; cont. 1891, Art. 14, no. 13).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed individual security and prescribed the guarantees expressed in Article 14, no. 14, including limitations upon imprisonment for debt, quartering of military personnel, special tribunals or commissions, arrest or imprisonment, incommunicado detention, oaths or examination against oneself in criminal proceedings, criminal conviction without lawful hearing, continued imprisonment once its grounds had ceased to exist, corporal punishment exceeding ten years, deprivation of liberty for political causes, double jeopardy, torture, and infamous punishments (Art. 14, no. 14; cf. 1891, Art. 14, no. 14: “Individual security, and by virtue thereof:”).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed equality, by virtue of which all persons were to be judged under the same laws and subjected to equal duties, services, and contributions; titles of nobility, hereditary honors and distinctions, and offices whose salaries or emoluments continued beyond service were prohibited; and officers and magistrates received no form of address other than ciudadano [citizen] and usted [you] (Art. 14, no. 15; cf. 1891, Art. 14, no. 15: “Equality, by virtue of which:”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the preceding enumeration did not restrict the power of the Estados [States] to accord their inhabitants other rights (Art. 15; cf. 1891, Art. 15: “The present enumeration does not restrict the power of the States to accord their inhabitants other guarantees.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] declared culpable those who issued, signed, executed, or ordered the execution of decrees, orders, or resolutions violating any right guaranteed to Venezuelans; rendered them punishable according to law; authorized every ciudadano [citizen] to accuse them; and fixed a five-year limitation period for actions against them (Art. 16; cf. 1891, Art. 17: “Those who issue, sign, execute, or order the execution of decrees, orders, or resolutions that violate or infringe any of the guarantees accorded to Venezuelans are culpable and shall be punished as prescribed by law. Every citizen is competent to accuse them.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the rights recognized and consecrated in the preceding articles would not be diminished or injured by laws regulating their exercise and that laws producing either effect would be deemed unconstitutional and without effect (Art. 17; new).

REG-MIL—La fuerza armada [Armed Force]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] provided that the national public force was divided into naval and land forces and consisted of milicias ciudadanas [citizen militias] organized by the Estados [States] pursuant to their laws (Art. 125; cont. 1891, Art. 91).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the public force placed at the charge of the Poder Nacional [National Power] would consist of a contingent, proportioned to population, furnished by each Estado [State] through the call to service of citizens required to render it under their internal laws (Art. 126; cont. 1891, Art. 92).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that in case of war the contingent could be augmented by bodies of the milicia ciudadana [citizen militia] up to the number of men necessary to satisfy “the requisition of the National Government” (Art. 127; cf. 1891, Art. 93: “In case of war, the contingent may be augmented by bodies of the citizen militia up to the number of men necessary to satisfy the national requisition.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could replace the commanders of the forces furnished by the Estados [States] in the cases and with the formalities prescribed by national military law, whereupon replacements were requested from the Estados [States] (Art. 128; cont. 1891, Art. 94).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that military and civil authority could never be exercised simultaneously by the same person or corporation (Art. 129; cf. 1891, Art. 95: “Military and civil authority shall never be exercised by the same person or corporation.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that all instruments of war existing within the territory of the República [Republic] upon its promulgation belonged to the Gobierno Nacional [National Government] (Art. 132; cf. 1891, Art. 97: “All instruments of war now existing belong to the National Government …”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the Estados [States] had the right to acquire the armament necessary for their militias and the instruments of war necessary for their internal security, and could import them free of all import duties upon compliance in each case with the formalities of the Código Militar [Military Code] and the applicable ley de Hacienda [public-finance law] (Art. 133; cf. 1891, Art. 97: “… without this being understood to prohibit the States from acquiring those required for their internal defense.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the Gobierno Nacional [National Government] could station neither forces nor commanders exercising command in any Estado [State], whether of the same or another Estado [State], without the permission of the government of the Estado [State] in which the force was to be stationed (Art. 134; cont. 1891, Art. 98).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that, during electoral periods, the fuerza pública nacional o la de los Estados [national or State public force] would remain confined to barracks throughout the period of popular elections (Art. 140; cf. 1891, Art. 108: “During electoral periods, the national or State public force shall remain strictly confined to barracks throughout the period of popular elections.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] provided that the armed force could not deliberate, that it was passive and obedient, and that no armed body could make requisitions or demand aid of any kind except from the civil authorities and in the manner and form determined by law; it further provided that commanders who violated that precept would be tried and punished according to law (Art. 145; cf. 1891, Art. 113: “The armed force may not deliberate; it is passive and obedient. No armed body may make requisitions or demand aid of any kind except from the civil authorities and in the manner and form determined by law.”).

REG-REL—Religión [Religion]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] recognized the Nación [Nation]’s possession of the derecho de patronato eclesiástico [right of ecclesiastical patronage] and provided that it would exercise that right as prescribed by the governing law (Art. 130; cont. 1891, Art. 96).

The Constitución [Constitution] guaranteed religious freedom among the rights of Venezuelans (Art. 14, no. 13; cont. 1891, Art. 14, no. 13).

CON-FIN—Disposiciones finales [Final Provisions]:

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] provided that the constitutional periods would be reckoned from 20 February 1894 (Art. 156; new).

For all acts in the civil and political life of the Estados [States], the population basis would be that determined by the latest census of the República [Republic] approved by Congreso [Congress] (Art. 157; cf. 1891, Art. 121: “For all acts in the civil and political life of the States of the Federation, their population basis is that determined by the latest census approved by the National Legislature.”).

All public acts and official documents of the Nación [Nation] and the Estados [States] were required to cite the date of Independencia [Independence] from 5 July 1811 and that of the Federación [Federation] from 20 February 1859 (Art. 158; cf. 1891, Art. 119: “in all public acts and official documents, the date of the Federation shall be cited from 20 February 1859, and that of the Law from 28 March 1864.”).

The Constitución [Constitution] would enter into force upon its promulgation in the Distrito Federal [Federal District] and in each Estado [State] of the Unión [Union] (Art. 159; cf. 1891, Art. 119: “This Constitution shall enter into force on the date of its official promulgation in each State.”).

The Asamblea Nacional Constituyente [National Constituent Assembly] would establish by special law the rules for attaining the definitive and strictly constitutional organization of the República [Republic] (Art. 160; new).

The Constitución de 1893 [Constitution of 1893] repealed the Constitución de 16 de abril de 1891 [Constitution of 16 April 1891] (Art. 161; cf. 1891, Art. 122: “The Federal Constitution of 27 April 1881 is repealed.”).

Signed by the members of the Asamblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly] present in the capital and bearing the cúmplase [executive order of compliance] of the Ejecutivo Nacional [National Executive], the Constitución [Constitution] was to be promulgated immediately in the Distrito Federal [Federal District] and, upon receipt, in the Estados de la Unión [States of the Union] (Art. 162; new).

The Constitución [Constitution] was adopted in the Cámara [Chamber] of the Palacio Legislativo [Legislative Palace] at Caracas, where the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente [National Constituent Assembly] held its sessions, on 12 June 1893, the eighty-third year of Independencia [Independence] and the thirty-fifth of the Federación [Federation]. It was ordered executed and observed at the Palacio Federal [Federal Palace] in Caracas on 21 June 1893 by Presidente [President] Joaquín Crespo and countersigned by his Ministros [Ministers].

Sources of Collation:


*

“Constitutional Authority and Venezuela:

September 6, 2026


Constitutional Authority and Venezuela
Ricardo F. Morín
2026

The constitutions of Venezuela and the United States frame petroleum as the material interest between two distinct constitutional orders.

Ricardo F. Morín
September 6, 2026

I have written to the President of the United States and to my representatives in Congress about recent United States actions involving Venezuela, its petroleum resources, sovereign revenues, reconstruction, and political transition.

I am publishing that correspondence because the questions raised by these actions belong in the public record.

My purpose is neither partisan nor dependent upon support for any Venezuelan political faction.  The same standard should apply to every American administration and to every government exercising authority in Venezuela.

The question at the center of this inquiry can be stated plainly:  who has the legal authority to make these decisions?

Under Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution, sovereignty resides in the Venezuelan people.  The institutions of the State exercise powers that come from that sovereignty; the institutions themselves are not sovereign.  Venezuela’s Constitution also places its hydrocarbon and mineral deposits within the public domain of the Republic and declares them inalienable and imprescriptible.  This raises a further question:  what constitutional power does any Venezuelan administration have to make long-term commitments involving those resources?

There is a separate American question.  What authority does the United States government have under the Constitution and federal law to acquire rights involving another nation’s sovereign resources and revenues?  What has Congress authorized?  What has Congress funded?  Which commitments belong to private investors, and which powers are being exercised by the United States government?

Private investment does not answer these questions.  A corporation can invest money and enter into contracts.  Corporate participation, however, cannot give either government constitutional powers that it does not otherwise possess.


THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD

The official record has become unusually specific.

In a Fact Sheet dated August 31, 2026, the White House states that an agreement involving North American Blue Energy Partners, or NABEP, gives the United States government “powerful governance rights, economic ownership, and guaranteed low-cost off-take,” meaning rights to purchase Venezuelan oil at favorable terms.

The same Fact Sheet explains what some of those rights are.  It states that the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital received a 35 percent ownership stake in NABEP’s corporate parent.  It states that the Department of State received the right to purchase 20 percent of the oil produced at production cost and the first opportunity to purchase the remaining 80 percent.

The governmental rights extend beyond ownership and oil purchases.  According to the Fact Sheet, the United States government can veto the appointment of any member of NABEP’s board of directors, and a majority of the board must be United States citizens.  The Fact Sheet also states that the United States government’s agreement with NABEP is governed by United States law and is subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts.

The White House further states that what it calls Venezuela’s “interim authorities” granted NABEP 100-year concessions covering 17 oil fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.  I use “interim authorities” here only because that is the White House’s description.  Its use should not be read as my own determination of the constitutional status or authority of the Venezuelan officials involved.

The White House describes two related but distinct relationships.  Its August 31 Fact Sheet states that Venezuela’s “interim authorities” granted NABEP the 100-year concessions.  The September 2 release, meanwhile, states that the United States government’s agreement is with the private company, not with Venezuela’s interim government, and that no political process formed part of those negotiations.  The later statement identifies the counterparty to the United States agreement; it does not, on its face, withdraw the earlier statement about who granted NABEP the Venezuelan concessions.

The August 31 Fact Sheet describes NABEP’s proposed investment of as much as $100 billion in Venezuelan oil infrastructure as private investment and says that the agreement will cost American taxpayers nothing.

That distinction matters.  Private investment is not the same thing as public spending.  Money invested by a private company is not a congressional appropriation.  But private financing does not turn governmental powers into private acts.  A United States government ownership stake, government purchasing rights, authority over board appointments, control or monitoring of revenues, and other rights exercised by federal agencies remain governmental actions.  Their legal authority must be established separately.

A White House release dated September 2 again describes the agreement as giving the United States government “powerful governance rights, economic ownership, and guaranteed low-cost off-take.”  The same release places the agreement within the Administration’s broader program of “stabilization, reconstruction and democratic transition.”

Another official document raises a related question.

Executive Order 14373, issued January 9, 2026, states that specified Venezuelan oil revenues held by the United States remain property of the Government of Venezuela rather than property of the United States.  Section 4(b) is expressly titled “Custodial Nature of United States Possession” and states that the United States will hold these funds “solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.”

Section 4(c)(ii) further provides that the funds are to be held pending sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela.

In ordinary terms, the United States holds the revenues but does not own them, while a United States cabinet officer is given responsibility for determining their sovereign disposition on behalf of Venezuela.  Section 5 further directs the Treasury to identify the funds as sovereign property of the Government of Venezuela “held in custody by the United States.”  The Treasury is also directed to comply with instructions from the Secretary of State concerning transfers or disbursements of those funds.

The Order states the legal authority upon which it relies.  It invokes the Constitution, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code.

The Order also expressly contemplates a continuing role for Congress.  Section 6(b) authorizes recurring and final reports to Congress concerning the national emergency under the reporting provisions of the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.  Section 7(b) states that implementation of the Order must be consistent with applicable law and is “subject to the availability of appropriations.”

Those provisions are part of the record and should not be overlooked.  They identify legal authorities asserted by the Executive Branch and recognize statutory reporting and appropriations constraints.  They do not, by themselves, answer the broader question of how far those authorities extend or establish the legal basis for every governmental action associated with Venezuela’s resources, reconstruction, or political transition.

This creates a question that deserves a clear answer:  what authority do the laws invoked by the Executive Order actually confer upon American officials to determine the disposition of sovereign Venezuelan property that the United States itself acknowledges it does not own?

The official documents establish what the Executive Branch says it has undertaken and identify some of the authority it relies upon.  They do not, by themselves, establish that every action described in them is constitutionally or statutorily authorized.

That distinction is the reason for this inquiry.

One set of questions must be answered under American law:  what powers do the Constitution and federal statutes give the Executive Branch, what has Congress authorized or funded, and where are the limits of those powers?

Another set must be answered under Venezuelan law:  did the Venezuelan officials entering these arrangements have the constitutional power to make them?

Neither question can answer the other.  American recognition cannot give Venezuelan officials powers that Venezuela’s own Constitution does not give them.  Venezuelan consent cannot give the United States government powers that the American constitutional system does not give it.

These are the questions addressed in the correspondence reproduced below.


PRIMARY DOCUMENTS

White House Fact Sheet, August 31, 2026
President Donald J. Trump Announces Historic Oil Agreement to Secure American Energy Dominance and Drive Venezuela’s Economic Recovery

https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/08/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-announces-historic-oil-agreement-to-secure-american-energy-dominance-and-drive-venezuelas-economic-recovery

White House Release, September 2, 2026
President Trump Secures the Biggest Oil Deal in World History

https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/09/president-trump-secures-the-biggest-oil-deal-in-world-history

Executive Order 14373, January 9, 2026
Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/safeguarding-venezuelan-oil-revenue-for-the-good-of-the-american-and-venezuelan-people

The Fact Sheet and September 2 release tell us how the Executive Branch describes the agreement.  They are not substitutes for the complete agreement itself.  Unless and until that agreement is made public, we can establish what the Executive Branch says the agreement contains, but we cannot independently examine all of its terms.


LETTERS TO CONGRESS

September 6, 2026

The following is reproduced as sent.

Ref. Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela

Dear Member of Congress:

I write as an American citizen concerned about a constitutional question that should transcend political affiliation:  the authority under which the Executive Branch is assuming governmental, financial, and proprietary powers concerning Venezuela, its sovereign assets, and its natural resources.

My concern is not whether the present policy toward Venezuela is politically desirable.  Nor is it a defense of Nicolás Maduro or of any Venezuelan political faction.  It concerns the limits of governmental authority under the constitutions of both nations and the corresponding responsibility of Congress.

Recent official statements describe a United States role in the stabilization, reconstruction, and democratic transition of Venezuela.  The White House has also announced arrangements giving agencies of the United States government substantial economic and governance rights associated with Venezuelan petroleum resources, including rights connected with concessions reportedly granted by Venezuela’s interim authorities.

These actions raise a question that cannot be answered exclusively under American law.

Article 5 of the Constitution of Venezuela places sovereignty in the Venezuelan people.  The organs exercising public power emanate from that sovereignty and are subject to it.  The government administering the State is therefore not itself the sovereign.

That distinction becomes especially consequential where national resources are concerned.  Venezuela’s Constitution places hydrocarbon and mineral deposits within the public domain of the Republic and declares them inalienable and imprescriptible.  Whatever authority a Venezuelan government possesses over those resources must consequently derive from the Venezuelan constitutional order.  Effective control of governmental institutions cannot by itself establish unlimited constitutional competence to dispose of them.

Recognition by the United States cannot answer that question.  Neither can participation by private enterprise.  A private corporation may possess contractual rights, but it cannot confer sovereign authority upon a Venezuelan administration or upon the government of the United States.  Nor can foreign recognition substitute for constitutional authority originating in the Venezuelan people.

There is a separate American constitutional question.  Congress possesses powers concerning appropriations, war, foreign commerce, and oversight that cannot simply be presumed to have passed to the Executive because an asserted foreign-policy objective is considered urgent or advantageous.  The involvement of private capital likewise does not eliminate the need to determine the legal authority for governmental rights, commitments, military involvement, administration of foreign sovereign property, or governmental direction accompanying that investment.

I therefore respectfully ask Congress to establish, through its constitutional powers of inquiry and oversight, the legal foundation for what has already occurred.

In particular, Congress should require public identification of the constitutional and statutory authority asserted for every significant United States governmental interest acquired in connection with Venezuelan resources; determine whether Congress authorized or appropriated funds for governmental activities associated with Venezuela’s stabilization, reconstruction, or political transition; obtain and examine the operative agreements rather than relying upon descriptions of them; determine the legal basis upon which United States officials purport to exercise governance, financial, custodial, or proprietary rights involving Venezuelan sovereign assets; and examine whether the Venezuelan parties purporting to authorize these arrangements possessed the constitutional competence to do so.

This inquiry should also address the antecedent question of Venezuelan popular sovereignty.  If any undertaking purports to exercise a power that the Venezuelan Constitution reserves to the people, the validity of that authority cannot logically be established merely by pointing to the signature of those presently exercising governmental control.

The principle at stake should apply irrespective of political party.  No Democratic or Republican President should acquire powers over another nation’s sovereign resources merely because the United States possesses sufficient economic or military power to make an arrangement effective in practice.

Effective power and lawful authority are different things.

I therefore ask Congress not simply whether current policy toward Venezuela is beneficial, but whether each exercise of American governmental power has been lawfully authorized, whether the Venezuelan constitutional authority upon which it depends actually exists, and whether Congress has permitted executive action to move beyond powers the Constitution assigns to it.

The answer should be established publicly and documentarily, before arrangements of extraordinary duration become accepted as accomplished facts.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

September 6, 2026

The following is reproduced as sent.

President Donald J. Trump
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Ref. Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela

Dear Mr. President:

I write concerning the constitutional foundations of the United States government’s present actions involving Venezuela, particularly those affecting its petroleum resources, sovereign revenues, reconstruction, and political transition.

This is not a partisan objection, nor is it an argument for the restoration of Nicolás Maduro.  It concerns a principle that should bind every American administration regardless of party:  the power of the United States does not itself create the legal authority to exercise sovereign powers belonging to another nation.

Your Administration has publicly described a program of stabilization, reconstruction, and democratic transition for Venezuela.  It has also announced substantial United States governmental economic and governance rights associated with Venezuelan petroleum resources.

The fundamental constitutional question begins in Venezuela rather than in Washington.

Under Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution, sovereignty resides in the Venezuelan people.  Governmental institutions exercise authority emanating from popular sovereignty; governmental institutions do not possess that sovereignty.

The distinction is essential.  Effective possession of governmental institutions does not make an administration synonymous with the Nation, nor does recognition by the United States transfer Venezuelan sovereignty to the administration presently exercising governmental control.

Venezuela’s constitutional treatment of natural resources makes the question still more consequential.  Hydrocarbon and mineral deposits are constitutionally characterized as public-domain property of the Republic and as inalienable and imprescriptible.  The authority of any administration to make commitments concerning those resources must therefore be established from the Venezuelan constitutional order itself.

Private enterprise cannot supply missing sovereign authority.  A corporation may invest capital or undertake contractual obligations, but corporate participation cannot confer upon either government a constitutional power that the Venezuelan constitutional order has not granted.

Nor does describing an arrangement as privately financed resolve the separate question of American governmental authority.  Where agencies of the United States acquire governance rights, economic interests, control over revenues, rights concerning petroleum production, or responsibilities associated with another nation’s reconstruction and political transition, the source and limits of those United States governmental powers remain matters of constitutional importance.

Executive Order 14373 recognizes that Venezuelan oil revenues held by the United States remain sovereign Venezuelan property rather than property of the United States.  That recognition makes the underlying question unavoidable:  by what authority may American officials determine the disposition, governance, or economic use of property whose sovereign character the United States itself acknowledges?

I respectfully ask your Administration to make public the complete legal basis for these United States governmental actions, including the constitutional and statutory authority asserted by the United States; the operative agreements creating governmental rights or obligations; the legal basis for the authority claimed by the Venezuelan parties entering those agreements; and the basis for concluding that the agreements are compatible with Venezuelan constitutional sovereignty and applicable international law.

The question is not whether the United States believes that these arrangements will benefit Venezuela.  Constitutional government does not derive its legitimacy from a foreign government’s assessment that the arrangements will be beneficial.

Nor should military, economic, or diplomatic predominance be permitted to settle a constitutional question that precedes the exercise of military, economic, or diplomatic power.

The Venezuelan people are the source of Venezuelan sovereignty.  Neither an American President nor a Venezuelan administration can substitute itself for the Venezuelan people.  Recognition by the United States cannot create Venezuelan constitutional competence, and private investment cannot convert effective control into sovereign authority.

This principle should not depend upon who occupies the White House.  The same limitation should bind this Administration and every succeeding administration.

I therefore respectfully ask that the constitutional authority for United States actions already undertaken be disclosed and examined before additional commitments concerning Venezuela’s resources, reconstruction, or governmental transition are made irreversible in practice.

The distinction is fundamental:  the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform that act.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín

LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

September 6, 2026

The following is reproduced as sent.

The Honorable Marco Rubio
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

Ref. Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I write concerning the constitutional and statutory authority underlying actions you have taken with respect to Venezuela in two distinct capacities: as a signatory to the recently announced petroleum agreement, and as the official whom Executive Order 14373 designates to determine the purposes for which Venezuelan sovereign revenues held by the United States may be disposed.

This is not a partisan objection, nor an argument for restoring Nicolás Maduro.  It concerns a principle that should bind every administration regardless of party: the power of the United States does not itself create the legal authority to exercise sovereign powers belonging to another nation.

Executive Order 14373 presents the contradiction directly.  The Order identifies the specified funds as property of the Government of Venezuela and states that the United States holds them “solely in a custodial and governmental capacity,” and not as a market participant.  Yet it provides that those funds are to be held pending sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to comply with your instructions concerning their disbursement or transfer.

Custody does not confer sovereignty.  An Executive Order may assign functions within the Executive Branch, but it cannot, by its own terms, create an authority greater than the constitutional and statutory authority from which it derives.  Executive Order 14373 identifies IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, and 3 U.S.C. §301 among its sources of authority, but the Order does not establish how those authorities confer upon a United States cabinet officer Venezuelan sovereign competence to determine governmental purposes for the disposition of property that the Order itself recognizes as belonging to Venezuela.  The assertion of that power therefore does not resolve the antecedent question of lawful authority to exercise it.

A related defect arises from the petroleum agreement announced by the White House.  The White House describes that agreement as giving the United States government governance rights, economic ownership, and guaranteed rights to purchase Venezuelan oil in connection with concessions covering approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.  Article 12 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that hydrocarbon deposits within the territory and specified maritime areas belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are therefore inalienable and imprescriptible.  Article 5 provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.

These provisions do not mean that every commercial interest in petroleum once lawfully produced is itself constitutionally inalienable.  They establish the antecedent constitutional question: the authority to create concessions and governmental rights concerning resources belonging to the Republic must itself derive from the Venezuelan constitutional order.

The participation of a private company does not cure that defect.  A private contractual act cannot substitute for sovereign competence, nor can a private entity confer upon the United States governmental rights that depend upon authority the Venezuelan constitutional order has not lawfully supplied.  The relevant question is not whether private investment may participate in Venezuelan petroleum development, but whether the concessions and governmental rights upon which this arrangement depends were created through constitutionally competent Venezuelan authority.

Effective control of governmental institutions does not itself establish constitutional competence.  United States recognition cannot create that competence, and the participation or consent of a private party cannot replace it.  Under Article 5, the source of Venezuelan sovereignty remains the Venezuelan people.

Accordingly, the publicly disclosed instruments do not establish the lawful authority necessary for the United States to exercise the sovereign functions described above.  Executive assertion cannot supply Venezuelan constitutional competence, and private agreement cannot convert effective control into sovereign authority.  If the United States maintains that enacted law and the Venezuelan constitutional order nevertheless authorize these actions, the operative agreements and the specific provisions upon which that position rests should be made public and subjected to examination against the constitutional limitations described here.

The Venezuelan people are the source of Venezuelan sovereignty.  Neither a United States official nor a private enterprise can substitute itself for them.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


LETTER TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR

September 6, 2026

The following is reproduced as sent.

The Honorable Pete Hegseth
Secretary of War
U.S. Department of War
Washington, DC 20301

Ref. Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I write concerning the constitutional and statutory authority underlying your Department’s participation in the recently announced petroleum arrangement involving Venezuela, including the 35 percent equity interest that the White House states has been granted to the Office of Strategic Capital.

This is not a partisan objection, nor an argument for restoring Nicolás Maduro.  It concerns a principle that should bind every administration regardless of party: the possession of governmental power does not itself establish that its exercise has been lawfully authorized.

The White House states that North American Blue Energy Partners granted your Department’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity stake in its corporate parent, representing what the White House describes as potentially hundreds of billions of dollars in value and dividends for the United States.  The fact that a private company purports to grant such an interest does not itself confer statutory authority upon a federal office to accept, hold, administer, or benefit from it.

The statutory framework governing the Office of Strategic Capital makes the defect particularly significant.  Section 149 of title 10 defines “capital assistance” as a loan, loan guarantee, or technical assistance and defines an eligible investment by reference to such capital assistance.  Its capital-assistance program provides for loans and loan guarantees, together with technical assistance, subject to the conditions Congress prescribed.

Congress subsequently considered the very authority implicated here.  The House included in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 a provision that would have provided equity-investment authority for the Office of Strategic Capital.  The final congressional agreement did not include that provision.  Congress enacted additional authorities for the Office while leaving the proposed equity-investment authority unenacted.

The publicly identified statutory framework therefore does not authorize the 35 percent equity holding described by the White House.  An executive office cannot treat its general investment-related responsibilities as equivalent to a specific power to acquire and hold equity where the governing statute defines the forms of capital assistance Congress authorized and Congress considered, but did not enact, an express equity-investment authority.  The White House’s assertion that the interest was obtained at no cost to the American taxpayer does not cure that statutory defect.  Absence of a purchase price is not an authorization to accept and hold property.

The White House further states that the United States government possesses veto power over appointments to the company’s board of directors and that a majority of the board must consist of United States citizens.  It characterizes the interests obtained by the United States as governance rights.  These governmental rights cannot derive their legal authority merely from the willingness of a private company to confer them.  A private agreement cannot enlarge the statutory powers of a federal agency.

A further and independent defect arises under the constitutional order of Venezuela.  Article 12 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that the country’s hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are therefore inalienable and imprescriptible.  Article 5 provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.

These provisions do not make every commercial interest in lawfully produced petroleum constitutionally inalienable.  They establish that the authority underlying concessions and governmental rights concerning the Republic’s hydrocarbon resources must itself arise within the Venezuelan constitutional order.

The participation of North American Blue Energy Partners does not answer that antecedent question.  A private entity may possess contractual rights, investment interests, and commercial capacity; it does not thereby possess sovereign competence to create governmental authority that Venezuelan law has not supplied, nor can its contractual grant enlarge the statutory authority Congress has conferred upon an office of the United States.

Neither effective control of Venezuelan governmental institutions nor recognition by the United States can itself create Venezuelan constitutional competence.  Likewise, neither private capital nor a purported private grant can cure the absence of governmental authority on the United States side.

Accordingly, the public legal record does not establish lawful authority for the Office of Strategic Capital to accept and hold the equity interest described by the White House.  If the Department maintains that a separate enacted authority defeats that conclusion, the specific statutory provision and the operative agreements upon which that position rests should be made public.  The same applies to the Venezuelan authority underlying the concessions and governmental rights upon which the arrangement depends.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


LETTER TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

September 7, 2026

The Honorable Chris Wright
Secretary of Energy
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue SW
Washington, DC 20585

Ref. Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I write concerning the constitutional and statutory authority underlying your Department’s participation in United States governmental activities involving Venezuela’s petroleum resources, electrical infrastructure, economic stabilization, and reconstruction.

This is not a partisan objection, nor an argument for restoring Nicolás Maduro.  It concerns a principle that should bind every administration regardless of party: governmental power and private economic capacity do not themselves create lawful authority to exercise sovereign powers belonging to another nation.

On September 2, 2026, the Department of Energy announced that you traveled to Venezuela to oversee agreements involving Chevron, Eni, and GE Vernova.  Your Department describes these agreements as expanding petroleum production, unlocking billions of dollars in private-sector investment, modernizing Venezuela’s electrical grid, and advancing the Administration’s effort to rebuild the country’s critical energy infrastructure.

The Department further states that these agreements build upon an earlier arrangement establishing what it describes as “U.S. majority control” over an estimated 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven petroleum reserves.

That description raises an antecedent question of governmental authority that private investment cannot answer.

Private companies may invest capital, enter contracts, assume commercial risks, and undertake infrastructure projects.  Their expenditures do not become congressional appropriations merely because United States officials encourage or facilitate them.  The distinction is fundamental.  Billions of dollars committed by private companies must not be represented as billions appropriated by Congress for Venezuelan reconstruction.

The converse is equally important.  Private financing does not transform governmental action into private action.  When a Cabinet Secretary travels to another nation to oversee agreements that his Department describes as implementing United States control over petroleum resources and rebuilding that nation’s critical infrastructure, the governmental role requires an independent source of lawful authority.  Private capital cannot confer powers upon the Department of Energy that Congress has not granted it.

The Venezuelan constitutional question is separate and equally fundamental.

Article 12 of the Constitution of Venezuela provides that hydrocarbon deposits within the national territory and corresponding maritime areas belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are therefore inalienable and imprescriptible.  Article 5 provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.

These provisions do not mean that every commercial interest in petroleum once lawfully produced is itself constitutionally inalienable.  They establish the antecedent question: the governmental authority to create concessions, confer control, and undertake long-term commitments concerning resources belonging to the Republic must itself derive from the Venezuelan constitutional order.

Nor does the participation of Venezuelan officials, PDVSA, CORPOELEC, Chevron, Eni, GE Vernova, or any other private or state enterprise resolve that question.  Contractual capacity and sovereign competence are not interchangeable.  A corporation may possess authority to contract without possessing authority to confer sovereign powers, and effective control of governmental institutions does not itself establish unlimited constitutional competence to bind the Venezuelan nation or dispose of rights concerning its public domain.

I therefore do not presume that a national referendum is required for every energy contract or infrastructure undertaking.  The more fundamental question precedes that issue: what constitutionally competent Venezuelan authority authorized the concessions, governmental rights, and long-term commitments that the Department of Energy now describes as producing “U.S. majority control” over Venezuelan petroleum resources?

The United States constitutional question must be answered independently.  Venezuelan consent cannot enlarge powers that Congress has not conferred upon the Department of Energy, just as United States recognition or participation cannot create constitutional competence that Venezuelan officials do not possess.

Congress has previously enacted legislation addressing assistance, democratic institutions, elections, and other United States activities concerning Venezuela.  Those enactments demonstrate that Congress knows how to authorize particular governmental activities concerning Venezuela and to appropriate funds for them.  They do not establish a general Executive authority to administer Venezuela’s economy, direct its reconstruction, or assume governmental control over its natural resources.

The distinction between private investment and governmental commitment is therefore indispensable.  If Chevron, Eni, GE Vernova, or other private entities invest their own capital, that fact should be stated as such.  If the United States Government is committing federal funds, assuming financial obligations, directing reconstruction, administering infrastructure, acquiring control over Venezuelan resources, or otherwise exercising governmental authority, the enacted statutory and appropriations authority for each such undertaking should likewise be identified.

Accordingly, the public record presently establishes substantial United States governmental participation in arrangements concerning Venezuela’s energy resources and reconstruction, but it does not, merely by announcing those arrangements, establish the constitutional and statutory authority necessary to exercise every governmental power the Department describes.

If the Department maintains that enacted law authorizes its participation in these activities, I respectfully ask that it identify the specific statutory provisions upon which it relies; disclose any governmental agreements defining the Department’s authority, obligations, financial commitments, or supervisory role; distinguish federal expenditures and obligations from private-sector investments; and identify the Venezuelan constitutional authority upon which the United States relies for the concessions, control, and governmental rights involved.

The question is not whether increased petroleum production, electrical reliability, foreign investment, or economic reconstruction may benefit Venezuela or the United States.  Expected economic benefit cannot itself confer constitutional authority upon either government.

The Venezuelan people remain the source of Venezuelan sovereignty.  Neither foreign governmental power, effective domestic control, nor private economic investment can substitute for constitutionally competent authority.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


OFFICIAL PUBLIC CONTACT CHANNELS

The letters above record what I have written.  The source documents allow readers to examine the underlying government statements for themselves.

Readers may reach their own conclusions.  Anyone who independently decides to communicate with the federal government may write in their own words, adapt my correspondence, reproduce it, disagree with it, or take a different position.

For readers throughout the United States, the appropriate members of Congress are their own Representative and Senators.

Find Your Representative, United States House of Representatives

https://www.house.gov/representatives/find-your-representative

Contact United States Senators

https://www.senate.gov/senators/senators-contact.htm

Contact the White House

https://www.whitehouse.gov/contact

Contact The Secretary of State

https://register.state.gov/contactus

Contact the U.S. Department of War

No direct electronic address available except through the Cabinet https://www.whitehouse.gov/contact/

Contact the U.S. Department of Energy

The.Secretary@hq.doe.gov

The House lookup identifies the Representative currently serving a reader’s congressional district and provides access to that Representative’s website and contact page.  The Senate directs public-policy correspondence to the Senators representing the writer’s own state and provides access to their contact information.  The White House provides an electronic contact form.

These links are offered as public information, not as enrollment in a campaign.  What a reader does with the information is entirely that reader’s decision.


PUBLIC POSITION

The constitutional question does not depend upon whether someone believes the present policy is good or bad for the United States or Venezuela.  It should not depend upon which political party controls the government.

The question is more basic:  does the government have the legal authority to do what it is doing?

The White House has made consequential claims in public documents.  It describes United States government rights involving an ownership stake, oil purchases, appointments to a corporate board, Venezuelan revenues, and a broader program of stabilization, reconstruction, and democratic transition.

Those actions should be measured against the powers that the United States Constitution and federal law actually give the government.

A second question must be answered under Venezuela’s Constitution.  The United States cannot give Venezuelan officials powers that Venezuela’s own Constitution does not give them.  Nor can a private corporation do so.

Under Venezuela’s Constitution, the Venezuelan people are the source of Venezuelan sovereignty.  A foreign government cannot supply that sovereignty, and neither can a private company.

None of this determines in advance what the answers must be.  It establishes the questions that should be answered.

Government action should not become lawful merely because the government has enough power to carry it out.  Nor should an unresolved question of authority disappear simply because an arrangement has already been put into effect.

That is why I am placing the correspondence and the documents on which it is based before the public.


ADDITIONAL LETTERS

On September 9, 2026, the following correspondence was submitted by United States mail to Congressional Oversight Committees, United Nations Officials, and Selected Press, Requesting Independent Journalistic Examination.

Letters to Congressional Oversight Committees:

September 8, 2026

The Honorable James E. Risch
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

423 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Ref. Congressional Oversight of Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela

Dear Chairman Risch and Ranking Member Shaheen:

I write to place before the Committee a constitutional and statutory question arising from the expanding role of the United States Government in Venezuela and to request congressional examination of the authority underlying that role.

This is not a partisan objection, nor an argument for restoring Nicolás Maduro.  It concerns the allocation of governmental authority under the laws of the United States and the constitutional sovereignty of Venezuela.  The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

The Committee has already examined United States policy toward Venezuela and the conditions necessary for a democratic transition.  Members of both parties have affirmed that Venezuela’s political future must ultimately be determined through free and fair elections and by the Venezuelan people themselves.  That principle acquires additional constitutional importance as the Executive Branch enters long-term arrangements concerning Venezuelan petroleum resources, governmental revenues, economic reconstruction, and institutional control before that democratic transition has occurred.

Executive Order 14373 identifies specified Venezuelan natural-resource revenues as property of the Government of Venezuela and states that the United States holds those funds “solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.”  Yet the Order provides that the funds are to be held pending sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to comply with instructions concerning their disbursement or transfer.

Custody and sovereign authority are not equivalent.  An Executive Order may allocate functions within the Executive Branch, but it cannot by its own terms create authority greater than that conferred by the Constitution and laws from which it derives.

A further question arises from the petroleum agreement announced by the White House on August 31, 2026.  The White House states that the agreement gives the United States Government governance rights, economic ownership, guaranteed rights to acquire Venezuelan petroleum, and veto power concerning appointments to the board of the private company involved.  It further states that Venezuelan interim authorities granted North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions covering 17 fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven petroleum reserves.

The same announcement describes these arrangements as part of a three-stage program of stabilization, reconstruction, and democratic transition.  It identifies up to $100 billion in proposed Venezuelan petroleum infrastructure expenditures as private-sector investment.  That distinction must be preserved.  Private investment is not a congressional appropriation, and private capital cannot itself confer governmental authority upon an Executive department or agency.

The Venezuelan constitutional question is separate.

Article 12 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are therefore inalienable and imprescriptible.  Article 5 provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.

These provisions do not make every commercial interest in petroleum once lawfully produced constitutionally inalienable.  They establish an antecedent question: the authority to create concessions and governmental rights concerning resources belonging to the Republic must itself derive from the Venezuelan constitutional order.

Neither United States recognition nor effective control of Venezuelan governmental institutions answers that question.  Nor does the participation of a private enterprise.  Contractual capacity cannot substitute for sovereign competence.

The duration of the arrangements makes the issue particularly consequential.  A 100-year concession purports to bind Venezuela far beyond the tenure of the officials presently exercising governmental power and beyond the democratic transition that the United States itself says remains to be completed.  A future election cannot retrospectively be presumed to supply constitutional authority for governmental commitments undertaken before that election.  The relevant inquiry is whether constitutionally competent authority exists at the time the Republic is purportedly bound.

There is also an unresolved congressional question concerning the extent of the United States governmental commitment.  Public reporting has described proposals for a substantial United States stabilization or reconstruction presence in Venezuela, including a proposal involving approximately 3,000 personnel and expenditures of approximately $3 billion.  I have not identified an enacted congressional authorization or appropriation establishing such a mission.  Nor should privately financed petroleum or infrastructure projects be treated as evidence that Congress has appropriated funds for a governmental reconstruction program.

I therefore respectfully ask the Committee to exercise its oversight authority to determine:

1. what enacted statutory authority supports the governmental rights, economic interests, petroleum acquisition rights, financial administration, and other sovereign functions the Executive Branch has undertaken or proposes to undertake concerning Venezuela;

2. what operative agreements, legal opinions, memoranda, or other instruments define those governmental rights and obligations;

3. what constitutional authority the United States relies upon for the Venezuelan officials presently exercising power to grant 100-year petroleum concessions and other long-term governmental rights affecting resources belonging to the Republic;

4. what federal funds have been appropriated, obligated, transferred, or expended for Venezuelan stabilization, reconstruction, administration, infrastructure, or related governmental activities, separately identifying expenditures of the United States Government from investments made by private enterprises;

5. whether any proposed deployment or assignment of approximately 3,000 United States personnel, or any approximately $3 billion stabilization or reconstruction program, has received statutory authorization, appropriations, or other congressional approval; and

6. what mechanisms exist for congressional audit and continuing oversight of Venezuelan sovereign revenues held or administered by the United States Government.

These questions do not depend upon whether the policies at issue are expected to produce economic benefits for Venezuela or strategic benefits for the United States.  Economic advantage cannot supply constitutional authority where that authority is otherwise absent.

Nor does the prospect of future democratic elections answer the present question.  If the Venezuelan people remain the source of Venezuelan sovereignty, the authority by which their Republic is bound today must be identifiable today.

I respectfully ask the Committee to obtain and examine the operative instruments and legal authorities upon which these arrangements depend and, to the extent consistent with legitimate requirements of confidentiality, to make that record available to Congress and the public.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

The Honorable Brian J. Mast
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Ref. Congressional Oversight of Constitutional Authority and United States Actions Concerning Venezuela

Dear Chairman Mast and Ranking Member Meeks:

I write to place before the Committee a constitutional and statutory question arising from the expanding role of the United States Government in Venezuela and to request congressional examination of the authority underlying that role.

This is not a partisan objection, nor an argument for restoring Nicolás Maduro.  It concerns a principle antecedent to disagreements over policy: governmental power does not itself establish lawful governmental authority, and neither recognition nor private economic participation can supply constitutional competence that does not otherwise exist.

The Committee has already addressed Venezuela’s democratic transition.  Members representing differing political positions have nevertheless recognized that the Venezuelan people must ultimately determine their political future through a credible democratic process.  That proposition becomes particularly important as the Executive Branch undertakes long-term arrangements concerning Venezuelan petroleum resources, sovereign revenues, reconstruction, and governmental control before that democratic transition has occurred.

Executive Order 14373 identifies specified Venezuelan natural-resource revenues as property of the Government of Venezuela and states that the United States holds them “solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.”  Yet the Order provides that those funds are to be held pending sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to comply with instructions concerning their disbursement or transfer.

The Order therefore raises an antecedent question that its own assertion of Executive authority does not resolve: what enacted authority permits an officer of the United States to determine governmental purposes for the disposition of sovereign property that the Order itself recognizes as belonging to Venezuela?

The petroleum agreement announced by the White House on August 31 raises a related question.  The White House states that the agreement gives the United States Government governance rights, economic ownership, guaranteed petroleum acquisition rights, and veto power concerning appointments to the board of the private enterprise involved.  It further states that Venezuelan interim authorities granted North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions covering 17 fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven petroleum reserves.

The White House identifies these arrangements as a central component of an Administration program of stabilization, reconstruction, and democratic transition.

That sequence deserves congressional examination.  The democratic transition is described as prospective, while governmental and economic arrangements capable of extending for generations are being created in the present.

Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.  Article 12 provides that hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are therefore inalienable and imprescriptible.

These provisions do not establish that every commercial interest in petroleum once lawfully produced is constitutionally inalienable.  They establish the antecedent constitutional question: by what authority are concessions and governmental rights concerning resources belonging to the Republic being created?

Effective governmental control is not synonymous with constitutional competence.  United States recognition cannot itself create Venezuelan constitutional authority.  A private enterprise may possess contractual capacity, but it cannot confer sovereign competence upon Venezuelan officials or enlarge the statutory powers of an agency of the United States.

The 100-year duration attributed to the petroleum concessions makes that distinction especially important.  Such concessions purport to create rights extending far beyond the tenure of the present Venezuelan authorities and beyond the democratic transition the United States says it seeks.  A future election cannot simply be presumed to supply retrospectively the constitutional authority required for commitments undertaken before that election.

The United States side presents an independent question.

The White House describes up to $100 billion in proposed petroleum infrastructure expenditures as private investment.  Other Administration announcements likewise describe billions of dollars in prospective private-sector energy and infrastructure investment.  These amounts must be distinguished from appropriated federal funds.  Private investment is not a congressional appropriation.

The converse is equally important.  Private financing does not transform governmental conduct into private conduct.  When officers and agencies of the United States acquire governance rights, administer foreign sovereign revenues, exercise economic interests, supervise reconstruction, or assume governmental obligations, those acts require statutory authority regardless of whether private capital finances the underlying commercial projects.

Public reporting has also described a proposed United States stabilization or reconstruction mission involving approximately 3,000 personnel and approximately $3 billion.  I have not identified an enacted congressional authorization or appropriation establishing such a mission.  If no such authority exists, the distinction should be made explicit.  If authority has been enacted or funds have been obligated, the relevant legal instrument and appropriation should be identified.

I therefore respectfully ask the Committee, including through its appropriate subcommittees, to determine:

1. what enacted statutory authority supports the governance rights, economic interests, petroleum acquisition rights, administration of Venezuelan sovereign revenues, and other governmental functions undertaken by the Executive Branch;

2. what operative agreements, legal opinions, memoranda, or other instruments define those rights and obligations;

3. what Venezuelan constitutional authority the United States relies upon for the grant of 100-year petroleum concessions and other long-term governmental commitments by the authorities presently exercising power in Venezuela;

4. what federal funds have been appropriated, obligated, transferred, or expended for Venezuelan stabilization, reconstruction, administration, infrastructure, or related governmental activities, with federal expenditures distinguished from private-sector investment;

5. whether any proposed deployment or assignment of approximately 3,000 United States personnel, or an approximately $3 billion stabilization or reconstruction program, has received congressional authorization or appropriations;

6. what authority governs the acquisition or exercise by United States departments or agencies of equity interests, governance rights, veto powers, petroleum acquisition rights, or comparable economic interests arising from these arrangements; and

7. what mechanisms Congress has established, or should establish, for auditing Venezuelan sovereign revenues held or administered by the United States and for reviewing the governmental agreements now being implemented.

These questions do not require Congress first to determine whether the Administration’s economic policy will succeed or fail.  They precede that judgment.  A policy may be economically advantageous and still require constitutional and statutory authority for the governmental acts through which it is implemented.

The same principle applies in Venezuela.  Expected reconstruction, increased petroleum production, or future democratic elections cannot substitute for the authority required when long-term obligations are created.

If the Venezuelan people are to chart their own destiny, the governmental authority by which their Republic is being bound in the present must itself be capable of constitutional identification.

I respectfully ask the Committee to obtain and examine the operative agreements and legal authorities underlying these arrangements and, to the extent consistent with legitimate requirements of confidentiality, to make that record available to Congress and the public.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives

2216 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Ref. Congressional Oversight of the Office of Strategic Capital’s 35 Percent Equity Interest in the Venezuela Petroleum Arrangement

Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Smith:

I write to request congressional examination of the statutory authority under which the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital has accepted or holds the 35 percent equity interest described by the White House in connection with the recently announced petroleum arrangement involving Venezuela.

The question falls directly within the Committee’s legislative and oversight responsibilities because Congress has not merely legislated generally concerning the Office of Strategic Capital.  During consideration of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, the House addressed the precise subject of equity-investment authority for that Office.

On August 31, 2026, the White House announced that North American Blue Energy Partners had granted the Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity interest in its corporate parent.  The White House characterized that interest as having been obtained at no cost to the American taxpayer and as representing up to hundreds of billions of dollars in potential value and dividends for the United States.

Whether the interest was acquired without a purchase price does not answer the antecedent statutory question.  Authority to accept, hold, administer, exercise rights arising from, or receive distributions upon an equity interest must derive from law.  A private entity cannot enlarge the statutory powers of a federal office by offering property to it.

Section 149 of title 10 establishes the Office of Strategic Capital and gives it substantial investment-related responsibilities.  Its capital-assistance program, however, defines “capital assistance” as a loan, loan guarantee, or technical assistance and defines an eligible investment by reference to that capital assistance.

The legislative history of the Fiscal Year 2026 authorization is therefore particularly consequential.  The House included section 905, which the joint explanatory statement states “would provide equity investment authority for the Office of Strategic Capital.”  The Senate contained no similar provision.  The final congressional agreement did not include the House provision.

I do not treat the omission of section 905 as though it were, by itself, a judicial determination that every possible equity transaction by the Office is unlawful.  It establishes something narrower and directly relevant to congressional oversight: Congress considered express equity-investment authority for the Office, and that proposed authority was not included in the final agreement.

Against that legislative record, the subsequent acquisition or acceptance of a 35 percent equity interest requires identification of the enacted authority upon which the Department relies.

The White House announcement raises additional questions concerning the nature of the interest.  The United States Government is said to possess veto power over appointments to the company’s board, while a majority of the board must consist of United States citizens.  The White House expressly characterizes the arrangement as conferring governance rights and economic ownership upon the United States Government.

These are not merely descriptive references to private investment.  They concern governmental property interests and governmental rights purportedly held by an office within the Department of War.

The distinction between private and governmental action is therefore indispensable.  North American Blue Energy Partners may possess whatever contractual capacity applicable private law affords it.  That capacity does not determine what property or powers a federal office is authorized by Congress to accept or exercise.

I respectfully ask the Committee to determine:

1. the specific enacted statutory authority under which the Office of Strategic Capital accepted, acquired, or holds the 35 percent equity interest described by the White House;

2. whether the interest is held directly by the United States, by the Department of War, by the Office of Strategic Capital, through an intermediary, or under some other legal arrangement;

3. the legal instrument by which the interest was conveyed and the terms governing dividends, voting rights, disposition, valuation, liability, and governmental control;

4. the statutory authority for the United States Government’s veto power over appointments to the company’s board and any other governance rights associated with the interest;

5. whether the Department relies upon 10 U.S.C. §149 or upon some separate enacted authority, and, if upon separate authority, what provision Congress enacted;

6. how the Department reconciles the transaction with the FY2026 legislative history in which express equity-investment authority for the Office was proposed in the House but not included in the final congressional agreement;

7. whether any appropriated federal funds, guarantees, contingent liabilities, administrative expenditures, or other governmental financial commitments accompany the interest, separately from the private capital that the White House states will finance petroleum development in Venezuela; and

8. what reporting, audit, valuation, conflict-of-interest, disposition, and continuing congressional oversight requirements govern an equity interest that the White House values potentially in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

These questions do not depend upon whether the underlying petroleum investment proves commercially successful or advantageous to the United States.  Expected economic benefit cannot substitute for statutory authority.

Nor does the absence of a purchase price resolve the matter.  Governmental ownership of valuable property can create rights, obligations, liabilities, administrative responsibilities, and future revenues irrespective of whether money was initially paid to acquire it.

Congress possesses both the authority and the institutional record necessary to determine whether the Executive Branch is exercising a power Congress enacted or one that was proposed but left unenacted.

I respectfully ask the Committee to obtain the operative agreement and the Department’s legal analysis and to determine the statutory basis upon which the Office of Strategic Capital has accepted and now exercises the equity and governance rights described by the White House.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

The Honorable Roger F. Wicker
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Jack Reed
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

228 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Ref. Congressional Oversight of the Office of Strategic Capital’s 35 Percent Equity Interest in the Venezuela Petroleum Arrangement

Dear Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed:

I write to request congressional examination of the statutory authority under which the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital has accepted or holds the 35 percent equity interest described by the White House in connection with the recently announced petroleum arrangement involving Venezuela.

This question warrants particular examination by the Senate Armed Services Committee because the legislative history of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 records Congress’s consideration of the precise authority now implicated.

On August 31, 2026, the White House announced that North American Blue Energy Partners had granted the Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity interest in its corporate parent.  The White House states that the interest was obtained at no cost to the American taxpayer and represents up to hundreds of billions of dollars in potential value and dividends for the United States.

The absence of a purchase price does not answer the statutory question.  Authority to accept, hold, administer, exercise rights arising from, or receive distributions upon an equity interest must derive from law.  A private company cannot confer statutory authority upon an office of the United States merely by purporting to grant property to it.

Section 149 of title 10 establishes the Office of Strategic Capital and assigns it substantial responsibilities concerning capital investment.  Its capital-assistance program, however, defines “capital assistance” as a loan, loan guarantee, or technical assistance and defines an eligible investment by reference to such capital assistance.

Congress considered going further.

The House version of the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act contained section 905.  The joint explanatory statement states expressly that this provision “would provide equity investment authority for the Office of Strategic Capital.”  The Senate bill contained no similar provision, and the final congressional agreement did not include the House provision.

That legislative history should not be overstated.  Failure to include a proposed provision does not, standing alone, establish a judicial holding that every conceivable equity transaction is unlawful.  It does establish that express authority for the Office to make equity investments was presented to Congress and was not enacted as part of the final agreement.

The subsequent announcement that the Office possesses a 35 percent equity interest therefore presents a concrete question for the committees that negotiated that legislation: what enacted authority permits the Office to possess the interest now attributed to it?

The White House further states that the United States Government possesses veto power over appointments to the company’s board and that a majority of the board must consist of United States citizens.  It characterizes the arrangement as conferring governance rights and economic ownership upon the United States Government.

These features make the statutory question more, not less, consequential.  They concern governmental ownership and governmental control, not merely the facilitation of private investment.

I respectfully ask the Committee to determine:

1. the specific enacted statutory authority under which the Office of Strategic Capital accepted, acquired, or holds the 35 percent equity interest;

2. the legal form in which that interest is held and the governmental entity that legally owns it;

3. the operative instrument establishing the interest and the terms governing voting, dividends, valuation, transfer, disposition, liabilities, and governmental control;

4. the statutory authority for the United States Government’s veto power over appointments to the company’s board and any related governance rights;

5. whether the Department relies upon 10 U.S.C. §149 or another enacted provision as authority for the equity interest and, if another provision is relied upon, what provision that is;

6. how the Department reconciles its present position with the FY2026 legislative history in which the House proposed express equity-investment authority for the Office, the Senate contained no corresponding provision, and the final agreement did not include the House proposal;

7. whether federal appropriations, guarantees, administrative expenditures, contingent liabilities, or other governmental commitments accompany the interest, separately identifying them from the private-sector capital the Administration states will finance petroleum development in Venezuela; and

8. what congressional reporting, audit, valuation, ethics, disposition, and oversight requirements govern the interest and any revenues derived from it.

The distinction between private contractual capacity and governmental statutory authority is fundamental.  A private company may have legal capacity to offer an equity interest.  That does not establish that a federal office possesses legal authority to accept and hold it.

Likewise, the potential economic value of the transaction cannot resolve the question.  If anything, an interest that the White House describes as potentially representing hundreds of billions of dollars in value and dividends warrants correspondingly clear congressional authority and oversight.

I respectfully ask the Committee to obtain the operative agreement and the Department’s legal analysis and to determine whether the equity and governance rights announced by the White House fall within authority Congress enacted.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

The Honorable Mike Lee
Chairman
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
United States Senate

The Honorable Martin Heinrich
Ranking Member
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
United States Senate

304 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Ref. Congressional Oversight of Department of Energy Authority Concerning Venezuela

Dear Chairman Lee and Ranking Member Heinrich:

I write to request congressional examination of the statutory authority underlying the Department of Energy’s expanding governmental role concerning Venezuela’s petroleum resources, electrical infrastructure, and economic reconstruction.

On September 2, 2026, the Department announced that Secretary Chris Wright traveled to Venezuela to oversee the signing of agreements involving Chevron, Eni, and GE Vernova.  DOE states that these arrangements will expand petroleum production, unlock billions of dollars in private-sector investment, modernize Venezuela’s electrical grid, and advance the Administration’s effort to rebuild critical energy infrastructure.

DOE further states that these agreements build upon President Trump’s August 28 announcement of what DOE calls a “historic binational agreement with Venezuela,” which DOE describes as establishing “U.S. majority control” of an estimated 65 billion barrels of proven Venezuelan petroleum reserves.

Congress has authorized the Secretary of Energy to conduct certain international energy activities.  In particular, 42 U.S.C. §16341 directs the Secretary to carry out a program promoting Western Hemisphere energy cooperation, including activities intended to increase energy supplies, improve energy efficiency, and assist the development and transfer of energy-supply and efficiency technologies.

That authority is relevant and should be acknowledged.  It does not, on its face, answer the separate question presented by DOE’s own description of the present arrangements: what enacted authority supports a governmental role involving “U.S. majority control” over another nation’s petroleum resources, supervision of long-term commercial agreements, or direction of that nation’s energy reconstruction?

The distinction between cooperation and governmental control is legally consequential.

The same is true of the distinction between private investment and public expenditure.  DOE describes Chevron’s announced investment of more than $7 billion and other anticipated expenditures as private-sector investment.  Those investments are not congressional appropriations.  Conversely, the fact that private companies finance commercial projects does not transform governmental action by the Secretary or Department into private conduct.

If DOE is committing federal funds, assuming obligations, administering agreements, directing reconstruction, exercising governmental control, or otherwise undertaking functions beyond facilitating lawful private energy cooperation, each such governmental act requires an identifiable source of statutory authority and, where federal funds are involved, an applicable appropriation.

The Venezuelan side presents a separate question.  DOE states that Eni and PDVSA entered a 25-year arrangement concerning the Junín 5 field and that Secretary Wright joined the Venezuelan interim President in witnessing an agreement between GE Vernova and CORPOELEC concerning Venezuela’s electrical system.  DOE simultaneously describes an earlier arrangement as establishing United States majority control over approximately 65 billion barrels of Venezuelan reserves.

Article 12 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are inalienable and imprescriptible.  Article 5 provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.

Those provisions do not make every commercial interest in lawfully produced petroleum inalienable, nor do I presume that every energy agreement requires a national referendum.  They do require identification of the constitutionally competent Venezuelan authority by which long-term concessions and governmental rights affecting resources belonging to the Republic are created.

I therefore respectfully ask the Committee to determine:

1. the specific statutory authorities upon which DOE relies for Secretary Wright’s participation in and supervision of the Venezuela agreements announced on September 2;

2. whether DOE relies upon 42 U.S.C. §16341, the Department of Energy Organization Act, another enacted statute, presidential delegation, or some combination of authorities, and the scope DOE attributes to each;

3. the identity and legal character of the “historic binational agreement with Venezuela” that DOE states President Trump announced on August 28, including the parties, operative provisions, duration, and governmental obligations created by it;

4. how that instrument relates to the separately described agreement between the United States Government and North American Blue Energy Partners and to the petroleum concessions granted by Venezuelan interim authorities;

5. what DOE means legally by “U.S. majority control” over approximately 65 billion barrels of Venezuelan proven petroleum reserves and what governmental rights DOE itself possesses under that arrangement;

6. whether DOE has obligated or expended federal funds, assumed contingent liabilities, provided guarantees, committed personnel or resources, or undertaken other governmental financial obligations in connection with Venezuelan stabilization, reconstruction, petroleum development, or electrical infrastructure;

7. which announced expenditures constitute private-sector investment and which, if any, constitute obligations or expenditures of the United States Government;

8. what Venezuelan constitutional authority the United States relies upon for the long-term concessions and governmental rights involved; and

9. what reporting, audit, records-preservation, and continuing congressional oversight mechanisms apply to DOE’s participation.

The question is not whether greater petroleum production, reliable electricity, or private investment may benefit Venezuela or the United States.  Those are policy and economic judgments.  They cannot themselves determine the scope of authority Congress conferred upon an Executive department.

I respectfully ask the Committee to obtain the operative agreements and DOE’s legal analysis so that Congress can distinguish authorized international energy cooperation from any governmental authority over Venezuela’s resources or reconstruction that requires a separate statutory foundation.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

The Honorable Brett Guthrie
Chairman
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.
Ranking Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives

2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Ref. Congressional Oversight of Department of Energy Authority Concerning Venezuela

Dear Chairman Guthrie and Ranking Member Pallone:

I write to request congressional examination of the statutory authority underlying the Department of Energy’s expanding governmental role concerning Venezuela’s petroleum resources, electrical infrastructure, and economic reconstruction.

On September 2, 2026, DOE announced that Secretary Chris Wright traveled to Venezuela to oversee agreements involving Chevron, Eni, and GE Vernova.  The Department states that the agreements will expand petroleum production, unlock billions in private-sector investment, modernize Venezuela’s electrical grid, and advance the Administration’s effort to rebuild critical energy infrastructure.

DOE further states that these agreements build upon President Trump’s August 28 announcement of what DOE describes as a “historic binational agreement with Venezuela,” which DOE says establishes “U.S. majority control” of approximately 65 billion barrels of proven Venezuelan petroleum reserves.

Congress has granted the Secretary authority to undertake specified international energy activities.  Under 42 U.S.C. §16341, the Secretary is directed to promote Western Hemisphere energy cooperation through activities including increased energy production, improved efficiency, and assistance in the development and transfer of energy technologies.

The existence of that authority makes it important to identify its boundary rather than to assume either that DOE possesses no international role or that international energy cooperation confers unlimited governmental authority.

DOE’s September 2 announcement goes beyond describing technical cooperation.  It places the Secretary personally in the supervision of agreements involving Venezuelan petroleum production and electrical infrastructure and connects those agreements to what DOE itself calls United States majority control over a substantial portion of Venezuela’s proven petroleum reserves.

I respectfully ask the Committee, exercising its jurisdiction over the Department of Energy, to determine the statutory basis and limits of that governmental role.

The financial record also requires clarification.  DOE describes billions of dollars committed by Chevron and other companies as private-sector investment.  Those expenditures should remain analytically distinct from federal appropriations, obligations, guarantees, administrative expenditures, or other commitments of the United States Government.

Private financing cannot supply governmental authority that Congress has not enacted.  Conversely, governmental encouragement or facilitation does not convert private corporate capital into public expenditure.  Both sides of that distinction are necessary if Congress and the public are to understand the actual financial commitments being made in Venezuela.

I therefore respectfully ask the Committee to determine:

1. the specific statutory authority for Secretary Wright’s participation in and supervision of the Venezuela agreements;

2. the extent to which DOE relies upon 42 U.S.C. §16341, the Department of Energy Organization Act, presidential delegation, or other enacted authority;

3. the identity, parties, terms, and legal status of the “historic binational agreement with Venezuela” that DOE states President Trump announced on August 28;

4. the legal meaning of DOE’s statement that this arrangement establishes “U.S. majority control” over approximately 65 billion barrels of proven Venezuelan petroleum reserves;

5. the governmental rights, obligations, supervisory functions, or financial commitments DOE itself possesses or exercises under the arrangement;

6. the relationship between the agreement described by DOE as announced on August 28 and the separately announced United States Government agreement with North American Blue Energy Partners;

7. all federal funds, personnel, guarantees, administrative resources, contingent liabilities, or other governmental commitments used or contemplated in connection with Venezuelan energy reconstruction;

8. the amounts that instead represent investments undertaken solely by Chevron, Eni, GE Vernova, North American Blue Energy Partners, or other private entities;

9. the Venezuelan constitutional authority upon which the United States relies for the long-term concessions and governmental rights involved; and

10. the mechanisms by which Congress can review the operative agreements, expenditures, legal opinions, and implementation of DOE’s activities.

The public interest is not served by collapsing governmental commitments and private investment into a single figure or by treating the economic desirability of an arrangement as evidence of legal authority.

Congress has established DOE’s powers by statute.  If those statutes authorize the governmental functions now being exercised in Venezuela, the provisions should be identifiable.  If additional authority is required, that determination belongs to Congress rather than arising from the accomplished fact of Executive action.

I respectfully ask the Committee to obtain the operative instruments and the Department’s legal analysis and to examine whether DOE’s activities remain within the authority Congress enacted.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


Letters to United Nations Officials

September 8, 2026

His Excellency António Guterres
Secretary-General of the United Nations
United Nations
New York, NY 10017

Ref. Venezuela, Sovereign Authority, and Subsequent United States Governmental Arrangements

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

I write concerning developments in Venezuela subsequent to the United States military action of January 3, 2026, and the principles of sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and the sovereign will of the Venezuelan people that you placed before the Security Council on January 5.

In the remarks delivered on your behalf to the Council, you expressed concern that rules of international law had not been respected in connection with the January 3 military action.  You recalled the Charter prohibition against the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State and called for an inclusive democratic process in which Venezuelans could determine their own future, with full respect for the sovereign will of the Venezuelan people.

Developments since then raise a related but distinct question.  The issue is no longer confined to the military action itself.  The United States Government has announced long-term governmental and economic arrangements concerning Venezuela while the democratic transition that the United States itself says should ultimately establish representative government remains incomplete.

On August 31, 2026, the White House announced a petroleum arrangement that it describes as giving the United States Government powerful governance rights, economic ownership, and guaranteed rights to acquire Venezuelan petroleum.  According to the White House, Venezuelan interim authorities granted a private company, North American Blue Energy Partners, 100-year concessions covering 17 petroleum fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.

The White House further states that the United States Government possesses veto power over appointments to the company’s board and that a majority of its directors must be United States citizens.  The arrangement is described as a central component of a program of stabilization, reconstruction, and eventual democratic transition.

Separate governmental action concerns Venezuelan sovereign revenues.  Executive Order 14373 identifies specified Venezuelan natural-resource revenues as property of the Government of Venezuela and states that the United States holds them solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.  Yet the Order provides for their sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the United States Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela.

These arrangements present questions that extend beyond the domestic law of either country.

I do not ask the United Nations to adjudicate the meaning of the Constitution of Venezuela or the statutory powers of an agency of the United States.  Those questions belong to the competent institutions of the respective legal orders.  Their international consequences, however, cannot be separated entirely from the principles you articulated on January 5.

Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.  Article 12 provides that hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are therefore inalienable and imprescriptible.

These provisions do not mean that every commercial interest in petroleum once lawfully produced is constitutionally inalienable.  Nor do I presume that every energy agreement requires a national referendum.  They do raise an antecedent question concerning the constitutional competence by which long-term concessions and governmental rights affecting resources belonging to the Republic are created.

That question acquires an international dimension when another State accepts governmental rights, economic ownership, control arrangements, or authority over sovereign revenues on the basis of those acts.

The distinction between effective governmental control and constitutional authority is therefore important.  Recognition by another State cannot, by itself, resolve the internal constitutional competence of those who purport to bind a nation for generations.  Nor can anticipated economic benefit answer a question concerning the source of sovereign authority.

The duration of the petroleum concessions makes the issue particularly consequential.  A 100-year concession would extend far beyond the tenure of the authorities presently exercising power and beyond the democratic transition that the United States says remains to be completed.

A future democratic government may make its own decisions concerning Venezuela’s resources and international economic relations.  The prospect of such a government, however, cannot simply be presumed to confer retrospectively the authority required for commitments undertaken before it exists.

I therefore respectfully ask that the subsequent governmental arrangements concerning Venezuela be considered in light of the principles expressed in your January 5 statement: respect for the Charter, the sovereignty and political independence of States, the rule of law, and the sovereign will of the Venezuelan people.

The question is not whether Venezuela should receive foreign investment, reconstruct its infrastructure, increase petroleum production, or maintain economic relations with the United States.  It is whether governmental arrangements of exceptional duration and consequence preserve the principle that Venezuelans themselves remain the source of authority by which their Republic is bound.

The transition from intervention to stabilization and reconstruction does not make that principle less important.  It makes the identification of lawful sovereign authority more important.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

The Honorable Mike Waltz
Representative of the United States of America
to the United Nations
United States Mission to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017

Ref. United States Representations at the United Nations and Governmental Arrangements Concerning Venezuela

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I write concerning the relationship between the position of the United States at the United Nations regarding Venezuela and the governmental arrangements subsequently announced by the United States concerning Venezuelan petroleum resources, sovereign revenues, stabilization, and reconstruction.

The question is distinct from whether the United States regards the former Maduro government as legitimate or whether its policies toward Venezuela are expected to produce economic or strategic benefits.  It concerns the international legal principle that the governmental power of one State does not itself establish authority to exercise sovereign functions belonging to another.

The situation in Venezuela came before the Security Council following the United States military action of January 3, 2026.  In that forum, questions of sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, self-determination, and the Charter obligations of Member States were placed directly before the United States and the Council.

Subsequent actions have expanded the question beyond the January military operation.

On August 31, the White House announced an arrangement that it describes as giving the United States Government powerful governance rights, economic ownership, and guaranteed low-cost rights to acquire Venezuelan petroleum.  The White House states that Venezuelan interim authorities granted North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions covering 17 fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.

The White House further states that the United States Government possesses veto power over appointments to the company’s board and that a majority of the board must consist of United States citizens.

Executive Order 14373 presents another dimension of the same problem.  It recognizes specified Venezuelan natural-resource revenues as property of the Government of Venezuela and states that the United States holds them solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.  Yet it provides for sovereign disposition of those funds for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the United States Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela.

The Administration describes the broader policy as proceeding through stabilization and reconstruction toward democratic transition.

That sequence raises a question the United States should be able to answer before the international institution in which it represents its adherence to the Charter.

What is the international legal basis upon which the United States distinguishes assistance to Venezuela from the acquisition or exercise of governmental and economic rights belonging to Venezuela?

The domestic constitutional questions are important but separate.  Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people.  Article 12 provides that hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are inalienable and imprescriptible.

Those provisions do not make every commercial interest in petroleum once lawfully produced inalienable, and they do not establish that every energy agreement requires a referendum.  They do establish the antecedent question of what constitutionally competent Venezuelan authority can create the concessions and governmental rights upon which the United States arrangements depend.

Recognition by the United States cannot itself answer that question.  Effective control of governmental institutions is a fact; constitutional competence to bind a Republic is a question of authority.

The 100-year duration attributed to the petroleum concessions makes the distinction particularly consequential.  Those concessions would survive the authorities that granted them, the present United States Administration, and the democratic transition that the United States itself says remains to occur.

A future Venezuelan election cannot simply be presumed to ratify retrospectively every governmental commitment made before that election.  If the United States maintains that the present Venezuelan authorities possess constitutional competence to create these long-term rights, the basis for that conclusion should be capable of articulation independently of United States recognition.

I therefore respectfully ask the United States Mission to identify how the Government reconciles the arrangements announced since January with the Charter principles of sovereign equality and political independence and with the principle that the political future of Venezuela is to be determined by the Venezuelan people.

I further ask whether the United States regards the governance rights, economic ownership, administration of sovereign revenues, and other governmental functions it has announced as temporary incidents of a transition; contractual rights intended to survive that transition; or sovereign governmental powers exercised on behalf of Venezuela.  The legal distinction among those possibilities is substantial.

Private-sector investment does not resolve it.  Private capital may finance petroleum development or reconstruction, but it cannot itself supply sovereign authority to either government.  Nor should private investment be confused with expenditures or obligations of the United States Government.

The United States has an interest in demonstrating at the United Nations that the principles it invokes concerning sovereignty and self-determination are principles of law rather than rules whose application depends upon the identity or power of the State concerned.

The Venezuelan people remain the source of Venezuela’s political future.  The governmental arrangements made before they are again able to express that future through a credible democratic process should therefore be capable of justification under the same principles of sovereignty and political independence that the United States expects other States to observe.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

His Excellency Jérôme Bonnafont
President of the United Nations Security Council
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations
One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza
245 East 47th Street, 44th Floor
New York, NY 10017

Ref. Venezuela: Subsequent Developments Concerning a Matter Formally Placed Before the Security Council

Dear Mr. President:

I write concerning subsequent developments bearing upon a matter that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela formally placed before the United Nations following the United States military action of January 3, 2026.

On that date, the Permanent Representative of Venezuela transmitted identical letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, subsequently circulated as documents A/80/586–S/2026/5.  Venezuela characterized the United States military action as an armed aggression with implications for regional and international peace and security and invoked, among other principles, Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations.

On January 8, Venezuela transmitted further material, circulated as A/80/592–S/2026/19, containing statements by several groups of States concerning the January 3 action.

I recognize that the allegations contained in those communications are the position of Venezuela and that their circulation as United Nations documents does not constitute an adjudication of their legal merits.  Their significance for the present submission is procedural and documentary: the situation between Venezuela and the United States was formally placed before the Security Council, and the Council convened on January 5 under the agenda item “Threats to international peace and security.”

At that meeting, the Secretary-General expressed concern that rules of international law had not been respected in connection with the January 3 military action.  He recalled the Charter principles of sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and the prohibition of the threat or use of force.  He further called for an inclusive democratic process respecting the sovereign will of the Venezuelan people.

France took a position of particular relevance to the developments that have followed.

Speaking before the Council, the representative of France stated that the military operation resulting in the capture of Nicolás Maduro contravened the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force.  France reaffirmed its commitment to the Charter and declared that Venezuela’s transition must be peaceful, democratic, respectful of the choices of the sovereign Venezuelan people, and “led by and for the Venezuelans.”

France now holds the presidency of the Security Council for September 2026.  I therefore respectfully submit that subsequent governmental arrangements concerning Venezuela warrant consideration against the principles already placed before the Council and expressly affirmed by France.

The circumstances have materially developed since January.

On August 31, 2026, the White House announced a petroleum arrangement that it describes as granting the United States Government governance rights, economic ownership, guaranteed petroleum acquisition rights, and veto power concerning appointments to the board of the private enterprise involved.  According to the White House, Venezuelan interim authorities granted North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions covering 17 petroleum fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.

The United States Government has separately established arrangements governing Venezuelan natural-resource revenues.  Executive Order 14373 recognizes specified funds as property of the Government of Venezuela and states that the United States holds them solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.  At the same time, the Order provides for their sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the United States Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela.

The United States Department of Energy has since described an arrangement concerning those petroleum resources as establishing “U.S. majority control” over approximately 65 billion barrels of Venezuelan proven reserves and has announced the participation of the United States Secretary of Energy in agreements concerning petroleum production and the reconstruction of Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure.

The United States presents these measures as components of stabilization, economic reconstruction, and an eventual democratic transition.

Those subsequent developments raise a question that was not before the Council in its present form on January 5.

The issue is no longer limited to the legality of the military action that precipitated the Council’s meeting.  It now concerns the governmental and economic arrangements being established in its aftermath, their intended duration, and their relationship to the sovereign authority of the Venezuelan people during a transition that the United States itself acknowledges remains incomplete.

Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.  Article 12 provides that hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are inalienable and imprescriptible.

I do not ask the Security Council to adjudicate the meaning of those provisions.  Nor do I contend that every commercial transaction involving lawfully produced petroleum requires direct popular approval.  The constitutional provisions identify an antecedent question whose international consequences are relevant here: by what sovereign authority are governmental rights and concessions of exceptional duration being created and accepted during a transition that has not yet restored the democratic expression of the Venezuelan people?

A 100-year petroleum concession is not intrinsically transitional.  It purports to create rights capable of surviving the officials who granted them, the present United States Administration, and generations of future Venezuelan governments.

The same distinction applies to governmental control.  Assistance to a State during a transition is one thing.  Acquisition by another State of governance rights, economic ownership, control over natural-resource arrangements, or authority concerning sovereign revenues presents a different question.

That distinction becomes especially significant in light of France’s January position that the Venezuelan transition must be “led by and for the Venezuelans.”

If that principle is to retain substantive meaning, the transition cannot be defined solely by the identity of the officials presently exercising governmental functions.  It must also encompass the source and limits of their authority to bind the Venezuelan people through commitments extending far beyond the transitional period itself.

I do not submit that the January communications from Venezuela predetermined the Council’s legal conclusion.  They did not.  I submit instead that they established a formal documentary record before the Council concerning the consequences of United States action for Venezuelan sovereignty and international peace and security.  The governmental arrangements announced since then constitute subsequent developments directly relevant to that record.

Nor does opposition to the former Maduro government resolve the question.  France itself demonstrated on January 5 that these propositions are not contradictory: it rejected Nicolás Maduro’s democratic legitimacy while simultaneously insisting upon the Charter, the prohibition on the use of force, Venezuelan sovereignty, and a transition determined by Venezuelans themselves.

That distinction is important.  International law does not require a State to approve the government of another State before respecting the sovereignty of its people.

I therefore respectfully request, during France’s presidency of the Security Council, that these subsequent developments be brought to the attention of the members of the Council in connection with the matter already considered on January 5 and the documentary record established by S/2026/5 and subsequent communications.

In particular, I respectfully submit for the Council’s consideration whether governmental and economic arrangements of exceptional duration, undertaken before the completion of the democratic transition invoked to justify them, are consistent with the principles of sovereign equality, political independence, self-determination, and respect for the sovereign will of the Venezuelan people that were placed before the Council in January.

The question does not require endorsement of Nicolás Maduro, opposition to foreign investment, or rejection of Venezuela’s economic reconstruction.  It requires only that the means employed to accomplish those objectives remain subject to the principles of law governing relations among States.

France stated before the Council that those principles must be applied “at all times and in all places.”  The developments since January provide an occasion to apply that proposition to the transition now occurring in Venezuela.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


Letters to Selected Press, Requesting Independent Journalistic Examination

September 8, 2026

Editors
The Washington Post
1301 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20071

Ref. Venezuela: The Unresolved Question of Authority Behind the United States Petroleum Arrangement

Dear Editors:

Your September 8 report, “Rubio enjoyed major support among Venezuelans. Then came Trump’s oil deal,” by Adam Taylor, Samantha Schmidt, and Helena Carpio, places in the public record a temporal and constitutional question that deserves further investigation.  The United States is entering long-term governmental and economic arrangements concerning Venezuela while the democratic government that American officials say should ultimately govern the country remains prospective.

I write as a Venezuelan-born naturalized American citizen who has been examining the public constitutional and statutory record surrounding these actions.  I do not write in defense of Nicolás Maduro, nor to oppose economic reconstruction, petroleum development, or American investment in Venezuela.  My concern is narrower: the distinction between the capacity of governments and private parties to accomplish an act and the lawful authority by which they may do so.

Your report makes that distinction especially concrete.  Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Sergio Novelli that “There is much more to be done, including the issues of democracy and elections.”  Asked before departing on his Latin American trip about the Venezuela oil arrangement, he further said that the petroleum fields would generate royalties and revenues for the Venezuelan people “eventually, through a democratically elected government, hopefully sooner rather than later.”

Those statements need not be characterized as a contradiction.  They establish two different temporal facts.  Long-term petroleum and governmental arrangements exist in the present; the democratically elected Venezuelan government through which Secretary Rubio says the revenues will eventually benefit the Venezuelan people remains a future objective.  The unresolved question lies between those facts: if the democratically elected government remains prospective, what is the source of authority by which commitments intended to endure for a century are being made in the present?

The documentary record permits that question to be examined without speculation.

On August 31, the White House announced that Venezuelan interim authorities had granted North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions covering 17 petroleum fields with approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.  The White House simultaneously described the United States Government as receiving “powerful governance rights,” “economic ownership,” guaranteed low-cost petroleum off-take, and veto authority concerning appointments to the company’s board.

The arrangement contains another feature deserving scrutiny.  The White House states that NABEP granted the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity interest in its corporate parent, potentially representing hundreds of billions of dollars in value and dividends.

Congress’s own record makes that transaction particularly significant.

The current text of 10 U.S.C. §149 gives the Office of Strategic Capital investment-related responsibilities but defines “capital assistance” as a loan, loan guarantee, or technical assistance.  During consideration of the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, the House included section 905, which, according to the Joint Explanatory Statement, “would provide equity investment authority for the Office of Strategic Capital.”  The Senate contained no similar provision.  The final congressional agreement did not include the House provision.

That legislative history does not by itself constitute a judicial determination that every conceivable federal equity transaction is unlawful.  It does, however, produce a concrete question for independent reporting: what enacted authority does the Administration contend permits the Office of Strategic Capital to accept, hold, administer, and derive value from the 35 percent equity interest announced by the White House?

There is an equally important Venezuelan question.

Article 5 of Venezuela’s Constitution provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.  Article 12 places hydrocarbon deposits within the Republic’s public domain and declares them inalienable and imprescriptible.

Article 12 should not be overstated.  It does not necessarily make every commercial interest in petroleum after lawful extraction inalienable.  Nor do I suggest that every Venezuelan energy contract requires a referendum.  The antecedent question is instead one of constitutional competence: what authority permits officials exercising power during a transition to grant 100-year concessions and governmental rights concerning resources belonging to the Republic?

The duration matters.  One hundred years is not a transitional interval.  The concessions would survive the officials who granted them, the present American Administration, the contemplated Venezuelan democratic transition, and generations of future governments.

There is also a separate question concerning Venezuelan revenues.  Executive Order 14373 states that specified Venezuelan natural-resource revenues remain property of the Government of Venezuela and that the United States holds them solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.  Yet it provides for their sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela.

Each element may have an explanation grounded in enacted law and operative agreements.  If so, those authorities should be identifiable.

I respectfully ask The Washington Post to examine the documentary chain independently and seek answers to several questions: What is the complete operative petroleum agreement?  What enacted statute authorizes the Office of Strategic Capital equity interest?  What governmental rights does “economic ownership” actually convey?  What is the legal character of the United States board veto?  What Venezuelan constitutional authority supports concessions extending for a century?  Which expenditures are genuinely private investment and which create federal obligations or governmental liabilities?  And how are commitments intended to survive a transition reconciled with Secretary Rubio’s acknowledgment, reported by the Post, that democratically elected government remains prospective?

These questions need not be partisan.  They do not depend upon approval of Maduro, President Trump, the Venezuelan interim authorities, or the petroleum companies involved.  Nor should the existence of questions be treated as an accusation of wrongdoing against private participants.

They concern something more durable than the individuals presently holding office: whether governmental power is being exercised pursuant to authority that can be identified in law.

The documents are public.  The consequences may endure for a century.  Independent examination by the press is therefore warranted.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

Editors
The New York Times
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10018

Ref. Venezuela: A Documentary Question Concerning Sovereign Authority, Petroleum, and the United States Government

Dear Editors:

I respectfully submit for independent examination a developing matter concerning United States actions in Venezuela whose importance extends beyond the policy merits of the Administration’s approach to that country.

The question is one of authority.

Since the United States military action of January 3, 2026, the Administration has moved from intervention into stabilization, petroleum development, economic reconstruction, and what it describes as an eventual democratic transition.  The public record now documents governmental arrangements of extraordinary duration and consequence undertaken during that interval.

On August 31, the White House announced an agreement concerning Venezuelan petroleum under which Venezuelan interim authorities granted North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions covering 17 fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.

The White House describes the United States Government as receiving “powerful governance rights,” “economic ownership,” guaranteed low-cost petroleum off-take, and veto authority concerning appointments to the company’s board.  It further states that NABEP granted the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity interest in the company’s corporate parent.

These descriptions raise questions in two separate legal systems.

Under United States law, 10 U.S.C. §149 establishes the Office of Strategic Capital and gives it substantial investment-related responsibilities.  The statute nevertheless defines “capital assistance” as a loan, loan guarantee, or technical assistance, and defines an eligible investment by reference to that capital assistance.

The legislative history adds an unusual fact.  During consideration of the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, the House adopted a provision that the Joint Explanatory Statement says “would provide equity investment authority for the Office of Strategic Capital.”  The Senate contained no similar provision.  The final agreement did not include the House provision.

The omission does not establish, without more, that every conceivable equity transaction by the federal government is unlawful.  It does establish something narrower and independently verifiable: Congress considered express equity-investment authority for this particular office and did not enact that provision in the final agreement.

What statutory authority, then, does the Administration contend permits the Office to accept and hold the 35 percent equity interest announced by the White House?  If another enacted statute supplies that authority, identifying it should resolve the question.

Venezuelan law presents a different inquiry.

Article 5 of Venezuela’s Constitution provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people.  Article 12 provides that hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are inalienable and imprescriptible.

Those provisions should be read carefully.  Article 12 does not necessarily make every commercial interest in petroleum following lawful extraction inalienable, and I do not suggest that every petroleum contract requires direct popular approval.

The more fundamental issue precedes either proposition: what constitutionally competent Venezuelan authority may create concessions and governmental rights of exceptional duration concerning the Republic’s petroleum resources?

The 100-year term makes that question difficult to dismiss as an incident of temporary administration.  The concessions are designed to survive the present interim authorities and bind Venezuelan governments that do not yet exist.

At the same time, the United States continues to describe democratic transition and elections as future objectives.

There is a further governmental arrangement worthy of examination.  Executive Order 14373 identifies specified Venezuelan natural-resource revenues as property of the Government of Venezuela and states that the United States possesses them solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.  The same Order provides that they are held pending sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the United States Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela.

The juxtaposition deserves careful reporting rather than premature conclusion.  Custody is not ownership.  Private investment is not congressional appropriation.  Recognition of an interim government is not necessarily constitutional competence to bind a nation indefinitely.  Effective control is not synonymous with lawful authority.

The international record supplies another dimension.  Venezuela formally placed the January 3 United States military action before the United Nations in documents A/80/586–S/2026/5.  On January 5, the Secretary-General told the Security Council that he remained deeply concerned that rules of international law had not been respected and invoked sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and the prohibition against the threat or use of force.

None of that adjudicates the legality of the subsequent petroleum arrangement.  It establishes that the international consequences of United States action concerning Venezuelan sovereignty were already formally before the United Nations before the century-long petroleum arrangements were announced.

I therefore respectfully ask The New York Times to investigate the complete legal and documentary chain rather than accept either the Administration’s characterization or its opponents’ conclusions.

The operative agreements should be obtained.  The statutory authority for the federal equity interest should be identified.  The legal meaning of “governance rights,” “economic ownership,” and “U.S. majority control” should be established.  Federal financial commitments should be distinguished from private investment.  The Venezuelan authority supporting century-long concessions should be examined.  And the relationship between commitments made now and democratic authority expected later should be confronted directly.

The inquiry requires neither hostility toward the United States nor defense of the government it displaced.  Constitutional government depends upon a more elementary proposition: desirable objectives do not create governmental authority merely because those possessing power are capable of achieving them.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

Opinion Editor
The Reader’s Forum
Miami Herald
11410 NW 20th Street
Suite 222
Miami, FL 33172

Ref. Venezuela’s Oil Agreement and the Democratic Authority That Has Yet to Exist

Dear Editor:

For Venezuelans in South Florida, the debate over the United States petroleum arrangement with Venezuela presents a choice that should not be reduced to support for Nicolás Maduro on one side and support for American intervention on the other.

There is a third and more fundamental position: Venezuela’s future should belong to Venezuelans, and the authority to bind that future should be established before commitments lasting generations are treated as accomplished facts.

I am a Venezuelan-born naturalized American citizen.  I oppose any attempt to restore the former Maduro government.  I also recognize the importance of investment, increased petroleum production, restoration of Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure, and economic recovery after decades of institutional and economic deterioration.

But economic desirability and constitutional authority are different questions.

On August 31, the White House announced what it calls the largest oil agreement in history.  According to its own account, Venezuelan interim authorities granted North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions for 17 petroleum fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.

The White House says the arrangement gives the United States Government powerful governance rights, economic ownership, guaranteed low-cost petroleum off-take, and veto authority concerning appointments to the company’s board.  It also says NABEP granted the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity interest in its corporate parent.

Two days later, the Department of Energy described the arrangement as establishing “U.S. majority control” of approximately 65 billion barrels while announcing Secretary Chris Wright’s participation in agreements involving Chevron, Eni, and GE Vernova to increase petroleum production and reconstruct Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure.

The private investment may be beneficial.  That does not answer the question of governmental authority.

Article 5 of Venezuela’s Constitution states that sovereignty resides intransferably in the people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.  Article 12 places hydrocarbon deposits within the Republic’s public domain and declares them inalienable and imprescriptible.

Article 12 should not be converted into a claim that every barrel of petroleum lawfully extracted can never become the subject of commerce.  Nor does every energy contract require a referendum.  The prior question is simpler: what constitutionally competent authority can grant concessions over Venezuela’s petroleum resources for a century?

One hundred years is not a transition.

The concessions could remain in force through governments elected by Venezuelans who had no opportunity to approve the political circumstances in which those commitments originated.  Yet American officials continue to describe democratic elections and a fully democratic Venezuelan government as objectives still to be achieved.

That sequence deserves examination.

There is an American statutory question as well.  The White House says the Office of Strategic Capital received a 35 percent equity interest.  Current federal law gives that Office investment-related responsibilities but defines its capital-assistance mechanism in terms of loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance.

More strikingly, the House of Representatives included in its Fiscal Year 2026 defense authorization bill a provision expressly providing equity-investment authority for the Office of Strategic Capital.  The Senate contained no similar provision, and the final congressional agreement did not include the House proposal.

That fact does not by itself prove that the announced equity interest is unlawful.  It makes the question unavoidable: what enacted authority does permit it?

Another question concerns Venezuelan petroleum revenues now held by the United States.  Executive Order 14373 acknowledges that specified funds remain property of the Government of Venezuela and says the United States holds them solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.  Yet their public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes are determined by the United States Secretary of State on behalf of Venezuela.

These are questions capable of documentary answers.

The complete petroleum agreements can be disclosed.  The statutory authority for the federal equity interest can be identified.  The meaning of “U.S. majority control” can be explained.  Private investment can be separated from federal expenditure and liability.  And the Venezuelan constitutional authority for commitments extending a century can be stated and examined.

Venezuelans should not have to choose between the authoritarian government from which they sought liberation and unquestioning acceptance of whatever arrangements follow its displacement.

Democracy means more than replacing one set of officials with another.  It means preserving for Venezuelans the sovereign capacity to determine the institutions, resources, and obligations through which their country will be governed.

Economic recovery matters.  Investment matters.  Stable relations with the United States matter.  But none requires abandoning the question of authority.

Indeed, if these arrangements are lawful, transparent examination should strengthen them rather than threaten them.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


September 8, 2026

Editors
The Philadelphia Inquirer
100 S. Independence Mall West
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Ref. Venezuela: A Request for Independent Examination of United States Governmental Authority

Dear Editors:

I write as a Venezuelan-born naturalized American citizen with a residence in the Philadelphia area concerning a matter that I have also placed before my elected representatives in Congress and appropriate federal officials.

My purpose is not to defend Nicolás Maduro, oppose Venezuela’s economic reconstruction, or contest the desirability of foreign investment.  It is to ask whether governmental actions of exceptional duration and consequence now being undertaken by the United States concerning Venezuela rest upon authority that can be identified in law.

The public documentary record presents questions that warrant independent journalistic examination.

On August 31, 2026, the White House announced a petroleum arrangement under which Venezuelan interim authorities granted North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions covering 17 petroleum fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.

The White House describes the United States Government as receiving powerful governance rights, economic ownership, guaranteed low-cost petroleum off-take, and veto authority concerning appointments to the company’s board.  It further states that NABEP granted the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity interest in its corporate parent, potentially representing hundreds of billions of dollars in value and dividends.

That equity interest raises a specific congressional question.

Under 10 U.S.C. §149, the Office of Strategic Capital possesses substantial investment-related responsibilities, but its statutory capital-assistance mechanism is defined in terms of loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance.

During consideration of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, the House included a provision that, according to the congressional Joint Explanatory Statement, “would provide equity investment authority for the Office of Strategic Capital.”  The Senate contained no similar provision.  The final congressional agreement did not include the House provision.

That legislative history does not, by itself, establish that every conceivable federal equity transaction is unlawful.  It establishes a narrower and verifiable fact: Congress considered express equity-investment authority for this Office and did not enact that provision in the final agreement.

The resulting question should have a documentary answer: what enacted authority permits the Office of Strategic Capital to accept, hold, administer, and receive value from the 35 percent equity interest announced by the White House?

A separate question arises under Venezuelan law.

Article 5 of Venezuela’s Constitution provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it.  Article 12 provides that hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, constitute property in the public domain, and are inalienable and imprescriptible.

Those provisions should not be overstated.  Article 12 does not necessarily make every commercial interest in petroleum following lawful extraction inalienable.  Nor do I contend that every Venezuelan energy contract requires a national referendum.

The antecedent question is one of constitutional competence: what authority permits officials exercising power during a transition to grant petroleum concessions lasting 100 years and to create governmental rights intended to survive that transition?

One hundred years is not a transitional interval.

The concessions would extend beyond the tenure of the Venezuelan officials who granted them, beyond the present American Administration, beyond the democratic transition that the United States says remains to be completed, and through generations of future Venezuelan governments.

There is an additional question concerning Venezuelan sovereign revenues.  Executive Order 14373 identifies specified Venezuelan natural-resource revenues as property of the Government of Venezuela and states that the United States holds them solely in a custodial and governmental capacity.  Yet the Order provides for their sovereign disposition for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the United States Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela.

The Department of Energy has since described the broader petroleum arrangement as establishing “U.S. majority control” over approximately 65 billion barrels of Venezuelan proven reserves.  Secretary of Energy Chris Wright has participated in agreements concerning petroleum development and reconstruction of Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure.

Here another distinction is essential.  The investments publicly announced by Chevron, Eni, GE Vernova, and other private actors should not be characterized as congressional appropriations merely because United States officials facilitated or participated in the arrangements.  Conversely, private financing cannot convert the exercise of governmental authority into private conduct or confer powers upon a federal agency that Congress has not granted.

The international record now adds another dimension.  Venezuela formally placed the January 3 United States military action before the United Nations Security Council.  On January 5, the Secretary-General invoked the principles of sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and the sovereign will of the Venezuelan people.  France, now holding the September presidency of the Security Council, stated at that meeting that Venezuela’s transition should be peaceful, democratic, respectful of the choices of its sovereign people, and led by Venezuelans themselves.

None of these facts independently establishes a judicial conclusion that the subsequent petroleum arrangements are unlawful.  Together, however, they establish questions sufficiently concrete to be investigated.

The operative agreements can be obtained and examined.  The statutory authority for the Office of Strategic Capital equity interest can be identified.  The legal meaning of “governance rights,” “economic ownership,” and “U.S. majority control” can be established.  Private investment can be distinguished from federal expenditure, guarantees, administrative costs, and governmental liabilities.  The constitutional authority asserted by the Venezuelan officials granting century-long concessions can be examined.  And the relationship between commitments undertaken during the present transition and the authority of a future democratically elected Venezuelan government can be investigated.

I have raised these questions with federal officials and members of Congress because they concern governmental accountability.  I raise them separately with The Philadelphia Inquirer because an independent press serves a different function.  Government should not be the sole institution responsible for examining the legal authority underlying its own conduct.

This inquiry need not begin with a conclusion.  It requires neither support for Maduro nor opposition to President Trump.  It requires only a willingness to follow the documentary record and ask whether the governmental authority claimed is the governmental authority that law actually provides.

If the necessary authority exists, its identification would strengthen the public record.  If it does not, the magnitude and duration of the arrangements make that absence a matter of public consequence.

The distinction is fundamental: the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform it.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE TO CONGRESS

On September 15, 2026, the following letter was addressed to Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi in response to his September 4 congressional inquiry concerning the governmental agencies, funds, financing mechanisms, guarantees, insurance, and other taxpayer-supported resources associated with the United States petroleum arrangement concerning Venezuela. The letter places before him the documentary record published here and identifies related questions of constitutional and statutory authority that extend beyond the source of private investment.

LETTER TO REPRESENTATIVE RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHI

September 15, 2026

The Honorable Raja Krishnamoorthi
United States House of Representatives
2367 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Re: Constitutional and Statutory Authority Concerning United States Actions in Venezuela

Dear Representative Krishnamoorthi:

I write in connection with your September 4, 2026 inquiry requesting disclosure of the United States government agencies, funds, financing mechanisms, guarantees, insurance, or other taxpayer-supported resources that may be used in connection with the recently announced Venezuela petroleum arrangement.

Between September 6 and September 9, I submitted related correspondence to the President, the Secretaries of State, War, and Energy, and the chairs and ranking members of congressional committees possessing jurisdiction over foreign affairs, the Armed Forces, energy, and federal expenditures.   I am submitting this additional letter because your inquiry independently reaches several of the questions raised in that correspondence.

My concern is not whether private investment in Venezuela should occur.   The White House has characterized the contemplated investment of as much as $100 billion in Venezuelan petroleum infrastructure as private capital and has stated that it will entail no cost to American taxpayers.    Private investment, however, is analytically distinct from governmental expenditure, federal financial exposure, and the exercise of governmental authority.

The same announced arrangement attributes to the United States Government an economic interest, rights concerning petroleum purchases, and authority affecting corporate governance.   Those governmental rights raise questions different from the source of the private investment itself.  They require identification of the constitutional and statutory authority under which an agency or instrumentality of the United States may acquire, accept, administer, or exercise them.

Executive Order 14373 presents a related but separate question.   The Order describes designated Venezuelan oil revenues as sovereign property of Venezuela held by the United States in a custodial and governmental capacity.   If any such Venezuelan sovereign revenues are to finance stabilization, reconstruction, petroleum infrastructure, governmental administration, or other activities, the public record should distinguish those funds from congressional appropriations, private capital, and any financial obligation undertaken by the United States Government.

A further question arises from Venezuela’s own constitutional order.  Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution places sovereignty in the Venezuelan people, while Article 12 places hydrocarbon deposits within the public domain and declares them inalienable and imprescriptible.   Recognition by the United States of Venezuelan governmental authorities does not itself determine the constitutional competence those authorities possess under Venezuelan law to undertake commitments affecting the Republic’s sovereign resources.

I therefore respectfully ask that your continuing inquiry consider, in addition to the questions contained in your September 4 letter:

  1. What enacted statutory authority permits any federal department, agency, office, or instrumentality to acquire or exercise the governmental economic and corporate-governance rights announced in connection with the petroleum arrangement?
  2. What federal funds, guarantees, insurance, credit support, contracts, personnel, or other governmental resources have been committed or may be committed, separately from private-sector investment?
  3. Are Venezuelan sovereign revenues held pursuant to Executive Order 14373 being used, pledged, committed, or contemplated for stabilization, reconstruction, petroleum development, or governmental administration, and under what legal authority?
  4. What operative agreements establish the respective rights and obligations of the United States Government, Venezuelan authorities, and the private parties participating in these arrangements?
  5. What legal determination has been made concerning the constitutional competence of the Venezuelan authorities entering commitments affecting petroleum resources and sovereign revenues of the Republic?

These questions do not presume their answers.    They seek to distinguish private investment from public expenditure, Executive policy from enacted statutory authority, presidential recognition from Venezuelan constitutional competence, and governmental capacity from lawful governmental authority.

I am attaching my published documentary record, Constitutional Authority and Venezuela: A Public Record of Correspondence, which contains the correspondence and official documents upon which these questions are based.  The publication is available at:

https://observationsonthenatureofperception.com/2026/09/06/constitutional-authority-and-venezuela/

Your September 4 inquiry now places several of these questions independently within congressional oversight.  I respectfully submit the record for consideration in connection with that continuing inquiry.

The distinction remains fundamental:  the capacity to accomplish an act does not establish the lawful authority to perform that act.

Respectfully,

Ricardo F. Morín


THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The constitutional powers of the United States do not operate in foreign affairs with equal scope, independence, or immediacy.  The President conducts diplomacy, recognizes foreign governments, serves as Commander in Chief, and exercises constitutional and statutory authorities that do not in every instance depend upon prior congressional authorization.  Congress possesses different and substantial powers:  it legislates, controls appropriations, regulates foreign commerce, exercises oversight, and holds enumerated powers concerning war and the Armed Forces.  The federal judiciary may determine the legality of governmental action when a controversy capable of judicial resolution properly comes before it.

These powers coexist, but they do not become effective through the same institutional process or at the same moment.  The President may exercise certain foreign-affairs powers through Executive action.  Congress, when legislation is required to authorize, condition, prohibit, or defund governmental action, must act collectively through the legislative process.  A federal court cannot intervene merely because a constitutional question exists; a controversy within its jurisdiction must first come before it.

The resulting constitutional arrangement is therefore not symmetrical.  Executive action may establish consequential facts before Congress has enacted a restraint and before a federal court has occasion to determine the limits of the authority asserted.  Congress may possess the constitutional power to legislate, appropriate, investigate, authorize, prohibit, or withhold funds, but possession of those powers does not make their restraint contemporaneous with Executive action.  Judicial review may remain available in principle without producing an adjudication while the governmental action proceeds.

The distinction is particularly consequential in foreign relations because “foreign affairs” does not constitute a single governmental power.  Recognition of a foreign government, diplomatic negotiation, administration or disposition of foreign sovereign revenues, acquisition of governmental economic or governance rights, acceptance of a federal equity interest, expenditure of United States funds, deployment of American personnel, and participation in the stabilization, reconstruction, or administration of another State present different questions of constitutional and statutory authority.  Authority sufficient for one does not necessarily supply authority for another.

The actions concerning Venezuela give this distinction a concrete referent.  Recognition of Venezuelan authorities may fall within presidential authority that does not depend upon congressional concurrence.  That proposition does not determine the statutory authority for a federal office to acquire an equity interest, the authority to expend federal funds, the legal basis for administering Venezuelan sovereign revenues, or the constitutional and statutory authority required for other governmental commitments.  Nor does presidential recognition of Venezuelan officials determine the competence that Venezuela’s own constitutional order gives those officials to bind the Republic.

The absence of a specific congressional authorization therefore cannot by itself establish that every Executive action concerning Venezuela is unauthorized.  Conversely, the existence of independent presidential authority in foreign affairs cannot establish that every governmental action undertaken in the name of foreign policy belongs to that authority.  The inquiry must remain particular:  which actions arise from powers the Constitution assigns independently to the President; which arise from authority Congress has enacted; which depend upon the interaction of presidential and congressional powers; and which require authority that has not been identified?

The institutional record introduces a further difficulty.  Members of Congress have raised objections and proposed restrictions concerning United States action in Venezuela, but proposals that have not been enacted impose no binding statutory restraint.  No judicial decision identified in this record has determined the limits of the governmental authority exercised or asserted in the arrangements examined here.  Meanwhile, governmental actions and long-term arrangements concerning Venezuelan petroleum, sovereign revenues, reconstruction, and political transition have proceeded.

The absence of a binding congressional restraint does not establish Executive authority.  The absence of a judicial decision does not establish illegality.  An Executive assertion of authority does not establish its own constitutional limits.  Each proposition describes an institutional fact; none can substitute for the legal authority whose identification this record seeks.

The problem disclosed by those facts reaches beyond institutional inaction.  It concerns the relation between the immediacy with which governmental power can act and the time required for constitutional restraint to acquire legal effect.

A constitutional order may divide governmental power in law while permitting one institution to establish consequential facts before the institutions possessing powers of restraint make those restraints effective.  The existence of checks and balances then presents a question different from their formal allocation:  whether those checks remain capable of governing the power they were constituted to check.

The contradiction therefore has two boundaries. Within the United States, Executive power may act while congressional restraint and judicial review have yet to acquire operative effect. Beyond the United States, that Executive power encounters a sovereignty that neither presidential recognition nor American military command can create, enlarge, or transfer. The constitutional autonomy of the American Executive may determine how the United States acts; it cannot, by itself, determine what belongs to Venezuela.

There the distinction with which this record began becomes unavoidable. Power may establish possession, control, compliance, or accomplished fact. None is synonymous with sovereign authority. If the constitutional authority of Venezuela ends where a transfer of sovereignty is forbidden, the superior capacity of another State to compel the act cannot supply the authority that the Venezuelan constitutional order has withheld. It demonstrates power precisely where authority remains in question.