Suprematism functions as the universal grammar of repressive justification. Suprematism is less a doctrine than a habit of explanation: the manner in which domination comes to sound necessary, privilege comes to appear orderly, and exclusion comes to be described as preservation. Its forms vary—race, religion, nation, civilization, party, historical destiny—but its logic remains constant: some are presumed fit to decide, others to comply.
This habit is not confined to any one society or system. It appears wherever hierarchy can be narrated as natural or deserved, and wherever authority is spared the burden of explanation. What distinguishes societies is not their immunity to suprematism, but the degree to which it is restrained. Progress does not consist in its disappearance, but in limiting the circumstances under which supremacy can excuse itself.
When that restraint weakens, advantage acquires moral cover, grievance hardens into entitlement, and authority reorganizes itself around exception rather than obligation. Suprematism then ceases to be merely a social tendency and becomes a principle of coherence—one that prepares the ground for repression not by force, but by familiarity.
Suprematism is rarely named at the moment it takes hold. It enters social life quietly, through habit rather than declaration, and through permission rather than force. Most people encounter it not as a belief, but as a pattern: who is trusted without question, whose mistakes are forgiven, whose grievances are taken seriously, and whose presence is treated as a complication. Long before it becomes political, suprematism arranges everyday expectations.
At its core, suprematism is the assumption that order depends on hierarchy—that some are naturally entitled to decide, while others must adapt. This assumption has appeared in every form of organized society. It attaches itself easily to existing distinctions, but does not depend on any of them. Its content changes. Its function does not. Wherever it takes root, it relieves power of the burden of explanation and replaces justification with inheritance.
Historically, efforts to restrain such arrangements have rarely depended upon the actions of those most affected by them alone. Groups subjected to discrimination often possess the least access to the institutions capable of altering laws, customs, and public attitudes. As a result, challenges to entrenched hierarchies have frequently depended upon the participation of individuals and institutions situated within the very structures being contested. The durability of supremacy lies not only in the injuries it imposes, but also in its capacity to limit the means through which those injuries can be redressed.
No society outgrows this impulse. What matters is whether it is constrained. Where restraint holds, authority remains conditional, rules survive inconvenience, and grievance does not harden into entitlement. Where it weakens, dominance reappears under new names, and inequality begins to feel practical rather than dangerous.
Suprematism becomes most persuasive in moments of strain. Economic uncertainty, cultural change, and political fragmentation make procedural life feel slow and fragile. In such moments, hierarchy offers clarity. It promises stability without negotiation and coherence without equality. What it conceals is the cost of that promise: the quiet replacement of shared obligation with selective privilege. These conditions do not create suprematism; they reveal how readily it adapts to the language through which societies interpret threat.
In contemporary American politics, strands of conservatism increasingly function not as custodians of institutional continuity but as vehicles through which suprematist reasoning finds renewed expression. The language of preservation — tradition, order, cultural defense — often serves to frame hierarchy as necessity rather than preference. Within segments of the Republican Party, populist rhetoric recasts political disagreement as a struggle between an authentic people and forces portrayed as alien or corrupt. This framing does not merely mobilize support; it reorganizes legitimacy itself, narrowing the field of acceptable plurality while presenting exclusion as protection.
Historically, populism has not always culminated in authoritarian forms, yet its grammar lends itself to them when grievance becomes the organizing principle of political identity. Suprematism thrives precisely in such moments, because it does not require explicit doctrine; it operates through the normalization of unequal standing and through narratives that portray dominance as restoration. What appears as resistance to change thus becomes a mechanism by which hierarchy is reaffirmed under the guise of necessity and allows power to concentrate while it retains the appearance of democratic expression.
Because the premise concerns order rather than identity, it travels easily across contexts. In one place it is spoken plainly; in another it is implied through custom or history. Everywhere it functions by the same means: by presenting inequality as inheritance rather than choice, and by treating dominance as continuity rather than imposition. Its strength lies not in what it claims, but in how little it needs to explain.
What has been accepted socially soon reorganizes authority. Once unequal power is experienced as stabilizing, its concentration no longer appears alarming. Decisions migrate upward with little resistance, justified less by argument than by temperament, experience, or presumed fitness. Exception enters quietly, not as a rupture but as an adjustment, a temporary deviation said to protect what remains intact. Law continues to exist, but its role shifts. It no longer governs in advance. It follows explaining afterward what authority has already decided.
When this reorganization occurs, authority begins to act directly rather than procedurally. Executive power is justified as the fulfillment of popular expectation and treated as license to bypass legislative and judicial mediation. Enforcement expands inward, organized around targets rather than warrants, and selection shifts from proven violation to presumed risk. At the same time, electoral administration is recast as a security problem, with authority drawn upward from the states on the claim that existing safeguards cannot be trusted. In both cases, an asserted threat is used to replace prior limits with command, to concentrate power, and to present the change as necessity rather than choice.
As this pattern settles, restraint becomes uneven. Rules remain visible, but their force depends increasingly on who invokes them and against whom. Obligation is emphasized downward, while discretion accumulates upward. What was once justified as exception begins to feel ordinary, even prudent. The expectation that authority must submit itself to procedure weakens, replaced by a belief that outcomes matter more than the means by which they are reached. Constitutional life does not disappear; it thins. It survives as language and form, while its discipline is quietly set aside.
Suprematism does not announce itself as cruelty or ambition. It presents itself as common sense. It appears whenever power no longer feels obliged to explain itself, and whenever inequality is treated as a condition of order rather than a failure of it. Societies do not collapse because they lack ideals, but because they grow accustomed to exemption. When supremacy is permitted to justify itself—by history, identity, urgency, or fear—law becomes selective, authority becomes personal, and procedure becomes a formality observed only when convenient. The disorder that follows is not chaos, but a disciplined imbalance in which restraint is asked of some and entitlement is granted to others. This is how constitutional life ends: not in rupture, but in acceptance.
Ricardo F. Morín Ligadura (Binding) Watercolor and ink with incised lines on cardboard 8 × 10 in. (20.3 × 25.4 cm) 2005
The United States does not cease to be bound by law when it acquires the power to determine what another country may do. Its officials require authority under American law. The State remains subject to its international obligations. Neither requirement is satisfied merely because the government affected by American power agrees to the resulting arrangement.
Venezuelan constitutional authority and American legal responsibility are distinct questions. The first concerns the competence to grant rights over the Republic’s wealth. The second concerns the means by which the United States obtained those rights and the authority under which its officials acted. An American contract cannot supply a missing Venezuelan competence. Venezuelan governmental consent cannot supply a missing American power or excuse a breach of an international obligation binding the United States.
The distinction was already present before the January intervention. On December 23, 2025, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel advised that the President could order military personnel to assist in removing Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela for prosecution in the United States. The memorandum expressly addressed domestic law. Its opening conclusion depended on the national interests served and on the anticipated force remaining below the level of war in the constitutional sense. [1]
The opinion supplied the executive branch’s interpretation of presidential authority for the proposed operation. Congressional authorization and judicial review remain separate sources of constitutional judgment. Each subsequent exercise of American power over Venezuela’s government, revenues, or petroleum requires its own legal basis.
The Constitution assigns Congress the power to declare war and makes the President Commander in Chief. The disputed boundary between those powers cannot be settled by the President’s description of his own conduct. Nor does an executive opinion addressing that boundary determine whether another State’s sovereignty may lawfully be violated. [2]
On January 4, Ambassador Mike Waltz publicly invoked self-defense under Article 51. [3] On January 5, he told the Security Council that the United States had conducted a law-enforcement operation with military assistance. He invoked the indictments against Maduro and Cilia Flores, the President’s responsibility to protect Americans, and Maduro’s lack of legitimacy. He also denied that the United States was occupying Venezuela. [4]
An indictment authorizes proceedings within a legal system. It does not, by itself, authorize the use of armed force within another State. The United Nations Charter prohibits force against territorial integrity or political independence. The pertinent grounds for departing from that prohibition include Security Council authorization and self-defense; valid territorial consent presents a separate inquiry. Article 51 identifies an armed attack as the condition for the inherent right it preserves. [5]
The Administration must explain how those justifications fit together and establish the conditions required by each. A prosecutorial purpose does not itself satisfy the international requirements for self-defense; invoking self-defense does not itself establish domestic authority for the operation. The Administration must identify the armed attack relied upon and explain the necessity and proportionality of its response. Article 51 also requires immediate reporting of self-defense measures to the Council. [5]
On January 6, the United Nations Human Rights Office rejected unilateral military intervention as a means of obtaining accountability for Venezuela’s human-rights violations and described the operation as undermining the prohibition on force. On January 13, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights likewise insisted on respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, and the prohibitions on aggression and force, while reiterating its findings concerning the Maduro government’s repression. [6][7]
Those institutional assessments identify obligations that remain binding when the target government commits abuses. If the Administration relies instead on an invitation to intervene, it must identify valid consent given before the operation and establish that its forces acted within that consent. Recognition of a preferred authority cannot stand in for the consent itself. [8]
The War Powers Resolution subjects presidential military action to reporting and termination requirements. [9] On January 14, the Senate sustained a point of order against the privileged status of S.J.Res. 98, a measure directing the removal of American forces from unauthorized hostilities within or against Venezuela. Senators divided fifty to fifty; the Vice President voted in the affirmative. [10]
That vote blocked the measure’s progress and left the statutory question unresolved. Congress grants authority through law. A defeated effort to restrain the President records a political failure to impose restraint, rather than an affirmative grant of the disputed power.
The financial arrangements raise their own questions of American authority.
Executive Order 14373, issued on January 9, identifies specified Venezuelan natural-resource revenues as Venezuelan sovereign property and describes American possession as custodial. Yet it assigns the Secretary of State responsibility for determining the public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes for which those funds may be disbursed, and directs Treasury to follow the Secretary’s instructions. [11]
The order invokes the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Section 1702(a)(1)(B) authorizes extensive regulation of foreign-property transactions. Section 1702(a)(1)(C) separately permits confiscation when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked, subject to a presidential determination connecting the foreign owner to those hostilities or attacks. The statute distinguishes transaction control from vesting ownership for American benefit. [12]
The Administration must account for its conduct under that distinction. Its January order claims custody while assigning American officials decisions over the use of Venezuelan wealth. Any later acquisition of ownership requires authority for that acquisition. Powers to control transactions cannot simply be treated as powers to take property for American benefit. [11][12]
Senators Ron Wyden, Elizabeth Warren, and Sheldon Whitehouse addressed precisely the problem of control without ownership in a letter dated September 16 and released the following day. Citing public reporting, they referred to at least $13 billion in Venezuelan oil revenues deposited in a Treasury custody account. They asked what constitutional or statutory constraints govern funds that the United States does not own but whose use its officials control. [13]
The senators requested account statements, transaction records, Venezuelan spending requests, and safeguards against improper disbursements. Their October 5 response deadline remained open on September 30. The letter places the Administration under a formal demand to account for its authority and conduct. [13] The Administration’s own order classifies those funds as Venezuelan sovereign property held in American custody. On that premise, the Administration must account for the authority by which American officials determine their use. [11]
The petroleum arrangement adds a further act requiring authority. On August 31, the White House announced that North American Blue Energy Partners had granted the Office of Strategic Capital a 35 percent equity interest in its corporate parent. It also announced preferential purchasing rights and powers over corporate governance. The fact sheet emphasized that the American interest came at no cost to the taxpayer. [14]
Acceptance, administration, and disposition of that interest each require legal authority. A zero acquisition price answers a question about cost, while leaving the agency’s power to acquire the asset to be demonstrated. Any proceeds received for the United States must also be accounted for under federal law governing public receipts and expenditures. [15]
A Congressional Research Service report updated September 8 describes the Office of Strategic Capital’s capital-assistance program in terms of loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance. It separately identifies proposed legislation that would authorize certain equity investments. [16]
The Administration must therefore identify the particular legal basis for the NABEP interest. The operative instrument and the authority invoked would permit assessment of whether the transaction falls within an existing power and satisfies its conditions. A press announcement leaves that statutory account incomplete.
American statutory authority, even if established, would answer only the domestic question. International law determines separately whether the United States has breached an obligation owed outside its own legal order. Article 3 of the International Law Commission’s articles on State responsibility expresses the distinction: an act’s treatment as lawful under internal law does not determine its international lawfulness. [17]
The Charter of the Organization of American States addresses the acquisition of advantage with particular precision. Article 19 prohibits direct and indirect intervention. Article 20 prohibits economic or political coercion intended to force another State’s sovereign will and obtain advantages. Article 21 rejects recognition of territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained through force or other coercive means. [18]
These provisions subject the relation between pressure and benefit to law. Coercive intervention can occur without military occupation, and a private company can serve as the vehicle through which governmental pressure secures an advantage.
The documented sequence is consequently material: American force removed the president; an American order placed decisions over Venezuelan revenues under American supervision; the Administration then announced enduring American interests in petroleum production and corporate governance. In April, President Trump had already described the economic relationship as resembling a joint venture and stated that the attack had paid for itself many times over. [4][11][14][19]
The sequence supports an inference connecting intervention to economic advantage. A finding of prohibited coercion must establish how American pressure constrained Venezuela’s sovereign choice and contributed to obtaining the particular rights. The President’s own description supplies evidence of that connection and requires the military action and economic return to be examined together.
The Administration’s reliance on governmental agreement must therefore be examined within the circumstances in which that agreement was obtained. Consent is relevant. Its existence on an instrument cannot, without examination, dispose of a claim that force or coercion procured it.
The corporate structure requires equal precision. The White House distinguishes its agreement with NABEP, governed by American law, from the company’s Venezuelan concessions, governed by Venezuelan legislation. [14] A contract with a private corporation is not automatically a treaty between States. Any associated intergovernmental commitments must be identified before rules governing treaty validity are applied.
Where the instrument is a treaty, the rule expressed in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention addresses consent procured through unlawful threats or force. The United States’ non-ratification requires attention to the applicable customary rule. The prior question about American conduct nevertheless remains direct: did the United States use prohibited force or coercion to obtain the advantages it now claims? [20][21]
American officials remain answerable for their own acts throughout that corporate structure. Their decisions to direct revenues, acquire interests, and exercise governmental powers are conduct of the United States. Attribution of additional corporate conduct requires further evidence, but the Administration’s own participation is already the subject of its announcements. [17]
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources supplies another applicable principle. Its legal standing does not depend solely on the status of a General Assembly declaration. The International Court of Justice has recognized it as a principle of customary international law, expressly reaffirming that character in its advisory opinion of July 19, 2024. [22]
Its application requires attention to the policy and conduct established by the evidence. Here the Administration has expressly announced a policy of securing American benefit from Venezuelan resources. A Venezuelan private beneficiary and an American governmental beneficiary can participate in the same transaction without either representing the sovereign people whose resources give it value.
Occupation would impose additional obligations if the facts establish it. Under the Hague Regulations, the relevant condition is effective authority over territory by hostile armed forces. Financial supervision and political predominance alone do not establish that condition. An American denial does not disprove it. The inquiry must concern the authority actually exercised over particular territory during the relevant period. [23]
If occupation is established, its law limits the occupant’s administration of public property and natural resources. The occupant does not acquire sovereignty. Its powers are temporary, and the rules governing usufruct require preservation of the capital of the resources administered. The International Court of Justice has reiterated those limits. [22][23]
The prohibitions on unlawful force and coercive intervention apply independently of that territorial classification. Responsibility for the intervention and the advantages obtained through it can therefore be examined while the evidence concerning occupation remains incomplete.
The Administration owes a specific account: the authority for its equity interest, the rules governing its directions over sovereign revenues, and the legal justification for the force and pressure through which the announced advantages were obtained. The operative instruments and transaction records are necessary to test that account. Their absence leaves the Administration’s claims of lawful authority unsubstantiated at precisely the points where its conduct requires explanation.
Congressional oversight, statutory limits, and international obligations address the conduct from different legal positions. Enforcement may remain contested and adjudication incomplete. The Administration nevertheless bears the burden of identifying the powers it exercises and answering the obligations its conduct engages.
The Administration has announced what the United States obtained. It has not thereby established what American law authorized its officials to acquire or what international law permitted the United States to exact.
The law governing that conduct is not a condition the United States may impose on Venezuela. It is an obligation the United States must meet itself.
Ricardo F. Morín
September 30, 2026
Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania
Notes
[1] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, “Proposed War Department Operation to Support Law Enforcement Efforts in Venezuela,” December 23, 2025, especially pp. 1–2; publicly released in redacted form.
[2] Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, and Article II, Section 2, Clause 1. Congress.gov, Constitution Annotated, 2024 Supplement, discussion of presidential and congressional war powers.
[3] Ambassador Mike Waltz, interview on Fox News Sunday Morning Futures, January 4, 2026, invoking Article 51; broadcaster’s report and embedded interview. This public statement is distinct from a communication to the Security Council reporting measures taken in self-defense.
[5] Charter of the United Nations, Articles 2(4), 39–42, and 51. The record reviewed for this essay does not establish whether the United States submitted an Article 51 communication reporting the January operation. No finding of failure to report is made.
[6] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, statement by spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani on the United States intervention in Venezuela, January 6, 2026; official UN Geneva transcript.
[7] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “IACHR expresses concern over armed incursion in Venezuela, calls for respect for international law, and the end of repression,” January 13, 2026.
[8] International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, Article 20 and its commentary, concerning valid consent, its limits, and consent given before the act. The commentary supplies the consent framework, not a determination of which Venezuelan authority could invite intervention. A claim of invitation by a recognized authority lacking effective control requires examination of that authority’s international capacity, the timing and scope of its consent, and the conduct authorized. Recognition alone does not resolve those questions.
[9] War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543(a)(1), 1544(b), and 1547. The sixty-day rule concerns the report submitted or required under § 1543(a)(1); the additional thirty-day period requires the presidential determination specified in § 1544(b). Applying the clock requires establishing when a report was submitted or required and whether the relevant use of forces continued. Continuing financial supervision is not itself continuing military hostilities.
[10] United States Senate, Roll Call Vote No. 9, 119th Congress, Second Session, January 14, 2026, point of order concerning the privileged status of S.J.Res. 98.
[11] Executive Order 14373, “Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People,” January 9, 2026, especially Sections 4(a), 4(b), 4(c)(ii), and 5(a)(ii).
[12] International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1702, especially § 1702(a)(1)(B)–(C). The armed-hostilities condition in subsection (C) is distinct from the constitutional-war threshold discussed by OLC. Subsection (C) also requires a presidential determination that the foreign owner planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in the relevant hostilities or attack. Acquisition of a corporate interest requires identification of its own legal basis; it is not classified here as confiscation merely because the acquirer is governmental.
[13] Senators Ron Wyden, Elizabeth Warren, and Sheldon Whitehouse, letter to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, dated September 16, 2026, released September 17, 2026, pp. 1–3. The committee release and download title bear the September 17 date; the letter itself bears September 16.
[14] The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Announces Historic Oil Agreement to Secure American Energy Dominance and Drive Venezuela’s Economic Recovery,” August 31, 2026.
[15] Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 9, Clause 7; Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). Section 3302(b) generally requires deposit of money received for the Government, subject to applicable statutory exceptions. The Appropriations Clause governs withdrawals from the Treasury. Venezuelan sovereign funds held in custody are not automatically American public receipts or appropriations. Receipts accruing to an American governmental equity interest require separate classification.
[16] Congressional Research Service, “Office of Strategic Capital: Overview and Considerations,” IF13215, updated September 8, 2026, sections on the capital-assistance pilot program and issues for Congress. Public reproduction of the CRS report.
[17] International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, especially Articles 2–5, 8, and 20; annexed to General Assembly Resolution 56/83. These articles are not a treaty; many provisions reflect customary law. Article 4 concerns State organs. Article 5 requires legal empowerment to exercise governmental authority and conduct in that capacity; ordinary corporate governance rights do not themselves establish such delegation. Article 8 concerns particular conduct under State instructions, direction, or control. State equity alone does not attribute all corporate conduct.
[20] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Articles 2(1)(a), 46, and 52. Article 46 provides a separate, narrow connection between internal competence and international validity: the violation must concern a fundamental internal rule governing treaty-making competence and be manifest. The expiry of a temporary presidential-substitution period does not by itself establish those conditions or invalidate every subsequent act. That issue remains distinct from responsibility for American force or coercion.
[21] U.S. Department of State, “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” archived treaty-law guidance on the United States’ signature, non-ratification, and recognition of customary treaty law.
[22] International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, July 19, 2024, paragraphs 124–125, 133, and 240; reproduced in UN document A/78/968. The opinion discusses Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, December 19, 2005, paragraph 244. In the 2005 judgment, the Court declined to apply permanent sovereignty to the looting and exploitation there considered. Paragraph 125 of the 2024 opinion distinguishes the absence of credible evidence of a governmental exploitation policy in that case from exploitation pursued as governmental policy contrary to occupation-law duties. The principle is therefore neither categorically inapplicable to occupation nor a substitute for establishing the relevant facts and obligations.
[23] International Committee of the Red Cross, “Occupation and international humanitarian law,” August 4, 2004, especially the discussion of Hague Regulations Articles 42 and 55 and the factual test for occupation.
The constitutional question now presented by Venezuela does not begin with petroleum. It begins with the identity of the sovereign.
Article 5 of the Constitution in force states that sovereignty resides in the people and cannot be transferred. It specifies that the people exercise sovereignty directly in the forms provided by the Constitution and law and indirectly, through suffrage, by the organs exercising Public Power. It then establishes the relation on which the rest depends: the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and remain subject to it. [1]
That language does not identify government with the sovereign people. It distinguishes the sovereign from the organs through which sovereign authority is exercised. A president, legislature, ministry, State enterprise, or interim administration may exercise constitutional competencies. None becomes the sovereign by exercising them. Governmental power is constituted power. Sovereignty remains with the people.
Article 12 gives this distinction a material object. Mineral and hydrocarbon deposits belong to the Republic, are property in the public domain, and are inalienable and imprescriptible. The deposits do not belong to the officials administering the Republic. Temporary control of governmental institutions does not convert public-domain wealth into the property of those who control them. [2]
The relation between Articles 5 and 12 therefore precedes any petroleum agreement. The Republic possesses the deposits. State organs may act concerning them only through authority conferred by the constitutional order. The sovereign source of those organs remains the people.
That structure has acquired immediate consequence because the United States has not merely facilitated commerce in Venezuelan petroleum. The present Administration publicly describes an arrangement designed to secure American governmental and economic advantages over Venezuelan reserves on a scale and for a duration extending far beyond the present political transition.
On August 31, 2026, the White House announced what it called the biggest oil deal in world history. It said Venezuelan interim authorities had granted North American Blue Energy Partners 100-year concessions over 17 fields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves. The same announcement described United States “majority control,” governmental governance rights, “economic ownership,” a 35 percent equity interest for the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital, a guaranteed right for the Department of State to purchase 20 percent of production at cost, a right of first refusal over the remaining 80 percent, veto authority over appointments to the company’s board, and a requirement that a majority of directors be United States citizens. [3]
The Administration did not present those provisions as incidental protections surrounding a Venezuelan development program. It presented them as American achievements. The White House said the arrangement would secure American “energy dominance for the next century,” expand the reserves effectively available to the United States, support American refineries and employment, and provide low-cost petroleum for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, military requirements, and other sensitive uses. [3][4]
The United States is not an accidental beneficiary of an arrangement designed elsewhere. The benefits to the United States are stated as objectives of the policy itself.
The same fact sheet describes the arrangement as part of stabilization, reconstruction, and eventual democratic transition. It says the new hydrocarbons framework was adopted with United States support. It describes United States governance and audit provisions, banking reform, payment oversight, and financial monitorship as means by which tax and royalty payments will be supervised. It also says the United States is sponsoring reconciliation talks between the 2015 National Assembly and the interim authorities. [3]
The vocabulary of transition therefore accompanies a structure in which the foreign power that intervened militarily has acquired enduring economic interests, governance rights, purchasing privileges, and supervisory functions over the principal natural resource of the country in transition.
The present interim administration did not obtain its current mandate through a new national election following the January United States military action. As of late September, its president continued to promise elections as part of a transition to full democracy without establishing a firm election date. The United States itself continues to describe democratic transition as prospective. [3][5][6]
That circumstance does not make Article 5 disappear. It makes Article 5 unavoidable.
If sovereignty were vested in whoever happened to control the machinery of government, effective control would answer the constitutional question. Article 5 says otherwise. The organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and remain subject to it. The Constitution therefore refuses the identification of governmental possession with sovereign ownership. [1]
The current National Assembly’s subsequent endorsement of the petroleum arrangement is part of the constitutional record. On September 1, it backed the arrangement by a show-of-hands vote. Some opposition deputies abstained because they had not been able to examine the written terms. [7] But an act of a constituted organ is not identical with the sovereign from which Article 5 says constituted authority derives. Legislative approval must possess constitutional competence for the act approved. The existence of a vote cannot, by itself, transform the organ casting it into the sovereign people or cure an antecedent absence of authority if the power purportedly exercised was not constitutionally available to that organ.
This is the distinction between representation and sovereignty. Representatives may exercise constitutionally conferred powers on behalf of the people. They do not own the sovereignty they exercise. Article 5 keeps the representative subject to the sovereign represented.
The distinction is particularly consequential where the commitment is intended to endure for a century. One hundred years is not a transitional interval. A concession of that duration reaches beyond the officials who granted it, beyond the present American Administration, beyond the promised democratic transition, and through generations of Venezuelans who had no part in the governmental circumstances under which it was created.
The American record itself recognizes, in another context, that control and possession do not extinguish Venezuelan ownership. Executive Order 14373, issued on January 9, defines specified natural-resource revenues held in United States Treasury accounts in Section 2 and determines in Section 4(a) that those funds are property of the Government of Venezuela. It says the United States holds those funds solely in a custodial and governmental capacity, not as a market participant, and requires Treasury to designate them as sovereign property of Venezuela rather than property of the United States. [8][9]
Yet Section 4(c)(ii) of the same order provides that those funds are held pending “sovereign disposition” for public, governmental, or diplomatic purposes determined by the United States Secretary of State on behalf of the Government of Venezuela. Section 5(a)(ii) directs Treasury to follow the Secretary of State’s instructions concerning disbursements and transfers. [8]
From January onward, the Administration thus assigned an American officer authority to determine the purposes for which Venezuelan sovereign property would be used. Venezuelan ownership remained formally acknowledged while decisions concerning its exercise passed to an officer of the intervening State. The authority by which that officer could determine sovereign purposes on Venezuela’s behalf was asserted in an American order rather than supplied by the Venezuelan Constitution.
Nearly eight months later, the petroleum arrangement added proprietary advantages to that supervisory structure. The White House described United States economic ownership, majority control, veto rights, preferential acquisition, and a governmental equity interest protected against dilution. Reuters reported that the 35 percent position was structured through penny warrants intended to preserve the United States ownership level as additional capital entered the enterprise. [3][10]
The sequence is not one of ignorance about whose resources are involved. The American documents repeatedly identify the reserves, revenues, concessions, and deposits as Venezuelan. The Administration knows the object is Venezuelan wealth. Its own January order expressly recognizes Venezuelan sovereign property. Its later announcements expressly identify the advantages sought for the United States. [3][8]
The Venezuelan juridical record identifies the force that altered the governmental circumstances. On January 3, the Constitutional Chamber described the United States action as an agresión militar extranjera [foreign military aggression] undertaken for the secuestro[abduction] of Nicolás Maduro. It treated his resulting ausencia forzosa [forced absence] as a material and temporary impossibility of exercising presidential functions. Invoking its interpretation of Articles 234 and 239.8, the Chamber ordered Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to exercise the presidency through an urgent precautionary measure intended to preserve the State and defend the Nation. It left the definitive classification of the absence to the competent State organs. [11]
The ruling that named the aggression also ordered the acting presidency whose consent the United States now invokes. Dismissing the Chamber as an organ of the former government does not supply an independent constitutional basis for that consent. The government maintained through the Chamber’s response subsequently became the channel through which the United States obtained the petroleum advantages it announced in August.
The President of the beneficiary State had already connected the military action to its economic return. On April 30, President Trump described the relationship with Venezuela as “like a joint venture,” said both countries were making money, and declared that the United States had “paid for the attack many times over.” [12]
Exploitation does not mean every foreign investment, petroleum sale, loan, or commercial concession. It denotes the deliberate extraction of advantage from another nation’s resources under conditions in which the foreign beneficiary possesses extraordinary power over the governmental circumstances through which consent is purportedly obtained. The asymmetry is recorded on both sides: the Venezuelan Chamber named the aggression and ordered a defensive measure; the American President described the resulting economic relationship as a joint enterprise that had repaid the attack. The August arrangement then gave enduring economic and governmental form to that advantage.
The White House’s own language makes the contradiction sharper. Its August fact sheet accuses Russian and Chinese actors, along with Venezuelan political cronies, of having “looted Venezuela’s resources” for the benefit of American adversaries. The same document then celebrates the displacement of those actors by a system designed to ensure American dominance in the hemisphere, American governmental control, American economic ownership, American purchasing privileges, and American strategic supply. [3][4]
The nationality of the beneficiary cannot determine whether Venezuelan sovereignty has been respected. If foreign control of Venezuelan resources is objectionable because the resources belong to Venezuela, changing the foreign beneficiary does not alter the constitutional location of Venezuelan sovereignty or the juridical status of the deposits.
The constitutional issue is not whether Venezuela may receive foreign capital, sell petroleum, or enter long-term commercial relations. It is the source of the authority by which the Republic is bound. Investment describes capital. Contract describes an instrument. Recognition describes a foreign government’s diplomatic position. None of those categories, by itself, supplies Venezuelan sovereign competence.
The distinction becomes still more important when corporate form intervenes. The White House has emphasized the role of a private company and the use of private American capital. [3][4] But a private corporation cannot grant itself a Venezuelan petroleum concession. The underlying right to exploit deposits belonging to the Republic must originate in Venezuelan law. Private corporate arrangements can distribute economic interests after a right exists. They cannot create the sovereign authority necessary to create the right in the first place.
Reuters identifies North American Blue Energy Partners as controlled by the Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt. [10] The arrangement therefore joins a Venezuelan private beneficiary to the American governmental interests it expressly creates. The advantage obtained by the United States need not be exclusive to be deliberate. Nor does a Venezuelan businessman’s private interest constitute the consent of the Venezuelan people. His participation does not alter the need to establish the constitutional authority for granting rights over the Republic’s deposits.
Nor can American law answer that antecedent Venezuelan question. American statutes, executive orders, licenses, contracts, and judicial jurisdiction can determine what United States officials and American entities may do under United States law. They cannot determine what authority Venezuelan officials possess under the Constitution of Venezuela to bind the Republic.
The American Preamble begins “We the People,” and American constitutional doctrine treats those words as identifying the source that ordained and established the Constitution. But the Supreme Court has not treated the Preamble as an independent source of substantive governmental power. Venezuela’s Article 5 is not prefatory language. It is an operative constitutional provision defining where sovereignty resides, how it is exercised, where State organs derive from, and to what they remain subject. [1][13][14]
Translating Article 5 into the familiar American phrase “We the People” would diminish rather than clarify it.
Article 5 is more exact. The people do not merely appear at the founding moment and then disappear into the institutions they created. Sovereignty remains theirs. Government does not receive sovereignty as property. It exercises constituted powers while remaining subordinate to the sovereign source from which those powers emanate.
The distinction between the sovereign people and their representatives determines what governmental consent can mean.
A representative act can bind the Republic only because the constitutional order gives the representative authority to perform that act. Representation is therefore derivative. Sovereignty is not. To treat the consent of representatives as self-validating is to reverse the constitutional relation Article 5 establishes.
The problem becomes more acute when the governmental order supplying the consent exists under foreign tutelage. The January order placed decisions over Venezuelan sovereign revenues in American hands. The subsequent structure extended that supervision across the transition: the foreign State sponsors political reconciliation, supports the legal framework governing the resource, claims audit and financial-monitoring functions, acquires governance rights and vetoes in the resulting enterprise, receives economic ownership and preferential purchasing rights, and openly describes the arrangement as securing its own dominance. [3][4][8]
Under those conditions, governmental consent cannot be treated as evidence independent of the foreign power obtaining the benefit. The foreign beneficiary participates in the political and institutional environment from which the purported consent emerges.
When the petroleum arrangement was announced, even the maximum temporary-substitution period under Article 234 had expired. Article 234 provides for substitution during a temporary presidential absence for up to ninety days, extendable by the National Assembly for up to ninety more. The first period ended on April 3. [1] On April 6, the Associated Press reported that the Assembly had taken no public vote to authorize an extension. [15] Even assuming authorization of the maximum second period, the outermost 180-day limit ended on July 2. [1]
On July 15, Acceso a la Justicia reported that the Assembly still had not pronounced on the presidential absence. It argued that the exhausted temporary period required the Assembly to activate Article 233 and the new presidential election prescribed within thirty consecutive days. Its reading permits Rodríguez to continue transitionally until an elected president takes office. That continuation does not dispense with the succession determination or the election; it exists pending their completion. [16]
On August 31, the White House announced the grant of rights it described as lasting a century. The Assembly’s failure to resolve the absence had been publicly documented, and the election required under the Article 233 reading had not occurred. By late September, there was still no firm election date. [3][5][6][16]
The Assembly’s endorsement supplied political support for a commitment reaching across generations while the constitutional duties governing the presidency making that commitment remained unperformed. [7][16]
The constitutional authority has not been established merely by pointing to the consent of the interim administration. That consent is precisely what is in question. A government continuing beyond the temporary-substitution period, without completion of the succession and electoral duties governing the transition, cannot be identified with the sovereign Venezuelan people merely because it continues to exercise governmental power. The foreign power that altered the circumstances of that government cannot invoke its consent as independent evidence that the Venezuelan people consented to the appropriation of the Republic’s natural wealth.
The intervening State invokes the consent of the governmental order maintained after its intervention as the juridical basis for its own acquisition. The circle never reaches the sovereign identified by Article 5.
The defense that someone had to govern establishes the need for continuity. It does not establish that continuity required granting the intervening State enduring ownership interests and preferential access to Venezuelan wealth. The Administration’s own January response to the emergency expressly distinguished custody and administration from proprietary acquisition. Its August arrangement crossed that distinction. Neither the need to preserve revenues nor the absence of an elected successor supplies authority to turn temporary administration into century-long foreign advantage.
Calling the arrangement reconstruction does not establish that authority. Calling it privatization does not establish it. Calling it stabilization does not establish it. Calling it a contract does not establish it. Each term describes a policy, mechanism, or objective. None establishes the Venezuelan constitutional source of the authority exercised.
Article 12 places the deposits in the public domain of the Republic. Article 5 places sovereignty in the people. Between those provisions stand the organs of government, possessing only the authority the constitutional order gives them. [1][2]
The constitutional chain therefore runs in one direction: from the sovereign people, through constituted authority, to the administration of the Republic and its public wealth. It does not run backward from possession of governmental offices to ownership of sovereignty.
A foreign power can acquire physical access. It can acquire contractual rights. It can acquire economic leverage. It can obtain governmental cooperation. It can exercise military superiority. It can even obtain effective control over institutions and revenues. None of those conditions changes the constitutional identity of the Venezuelan sovereign.
The Administration’s rhetoric of victory makes the distinction still more stark. On September 22, while discussing Venezuela and the oil agreement in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Trump said, “To the victor belong the spoils.” [17] A victor may possess the capacity to take advantage of circumstances created by victory. Capacity is not title. Superior force can explain how control was obtained. It cannot establish, by itself, the Venezuelan constitutional authority by which control becomes lawful.
That is why the issue cannot be reduced to whether the petroleum arrangement will increase production, attract investment, lower prices, rebuild infrastructure, or generate tax revenue. Those consequences may be economically important. They do not answer the antecedent question.
The question is who possessed authority to consent.
Under Article 5, that inquiry cannot end with the identification of those presently occupying governmental institutions. The organs of the State are not the source of sovereignty. They emanate from it and remain subject to it. [1]
Under Article 12, the object of the transaction is not ordinary governmental property available to rulers in their own right. The deposits belong to the Republic as public-domain property. [2]
The United States may call its role stabilization. It may call its interests economic ownership. It may call its supervision reconstruction. It may call its dominance strategic necessity. Venezuela’s Constitution supplies the prior vocabulary: people, sovereignty, Republic, Public Power, public domain, competence.
Those terms determine the Venezuelan question.
The American Administration’s own record establishes that the acquisition of advantage is deliberate. It announces the control, quantifies the ownership, fixes the purchasing privilege, protects the equity position, imposes governance conditions, celebrates the absence of cost to the American taxpayer, and states the objective of American dominance. [3][4][10]
The Administration has used the consent of the interim authorities to secure enduring American advantages over Venezuelan wealth. It has not established the Venezuelan constitutional authority by which those authorities could grant them.
Ricardo F. Morín
September 30, 2026
Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania
Notes
[1] Centro para la Integración y el Derecho Público (CIDEP), Constituciones de Venezuela, Constitución de 1999, Articles 5, 233, 234, and 239.8.
[3] The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Announces Historic Oil Agreement to Secure American Energy Dominance and Drive Venezuela’s Economic Recovery,” August 31, 2026.
[7] Reuters, “Venezuela’s assembly backs oil deal announced with U.S.,” September 1, 2026. Euronews, “Venezuela hands the US control over a fifth of its oil in landmark deal,” September 2, 2026, reports the show-of-hands vote and the abstention of opposition deputies who had not been able to examine the written terms.
[8] Executive Order 14373, “Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People,” January 9, 2026, especially Sections 2, 4(a), 4(b), 4(c)(ii), and 5(a).
[9] The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Safeguards Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People,” January 9, 2026.
[10] Reuters, “US structured Venezuela oil position to protect it from dilution, official says,” September 4, 2026. Also identifies NABEP as controlled by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt.
[11] Acceso a la Justicia, “La SC ordena que Delcy Rodríguez, Vicepresidenta Ejecutiva, asuma y ejerza en condición de ‘encargada’ la presidencia de la República,” January 3, 2026. Reproduces the Constitutional Chamber’s decision, including its descriptions of foreign military aggression, abduction, and forced absence, and its precautionary order under Articles 234 and 239.8.
[12] GovInfo, “Remarks During a Document Signing Ceremony and an Exchange With Reporters,” April 30, 2026, p. 8, official presidential transcript, including the descriptions “like a joint venture” and “we’ve paid for the attack many times over.”
[15] Associated Press, “Venezuela’s Delcy Rodríguez remains acting president after her initial 90-day appointment expired,” April 6, 2026. Reports that the National Assembly had not taken a public vote to extend the initial period.
[16] Acceso a la Justicia, “¿Qué ocurre con la encargaduría presidencial?”, July 15, 2026. Reports the Assembly’s failure to pronounce on the presidential absence, argues for activation of Article 233 following exhaustion of the temporary-substitution period, and reads the Constitution as permitting transitional service until the elected president takes office.
[17] Factba.se / Roll Call, transcript of President Donald J. Trump’s address to the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 22, 2026, including the statement “To the victor belong the spoils” following his discussion of the Venezuela oil agreement.
Ricardo F. Morín Persian Three 19” × 29” Graphite, sanguine and Sumi ink on watercolor paper 2003
The present crisis does not begin with soldiers in the streets or laws being openly suspended. It begins earlier, in our thoughts and conversations, as words change their meaning. Before courts are bypassed or elections are challenged, the language used to describe legality begins to shift. Words once tied to injury become tools of accusation. Authority moves first by changing how things are said, long before procedures are changed.
The shift is often noticed first not in statutes, but in how accusations are repeated on television, in hearings, and in everyday conversation, long before any ruling is issued.
A person opens an official notice declaring that a “violation” has occurred, yet the document contains no description of the act, no evidence to examine, and no process by which the finding might be contested. What is presented is not an allegation awaiting review, but a conclusion that now governs what actions are permitted next.
In earlier constitutional systems, a violation referred to a specific act. Evidence had to be gathered. Law had to be applied. A process had to be followed. Today, a violation is increasingly declared rather than demonstrated. The word no longer signals a legal test. It signals that judgment has already been made. What once required adjudication can become an instrument of command.
A rule can then be enforced before the disputed premise on which it rests has been adjudicated. The affected party may retain a right of review, but review occurs after the language of violation, necessity, security, or compliance has already supplied a reason for action.
Language and procedure meet at that point. A disputed condition is named as though established; governmental action proceeds upon the name; review follows.
This logic became visible on January 6, 2021. An election certified through legal procedures was declared illegitimate by assertion. A lawful transfer of power was described as theft. Defeat was renamed a violation. What followed was not confusion. It was narrative replacing legal process.
The legal aftermath did not produce a single institutional resolution. The federal prosecution concerning efforts to overturn the 2020 election was dismissed in November 2024 after Donald Trump’s reelection, pursuant to the Department of Justice’s longstanding position concerning prosecution of a sitting President. On January 20, 2025, presidential clemency commuted the sentences of fourteen people convicted of offenses related to January 6, granted full pardons to the other individuals convicted of such offenses, and directed the Attorney General to seek dismissal with prejudice of pending indictments arising from January 6. The Georgia election-interference prosecution against Trump was dismissed in November 2025.
Different proceedings ended through different constitutional and procedural mechanisms. None produced a final adjudication of the federal election-interference charges against the returning President.
The sequence also appears in administrative government.
In 2026, the Department of Homeland Security made full receipt of specified counterterrorism grants conditional upon changes to state and local election administration, with 20 percent of an award subject to withholding for noncompliance. Six cities and counties challenged those conditions. On September 28, a federal court held that the Federal Emergency Management Agency lacked congressional authority to impose them and vacated the election-related requirements.
The judgment demonstrates that constitutional restraint had not disappeared. Judicial review remained capable of making restraint effective. The disputed condition nevertheless existed as an administrative command before judicial review determined whether the agency possessed authority to impose it.
The constitutional difficulty lies in that interval. Governmental action and its prospective consequences can precede the institutional judgment that determines the lawful limits of the authority asserted.
The same sequence appears in less formal civic encounters. A courthouse remains open. Hearings are scheduled. Filings are accepted. Yet a consequential determination may already govern the person who seeks review. Procedure remains available, but it begins after the disputed condition has acquired practical effect.
Beyond the United States, a related distinction separates power from sovereign authority. Military or diplomatic power may alter the circumstances in which another State decides. It does not itself determine the sovereign competence by which that decision becomes lawful.
Earlier claims about acquiring Greenland treated territorial control as an object of strategic necessity. On September 22, 2026, the United States, Denmark, and Greenland signed an agreement that instead proceeds through the existing defense relationship. It would permit new American facilities at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig, expansion of Pituffik Space Base, and broader American military access while leaving Greenland within the Danish realm and affirming its right to self-determination. The agreement remains subject to parliamentary approval in Greenland and Denmark.
Pressure did not itself transfer sovereignty. The arrangement that followed requires agreement and constitutional process.
On September 1, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved an oil agreement between Venezuela and the United States involving 17 fields and approximately one-fifth of the country’s oil reserves. Some opposition legislators abstained because they had not been able to examine the written terms of the agreement. The legislative act is part of the constitutional record; it cannot simply be disregarded. It also does not answer a different question: what constitutional competence the Venezuelan institutions presently exercising power possess to create rights intended to endure far beyond the present government. American recognition can determine whom the United States treats as Venezuela’s government. It cannot answer that Venezuelan constitutional question.
Across these cases, law has not disappeared. Courts adjudicate. Legislatures enact. Agreements remain subject to constitutional process. The difficulty appears in two related forms: power may act before review determines its lawful limits, and power may alter the circumstances in which another sovereign must exercise its own authority.
Language gives the first condition institutional force and can accompany the second. A disputed premise described as a violation, necessity, security requirement, or act of compliance can begin to govern conduct before the institutions charged with determining its legal consequences have completed that determination.
What emerges is power that remains procedurally recognizable as lawful while the limits of its authority remain subject to determination. Procedure survives. The sequence changes.
The danger lies in what language permits power to present as already decided. When accusation becomes violation, necessity becomes authority, and compliance becomes evidence of legality, judgment begins after its vocabulary has been supplied by power.
The first freedom is judgment.
Freedom survives only where judgment remains possible. Judgment survives only where language has not yet been taken over by power.
Ricardo F. Morín September 30, 2026 Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania
From American Authorization to Venezuelan Sovereignty
Ricardo F. Morín Venezuela’s Gold and the Authority to Extract Digital image, 2026
On September 6, 2026, I published Constitutional Authority and Venezuela: A Public Record of Correspondence, an examination of United States governmental actions concerning Venezuelan petroleum, sovereign revenues, reconstruction, and political transition:
That inquiry began with a question of authority rather than policy: who possesses the lawful authority to make decisions concerning resources and sovereign powers belonging to Venezuela?
The question required examination of two constitutional orders. Article 5 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides that sovereignty resides intransferably in the Venezuelan people and that the organs of the State emanate from popular sovereignty and are subject to it. Article 12 places hydrocarbon and mineral deposits within the public domain of the Republic and declares them inalienable and imprescriptible. On the American side, the inquiry asked what constitutional and statutory authority permits the United States Government to acquire governmental, economic, custodial, or proprietary rights concerning another nation’s sovereign resources and revenues.
The documentary record available in early September made petroleum the principal material subject of that inquiry. The White House had announced 100-year concessions covering 17 Venezuelan oil fields and attributed substantial economic and governance rights to the United States Government. Executive Order 14373 separately placed specified Venezuelan oil revenues in United States custody while recognizing those revenues as sovereign property of Venezuela.
Article 12, however, is not confined to petroleum. It expressly encompasses mineral deposits.
The public record now shows that months before the petroleum arrangements announced at the end of August, officials of the United States Government were already participating in the reopening of Venezuela’s mineral sector to American commerce and investment. Gold therefore presents the same constitutional referent through a different sequence of governmental and commercial acts.
On March 4, 2026, United States Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and National Security Council official David Copley led a delegation to Venezuela that included representatives of mining interests. Gold Reserve, a mining company participating in the delegation, subsequently stated that the meetings concerned conditions for renewed foreign investment and mining operations in Venezuela.
Two days later, on March 6, the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Department of the Treasury issued General License 51, authorizing specified transactions involving Venezuelan-origin gold.
OFAC administers United States economic sanctions. A general license permits categories of transactions that American sanctions would otherwise prohibit. It does not, by performing that function, create a Venezuelan mining right or determine who possesses authority under Venezuelan law to extract a mineral belonging to the Republic.
A commercial transaction was also taking shape. Venezuela’s State mining company, Minerven, entered an arrangement with the commodities trader Trafigura involving approximately 650 to 1,000 kilograms of Venezuelan gold doré intended for processing and distribution for sale in the United States.
Gold doré is a partially refined product produced from mined material. It ordinarily requires further refining before reaching the purity associated with commercial bullion. The transaction concerned gold that had already passed from extraction into commerce.
On March 27, Treasury issued three instruments governing different stages of American participation in Venezuela’s mineral sector.
General License 51A authorized specified transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the exportation, sale, storage, purchase, delivery, or transportation of Venezuelan-origin minerals, including gold. It expressly excluded exploration, development, mining, extraction, processing, refining, or production of minerals in Venezuela and the formation of Venezuelan entities for those purposes. The license also required participants to report documentation demonstrating supply-chain due-diligence plans for determining the chain of custody of the minerals.
General License 54 separately authorized the provision from the United States or by United States persons of goods, technology, software, and services for mineral exploration, development, mining, extraction, processing, refining, or production in Venezuela. It also authorized specified maintenance and support for mineral operations, while excluding the formation of new joint ventures or other entities in Venezuela to undertake those activities.
General License 55 separately authorized negotiations and entry into contingent contracts for new investment in Venezuela’s mineral sector, including gold. Performance of those contracts was required to remain expressly contingent upon separate authorization from OFAC.
Treasury distinguished commerce in Venezuelan-origin minerals, the provision of operational goods and services, and prospective investment. General License 51A did not itself authorize extraction in Venezuela, and General License 55 did not itself authorize performance of the investments negotiated under it.
On April 7, Senator Ron Wyden formally sought information from Trafigura concerning the Minerven transaction. His inquiry asked about the origin of the gold, the diligence undertaken to establish its provenance, the role of United States officials in the transaction, and risks arising from illicit mining and criminal activity within Venezuela’s gold sector.
The inquiry did not establish that the Trafigura gold had been illegally mined. It placed the origin of gold entering the United States and the governmental role in facilitating its commerce within the formal congressional record.
For the Trafigura transaction, the relevant chain begins before the gold reaches Minerven.
From what mine or mines was the material extracted? Who conducted the extraction? Under what mining title or governmental authority? Through what intermediaries did the gold pass before reaching the State enterprise? What records permit that chain to be reconstructed?
Venezuela’s gold-producing regions have been associated with extensive illicit mining, armed groups, environmental destruction, smuggling, and unlawful commerce. Those conditions make the provenance of the particular gold consequential, but they do not establish that the gold itself originated in illegal extraction.
Treasury’s own regulatory framework also addressed provenance through General License 51A’s chain-of-custody reporting requirement.
On September 2, Treasury continued the three-part regulatory structure through General Licenses 51D, 54C, and 55A. General License 51D addressed specified transactions involving Venezuelan-origin coal or minerals, including gold. General License 54C addressed specified supplies and services for coal or mineral operations in Venezuela. General License 55A permitted negotiation and entry into specified contingent investment contracts while requiring performance to remain contingent upon separate authorization from OFAC.
On September 16, Heeney Capital announced that it had signed what it described as a mining concession with the Republic of Venezuela and the Corporación Venezolana de Minería to develop and operate a gold project in the El Callao Mining District. Reuters reported that the arrangement concerns the Chocó mine, extends for thirty years, grants rights to export the gold extracted from the mine, involves Mercuria as Heeney’s partner, and contemplates initial investment of up to $1 billion.
The Trafigura transaction concerned gold that had already been extracted and entered commerce. The Heeney-CVM mining agreement reaches instead toward the deposit from which future gold would be extracted.
If the mineral deposit belongs to the Republic, constitutes property in the public domain, and is constitutionally inalienable and imprescriptible, the relevant inquiry precedes the commercial disposition of extracted gold. It concerns the governmental competence by which rights to develop, operate, extract from, and commercially exploit the deposit may be conferred.
The public announcement does not establish that extraction under the agreement has commenced. General License 55A likewise does not, by itself, establish American authorization for performance of every activity contemplated by the agreement.
The public record does not presently supply the complete operative Heeney-CVM mining agreement, the complete Venezuelan legal analysis supporting its execution, or a complete documentary chain establishing which American authorizations apply to each contemplated act of performance.
The gold arrangements operate across two legal systems whose functions are different.
United States law determines whether American persons may undertake transactions otherwise prohibited by American sanctions, what conditions apply to those transactions, and what additional American governmental authorization may be required.
Venezuelan law determines the governmental competence by which rights over Venezuelan mineral deposits may be granted.
A Venezuelan agreement cannot enlarge the constitutional or statutory powers of the United States Government. An American Treasury license cannot enlarge the constitutional competence of Venezuelan officials.
The same separation applies to recognition. The President of the United States possesses constitutional authority concerning recognition of foreign governments. American recognition can determine whom the United States treats as the government of Venezuela for purposes within that recognition authority. It does not determine, merely through the act of recognition, the powers that Venezuela’s Constitution confers upon the officials recognized.
The Heeney-CVM mining agreement presents a question that cannot end with the identity of its governmental counterparties. The authority of the Venezuelan Government and the Corporación Venezolana de Minería to confer the rights described in the agreement must therefore arise within the Venezuelan legal order.
The petroleum and gold records concern different exercises of governmental and commercial power over resources governed by the same constitutional provision.
In petroleum, the United States Government publicly claims economic and governance rights associated with long-term Venezuelan concessions. In gold, the documented American role proceeds through sanctions authorization, governmental facilitation, private commerce, and a long-term mining agreement concerning development and operation of a Venezuelan mineral deposit.
The legal instruments differ. The participants differ. The governmental interests differ.
The constitutional referent does not.
Article 12 encompasses both hydrocarbon and mineral deposits as property within the public domain of the Republic. Article 5 places sovereignty in the Venezuelan people. The constitutional question therefore arises before petroleum becomes oil available for purchase and before a mineral deposit becomes gold available for export. It concerns the authority by which rights over the resource are created.
For gold, the documentary inquiry proceeds along two separate lines. Provenance concerns the origin and legal chain of material already extracted. Sovereign competence concerns the constitutional and statutory authority governing the power of Venezuelan officials to confer mining, operational, extraction, and export rights over mineral deposits belonging to the Republic.
American law may determine whether an American person may purchase Venezuelan gold, provide specified services to a mineral operation, negotiate an investment, or undertake other activities otherwise restricted by American sanctions. Those determinations do not establish the provenance of the mineral and do not determine the sovereign competence by which rights over a Venezuelan mineral deposit are created.
American permission can open an American market. It cannot create Venezuelan sovereignty.
The question is therefore not simply who possesses the gold.
It is who possessed the lawful authority to take it from the ground.
“Geometric Allegory” digital painting (2023) by Ricardo Morín (American visual artist, born in Venezuela, 1954)
Scope and Use
This entry forms part of the constitutional corpus presented in the Appendix, comprising the constitutions of Venezuela organized for consultation rather than sequential reading. Comparison proceeds through permanent rubric codes whose identities remain constant throughout the corpus; absent rubrics signify constitutional silence, while retired rubrics are not reassigned. Citations are anchored first on the article number and follow the CIDEP recension linked at the close of the entry. The corpus definition, editorial methodology, and citation convention are set forth in the Scope and Use note introducing the nineteenth-century constitutions in “Unmasking Disappointment: Series XI”.
Ricardo F. Morín Sept , 2026 Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania
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15). The Constitution of 1922
The 1922 Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela] was declared sanctioned at the Palacio Federal Legislativo [Federal Legislative Palace], Caracas, on 19 June 1922, after the unanimous ratification recorded for the Asambleas Legislativas de los Estados [State Legislative Assemblies], and promulgated at the Palacio Federal [Federal Palace], Caracas, on 24 June 1922, under the provisional presidency of Victorino Márquez Bustillos.
Historical reference
President Victorino Márquez Bustillos, who had exercised the provisional presidency while President Juan Vicente Gómez held military command, signed the execution formula printed in the CIDEP recension with the date 24 June 1922. Gómez was elected President for the constitutional period 1922–1929 and resumed the exercise of the presidency in 1922.
Sources: CIDEP, Constitution of 1922, pp. 3 and 21; Ramón J. Velásquez, “Gómez, Juan Vicente,” Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Empresas Polar.
The Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] invoked Article 133 of the existing Pacto Federal [Federal Compact] in its enacting formula:
“The Congress of the United States of Venezuela, in the name of Almighty God, and in exercise of the faculty conferred upon it by Article 133 of the Federal Compact in force, decrees the present Constitution.”
The formula differed from that of June 1914, which identified a congress of plenipotentiary deputies and the authority conferred by the district assemblies (cf. 1914, enacting formula: “The Congress of Plenipotentiary Deputies of the States forming the Venezuelan Union, in exercise of the power conferred upon it by the Assemblies of Plenipotentiary Deputies of the Districts of the States, in the name of Almighty God, decrees the present: Constitution.”).
FND-TER—Territory:
The territory comprised the former Capitanía General de Venezuela [Captaincy General of Venezuela], subject to modifications resulting from public treaties, and consisted of the territories of the States, the Distrito Federal [Federal District], the Territorios Federales Amazonas y Delta-Amacuro [Amazonas and Delta-Amacuro Federal Territories], and the Venezuelan islands in the Caribbean Sea (Art. 1; cont. 1914, Art. 1). The Nation retained the name Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela], its declared independence, and its republican, federal, democratic, elective, representative, responsible, and alternating form of government (Arts. 8–9; cont. 1914, Arts. 8–9).
State boundaries continued to refer to the Ley de 28 de abril de 1856 [Law of 28 April 1856] and the modifications of 1909. Article 2 additionally recognized the boundary modifications agreed by Aragua and Carabobo in the Maracay Protocol of 31 January 1917 and approved by their respective legislative assemblies on 27 February and 2 March 1917 (cf. 1914, Art. 2: “[…] subject to the modifications established in the Constitution sanctioned by the National Congress on 4 August 1909 and ordered executed on 5 August of the same year.”).
Boundary controversies remained subject to referral by the Cámara del Senado [Chamber of the Senate], at the request of one or more affected States, to a tribunal of árbitros arbitradores [arbitrators empowered to decide in equity] freely appointed by the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] (Art. 3; cont. 1914, Art. 3).
The Distrito Federal [Federal District] retained Caracas, its enumerated outlying parishes, and the Departamento Vargas [Vargas Department]. Caracas remained the capital and seat of the general powers, with temporary executive residence elsewhere within the Federal District permitted in unforeseen circumstances (Arts. 4 and 6; cont. 1914, Arts. 4 and 6). Amazonas and Delta-Amacuro could attain statehood upon satisfying the population and administrative-capacity requirements; the Caribbean islands remained under direct federal administration until constituted as Territories (Art. 5; cont. 1914, Art. 5). The prohibition upon alienating, leasing, or ceding national territory to a foreign power remained (Art. 7; cont. 1914, Art. 7).
POW-LEG—Congress:
Legislative power remained vested in the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela], composed of the Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] and the Cámara del Senado [Chamber of the Senate] (Art. 34; cont. 1914, Art. 34). The ratio of one Diputado [Deputy] for thirty-five thousand inhabitants, with an additional Deputy for an excess of fifteen thousand and at least one for each State, the equal number of Suplentes [Alternates], and the three-year term remained. Deputies had to be Venezuelan by birth and at least twenty-one years of age. The Federal District and qualifying Federal Territories also elected Deputies (Arts. 35–37; cont. 1914, Arts. 35–37). Article 35 retained votación directa [direct voting], as confirmed by the scanned collection hosted by CIDEP, printed page 235; direct voting was also prescribed by Article 19, base 20, and Article 37 (cont. 1914, corresponding provisions).
The Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] retained the power to censure Ministers, whose offices thereby ceased, and to elect the Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation] and two Alternates every three years (Art. 38; cont. 1914, Art. 38). Each State assembly elected two principal Senators and two Alternates from outside its membership for three years; Senators had to be Venezuelan by birth and at least thirty years of age (Arts. 39–40; cont. 1914, Arts. 39–40). The Senate retained its functions concerning boundary arbitration, interment in the Panteón Nacional [National Pantheon], foreign gifts and distinctions, and military and naval promotions (Art. 41; cont. 1914, Art. 41). For foreign gifts and distinctions, Article 41(3) referred to public employees, whereas its antecedent referred to national employees.
The Chambers continued to convene on 19 April or the nearest possible date, but their sessions now closed without extension on 5 July (Art. 42; cf. 1914, Art. 42: “The sessions shall last seventy non-extendable days.”). The provisions respecting quorum, public or secret sessions, internal regulation, concurrent sittings, incompatibilities, remuneration, immunity, non-responsibility for votes and opinions, contracts, and vacancies remained (Arts. 43–53; cont. 1914, Arts. 43–53).
The distinction between Leyes [Laws] enacted by the Chambers as co-legislators and Acuerdos [Resolutions] adopted jointly or upon matters exclusive to one Chamber remained, as did the presidency of the joint assembly by the President of the Senate (Arts. 54–56; cont. 1914, Arts. 54–56). The joint assembly retained its electoral, reporting, accounting, military-appointment, and statehood functions; its competence to receive resignations now expressly included the Vice Presidents (Art. 57; cf. 1914, Art. 57(3): “To take cognizance of the resignation of the President of the United States of Venezuela.”).
The common legislative attributions continued to encompass federal organic and electoral laws, taxation, codes, currency, public offices, debt and loans, statistics, sanitation, militia, census, treaties, contracts and concessions, the budget, weights and measures, pensions, military organization, war, and port security (Art. 58; cont. 1914, Art. 58). The census remained decennial; Article 58(8) no longer specified 1 January 1916 as the initial date.
Legislative initiative, three discussions in each Chamber, the treatment of disagreements, rejection, repeal, publication, nondelegation, and nonretroactivity remained regulated in Articles 59–71. Article 65 specified that pending projects received the three discussions in the following year in the Chamber in which they had not received them (cf. 1914, Art. 65: “Projects remaining pending in either Chamber at the end of the sessions shall undergo the same three discussions in the sessions of the following year.”). The other cited procedural provisions retained their corresponding antecedents (Arts. 59–64 and 66–71; cont. 1914, Arts. 59–64 and 66–71).
ECO-TES—Treasury:
The Chambers retained the powers to decree national taxes and authorize annual collection, regulate national debt and interest, decree loans, approve the specified contracts and concessions, and sanction the Presupuesto General de Rentas y Gastos Públicos [General Budget of Public Revenues and Expenditures] (Art. 58, nums. 2, 6–7, and 10–11; cont. 1914, Art. 58, same numbers).
State revenues continued to comprise the Impuesto Territorial [Territorial Tax] collected at customs houses; proceeds from mines, terrenos baldíos [public lands], and saltworks; the statutory share of the Renta de Aguardiente [Distilled-Spirits Revenue]; taxes upon the exploitation of natural products; and papel sellado [stamped paper]. The States delegated the establishment and organization of the first three revenue categories to the federal legislature and their administration to the Nation, with net proceeds distributed according to population (Art. 19, bases 27–28; cont. 1914, Art. 19, bases 27–28). The prohibition upon alienating public lands on maritime, fluvial, and lacustrine islands also remained (Art. 19, base 28, sole paragraph; cont. 1914, same provision).
Exports remained free of duties (Art. 117; cont. 1914, Art. 117). Disbursements from the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury] required a congressional appropriation or an executive decree authorizing a Crédito Adicional [Additional Credit] with the affirmative vote of the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers]. Officials incurred civil liability for unauthorized payments; ordinary expenditures took precedence, and additional credits required submission to the succeeding meeting of the legislature (Art. 118; cont. 1914, Art. 118).
The prohibition upon issuing paper currency or prescribing compulsory circulation of banknotes or other paper-represented value remained. Silver or nickel coinage required prior legislative authorization (Art. 119; cont. 1914, Art. 119). Public-interest contracts could not be transferred to foreign governments and incorporated the prescribed Venezuelan jurisdictional clause; companies formed in their execution had to establish legal domicile in Venezuela (Art. 121; cont. 1914, Art. 121). Ministerial budget and accounting obligations remained (Art. 89; cont. 1914, Art. 89).
POW-EXE—Executive:
The Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] continued to exercise the federal executive with the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of the Departments]. Executive functions remained exercisable outside the Federal District only in the constitutional cases (Arts. 72–73; cont. 1914, Arts. 72–73).
The Congreso [Congress] elected the President within the first fifteen days after installation and, in the same sitting, a First and a Second Vice President. The sitting was public and permanent, with five days’ notice; election was by secret ballot and an absolute majority of the members present (Arts. 74–76; cf. 1914, Art. 74: “[…] to elect the President of the United States of Venezuela.”). A designated Minister continued to supply temporary presidential absences. Absolute vacancies were now supplied by the Vice Presidents in their order of election; failing both, the President of the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] assumed office and convened new elections for the unexpired term (Art. 77; cf. 1914, Art. 77: “In the event of an absolute vacancy, the President of the Federal and Cassation Court shall assume power and shall immediately convene Congress to elect a new President for the remainder of the term.”).
The President and Vice Presidents had to be Venezuelan by birth, of estado seglar [secular status], more than thirty years of age, and in possession of civil and political rights. They made the legal promise before the legislature or, if that was impossible, before the Court in Sala Plena [Plenary Session] (Art. 78; cf. 1914, Art. 78: “[…] shall make the legal promise before Congress before entering upon the exercise of his functions.”).
The presidential attributions continued to include appointments, promulgation and execution of laws, regulations, federal administration, loans, diplomatic negotiations, contracts, nationality and navigation instruments, military command, emergency measures, amnesties, and pardons (Art. 79; cont. 1914, corresponding provisions of Art. 79). Public health was added to the services regulated under number 10. Number 21 also permitted the expulsion of foreigners described by the text as pernicious who possessed immovable property valued below forty thousand bolívares, proved by public instruments of ownership (cf. 1914, Art. 79(21): “[…] to expel pernicious foreigners who possess no immovable property in the country.”).
The annual presidential message, statutory remuneration, responsibility for treason and ordinary crimes, and cessation of presidential functions on 19 April of the final year remained (Arts. 80–83; cont. 1914, Arts. 80–83). The executive and judicial terms remained seven years, now counted from 19 April of the election year (Art. 128; cf. 1914, Art. 128: “[…] seven years […] from 19 April 1915.”).
The law continued to prescribe the ministerial departments; Article 84 additionally authorized the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] to create Ministries during the legislative recess (cf. 1914, Art. 84: “The President of the United States of Venezuela shall have for his dispatch the Ministers prescribed by law. The law shall determine their functions and duties and organize their Secretariats.”). Ministerial qualifications, countersignature, personal and joint responsibility, annual reports and accounts, appearances before the Chambers, and the enumerated grounds of responsibility remained (Arts. 85–91; cont. 1914, Arts. 85–91).
POW-JUD—Judicial Power:
Judicial power remained vested in the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] and the other tribunals established by law. Judicial officers remained responsible for treason, bribery, constitutional and legal violations, and ordinary crimes (Arts. 92–93; cont. 1914, Arts. 92–93).
The Court retained seven Vocales [Members], elected for seven years and required to be Venezuelan by birth, more than thirty years of age, of secular status, and attorneys of the Republic. Seven groups of State and Federal District delegations each presented two candidates; the unelected candidates became Alternates, and the Court supplied absolute vacancies by lot until the next legislative meeting (Arts. 94–97; cont. 1914, Arts. 94–97).
Article 98(2) added criminal proceedings against the Vice Presidents to the Court’s jurisdiction. The preliminary determination whether proceedings should be instituted accordingly applied to the first three numbered categories (cf. 1914, Art. 98: “In the two preceding cases, the Court shall declare whether or not there is cause to institute proceedings […]”). The remaining attributions concerning national and State officials, diplomats, claims against the Nation, cassation, prizes, jurisdictional conflicts, constitutional review, statutory collisions, public acts, contracts, foreign judgments, and titles to mines, public lands, and ejidos [municipal common lands] continued, with the subsequent numbered attributions shifted by one (Art. 98, nums. 3–18; cont. 1914, Art. 98, nums. 2–17). The annual report, prohibition upon concurrent executive employment, and statutory remuneration remained (Arts. 99–101; cont. 1914, Arts. 99–101).
The Ministerio Público [Public Ministry] remained entrusted to the Procurador General de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation], elected by the Chamber of Deputies for three years, with two Alternates. Eligibility remained Venezuelan nationality by birth, age above thirty, and qualification as an attorney (Arts. 38(2) and 102–104; cont. 1914, Arts. 38(2) and 102–104). His functions continued to encompass execution of laws, legal opinions, supervision of federal officers, accusations, fiscal proceedings, and representation of the Nation. The reference governing the Ministerio Fiscal [Fiscal Ministry] now included the first four numbered jurisdictions of the Court, including proceedings against Vice Presidents (Art. 105(5); cf. 1914, Art. 105(5): “[…] the proceedings referred to in attributions 1, 2, and 3 of the Federal and Cassation Court […]”).
POW-SUB—Subnational Government:
The same twenty States retained reciprocal recognition of autonomy, political equality, and sovereignty not delegated by the Constitution, subject to the Bases de la Unión [Bases of the Union]. Their obligations respecting constitutional organization, federal enactments, municipal autonomy, foreign relations, justice, inter-State controversies, military contingents, and revenues remained prescribed in Article 19 (cont. 1914, Art. 19). Base 17 added public health to the Nation’s legislative competence alongside public instruction (cf. 1914, Art. 19, base 17: “To reserve to the Nation the faculty of legislating upon Public Instruction […]”).
The Concejos Municipales [Municipal Councils] retained economic and administrative autonomy and their revenue powers subject to the specified restrictions. Wartime assumption of district administration by the State executive continued to require the vote of the State assembly or, during its recess, the State supreme court (Art. 19, base 4; cont. 1914, same provision). States could unite and recover their separate status, retaining the specified Senate and Court-election rights while united (Arts. 20–21; cont. 1914, Arts. 20–21).
Residual competence remained with the States. Their three-year constitutional terms were now counted from 20 February of the year in which the respective term commenced (Art. 106; cf. 1914, Art. 106: “[…] three years, counted from 20 February 1915.”). State tribunals remained independent, subject to the review assigned by law to the federal Court (Art. 108; cont. 1914, Art. 108).
Article 113 retained the prohibition upon resident federal officials exercising authority in the States except in the enumerated services, together with subjection to State laws and removal upon a legally grounded State request. Its enumeration included fiscal, educational, communications, sanitary, resource-administration, and military-establishment personnel. The restriction of the latter jurisdiction to their respective functions and the precincts of fortresses, barracks, naval stations, and ports of entry remained in the scanned collection hosted by CIDEP, printed page 244. The separate reference to frontier forces was not repeated (cf. 1914, Art. 113: “[…] forces assigned to the defence of the frontiers or to garrison fortresses, arsenals, naval stations, and ports of entry […]”).
CON-AMD—Amendment of the Constitution:
The amendment procedure remained in Articles 130–134. Amendments or additions requested by three-fourths of the Asambleas Legislativas de los Estados [State Legislative Assemblies] in ordinary session could be decreed by the Congreso Nacional [National Congress] only in ordinary session and upon the points on which a majority of States concurred (Art. 130; cont. 1914, Art. 130).
The ordinary legislative procedure applied; the President of the legislature submitted the agreed text to the State assemblies for definitive ratification. Legislatively initiated amendments required ratification by three-fourths of those assemblies, and their final votes returned to the national legislature for scrutiny (Arts. 131–134; cont. 1914, Arts. 131–134). The repeated phrase in the CIDEP transcription of Article 130 of 1914 is not repeated in the 1922 recension.
CIV-SUF—Suffrage:
Venezuelans more than twenty-one years of age who satisfied the constitutional qualifications remained electors and eligible for office. Freedom of suffrage remained subject to the Constitution and laws, and citizens enjoying their political rights could elect and be elected to public office (Arts. 12, 22(11), and 123; cont. 1914, same provisions).
The States retained direct voting for the Concejos Municipales [Municipal Councils], Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies], and Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies], and indirect or delegated voting for other popularly elected officers, with secrecy and the federal censo electoral [electoral census] required in both cases (Art. 19, base 20; cont. 1914, same provision). The express direct-vote provision for the Federal District and qualifying Federal Territories remained (Art. 37; cont. 1914, Art. 37). The representation count continued to exclude the population designated by the recension as indígenas que viven en estado salvaje [Indigenous persons living in a savage state] (Art. 37, sole paragraph; cont. 1914, same provision).
The Congreso [Congress] now elected two Vice Presidents in addition to the President, by secret ballot and an absolute majority of those present (Arts. 74–76; cf. 1914, Art. 76: “The voting shall be secret, and the citizen obtaining an absolute majority of the votes of the members of Congress present at the election shall be proclaimed elected President of Venezuela.”). Members of the Fuerza Pública Nacional [National Public Force] on duty remained quartered during voting (Art. 124; cont. 1914, Art. 124).
CIV-CIT—Citizenship:
Article 10 retained nationality of origin and acquired nationality. Nationality by birth comprised persons born in Venezuela and children of Venezuelan parents, irrespective of birthplace. Acquisition extended, under the stated conditions, to adult children born abroad of a father or mother Venezuelan by naturalization; persons born in the Hispanic-American republics; foreigners obtaining a carta de naturaleza [letter of naturalization]; and a foreign woman married to a Venezuelan, including continuation after dissolution upon the prescribed declaration within the first year (cont. 1914, Art. 10).
The declaration before the Registrador Principal [Principal Registrar], its inscription, transmission to the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive], and ordered and completed publication in the Gaceta Oficial [Official Gazette] remained required (Art. 11; cont. 1914, Art. 11). The duties of service and the equality of rights and duties throughout the Union remained (Arts. 13–14; cont. 1914, Arts. 13–14).
The four grounds for suspension of citizenship rights remained undertaking to serve against Venezuela, conviction or punishment carrying political or public-office disqualification, unauthorized acceptance by an official of foreign gifts or distinctions, and judicial interdiction (Art. 24; cont. 1914, Art. 24). The rules concerning foreigners’ rights and duties, political participation, indemnification, and treaties remained in Articles 15–18 (cont. 1914, Arts. 15–18).
RTS-GAR—Rights:
Article 22 retained the inviolability of life and abolition of capital punishment; property; correspondence and private papers; the home; personal liberty; expression; transit; industry; assembly and association; petition; suffrage; teaching; religion; individual security; and equality (cont. 1914, Art. 22). The property guarantee retained legislative contributions, judicial decisions, sanitary measures, and taking for public utility after adversarial proceedings and indemnification. The guarantees concerning forced recruitment and slavery also remained (Art. 22, nums. 1–3 and 5; cont. 1914, same provisions).
The home could additionally be entered to execute judicial decisions in criminal proceedings (Art. 22(4); cf. 1914, Art. 22(4): “[…] only to prevent the perpetration or consummation of a crime, or for sanitary reasons, and this shall also be executed in accordance with the laws.”). The expression guarantee retained fianza de cárcel segura [bail securing provisional liberty] when an arrest order had issued in the specified proceedings. The restrictions upon monopolies, the statutory exceptions to association, the thirty-day maximum preliminary investigation after detention, the prohibition upon incommunicado detention, the twenty-year maximum corporal penalty, and the prohibition upon a second trial for the same offence remained (Art. 22, nums. 6, 8–9, and 14; cont. 1914, same provisions).
The enumeration did not deny other rights; officials issuing or executing measures contrary to guaranteed rights remained punishable; and laws impairing those rights were to be declared unconstitutional and ineffective (Arts. 23 and 25–26, read with Art. 98(11); cont. 1914, Arts. 23 and 25–26, read with Art. 98(10)).
Reference correction: the applicable locus is Article 98(11), which expressly assigns the declaration of nullity of unconstitutional laws. Article 26 prints attribution 10 in both the modern CIDEP transcription and the scanned collection, printed page 235; attribution 10 concerns conflicts of judicial competence. The apparatus supplies the correct parallel reference without altering the recorded source reading.
REG-MIL—The Armed Force:
The States continued to supply their proportional unarmed contingent, prohibit the specified enlistments and levies, and refrain from war against one another (Art. 19, bases 22–24; cont. 1914, same provisions). The joint Congreso [Congress] could continue to appoint annually a Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Nacional [Commander in Chief of the National Army] and determine his functions (Art. 57(2); cont. 1914, Art. 57(2)). The Chambers retained their legislative functions concerning militia, military organization, recruitment, war, and peace (Art. 58, nums. 8 and 18–20; cont. 1914, same provisions).
The President retained the declaration of a legislatively decreed war, command of the Ejército [Army] and Armada [Navy], organization of the Milicia [Militia], and determination of force numbers. The military, extraordinary, pacificatory, and amnesty attributions remained subject to the legislative determination when a Commander in Chief was appointed (Art. 79, nums. 17 and 22–25, and sole paragraph; cont. 1914, same provisions).
The Fuerza Pública Nacional [National Public Force] remained naval and terrestrial, composed of citizen militias and augmentable in war. Civil and military authority could coincide only during disturbances of public order; all military materiel belonged to the Nation. The Fuerza Armada [Armed Force] remained passive, obedient, and non-deliberative, and could requisition assistance only through civil authorities according to law (Arts. 109–111, 115, and 125; cont. 1914, same articles). The electoral quartering requirement remained in Article 124.
REG-REL—Religion:
Religious liberty continued under the laws and the supreme inspection of all worship by the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive] (Art. 22(13); cont. 1914, Art. 22(13)). The Nation retained the Derecho de Patronato Eclesiástico [Right of Ecclesiastical Patronage], exercisable under the Ley de 28 de julio de 1824 [Law of 28 July 1824] (Art. 112; cont. 1914, Art. 112).
ECO-INF—Infrastructure:
The territory to be ceded by the States for federal works now expressly included aerodromos [aerodromes], alongside forts, wharves, warehouses, shipyards, penitentiaries, communication routes, quarantine stations, and national buildings (Art. 19, base 7; cf. 1914, Art. 19, base 7: “[…] forts, wharves, warehouses, shipyards, penitentiaries, communication routes, quarantine stations, national buildings, and other works indispensable to the general Administration.”).
Federal legislative and executive jurisdiction retained Correos, Telégrafos y Teléfonos [Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones], navigation, wharves, and national roads, and now expressly included aerial navigation (Art. 19, base 9; cf. 1914, Art. 19, base 9: “[…] maritime, coastal, and fluvial navigation and wharves and national roads […]”). A new sole paragraph expressly authorized federal provisions governing vehículos de tracción mecánica [mechanically propelled vehicles] on national roads. The definition of roads crossing a State, Territory, or the Federal District and extending beyond its boundaries remained.
National legislative competence and presidential regulatory competence now expressly included Sanidad [Public Health] (Arts. 19, base 17, and 79(10); cf. 1914, Art. 79(10): “To regulate the postal, telegraphic, and public or private telephone services […]”). Legislative approval of communication-route concessions and national-interest contracts, the issuance of navigation patents, and legislation upon maritime port and coastal security remained (Arts. 58(10), 58(21), and 79(12); cont. 1914, same provisions).
CON-FIN—Final Provisions:
Promulgation and entry into force depended upon the Congreso Nacional [National Congress] finding, after scrutiny, that the State legislative assemblies had ratified the amendments and additions (Art. 135; cf. 1914, Art. 135: “[…] at least two-thirds of the Assemblies have ratified the present Constitution.”). The 1914 provision concerned district plenipotentiary assemblies and scrutiny by the constituent congress; the 1922 provision concerned State legislative assemblies and the national legislature.
Seven-year executive and judicial terms were counted from 19 April of the election year; the census basis and official computation of Independence from 19 April 1810 and Federation from 20 February 1859 remained (Arts. 127–129; cont. 1914, Arts. 127 and 129; cf. 1914, Art. 128: “[…] seven years […] from 19 April 1915.”). Article 129 was a general provision, not the transitory provision.
The Disposición Transitoria [Transitory Provision] required immediate election of the First and Second Vice Presidents after promulgation (Art. 136). The Disposición Final [Final Provision] repealed the Constitution of 13 June 1914 (Art. 137; cf. 1914, Art. 141: “The Provisional Constitutional Statute of 19 April 1914 is repealed.”). The concluding attestation was dated 19 June 1922 at the Palacio Federal Legislativo [Federal Legislative Palace], Caracas; the execution order was dated 24 June at the Palacio Federal [Federal Palace], Caracas, and signed by V. Márquez Bustillos and the Ministers.
Source note: this entry follows the recension of the Centro para la Integración y el Derecho Público [Centre for Integration and Public Law] (CIDEP), collated at the specified loci with the CIDEP-hosted scan of Leyes y Decretos de Venezuela [Laws and Decrees of Venezuela], volume 45 (1922), published by the Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales [Academy of Political and Social Sciences], Caracas, 1994. The scanned witness supplies the words omitted from Articles 35 and 113 of the modern transcription and confirms the readings of Articles 26 and 98(11), on printed pages 235, 243, and 244. The antecedent is the Constitution of June 1914, not the separate Provisional Constitutional Statute of April 1914. 1922 recension, 1922 scanned collection, 1914 recension.
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16). The Constitution of 1925
The 1925 Constitución de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Constitution of the United States of Venezuela] was declared sanctioned at the Palacio Federal Legislativo [Federal Legislative Palace], Caracas, on 24 June 1925, following the unanimous State ratification recorded in the agreement reproduced by the Portal Iberoamericano de Derecho de la Cultura [Ibero-American Portal of Cultural Law]. The concluding attestation in CIDEP bears the same date. The execution order was dated 1 July 1925 at the Palacio Federal [Federal Palace], Caracas, under the presidency of Juan Vicente Gómez.
DOC-PRE—Preamble:
The collated enacting formula identifies the Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] and invokes Article 133 of the existing Pacto Federal [Federal Compact]:
“The Congress of the United States of Venezuela, in the name of Almighty God, and in exercise of the faculty conferred upon it by Article 133 of the Federal Compact in force, decrees the present Constitution.”
The invocation and article reference corresponded to those of the antecedent (cf. 1922, enacting formula: “[…] in exercise of the faculty conferred upon it by Article 133 of the Federal Compact in force […]”).
Textual correction: the formula and prefatory date are supplied from the reproduction identified in the source note. That witness gives Article 133 and an agreement dated 24 June 1925; the modern CIDEP file prints Article 126 and 24 May 1928 in these positions. The two readings and the basis of the correction are recorded in the accompanying verification record.
FND-TER—Territory:
Article 1 combined the definition of the Nation as a political compact under the name Estados Unidos de Venezuela [United States of Venezuela] with its declared independence, and expressly mentioned foreign protection as well as domination (cf. 1922, Arts. 8–9: “[…] in a compact of political association with the name United States of Venezuela.”“[…] free and independent of every foreign power or domination […]”). The governmental form appeared separately in Article 13.
The territorial reference to the Capitanía General de Venezuela [Captaincy General of Venezuela] and treaty modifications remained. The prohibition upon territorial alienation expressly included transfer and temporary alienation (Art. 2; cf. 1922, Art. 7: “The territory of the Nation may not be alienated, leased, or ceded in any manner to a foreign power.”). Articles 3–4 distinguished the States, Distrito Federal [Federal District], Territorios Federales [Federal Territories], and Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies], and enumerated the same twenty States named in Article 19 of 1922.
Article 5 retained the 1856 boundary reference, the modifications of 1909, and the Aragua–Carabobo agreement of 1917, while expressly accounting for the creation of the federal territorial divisions. It also authorized adjoining States to modify their common boundary by agreements approved by their legislatures, including reciprocal territorial compensation or cession (cf. 1922, Art. 2: “[…] the modifications established in the Protocol concluded at Maracay on 31 January 1917 by the Plenipotentiaries of Aragua and Carabobo […]”).
The Distrito Federal [Federal District] was expressly composed of the Departamentos Libertador y Vargas [Libertador and Vargas Departments], with the same city and outlying parishes enumerated for Libertador. Its municipal powers remained subject to the statutory restriction concerning federal political action (Art. 6; cont. 1922, Arts. 4 and 58(1), as to the territory and that restriction). Caracas remained the capital and seat of the government, subject to the specified wartime transfers and presidential official visits (Arts. 7 and 100, nums. 24(b) and 25; cf. 1922, Art. 6: “[…] the Federal Executive may establish its temporary residence at any other point within the Federal District when an unforeseen circumstance requires it.”).
Amazonas and Delta Amacuro remained Federal Territories. Their boundaries and those of the Federal District could be modified by agreements with neighbouring State governments, approved by the national legislature and the affected State legislatures (Art. 8). The population and administrative-capacity requirements for statehood remained and extended to subsequently created Territories (Art. 9; cont. 1922, Art. 5, as to those requirements). The Dependencias Federales [Federal Dependencies] comprised the Venezuelan Caribbean islands except Margarita, identified with Nueva Esparta, and remained directly administered by the federal executive until elevated by law to territorial status (Art. 10; cf. 1922, Art. 5, sole paragraph: “[…] until they are populated and may constitute one or more Territories.”).
Inter-State boundary controversies were assigned to the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] under the statutory procedure (Art. 11; cf. 1922, Art. 3: “[…] submitted by the Chamber of the Senate […] to a tribunal of arbitrators empowered to decide in equity, freely appointed by the Federal Executive.”).
POW-LEG—Congress:
The Congreso de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [Congress of the United States of Venezuela] retained its two Chambers (Art. 55; cont. 1922, Art. 34). The representation ratio, minimum State representation, equal number of Suplentes [Alternates] for Deputies, three-year legislative terms, and nationality and age requirements for Deputies remained (Arts. 56–58; cont. 1922, Arts. 35–37). Article 58 designated the Indigenous population excluded from the representation count as indígenas no reducidos [unassimilated Indigenous persons] (cf. 1922, Art. 37, sole paragraph: “Indigenous persons living in a savage state shall not be included in the population basis.”). State assemblies retained the election of two Senators and two Alternates; senatorial eligibility now specified age above thirty (Arts. 60–61; cf. 1922, Art. 40: “[…] to have attained thirty years of age.”).
The Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies] retained the voto de censura [vote of censure] against Ministers, but the President was not obliged to remove a censured Minister unless the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] declared legal cause for prosecution (Art. 59(1); cf. 1922, Art. 38(1): “To cast a vote of censure against the Ministers of the Departments, who shall thereby cease in their offices.”). Election of the Procurador general de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation] no longer appeared among the Chamber’s functions and was assigned to the President by Article 113.
The Cámara del Senado [Chamber of the Senate] retained the functions concerning the Panteón Nacional [National Pantheon], foreign gifts and distinctions, and military and naval promotions; referral of State boundary disputes was not retained in its enumeration (Art. 62; cont. 1922, Art. 41, nums. 2–5; see 1925, Arts. 11 and 120(16)). Ordinary sessions lasted ninety non-extendable days, rather than ending on 5 July. Extraordinary sessions were confined to the convocation’s subjects and legislation connected with them (Art. 63; cf. 1922, Art. 42: “[…] shall close their sessions, without extension, on the following 5 July.”).
Quorum, public or secret sessions, internal rules, concurrent sittings, incompatibilities, remuneration, contracting restrictions, and vacancies continued in Articles 64–69 and 72–73, corresponding to Articles 43–48 and 52–53 of 1922. Article 70 specified the protections from detention, interference with functions, and compulsory participation in civil proceedings during legislative immunity. It also prohibited waiver by the Chambers (cf. 1922, Art. 49: “[…] immunity, which consists in the suspension of every civil or criminal proceeding, whatever its origin or nature.”). Article 71 retained non-responsibility for opinions, without separately repeating the antecedent’s reference to votes (cf. 1922, Art. 51: “The members of the Chambers are not responsible for the vote or the opinions they express therein.”).
Joint sittings, the distinction between Leyes [Laws] and Acuerdos [Resolutions], and the joint assembly’s presiding officers remained (Arts. 74–76; cont. 1922, Arts. 54–56). Article 77 retained constitutional elections, presidential resignation, reports and accounts, and territorial admission, and expressly included examination of additional credits. It did not reproduce the annual appointment of a Commander in Chief or the separate reference to vice-presidential resignations in Article 57 of 1922.
Common legislative powers were enumerated in Article 78. They included taxes, debt and loans, offices, currency, treaties, contracts, national immovables, the budget, census, pensions, military recruitment, war, ports, and federal legislation. Amnesties appeared among these powers (Art. 78(16); cf. 1922, Art. 79(25): “To grant amnesties and pardons.”). Mining concessions and public-land titles granted under their respective laws were excepted from congressional approval (Art. 78(6); cf. 1922, Art. 58(10)(a): “To approve or deny […] mining titles and concessions and alienations of public lands […]”).
Legislative initiative required at least three members of a Chamber or the executive acting through the competent Minister; the prior requirement of press publication for ministerial proposals was not repeated (Art. 79; cf. 1922, Art. 59: “[…] the project must previously be published in the press and presented by the Minister to one of the Chambers.”). Three discussions in each Chamber remained. Unresolved disagreements proceeded to a joint sitting for decision by majority vote (Arts. 80–82; cf. 1922, Art. 62: “[…] the project shall lapse once the initiating Chamber separately resolves to ratify its insistence.”). Pending projects required renewed presentation and the discussions applicable to new projects (Art. 84; cf. 1922, Art. 65: “[…] in the Chamber in which they did not undergo them.”).
The enacting formula, complete restatement of amending laws, repeal formalities, and nondelegation remained (Arts. 85–87 and 91; cont. 1922, Arts. 66–68 and 70). Articles 88–90 prescribed authenticated duplicates, publication, correction of printing errors, and commencement on the stated date or, absent one, upon publication. Article 92 retained the lesser-penalty exception to nonretroactivity and specified immediate application of procedural laws to pending proceedings, with the stated protection for previously produced evidence in criminal causes (cf. 1922, Art. 71: “No legislative provision shall have retroactive effect, except in matters of judicial procedure and where it imposes a lesser penalty.”).
ECO-TES—Treasury:
Article 48 expressly prohibited collection of taxes not authorized by law and retained the requirement of a budgetary appropriation or a prior Crédito Adicional [Additional Credit], with civil liability for unauthorized disbursements (cf. 1922, Art. 118: “No expenditure shall be made from the National Treasury for which Congress has not expressly appropriated an amount in the General Budget of Public Expenditures or an Additional Credit has not been agreed with the affirmative vote of the Council of Ministers […]”).
The customs receipts, Impuesto Territorial [Territorial Tax], and revenues from saltworks, pearls, mines, and public lands were assigned to the Tesoro Nacional [National Treasury]. State ownership of the specified resources within their territory remained expressly recognized, with federal administration (Art. 15, nums. 14 and 18). The States instead received a Situado Constitucional [Constitutional Allocation] of ten million bolívares annually, distributed according to population. After three years the aggregate allocation was to equal twelve per cent of revenue receipts in the preceding calendar year (Art. 17(4)(1); cf. 1922, Art. 19, base 28: “[…] to cede to the Nation the administration of this revenue, for distribution of its net proceeds among all the States proportionally to the number of their inhabitants.”).
State revenues also included papel sellado [stamped paper], consumption taxes, and other authorized contributions; municipal revenues were separately regulated. The restrictions included prohibitions upon taxing reserved federal or municipal subjects, inter-State transit, goods before consumption, and unequal treatment by origin, and upon requiring federal fiscal cooperation or payment in personal labour or its monetary equivalent (Arts. 17(4) and 18(3); cf. 1922, Art. 19, bases 10–13: “[…] only national customs houses shall exist […]”“[…] not to create taxes whose establishment requires the cooperation of the Nation’s fiscal administration.”). Exports remained untaxed (Art. 15(14); cont. 1922, Art. 117).
The Chambers continued to legislate upon taxation, loans, debt, currency, and the Presupuesto General de Rentas y Gastos Públicos [General Budget of Public Revenues and Expenditures]. They could not order particular disbursements outside the Budget Law through special laws or resolutions (Art. 78, nums. 1–4 and 9). The gold standard and prohibition upon compulsory circulation of paper-represented value remained; the separate prohibition upon issuing paper currency in Article 119 of 1922 was not repeated (cf. 1922, Art. 119: “[…] issue paper currency, or declare banknotes or any value represented on paper to be in compulsory circulation.”).
The President administered national revenues through the respective Ministers and could decree additional credits in Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] for insufficient or unprovided appropriations, provided funds were available without impairing ordinary expenditure. The joint legislature examined those credits against the constitutional procedure. The responsible Minister prepared the annual proposed budget in consultation with the other Ministers (Arts. 100, nums. 19 and 30; 77(6); and 109; cf. 1922, Art. 118: “Every Additional Credit must be submitted to the approval of Congress at its next meeting.”).
Public contracts retained the prohibition upon transfer to foreign governments and the Venezuelan jurisdictional clause. Article 50 additionally prohibited contracting with, or permitting assignment to, companies not legally domiciled in Venezuela (cf. 1922, Art. 121: “Companies formed in execution of such contracts shall establish their legal domicile in Venezuela.”). Article 24 expressly prohibited State and municipal foreign loans.
POW-EXE—Executive:
The Presidente de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela [President of the United States of Venezuela] continued to exercise the federal executive with the Ministros del Despacho [Ministers of the Departments]. Article 94 expressly provided for execution through federal employees and agents, with State assistance in the constitutional cases (Arts. 93–94; cont. 1922, Art. 72, as to the President and Ministers).
There was one Vicepresidente de la República [Vice President of the Republic], with the same nationality, secular-status, age-above-thirty, and civil-and-political-rights requirements as the President (Art. 95; cf. 1922, Art. 74: “In this same sitting a First and a Second Vice President shall be elected […]”). The legislature elected both within the first fifteen days after installation, with at least five days’ notice published in the Gaceta Oficial [Official Gazette] (Arts. 96–97). These articles did not repeat the secret-ballot and absolute-majority formula of Article 76 of 1922. The oath was taken before the legislature or, if necessary, the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] (Art. 99; cont. 1922, Art. 78, as to the alternative institutions).
The Vice President supplied both temporary and absolute presidential vacancies; failing him, the Court’s President assumed the executive and convened elections for the remainder of the term (Art. 98; cf. 1922, Art. 77: “Temporary absences of the President of the United States of Venezuela shall be supplied by the Minister of the Departments designated by him.”). The President could communicate instructions from anywhere within the Republic without leaving office merely through absence from the capital. Official visits could temporarily establish the executive seat where the President was situated, with current administrative business in Caracas regulated by decree (Arts. 98 and 100(25); cf. 1922, Art. 73: “The functions of the Federal Executive may not be exercised outside the Federal District except in the cases provided by this Constitution.”).
Article 100 retained and restated powers concerning appointments, laws and regulations, administration, loans, treaties, national contracts, revenues, nationality, navigation, military command, and extraordinary sessions. It expressly prescribed the participation of the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] for the enumerated decisions. Publication of laws was required as soon as possible, without the former fifteen-day limit (Art. 100(7); cf. 1922, Art. 79(7): “[…] within the first fifteen days after receiving them […]”). Admission of foreigners remained subject to presidential prohibition; expulsion was now referred to international law and national legislation, without the former property-value condition (Art. 100(22); cf. 1922, Art. 79(21): “If they possess such property, expulsion may be decreed only when the immovables are valued below forty thousand bolívares […]”).
The President could exercise powers delegated by State constitutions and reorganize States controlled by rebel forces or whose governments participated in rebellion. Suspension of guarantees was governed by Article 36 and Article 100(24). Pardons remained presidential; amnesties appeared among the common legislative powers (Arts. 100, nums. 24(d), 27–28; and 78(16); cf. 1922, Art. 79(25): “To grant amnesties and pardons.”). The annual message and responsibility for treason and ordinary crimes remained. Article 103 expressly terminated both presidential and vice-presidential functions on 19 April of the final year (Arts. 101–103; cont. 1922, Arts. 80, 82–83, as to the corresponding presidential provisions).
Ministerial countersignature remained, subject to the new Secretario general [Secretary General], who countersigned appointments of Ministers and the Federal District Governor and could transmit presidential instructions. His own appointment required no ministerial countersignature (Arts. 104–105; cf. 1922, Art. 86: “All acts of the President shall be countersigned by the Minister or Ministers to whose departments those acts correspond […]”). Ministers and the Secretary General had to be Venezuelan by birth, above thirty, and in possession of civil and political rights; the prior ministerial secular-status requirement was not repeated (Art. 106; cf. 1922, Art. 85: “[…] of secular status […]”).
Article 107 defined deliberation in Gabinete [Cabinet] and permitted attendance by the Vice President and Secretary General. Personal and joint ministerial responsibility, annual Memorias [Reports] and accounts, and the right and obligation to appear before the Chambers remained (Arts. 108–110; cont. 1922, Arts. 87–90). Article 109 assigned preparation of the proposed budget to the Minister responsible for national revenues, in consultation with the other Ministers.
POW-JUD—Judicial Power:
Judicial power remained vested in the Corte Federal y de Casación [Federal and Cassation Court] and the other tribunals established by law (Art. 116; cont. 1922, Art. 92). Article 117 expressly prescribed fixed terms for all federal judges and removal during those terms only in the statutory cases.
The Court retained seven Vocales [Members] with seven-year terms, Venezuelan nationality by birth, age above thirty, and qualification as attorneys; the secular-status condition was not repeated (Art. 118; cf. 1922, Art. 94, sole paragraph: “[…] more than thirty years of age, of secular status, and attorneys of the Republic.”). The national legislature elected each Member separately by absolute majority and then seven numbered Alternates, who supplied temporary and absolute vacancies in that order (Art. 119; cf. 1922, Art. 95: “[…] each Group shall present two candidates, from among whom Congress shall elect the Member […]”; Art. 97: “[…] the Court itself selecting by lot, in each case, one of the Alternates.”).
Article 120 retained jurisdictions concerning high officials, diplomats, cassation, prizes, public-authority disputes, judicial competence, unconstitutional laws, conflicts of laws, State autonomy, contracts and concessions, foreign judgments, and claims against the Nation. It expressly assigned State boundary disputes to the Court (Art. 120(16); cf. 1922, Art. 3: “[…] a tribunal of arbitrators empowered to decide in equity, freely appointed by the Federal Executive.”). The separate reference to criminal proceedings against Vice Presidents in Article 98(2) of 1922 was not repeated.
The nullity of an unconstitutional law was confined to the conflicting provisions unless their connection with the remainder warranted nullity of the whole law. Executive decrees and regulations altering the spirit, reason, or purpose of a law were expressly subject to annulment. Contract and concession controversies followed juicio contencioso [contentious proceedings], subject to the specified reservation for matters committed by the applicable law to executive decision without judicial recourse (Art. 120, nums. 9, 12–13; cf. 1922, Art. 98(11): “To declare the nullity of national or State laws when they conflict with the Constitution of the Republic.”; Art. 98(15): “To hear controversies arising from contracts or negotiations concluded by the President of the Republic.”). The preliminary procedure for accusations remained in Article 121; Article 122 required an annual report indicating the legal reforms the Court considered appropriate (cont. 1922, Art. 98, procedural paragraph, and Art. 99, as to preliminary determination and annual reporting).
The Ministerio Público Federal [Federal Public Ministry] received a separate constitutional title and was defined as the organ of the federal executive before federal and State judicial authorities. The Procurador general de la Nación [Procurator General of the Nation] was freely appointed and removed by the President (Arts. 111–113; cf. 1922, Art. 38(2): “To elect every three years […] the Procurator General of the Nation and two Alternates […]”). The former three-year term and the eligibility requirements of Article 103 of 1922 were not repeated in these provisions. The Procurator’s functions comprised supervision of lawful adjudication in the specified causes, legal opinions, accusations against officials, fiscal intervention, and judicial representation of the Nation, subject to lawful executive instructions (Arts. 114–115; cf. 1922, Art. 105(7): “[…] in either case, to comply with the instructions communicated by the Federal Executive.”).
POW-SUB—Subnational Government:
The States retained autonomy, political equality, nondelegated sovereignty, and duties concerning national independence and integrity. The republican, federal, democratic, elective, representative, responsible, and alternating governmental form applied expressly to both the Union and each State (Arts. 12–13; cont. 1922, Arts. 9 and 19, opening paragraph and bases 2, 5–6). Article 51 expressly included municipal power in the distribution of public power (cf. 1922, Art. 32: “Public Power is distributed between the Federal Power and the Power of the States […]”).
The Distritos [Districts] retained municipal autonomy in their administrative regime. Wartime assumption of their administration by the State executive was remitted to the State constitution, rather than the nationally prescribed assembly or court approval (Art. 14; cf. 1922, Art. 19, base 4: “[…] with the vote of its Legislative Assembly, and, if the latter is not assembled, with that of its Supreme Court.”).
Article 15 enumerated federal competences; Article 16 required compliance with federal enactments within those competences. The enumeration expressly included banking and credit institutions, social provision, labour, natural-resource conservation, military aviation, and the other listed matters (cf. 1922, Art. 19, base 16: “[…] one and the same substantive civil, commercial, and criminal legislation, as well as procedural legislation.”; base 17: “To reserve to the Nation the faculty of legislating upon Public Health and Public Instruction […]”).
States retained constitution-making, elections, justice, revenue organization, and their other reserved autonomous rights. They could retain or change their names and could delegate specified powers to the President through their constitutions (Art. 17; cf. 1922, Art. 106: “Everything not expressly attributed in this Constitution to the General Administration of the Nation belongs to the competence of the States.”). The uniform three-year State term prescribed in that antecedent was not repeated. Municipal functions, ejidos [municipal common lands], and revenues were separately enumerated in Article 18.
Article 20 expressly authorized the enumerated federal judges, public-ministry agents, administrative and fiscal officers, and forces within the States, limited their jurisdiction to their functions, and prohibited incompatible State duties. It did not repeat removal upon a State government’s legally grounded request (cf. 1922, Art. 113: “[…] subject to immediate removal or replacement […] upon the request of the government of the respective State for a legal cause.”).
Recognition of public and judicial acts, federal works, prohibited levies, and the prohibition upon inter-State war remained regulated (Arts. 19 and 21–23; cont. 1922, Art. 19, bases 7, 15, and 23–24, as to those obligations). States and municipalities could not negotiate foreign loans (Art. 24). States retained the right to unite and recover their separate status (Art. 25; cont. 1922, Art. 20), but the distinct guarantee concerning Senate and Court-election representation in Article 21 of 1922 was not repeated.
CON-AMD—Amendment of the Constitution:
The charter expressly provided for total or partial reform. State-initiated reform still required requests from three-fourths of the Asambleas Legislativas de los Estados [State Legislative Assemblies] in ordinary session, action by the Congreso Nacional [National Congress] in ordinary session, and concurrence upon the points supported by a majority of States (Art. 123; cf. 1922, Art. 130: “This Constitution is susceptible of amendments or additions […]”).
Legislative procedure, submission to State assemblies for definitive ratification, and return of the final State vote to the national legislature for scrutiny remained (Arts. 124–125 and 127; cont. 1922, Arts. 131–132 and 134). For amendments initiated by the national legislature, the ratification threshold was two-thirds of the State assemblies (Art. 126; cf. 1922, Art. 133: “[…] they shall not be considered sanctioned without ratification by three-fourths of the Legislative Assemblies of the States.”).
CIV-SUF—Suffrage:
Article 32(12) placed electoral capacity within the right of suffrage. Venezuelans more than twenty-one years of age who were neither under interdiction nor subject to a criminal sentence entailing political disqualification were electors and eligible for public offices, subject to constitutional restrictions and the special competence or capacity required by law for particular offices (cf. 1922, Art. 12: “Venezuelans more than twenty-one years of age who possess the qualifications required by this Constitution are electors and eligible.”; Art. 22(11): “Freedom of suffrage, with no restrictions other than those established by this Constitution and the laws.”).
Direct and secret voting, based on the federal electoral census, remained prescribed for the Consejos Municipales [Municipal Councils], Asambleas Legislativas [Legislative Assemblies], and congressional Deputies (Art. 17(1); cont. 1922, Art. 19, base 20, as to those elections). The same provision did not repeat the antecedent’s prescription of indirect or delegated voting for other popularly elected officials. Deputy elections and population qualifications remained in Articles 56 and 58 (cont. 1922, Arts. 35 and 37).
The national legislature elected the President and one Vice President (Arts. 95–97; cf. 1922, Art. 74: “[…] a First and a Second Vice President […]”). Article 47 required troops to remain quartered during electoral periods (cf. 1922, Art. 124: “During electoral periods, members of the National Public Force who are on duty shall remain quartered during voting.”).
CIV-CIT—Citizenship:
The charter used nationality by birth and nationality acquired by naturalization (Art. 27; cf. 1922, Art. 10: “Venezuelan nationality is of origin or acquired.”). Birth in the Republic and descent from Venezuelan parents remained the grounds for nationality by birth (Art. 28; cont. 1922, Art. 10(a)).
The naturalization categories retained adult children born abroad of a father or mother Venezuelan by naturalization, statutory naturalization, and a foreign woman married to a Venezuelan under the stated conditions. The republics whose nationals could acquire nationality through residence and declaration were designated Ibero-American, rather than Hispanic-American (Art. 29; cf. 1922, Art. 10(b)(2): “Persons born or to be born in the Hispanic-American Republics […]”). The declaration and publication procedure remained, with acquisition dependent upon completed publication in the Gaceta Oficial [Official Gazette]; Article 30 did not separately repeat the requirement that the executive order that publication (cont. 1922, Art. 11, as to registration and publication).
Article 31 expressly required defence of the Nation and obedience to the Constitution, laws, and lawful public acts. Persons undertaking service against Venezuela were punishable under the law as traidores a la Patria [traitors to the Fatherland] (cf. 1922, Art. 13: “All Venezuelans have the duty to serve the Nation as the laws provide.”; Art. 24(1): “For undertaking to serve against Venezuela.”). Interdiction and politically disqualifying criminal sentences appeared in the suffrage provision, while unauthorized acceptance by officials of foreign gifts and distinctions was separately punishable under Article 49 (Arts. 32(12) and 49; cf. 1922, Art. 24(3): “For accepting, while an employee, gifts, offices, honours, or rewards from foreign governments without prior corresponding authorization from the Senate.”).
Foreigners’ rights and duties remained subject to law and could not exceed those of Venezuelans. The political-participation and indemnification provisions continued, with municipalities expressly included in the latter; the treaty restriction appeared in the presidential treaty power (Arts. 37–39 and 100(20); cont. 1922, Arts. 15–18, as to the corresponding rules).
RTS-GAR—Rights:
Article 32 retained guarantees concerning life, property, correspondence, the home, personal liberty, expression, movement, industry, assembly, association, petition, suffrage, teaching, religion, individual security, and equality. It expressly added work to industrial liberty and placed the right to accuse officials within the enumeration (Art. 32, nums. 8 and 11; cont. 1922, Art. 116, as to accusation).
The property provision expressly required compliance with laws concerning public hygiene and conservation of forests and waters (Art. 32(2); cf. 1922, Art. 22(2): “[…] judicial decision, sanitary measures in accordance with law, and taking for works of public utility […]”). The secrecy of domestic and private papers was qualified by their lack of relation to the proceeding; entry into the home could implement lawful judicial decisions in proceedings generally, alongside crime prevention and sanitary visits (Art. 32, nums. 3–4; cf. 1922, Art. 22(3): “[…] always preserving secrecy concerning domestic and private matters.”; Art. 22(4): “[…] to execute judicial decisions in matters of criminal procedure […]”).
Expression remained subject to responsibility for the enumerated offences. The specific expression-related bail sentence was not repeated; bail appeared in the general security provision (Art. 32, nums. 6 and 15(f); cf. 1922, Art. 22(6): “[…] the accused may furnish bail securing provisional liberty […] until final judgment […]”). The association guarantee referred generally to statutory restrictions and prohibitions instead of the two laws dated 1837 and 1874 (Art. 32(9); cf. 1922, Art. 22(9): “[…] with the exceptions established by the laws of 23 February 1837 and 5 May 1874.”). Petitioners had a right to a timely answer; the former collective-petition signature and factual-responsibility clauses were not repeated (Art. 32(10); cf. 1922, Art. 22(10): “If the petition is submitted by several persons, the first five answer for the authenticity of the signatures, and all for the truth of the facts.”).
Individual security retained natural judges, pre-existing law, detention formalities, the thirty-day preliminary-investigation limit, protection against self-incrimination and incommunicado detention, the twenty-year corporal-penalty ceiling, and prohibition upon a second trial for the same punishable act. Article 32(15) additionally mentioned ascendants, release following a final judicial decision removing the grounds of detention, release upon sufficient bail in statutory cases, and prohibition of perpetual penalties even when non-corporal (cf. 1922, Art. 22(14)(8): “Nor be condemned to corporal punishment for more than twenty years.”). Equality expressly included equal legal protection, statutory limits upon exemptions from contributions, and an exception for diplomatic forms of address (Art. 32(16); cf. 1922, Art. 22(15)(3): “No official form of address shall be given other than Citizen and You.”).
Unenumerated rights remained recognized (Art. 33; cont. 1922, Art. 23). The prohibition upon impairment expressly extended to federal laws, State constitutions and laws, and municipal ordinances (Art. 34; cf. 1922, Art. 26: “[…] shall not be impaired or injured by laws regulating their exercise […]”). The responsibility provision included an exception for measures of national defence or preservation or restoration of peace adopted by competent officials in the cases of Article 36 (Art. 35; cf. 1922, Art. 25: “[…] are culpable and shall be punished according to law.”).
Suspension of guarantees required a declaration by the President in Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] during international or civil war or imminent danger of either. It lasted only until peace was restored and preserved life and the prohibition of infamous punishment. Confiscation was prohibited except for the specified reciprocal wartime reprisals. Arrest, confinement, and expulsion ceased with the circumstances occasioning them, except that expulsion of foreigners could remain unrevoked (Art. 36; cf. 1922, Art. 79(23)(d): “[…] to suspend […] rights whose exercise is incompatible with the defence of the country, except the inviolability of life.”).
REG-MIL—The Armed Force:
Federal competence expressly included the Ejército [Army], Armada [Navy], and Aviación Militar [Military Aviation]. States and municipalities could maintain only police and prison guards, apart from forces organized by federal order. The proportional contingent extended expressly to the States, Federal District, Territories, and Dependencies; the law could organize contractual enlistment as well as citizen militias (Art. 15(8); cf. 1922, Art. 19, base 22: “To supply the unarmed contingent proportionally corresponding to them to constitute the National Public Force […]”). National ownership of military materiel remained (Art. 15(8); cont. 1922, Art. 115).
The prohibition upon concurrent civil and military authority now expressly excepted the President and lawful wartime assignment of military functions to a civil officer (Art. 45; cf. 1922, Art. 111: “[…] except in cases of disturbance of public order.”). The armed force remained passive, obedient, and non-deliberative, with requisitions through civil authorities; the electoral quartering requirement referred to troops (Art. 47; cont. 1922, Art. 125, as to non-deliberation and requisitions; see also 1922, Art. 124).
The President retained direction of war, command of the Army and Navy, organization of the Army and national militia, and determination of force numbers (Art. 100(23); cont. 1922, Art. 79(22)). The Chambers retained the declaration of war and legislation upon formation and replacement of forces (Art. 78, nums. 14–15; cont. 1922, Art. 58, nums. 20 and 19). The 1925 enumeration did not retain the annual legislative appointment of a separate Commander in Chief or the associated qualification of presidential powers (cf. 1922, Art. 57(2): “To appoint each year, if deemed appropriate […] a Commander in Chief of the National Army, and determine his functions in the same act.”; Art. 79, sole paragraph: “[…] in conformity with what Congress determines when exercising attribution 2 of Article 57 […]”).
REG-REL—Religion:
Religious liberty remained under statutory regulation and the supreme inspection of worship by the Ejecutivo Federal [Federal Executive]. The guarantee now expressly preserved the Patronato Eclesiástico [Ecclesiastical Patronage] referred to in Article 52 (Art. 32(14); cf. 1922, Art. 22(13): “Religious liberty in accordance with the laws and under the supreme inspection of every form of worship by the Federal Executive.”). Exercise of that patronage under the Ley de 28 de julio de 1824 [Law of 28 July 1824] remained (Art. 52; cont. 1922, Art. 112).
ECO-INF—Infrastructure:
Federal competence retained aerial, maritime, and fluvial navigation, wharves, national roads, and Correos, Telégrafos y Teléfonos [Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones]. Article 15 expressly included wireless communications, landing works, cables aéreos de tracción [aerial traction cables], and railways even within one State, while reserving urban tramways and urban traction cables to the respective municipalities (Art. 15, nums. 13 and 15–16; cf. 1922, Art. 19, base 9: “[…] aerial, maritime, coastal, and fluvial navigation and wharves and national roads […]”). The rule against restricting navigation of waters requiring no special works remained.
Federal public works throughout the Nation were expressly provided for without excluding works undertaken by States and municipalities (Art. 15(19)). Article 21 authorized federal forts, wharves, warehouses, shipyards, penitentiaries, and the other enumerated establishments in State territory (cf. 1922, Art. 19, base 7: “To cede to the Government of the Federation the territory necessary to erect forts, aerodromes, wharves, warehouses, shipyards, penitentiaries, communication routes, quarantine stations, national buildings, and other works indispensable to the general Administration.”).
The Municipalidades [Municipalities] received express competence for police, supplies, cemeteries, municipal ornamentation, civil architecture, lighting, aqueducts, urban tramways, and other municipal services. Local hygiene remained subject to federal sanitary law, regulation, and inspection (Art. 18(1); cf. 1922, Art. 19, base 4: “[…] municipal autonomy of the Districts and their independence from the political power of the State in matters concerning their economic and administrative regime […]”).
Congressional approval covered the enumerated railway, traction-cable, telegraphic, wireless, immigration, and other national-interest contracts. Mining concessions and public-land titles issued according to their respective laws were excluded from that approval (Art. 78(6); cf. 1922, Art. 58(10): “To approve or deny […] mining titles and concessions and alienations of public lands […] concessions for constructing communication routes […]”). The legislative enumeration included navigation, communications, railways, roads, motor traffic, public lands, saltworks, pearl fisheries, and mines (Art. 78(18); cf. 1922, Art. 19, base 9, sole paragraph: “The Federal Power is authorized to issue legislative and executive provisions concerning mechanically propelled vehicle traffic upon those roads.”).
Presidential regulation of sanitary and communications services required the Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] (Art. 100(10); cont. 1922, Art. 79(10), as to the services regulated). The competent Minister issued navigation patents and titles for public-land adjudications or leases and mining concessions (Art. 100, nums. 12 and 29; cf. 1922, Art. 79(18): “To administer public lands, mines, saltworks, and the distilled-spirits revenue in conformity with this Constitution and the laws.”).
CON-FIN—Final Provisions:
The seven-year federal period was counted from 19 April 1922, with legislative renewal within it (Art. 54; cf. 1922, Art. 128: “The constitutional terms of the Executive and Judicial branches of the Federal Power shall last seven years and shall be counted from 19 April of the election year.”). Article 128 continued the existing President, Vice President, and Court Members for the unexpired period, numbered the Court Alternates by their former electoral groups, retained Senators and Deputies for the remainder of their three-year terms, and required provision of the Procurator’s office under Article 113.
The Disposiciones Transitorias [Transitory Provisions] also authorized provisional presidential organization of the States pending their new constitutions and prescribed reciprocal renunciation of specified State and national fiscal claims through the fiscal year 1924–1925 (Arts. 129–130). These were not the transitory subject of 1922 (cf. 1922, Art. 136: “The First and Second Vice Presidents of the Republic for the present term shall be elected as soon as this Constitution is promulgated.”).
Promulgation and entry into force followed legislative scrutiny establishing State ratification (Art. 131; cont. 1922, Art. 135, as to scrutiny before commencement). The Constitution of 19 June 1922, ordered executed on 24 June 1922, was repealed (Art. 132; cf. 1922, Art. 137: “The Constitution of 13 June 1914 is repealed.”). The official computation of Independence and Federation remained in Article 26 (cont. 1922, Art. 129).
The concluding attestation was dated 24 June 1925 at the Palacio Federal Legislativo [Federal Legislative Palace], Caracas. The execution order was dated 1 July 1925 at the Palacio Federal [Federal Palace], Caracas, and signed by J. V. Gómez and the Ministers. The prefatory agreement of 24 June 1925 used in this apparatus is identified under DOC-PRE and in the source note.
Source note: this entry follows the recension of the Centro para la Integración y el Derecho Público [Centre for Integration and Public Law] (CIDEP), with the prefatory date and enacting formula corrected by collation with the reproduction in the Portal Iberoamericano de Derecho de la Cultura [Ibero-American Portal of Cultural Law], page 1. The Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes [Miguel de Cervantes Virtual Library] catalogue independently records sanction on 24 June 1925 and execution and official publication on 1 July 1925. 1925 CIDEP recension, 1925 collation witness, 1925 catalogue record, 1922 antecedent.
Ricardo F. Morín Golden Tent 40″h. x 26″w Watercolor on paper 2005
People try to understand the world while living inside it. They rely on rules that must hold and on words that must make sense. Some things cannot contradict each other. Some outcomes follow necessarily from given conditions. At the same time, people need meaning to be communicated, shared, corrected, and lived with over time. These two demands do not coincide. Rules alone do not explain experience, and meaning alone cannot hold without limits.
Mathematics shows constraint in its clearest form. When a relation is proven, it holds regardless of who considers it or when it is considered. Time does not alter a proof. Perspective does not change necessity. Mathematics shows what must be true independent of circumstance. Yet because of this independence, mathematics says little about what it is like to live under those constraints or to apply them within experience.
Language works differently. Meaning arises through use rather than through necessity. Words gain sense as people employ them across situations that change. Language carries memory, absorbs disagreement, and adapts as conditions shift. Its strength lies in allowing meaning to remain intelligible even when context cannot be removed. But this same flexibility prevents language from settling meaning once and for all. What is understood remains open to revision and dispute.
Rules by themselves do not produce understanding. Constraint must be carried into language so that meaning can be tested, shared, and corrected. Without language, rules remain abstract. Without constraint, language loses coherence.
Human understanding takes shape in the tension between these two demands rather than in their resolution. Logic without language remains detached from lived experience. Language without constraint dissolves into arbitrariness. Their refusal to collapse into one another is not a failure, but the condition under which understanding becomes possible.
This tension can be pictured through the idea of a horizon. When people look across a landscape, the horizon is not a wall but a meeting point. Different lines of sight converge there and make depth visible. No single line explains the horizon. The horizon explains how many perspectives can belong to the same space.
When perspective shifts, the horizon shifts with it. In curved or multidimensional space, there is no single fixed vanishing point. Structure remains, but position matters. Understanding develops through movement and reorientation rather than through arrival at a final viewpoint.
The sequence of diagnostic axes examined elsewhere—memory, identity, testimony, judgment, responsibility, and authorship—does not resolve into a single conclusion. Each axis shows how human capacities fail to remain fully governable over time. Only after tracing these failures does the horizon become visible. The horizon does not explain the axes or correct them. It names the space in which their limits can be understood.
What appears here is not meaning itself, but the condition under which judgment can form without collapsing into rigid necessity or unchecked arbitrariness. To recognize this horizon is not to remove uncertainty, but to locate it. Rules continue to limit what can be true. Language continues to shape what can be lived. Their coexistence, marked by friction rather than harmony, reflects the conditions under which human understanding remains possible.
Ricardo F. Morín Fidelity approx. 30″ x 47″ Sepia-printed collage from a translucent graphite drawing 1990
Between 1987 and 1990, I conceived Fidelity, a portrait of Victor Wiener, his Dutch partner, and their dog. Victor stands on the right. The two men face the viewer while the dog, seated at their feet, looks upward. The drawing preserves an early moment in their companionship, more than three decades ago, when much of the life they would share still lay ahead.
The finished work was a composite collage. I assembled the figures and the dog in two layers, with the background occupying a third. On smooth beige paper, the sepia varies in density and texture according to the handling of the medium. White chalk brings light to the men’s heads and to the dog, while soft tonal transitions preserve the drawing’s sfumato. The narrow beige edges at the top and bottom, with their sepia tabs, belong to the work itself.
I gave the finished composite to Victor. There was a history behind that gift.
In 1987, four of my paintings disappeared after being rented for The Clinic, a Lorimar production filmed at Kaufman Studios in Astoria, Queens, subsequently released as Hothouse. Through Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, a law firm accepted my case pro bono and assigned a junior attorney to represent me in pursuing a lawsuit. Victor, then executive director of the Appraisers Association of America, prepared the evaluation and rationale presented to Lorimar’s insurance adjusters concerning the lost works. His professional judgment helped establish the value of paintings I could no longer produce for examination.
I received fifteen thousand dollars in partial compensation. The amount fell short of the paintings’ full value, but it helped me continue working during one of the most difficult periods of my life. I was living with AIDS and paying for experimental drugs. The compensation helped sustain my painting and cover those expenses during the five years before I went on disability.
The money became time in which I could paint, obtain treatment, and persist through a period whose outcome I could not foresee. The paintings remained lost. Something of their value returned to the conditions that allowed other work to exist.
My legal and tax records from 1987–1993 accompanied me to Venezuela when I believed I was approaching death and sought refuge with my family. None of those papers has survived. With them went the documents that would now allow me to name the firm, the young lawyer, and the insurer. I remember the assistance and what it made possible, but I am still trying to recover the names of those who provided it.
In the years following my transition to disability, Victor’s life and mine grew apart amid difficult circumstances. We suffered, each within a life whose particulars remain private.
Around 2004, an unexpected encounter brought us together again. We agreed to have dinner at my place, where Victor and his partner met my life partner, David. The evening briefly restored a familiarity that years of separation had interrupted.
During dinner, Victor spoke of my work in relation to accomplished artists he knew, recognizing a strength comparable to theirs. I remember the distinction he made between resemblance and accomplishment. His words have stayed with me alongside the earlier assistance that had helped me continue painting.
When I look at Fidelity now, I see Victor beside the person with whom he was building a life, their dog looking up at them. Their companionship has its own history; my gratitude enters the circumstances of the portrait’s making and its passage into their lives. The work preserves a moment we can still look upon, although much of what surrounded it has become difficult to recover.
I have recently written to Victor, hoping that his recollection or surviving correspondence might help identify the lawyer and firm. I would like to give their assistance the acknowledgment it deserves. The loss of my papers has made that task uncertain, but the consequences of their work remain part of my life.
Today, when I play memory-building games on LinkedIn, Victor’s name occasionally appears alongside mine in a comparison of our scores. That is all I see of him now. His name brings back the circumstances in which we knew one another, his assistance, and the portrait I gave him. I hope that he and his partner are doing well.
Ricardo F. Morín Templates III 14” x 20” Watercolor and ink on paper 2003
People often discover that what they say or do does not remain where they placed it. A remark made in passing is repeated elsewhere. A decision taken for one purpose is later cited for another. Words meant to clarify are reused to justify actions the speaker never anticipated. Once expressed, what has been authored moves beyond the situation in which it was produced and enters contexts the author does not control.
What is written, declared, or enacted does not retain its meaning by remaining tied to intention. Readers, listeners, colleagues, and institutions receive what has been authored through their own expectations, needs, and circumstances. As situations change, the same words or actions are taken up differently. Meaning migrates not because authors relinquish care, but because interpretation unfolds wherever what has been authored circulates.
As interpretation accumulates, the link between origin and significance loosens. What an author sought to express does not vanish, yet it no longer governs how the expression will be understood or used. Each act of reception introduces new relations, drawing on conventions and pressures that exceed the author’s horizon. Over time, layers of meaning form that cannot be reduced to a single originating moment without loss.
Under these conditions, authority persists without control. Authored material continues to shape understanding and guide action even as the author’s capacity to direct its meaning diminishes. Texts, decisions, and gestures acquire standing not because their origin remains present, but because their effects endure within systems that rely on them. Authority attaches to circulation and use rather than to command.
When authorship is mistaken for sovereignty over meaning, confusion follows. Attempts to fix interpretation by appealing to origin fail to account for the fact that meaning arises through use rather than preservation. Efforts to reclaim control often generate conflict instead of clarity, as different contexts assert incompatible claims on what has been authored. What collapses in such moments is not meaning itself, but the assumption that meaning can be governed from a single point.
Authorship therefore functions as an unavoidable condition rather than a position of mastery. To author is to introduce words or actions into a field where interpretation proceeds independently of intent. What remains with the author is not ownership of meaning, but exposure to its unfolding. Authorship binds the author to consequences that continue to develop as what has been authored acquires significance beyond its initial articulation.
Authorship persists not as sovereignty over meaning, but as exposure to the ongoing movement of significance as what is authored circulates beyond its origin.
Ricardo F. Morín The Clown That Will Make You Cry Unfired clay bust in three colors 18 × 18 inches overall 1975
The pale hair has been arranged for permanence. Beneath it, the face has acquired the colour of annatto; the hands remain another color.
He entered a business his father had built. The father provided the enterprise; the son enlarged the signature. His name went onto buildings, products, and promises. Some of the companies subsequently entered bankruptcy. The name continued to advertise success. Creditors were left to appreciate the difference between the reputation that survived and the money that did not.
Television supplied a boardroom in which the competence of everyone except the host was under examination. Contestants competed for his approval and departed at his command. The programme could accommodate an unsuccessful applicant every week without disturbing the premise that the man behind the desk knew what he was doing. The audience could change the channel; nobody inside the programme could vote the host out.
In 2020, the electorate declined to renew his employment. He answered with the claim that the election had been stolen. An unfavourable verdict had reached a man accustomed to delivering them. The voters’ decision became, in his telling, subject to the approval of the candidate whose conduct they had been asked to judge.
The claim becomes useful as a requirement of loyalty. A person who repeats a plausible error may merely be mistaken. An official who repeats a disproved assertion gives the president a more exacting assurance of obedience. Correction would spoil the test. Government can acquire employees whose principal qualification is their willingness to help the employer remain wrong.
The barker brings forward the Cabinet’s financial marvels. His choice for Commerce was a billionaire financier. A sufficiently large fortune can do the work of a qualification before a question has been asked. The audience is invited to inspect private wealth and take public judgment on trust.
The efficiency attraction was entrusted to Elon Musk, who promised a trillion dollars in spending cuts. A wall of savings followed. Federal auditors later found that DOGE had claimed $1.7 billion from a military health IT contract that had neither been terminated nor reduced. The contract continued. The saving had nevertheless enjoyed a successful public career.
Officials with professional obligations can be less entertaining. An auditor may produce a figure that spoils an announcement; a civil servant may explain that the president’s preference has encountered a law. The president has ordered several federal bodies reduced to the minimum required by law and independent agencies brought under closer presidential supervision. An institution depleted of staff has fewer people available to explain the limits of an instruction. A vacant chair offers no competing account of the government’s obligations. The vacancy is an agreeable public servant.
The president’s departure would not retire the example. Vacancies, precedents, and enlarged claims of executive power would be available to a successor whose promises sounded entirely different. The next president might even promise to save the country from the present one. The restraints would be no easier to rebuild because the new occupant had better manners.
For the government of artificial intelligence, the president offers his intelligence. His administration’s March 2026 proposal still found employment for Congress and existing regulators, allowing ordinary state enforcement while seeking to displace some state AI rules. On September 14, he identified the only necessary safeguard as a “STRONG AND SMART (High IQ!) PRESIDENT” and assured the country that the position was filled. He also invoked existing criminal and regulatory powers. The public assurance nevertheless rested on the overseer’s testimonial to himself.
For more general guidance, the president has put his doctrine in writing: “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law.”
He has found a further use for the separation of powers: the branches need not arrive at the same time. The executive issues an order, legislators request the documents, and judges consider the challenge. By the time authority has been examined, the country may already be living under the decision. Restoring a limit can then be made to look like disturbing an established order. The executive has acquired the advantage of making obedience immediate and correction expensive.
In the tariff case, the Supreme Court found no tariff power in the emergency statute he had invoked. The duties had reached commerce before the claimed authority completed its journey through the courts. Businesses had to respond to an executive decision whose legal foundation the executive had overstated. The government could collect first while the governed financed the question of whether the government had been entitled to collect.
The spectators outside the country have no ballot with which to interrupt the performance. A threat delivered to an applauding audience can become another country’s emergency. People who never asked to attend the spectacle must conduct their affairs around its next announcement.
Geography offers a cheaper form of expansion. The Gulf of Mexico and Lake Ontario have been furnished with the name America for federal use. An official map can display the achievement without moving the opposite shore. Greenland requires more elaborate paperwork. The president has described expanded American military access as permanent control over security; Denmark maintains its sovereignty and Greenland its right to self-determination. The agreement must accommodate an announcement of possession without a transfer of ownership.
At home, the audience must be kept suitably informed. Reporters from CNN, MS NOW, and Politico have been turned away from the White House over their organizations’ coverage. The man under scrutiny has taken charge of admitting the witnesses. An audience prepared for greatness should not have to choose between the barker and a reporter who has looked behind the curtain. The exclusion also instructs the reporters still admitted, before they have asked a question.
The president’s appointment has received a further endorsement from the president. “I was saved by God to make America great again,” he announced at his inauguration. For the supporter who regards Christian identity as a warrant to rule other citizens, the declaration offers a useful promotion. A political preference can become a sacred obligation. The neighbour retains a vote; the neighbour’s right to prevail becomes negotiable.
Congress knows a quieter way of distinguishing the governors from the governed. The law recognizes illness as an exception to salary deductions in the House. A member who opposes comparable security for workers can recover without the financial lesson prescribed for constituents. Nor need the compliant legislator surrender the advantages of office when surrendering its independence. A salary, a title, and a staff survive the discovery that the president has already done the thinking. Constituents can still write. Congressional stationery remains available for explaining an executive decision.
A loyal supporter may eventually need a rule that obliges the president to listen. An order may touch the supporter’s property, livelihood, or family. The citizen will then discover the difference between having a right and being on good terms with the man who can disregard it. The petition must establish the writer’s loyalty before approaching the inconvenience of the writer’s injury. Even a complaint must contribute to the assurance that the president has done nothing wrong.
The ballot may remain secret while the campaign teaches the citizen to expect a benefactor. A person entitled to examine the conduct of a public servant is encouraged to consider the advantages of being a grateful recipient. The president can receive the public’s thanks for a payment the public would have to finance.
The midterms will provide an opportunity to inspect the supporting cast. A candidate for Congress who promises obedience to the president should explain why obedience requires an independent office. The nation already pays for a White House staff. A legislature capable of refusal would preserve a restraint for the next president as well as the present one.
The people may have their country back, provided they make no further claim to govern it.