The Trojan Horse, Ricardo F. Morín. CGI, 2026. Political allegory.
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Ricardo F. Morín
October 31, 2026
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Political credibility may be lost through conduct, disappointed expectations, or the gradual withdrawal of public confidence. It may also be weakened by accusations whose repetition exceeds the evidence upon which they rest. The distinction is particularly consequential when a political figure defends an electoral mandate that has been denied effect while those exercising governmental power determine the conditions under which that mandate may eventually be addressed. In Venezuela, the credibility of María Corina Machado is being contested amid negotiations conducted with an interim government whose constitutional legitimacy remains disputed. The Trump administration has supported that government while pursuing arrangements for stabilization, economic recovery, and an eventual political transition.[1] Yet the constitutional question preceding these arrangements has not been resolved. The electoral evidence from 2024 identifies a president whose term has not been permitted to begin. Public judgment itself may be compromised when those who control the political process also determine the admissibility of those who defend an electoral decision whose constitutional consequences remain unfulfilled.
The presidential election of July 28, 2024, produced a result whose significance cannot be reduced to an opposition claim. Although the National Electoral Council declared Nicolás Maduro the winner without publishing the polling-station records necessary to substantiate its announcement, the records collected and published by the opposition demonstrated a decisive victory for Edmundo González Urrutia. The Carter Center independently examined those records and found them authentic and consistent with a clear victory for González. Its findings also documented serious deficiencies in the electoral process, including restrictions imposed upon candidates and voters, the absence of institutional impartiality, and the authorities’ refusal to disclose the evidence supporting their declared result.[2] Those deficiencies impaired the election’s democratic integrity, but they did not establish that Maduro had received the majority of votes. The failure of the institutions responsible for administering an election does not convert their unsupported declaration into evidence of the electorate’s choice.
Under Article 228 of Venezuela’s Constitution, the presidency is determined by universal, direct, and secret suffrage, and the candidate receiving the majority of valid votes is to be proclaimed elected. Article 230 establishes a six-year presidential term, while Article 231 provides for assumption of office on January 10 of its first year.[3] The evidence supporting González’s victory consequently concerns the presidential period beginning January 10, 2025, and extending to January 2031. The authorities’ refusal to proclaim him and permit his inauguration introduced a separation between the electoral title supported by the voting records and formal possession of the office. The constitutional requirements for proclamation and inauguration cannot simply be disregarded, but neither can their obstruction be treated as evidence that the electoral decision never occurred. The dispute concerns a choice already expressed by the electorate and the constitutional consequences of preventing that choice from taking effect. It is not merely a disagreement about who should govern Venezuela at some future date.
Maduro’s refusal to surrender power on January 10, 2025, established the present separation between electoral legitimacy and governmental control. His removal by American military action on January 3, 2026, did not resolve it. Rather than support González’s immediate assumption of the presidency indicated by the electoral records, the Trump administration elected to work with the governmental apparatus that had remained in place under Maduro. Delcy Rodríguez, his appointed executive vice president, consequently exercised presidential functions with Washington’s support.[1] The two administrations’ actions were not legally identical. Maduro’s government rejected the electoral evidence and retained power against the result it disclosed. The Trump administration subsequently chose to recognize and cooperate with Rodríguez instead of giving immediate practical effect to González’s electoral claim. That decision did not formally extinguish González’s title, but it prolonged the circumstances in which the candidate supported by the voting records remained unable to exercise the presidency. Maduro’s removal ended his personal exercise of governmental power without settling the constitutional authority of those who succeeded him.
Rodríguez’s assumption of presidential functions presents a separate constitutional difficulty. On January 3, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice issued Judgment No. 00001, invoking Articles 234 and 239 of the Constitution to order her to exercise presidential functions following Maduro’s forced absence. The Chamber described the situation as exceptional and not literally contemplated by the Constitution. It relied upon Article 234 as a general basis for addressing a temporary impossibility while declining to determine definitively whether Maduro’s absence was temporary or absolute.[4] Article 234 ordinarily permits the executive vice president to substitute for a temporarily absent president for ninety days, extendable by the National Assembly for another ninety. It also requires the Assembly, after ninety consecutive days of absence, to determine by majority vote whether the absence should be considered absolute. Article 233 identifies the circumstances constituting absolute presidential absence and prescribes the corresponding succession and electoral procedures.[3] These provisions cannot be treated as though the expiration of ninety or 180 days automatically produces every consequence contemplated by Article 233. Neither, however, does the Court’s invocation of an exceptional circumstance establish an indefinite constitutional entitlement to exercise presidential authority. By July 2026, the ordinary maximum period for temporary substitution had elapsed without a publicly established resolution of the succession question.[1] According to an October 26 report by EFE, a senior State Department official described a proposed sequence in which, following the renewal of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and the National Electoral Council, Rodríguez would declare a permanent presidential vacancy, initiating a six-month period for elections.[4] That proposed sequence neither constituted an adopted declaration of a permanent vacancy nor resolved which Venezuelan institution possessed constitutional competence to make such a determination. The judgment supplied an immediate arrangement for administrative continuity while leaving unanswered the constitutional basis and duration of its continuation. More fundamentally, it proceeded from Maduro’s presumed presidential title without resolving the disputed electoral mandate arising from 2024.
The Trump administration’s recognition of Rodríguez in March 2026 gave her government a defined position in American diplomatic and legal relations. Washington acknowledged her as Venezuela’s head of state, capable of acting on its behalf.[5] Such recognition has practical consequences for governmental representation, commercial transactions, and relations between states. It does not determine whether Rodríguez possesses legitimate presidential title under Venezuela’s Constitution. A foreign government may recognize authorities with whom it considers cooperation necessary, but that decision cannot confer an electoral mandate that the recognized authorities do not otherwise possess. Nor does the practical necessity of maintaining public administration establish a constitutional entitlement to exercise power beyond the limits governing its temporary assumption. The existing distribution of power may explain why Washington chose Rodríguez as its interlocutor. It cannot, without further constitutional justification, establish that she possesses authority to determine the disposition of the presidential mandate recorded in 2024.
Machado’s political position must be understood within that unresolved constitutional dispute. She won the opposition presidential primary in 2023 but was prevented from standing in the 2024 election. She subsequently supported González as the opposition’s presidential candidate, and the movement associated with her helped mobilize the electorate and preserve the polling-station records that documented his victory.[6] Her continued defense of that result therefore concerns a mandate conferred upon another person, not an entitlement to the presidency that she claims for herself. Her conduct, alliances, and political judgment remain open to criticism, but those questions cannot displace the constitutional significance of González’s unfulfilled term. Machado’s position is not confined to her standing as a prospective political participant. She also defends an electoral decision whose implementation was first obstructed under Maduro and has remained unrealized under the political arrangements supported by Washington.
The composition of the negotiations illustrates the consequences of that separation. Representatives of Rodríguez’s interim government and Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly participate in discussions intended to reform judicial and electoral institutions before future elections. Machado’s Vente Venezuela movement is not represented among the participating delegations.[1] The American administration has defended institutional reconstruction as necessary for credible elections, and the restoration of independent courts and electoral administration remains a legitimate objective.[7] The presence of representatives of the 2015 National Assembly introduces an element of prior electoral legitimacy into the discussions, but it does not establish that the negotiations possess authority to dispose of the presidential decision of 2024. Rodríguez’s participation follows from her effective control of governmental institutions and Washington’s recognition of her capacity to act. Neither circumstance resolves the constitutional foundation of her authority. An interim government whose title remains disputed consequently participates in determining the arrangements through which an independently supported electoral mandate may eventually be addressed, while the movement associated with the defense of that mandate remains outside the negotiations.
Machado’s return to Venezuela on October 25 altered her physical circumstances without changing this distribution of power.[8] On October 26, Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Washington had urged the interim government to permit her return, while reiterating the administration’s commitment to reforming Venezuela’s electoral institutions before another presidential election.[7] When asked about Machado’s return, Rodríguez called for an end to political show and described dialogue as a serious undertaking requiring experience and knowledge, removed from the participation of political novices. She also expressed the hope that different voices would be heard, while suggesting that those who had supported sanctions or external intervention should demonstrate repentance.[9] On the same day, Machado’s spokesperson, Claudia Macero, confirmed her willingness to meet Rodríguez or any other necessary participant, provided the discussions occurred openly and with an established agenda.[10] The statements did not establish that an agreement could be reached or that Machado possessed an unconditional entitlement to join the existing negotiations. They did establish a willingness to negotiate alongside an unfavorable characterization of her political seriousness, without demonstrating that her conduct justified her movement’s continued absence.
The exchange occurred against a history of serious political antagonism. In January, Machado had described Rodríguez as one of the principal architects of torture, persecution, corruption, and drug trafficking under Maduro.[11] International investigations have extensively documented torture, arbitrary detention, and other grave abuses committed through Venezuelan state institutions. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission reported in September 2026 that substantial elements of the repressive apparatus remained intact despite changes in political leadership.[12] These findings establish an evidentiary foundation for examining the responsibility of officials associated with the preceding government. They do not, without further examination, establish Rodríguez’s individual responsibility for each offense attributed to her. Her criticism of Machado’s political seriousness concerns a different allegation, with a different evidentiary burden. Equal standards of examination do not require equal weight to be assigned to assertions supported by different bodies of evidence. Nor does governmental office confer upon Rodríguez an independent authority to determine the political qualifications of a rival whose movement helped defend an electoral mandate that the institutions she serves have not honored.
The transformation of characterization into apparent evidence is among the more consequential operations of political propaganda. A political leader’s refusal to accommodate a particular arrangement may be presented as proof of inflexibility; her insistence upon electoral participation as evidence of personal ambition; her popularity as a source of instability. Once such descriptions circulate widely, subsequent disagreement may be interpreted as confirmation of an established defect, even when the disagreement concerns a substantive question deserving independent examination. Repetition supplies the appearance of corroboration, while the original basis of the allegation recedes from consideration. A political movement’s absence from negotiations may then encourage speculation about its seriousness, capacity, or willingness to cooperate, and that speculation may subsequently be invoked to justify its continued absence. Exclusion encourages doubt about credibility, while that doubt provides a retrospective justification for exclusion. What requires explanation is presented as though it had already been explained. Such a process does not establish that every omission from negotiations results from propaganda or that Machado’s absence was deliberately engineered through a campaign of discrediting. It reveals how an arrangement may obtain an appearance of justification from consequences partly produced by the arrangement itself.
The constitutional discrepancy introduces a more fundamental inversion. Rodríguez’s participation is treated as an established feature of the transition because she exercises governmental power and enjoys Washington’s recognition, while Machado’s political admissibility remains subject to discussion. Yet the source and duration of Rodríguez’s presidential authority have not been constitutionally resolved, whereas the electoral records supporting González’s claim have undergone independent examination. The two positions do not carry identical constitutional significance, and neither recognition nor control of governmental institutions can make them equivalent. The danger lies in permitting the continued exercise of power to acquire the appearance of rightful authority while those who question its legitimacy are required to establish their own political qualifications. Those whose authority requires constitutional justification assume the position of judging the admissibility of those who defend an electoral mandate. Public support may survive this arrangement without securing corresponding representation in the negotiations. A movement need not lose its supporters to suffer political disadvantage if those responsible for determining the course of the transition treat its support as insufficient grounds for participation. The judgment of citizens is then measured against the preferences of the negotiating authorities rather than the legitimacy of those authorities being examined against the decisions of the electorate.
The language of stability can reinforce this reversal. The restoration of courts, electoral institutions, civil liberties, and ordinary economic activity requires time and cooperation. These are substantive requirements, not merely rhetorical conveniences. On October 26, Rubio warned that attempts to derail the transition would seriously harm Venezuela, and he expressly included the interim authorities among those whose failure to cooperate could jeopardize the process. His warning did not establish that Machado was obstructing the transition. It reflected Washington’s determination to preserve the sequence of institutional reforms it had adopted.[7] The constitutional question concerns the criteria by which compliance with that sequence is distinguished from legitimate disagreement about its purposes or consequences. A demand for earlier elections may conflict with Washington’s preferred timetable without necessarily threatening the objective of credible elections. Conversely, adherence to the timetable does not establish that the electoral mandate previously denied effect has been constitutionally addressed. The necessity of institutional reconstruction may explain the postponement of a new vote, but it cannot itself resolve what should become of the choice already expressed by the electorate.
A future presidential election may offer a means of restoring democratic authority if the conditions for a credible contest can be established. Machado herself has advocated a new electoral timetable.[13] Yet the possible merits of another election do not explain what became of González’s electoral mandate. If the result of 2024 is treated as inconsequential merely because another election is contemplated, the obstruction of the earlier decision may have succeeded in depriving that decision of practical effect. Recognition of González’s electoral claim does not settle every constitutional question concerning a delayed assumption of presidential functions, and the legal consequences of the intervening years require examination. Neither does the passage of time automatically extinguish the electoral evidence or justify the refusal to honor it. A subsequent election could establish a new mandate, but it would not retrospectively validate the denial of the previous one. The question of constitutional title cannot be disposed of simply by replacing the occasion on which the electorate was permitted to choose.
Political discrediting need not arise from a coordinated campaign to produce consequential effects. Economic interests, diplomatic objectives, institutional considerations, and personal rivalries may influence negotiations without establishing that their participants share a concealed purpose. Political adversaries may have reasons to diminish a rival’s influence; commentators may repeat conjecture because it supplies an appealing explanation for uncertain events; and audiences may accept familiar accusations without examining their original basis. These activities can reinforce one another without coordination. A deliberate campaign would require evidence concerning its participants, communications, resources, and objectives. Yet uncertainty about the origin of an allegation does not settle the separate question of its consequences. A narrative may benefit interests that did not originate it, just as a participant may exploit an existing controversy without having produced it. The distinction between a beneficiary and an originator prevents the attribution of motives without evidence while leaving the political consequences available for examination.
The Trump administration’s responsibility must be assessed through the decisions it has undertaken and the leverage it continues to exercise. Its recognition of Rodríguez, its commitments to the interim authorities, its commercial arrangements, and its proposed sequence of political reforms are exercises of American governmental power with consequences for Venezuela.[1] Their practical justification may rest upon considerations of stability, security, economic recovery, or diplomatic feasibility. None independently determines the constitutional legitimacy of the Venezuelan authorities with whom Washington has chosen to cooperate. The same evidentiary discipline applies to Machado’s criticism of those arrangements, her demands concerning electoral timing, and her relationship with American political figures. Disagreement with an economic or diplomatic agreement does not establish a defect of character, just as public support does not exempt a political leader from responsibility for her statements or decisions. The examination of governmental authority and the examination of political conduct must remain directed toward their respective subjects. Responsibility follows the exercise of authority; the validity of an allegation follows the evidence supporting it.
The conditions under which citizens form political judgments are already being shaped before another election is held. Access to public communication, recognition of political participants, the composition of negotiations, and the credibility assigned to competing movements may affect the alternatives that citizens are eventually permitted to consider. An election conducted after these conditions have changed may still permit a genuine contest, but its integrity cannot be assessed solely by reference to the procedures followed on election day. Citizens may properly withdraw support because they have examined new evidence, changed their expectations, or reached different conclusions about political conduct. Such reconsideration is indispensable to independent judgment. But public confidence may also be weakened by accusations whose circulation exceeds their evidentiary foundation. When the institutions responsible for determining the electoral arrangements possess disputed constitutional authority of their own, the consequences extend beyond the reputation of a political figure. The resulting process may establish not only the conditions under which citizens choose, but also the terms under which an earlier choice is to be recognized, reconsidered, or disregarded.
Venezuela’s present uncertainty cannot be resolved by confusing the exercise of power with constitutional title or by treating prospective arrangements as a substitute for decisions already made. The Trump administration possesses considerable influence over the course of the transition, but neither its intentions nor its ultimate capacity to accomplish its stated objectives can be inferred completely from its announcements. Rodríguez exercises governmental power, yet the continuation of her interim presidency does not settle its constitutional foundation. González possesses a substantial electoral claim grounded in the independently examined results of 2024, but he has not been permitted to assume the office for which the evidence indicates he was elected. Machado defends that claim while remaining subject to political judgment concerning her own conduct and aspirations. These positions cannot be made equivalent merely because their occupants participate, or seek to participate, in the same political controversy. The composition of the negotiations establishes who presently takes part in them; it does not determine who possesses constitutional title or who deserves the confidence of the electorate.
The injury that propaganda can inflict upon political life is not confined to the reputation of the person against whom it is directed. Its more enduring consequence lies in the possibility that citizens will be deprived of the means to distinguish an established fact from an insinuation, an institutional decision from a personal judgment, or the exercise of governmental power from the constitutional authority that should justify it. Doubt is indispensable to independent thought when it invites examination. It becomes an instrument of subordination when it is cultivated to prevent examination from reaching its proper object. The electoral decision of 2024 has already been denied effect, and the constitutional consequences of that denial remain unresolved. Whether Machado ultimately retains, enlarges, or loses public confidence is a question Venezuelans must be free to determine. The further danger is that the continuing denial of an electoral mandate may come to be accepted as a legitimate condition of political life, while those who defend that mandate are made to answer for their credibility before authorities whose own title remains in question.
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Endnotes
[1] Congressional Research Service. Venezuela’s Post-Maduro Political Transition and U.S. Policy. Report R49186, August 13, 2026. Documents the American military operation, the administration’s support for Rodríguez rather than González, the phased transition, and the composition of negotiations.
[2] The Carter Center. Final Report: Observation of the 2024 Presidential Election in Venezuela. February 17, 2025. Independent examination of electoral conditions, official results, and opposition polling-station records.
[3] Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, with Constitutional Amendment No. 1, approved February 15, 2009. Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, No. 5.908 Extraordinario, February 19, 2009. Articles 228, 230, 231, 233, 234, and 239. Article 230 retains the six-year presidential term as amended, while eliminating the former limitation on reelection. Official gazette reproduced by the Superintendencia de las Instituciones del Sector Bancario (SUDEBAN).
[4] Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Sala Constitucional. Sentencia n.º 00001, expediente 2026-00001, January 3, 2026. Constitutional interpretation concerning the temporary exercise of presidential functions by Vice President Delcy Rodríguez. Decision discussed and reproduced by Acceso a la Justicia. See also EFE, “El Gobierno Trump espera que Delcy Rodríguez deje vacante la Presidencia de Venezuela en 2027,” October 26, 2026, reporting the succession proposal described by a senior State Department official.
[5] U.S. Department of State. A Statement on U.S.-Venezuela Relations, March 5, 2026. See also Ambassador Michael G. Kozak’s letter of March 10, 2026, incorporated into the United States’ Statement of Interest filed March 11, 2026, in Stansell v. FARC, No. 16-mc-00405 (S.D.N.Y.), Docket 621. The court filing and attached State Department communication appear in a seven-page package subsequently submitted to the Foreign Agents Registration Act archive by The Cormac Group LLC, registration No. 7406, on March 16, 2026. The archive submission is not itself a State Department filing.
State Department announcement, preserved reproduction:
[6] Inter-Parliamentary Union. Human Rights of Parliamentarians: Venezuela. Parliamentary documentation of Machado’s 2023 opposition primary victory, her disqualification from the 2024 presidential election, and the selection of González Urrutia as the opposition candidate.
[7] U.S. Department of State. Marco Rubio, Secretary of State. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Venezuela. Remarks via teleconference, October 26, 2026. Addresses Machado’s return, electoral-system reform, the transitional timetable, and the administration’s expectations of the interim authorities. The original State Department webpage could not be opened directly during verification; an accessible reproduction is provided below. An October 26 EFE report separately attributes to a senior State Department official the proposed sequence of institutional reform, presidential vacancy, and elections within six months.
[8] Associated Press. Venezuela’s opposition leader Machado returns after months in exile, as doubts over democracy deepen. October 25, 2026. Reporting on Machado’s return, the public reception, and the unsettled political arrangements.
[9] El Impulso. Delcy Rodríguez al ser consultada sobre el regreso de María Corina Machado: “La política no es un show”. October 26, 2026. Contemporary reporting concerning Rodríguez’s remarks.
El Estímulo. Aumentos, elecciones, el estilo Rubio y un mensaje a la “neófita”: el discurso de Delcy Rodríguez. October 29, 2026. Reproduces Rodríguez’s references to experience, knowledge, and political novices.
[10] ANSA. Machado dispuesta a reunirse con Delcy Rodríguez en Caracas. October 26, 2026. Reports Claudia Macero’s statements concerning Machado’s willingness to negotiate openly with Rodríguez or other participants.
[11] CNN. One World: Transcript, January 6, 2026. Reproduces Machado’s January 5 Fox News statement describing Rodríguez as one of the principal architects of torture, persecution, corruption, and narcotrafficking.
[12] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. A/HRC/63/57, issued August 17, 2026, and published September 2026. Findings concerning the continuity of repressive institutions, human rights violations, and the absence of adequate accountability. See also the Mission’s detailed Spanish-language study “La continuidad del aparato represivo del Estado,” A/HRC/63/CRP.5, September 17, 2026, concerning the persistence of repressive institutions; it is distinct from A/HRC/63/CRP.4 on colectivos.
[13] Reuters. Rubio says Venezuela’s electoral infrastructure must be replaced before a vote. October 26, 2026. Reports the administration’s position on electoral reform, the timing of future elections, and Machado’s proposals for a new vote.
“The Uses of Doubt”
November 1, 2026*
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Ricardo F. Morín
October 31, 2026
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Political credibility may be lost through conduct, disappointed expectations, or the gradual withdrawal of public confidence. It may also be weakened by accusations whose repetition exceeds the evidence upon which they rest. The distinction is particularly consequential when a political figure defends an electoral mandate that has been denied effect while those exercising governmental power determine the conditions under which that mandate may eventually be addressed. In Venezuela, the credibility of María Corina Machado is being contested amid negotiations conducted with an interim government whose constitutional legitimacy remains disputed. The Trump administration has supported that government while pursuing arrangements for stabilization, economic recovery, and an eventual political transition.[1] Yet the constitutional question preceding these arrangements has not been resolved. The electoral evidence from 2024 identifies a president whose term has not been permitted to begin. Public judgment itself may be compromised when those who control the political process also determine the admissibility of those who defend an electoral decision whose constitutional consequences remain unfulfilled.
The presidential election of July 28, 2024, produced a result whose significance cannot be reduced to an opposition claim. Although the National Electoral Council declared Nicolás Maduro the winner without publishing the polling-station records necessary to substantiate its announcement, the records collected and published by the opposition demonstrated a decisive victory for Edmundo González Urrutia. The Carter Center independently examined those records and found them authentic and consistent with a clear victory for González. Its findings also documented serious deficiencies in the electoral process, including restrictions imposed upon candidates and voters, the absence of institutional impartiality, and the authorities’ refusal to disclose the evidence supporting their declared result.[2] Those deficiencies impaired the election’s democratic integrity, but they did not establish that Maduro had received the majority of votes. The failure of the institutions responsible for administering an election does not convert their unsupported declaration into evidence of the electorate’s choice.
Under Article 228 of Venezuela’s Constitution, the presidency is determined by universal, direct, and secret suffrage, and the candidate receiving the majority of valid votes is to be proclaimed elected. Article 230 establishes a six-year presidential term, while Article 231 provides for assumption of office on January 10 of its first year.[3] The evidence supporting González’s victory consequently concerns the presidential period beginning January 10, 2025, and extending to January 2031. The authorities’ refusal to proclaim him and permit his inauguration introduced a separation between the electoral title supported by the voting records and formal possession of the office. The constitutional requirements for proclamation and inauguration cannot simply be disregarded, but neither can their obstruction be treated as evidence that the electoral decision never occurred. The dispute concerns a choice already expressed by the electorate and the constitutional consequences of preventing that choice from taking effect. It is not merely a disagreement about who should govern Venezuela at some future date.
Maduro’s refusal to surrender power on January 10, 2025, established the present separation between electoral legitimacy and governmental control. His removal by American military action on January 3, 2026, did not resolve it. Rather than support González’s immediate assumption of the presidency indicated by the electoral records, the Trump administration elected to work with the governmental apparatus that had remained in place under Maduro. Delcy Rodríguez, his appointed executive vice president, consequently exercised presidential functions with Washington’s support.[1] The two administrations’ actions were not legally identical. Maduro’s government rejected the electoral evidence and retained power against the result it disclosed. The Trump administration subsequently chose to recognize and cooperate with Rodríguez instead of giving immediate practical effect to González’s electoral claim. That decision did not formally extinguish González’s title, but it prolonged the circumstances in which the candidate supported by the voting records remained unable to exercise the presidency. Maduro’s removal ended his personal exercise of governmental power without settling the constitutional authority of those who succeeded him.
Rodríguez’s assumption of presidential functions presents a separate constitutional difficulty. On January 3, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice issued Judgment No. 00001, invoking Articles 234 and 239 of the Constitution to order her to exercise presidential functions following Maduro’s forced absence. The Chamber described the situation as exceptional and not literally contemplated by the Constitution. It relied upon Article 234 as a general basis for addressing a temporary impossibility while declining to determine definitively whether Maduro’s absence was temporary or absolute.[4] Article 234 ordinarily permits the executive vice president to substitute for a temporarily absent president for ninety days, extendable by the National Assembly for another ninety. It also requires the Assembly, after ninety consecutive days of absence, to determine by majority vote whether the absence should be considered absolute. Article 233 identifies the circumstances constituting absolute presidential absence and prescribes the corresponding succession and electoral procedures.[3] These provisions cannot be treated as though the expiration of ninety or 180 days automatically produces every consequence contemplated by Article 233. Neither, however, does the Court’s invocation of an exceptional circumstance establish an indefinite constitutional entitlement to exercise presidential authority. By July 2026, the ordinary maximum period for temporary substitution had elapsed without a publicly established resolution of the succession question.[1] According to an October 26 report by EFE, a senior State Department official described a proposed sequence in which, following the renewal of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and the National Electoral Council, Rodríguez would declare a permanent presidential vacancy, initiating a six-month period for elections.[4] That proposed sequence neither constituted an adopted declaration of a permanent vacancy nor resolved which Venezuelan institution possessed constitutional competence to make such a determination. The judgment supplied an immediate arrangement for administrative continuity while leaving unanswered the constitutional basis and duration of its continuation. More fundamentally, it proceeded from Maduro’s presumed presidential title without resolving the disputed electoral mandate arising from 2024.
The Trump administration’s recognition of Rodríguez in March 2026 gave her government a defined position in American diplomatic and legal relations. Washington acknowledged her as Venezuela’s head of state, capable of acting on its behalf.[5] Such recognition has practical consequences for governmental representation, commercial transactions, and relations between states. It does not determine whether Rodríguez possesses legitimate presidential title under Venezuela’s Constitution. A foreign government may recognize authorities with whom it considers cooperation necessary, but that decision cannot confer an electoral mandate that the recognized authorities do not otherwise possess. Nor does the practical necessity of maintaining public administration establish a constitutional entitlement to exercise power beyond the limits governing its temporary assumption. The existing distribution of power may explain why Washington chose Rodríguez as its interlocutor. It cannot, without further constitutional justification, establish that she possesses authority to determine the disposition of the presidential mandate recorded in 2024.
Machado’s political position must be understood within that unresolved constitutional dispute. She won the opposition presidential primary in 2023 but was prevented from standing in the 2024 election. She subsequently supported González as the opposition’s presidential candidate, and the movement associated with her helped mobilize the electorate and preserve the polling-station records that documented his victory.[6] Her continued defense of that result therefore concerns a mandate conferred upon another person, not an entitlement to the presidency that she claims for herself. Her conduct, alliances, and political judgment remain open to criticism, but those questions cannot displace the constitutional significance of González’s unfulfilled term. Machado’s position is not confined to her standing as a prospective political participant. She also defends an electoral decision whose implementation was first obstructed under Maduro and has remained unrealized under the political arrangements supported by Washington.
The composition of the negotiations illustrates the consequences of that separation. Representatives of Rodríguez’s interim government and Venezuela’s 2015 National Assembly participate in discussions intended to reform judicial and electoral institutions before future elections. Machado’s Vente Venezuela movement is not represented among the participating delegations.[1] The American administration has defended institutional reconstruction as necessary for credible elections, and the restoration of independent courts and electoral administration remains a legitimate objective.[7] The presence of representatives of the 2015 National Assembly introduces an element of prior electoral legitimacy into the discussions, but it does not establish that the negotiations possess authority to dispose of the presidential decision of 2024. Rodríguez’s participation follows from her effective control of governmental institutions and Washington’s recognition of her capacity to act. Neither circumstance resolves the constitutional foundation of her authority. An interim government whose title remains disputed consequently participates in determining the arrangements through which an independently supported electoral mandate may eventually be addressed, while the movement associated with the defense of that mandate remains outside the negotiations.
Machado’s return to Venezuela on October 25 altered her physical circumstances without changing this distribution of power.[8] On October 26, Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Washington had urged the interim government to permit her return, while reiterating the administration’s commitment to reforming Venezuela’s electoral institutions before another presidential election.[7] When asked about Machado’s return, Rodríguez called for an end to political show and described dialogue as a serious undertaking requiring experience and knowledge, removed from the participation of political novices. She also expressed the hope that different voices would be heard, while suggesting that those who had supported sanctions or external intervention should demonstrate repentance.[9] On the same day, Machado’s spokesperson, Claudia Macero, confirmed her willingness to meet Rodríguez or any other necessary participant, provided the discussions occurred openly and with an established agenda.[10] The statements did not establish that an agreement could be reached or that Machado possessed an unconditional entitlement to join the existing negotiations. They did establish a willingness to negotiate alongside an unfavorable characterization of her political seriousness, without demonstrating that her conduct justified her movement’s continued absence.
The exchange occurred against a history of serious political antagonism. In January, Machado had described Rodríguez as one of the principal architects of torture, persecution, corruption, and drug trafficking under Maduro.[11] International investigations have extensively documented torture, arbitrary detention, and other grave abuses committed through Venezuelan state institutions. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission reported in September 2026 that substantial elements of the repressive apparatus remained intact despite changes in political leadership.[12] These findings establish an evidentiary foundation for examining the responsibility of officials associated with the preceding government. They do not, without further examination, establish Rodríguez’s individual responsibility for each offense attributed to her. Her criticism of Machado’s political seriousness concerns a different allegation, with a different evidentiary burden. Equal standards of examination do not require equal weight to be assigned to assertions supported by different bodies of evidence. Nor does governmental office confer upon Rodríguez an independent authority to determine the political qualifications of a rival whose movement helped defend an electoral mandate that the institutions she serves have not honored.
The transformation of characterization into apparent evidence is among the more consequential operations of political propaganda. A political leader’s refusal to accommodate a particular arrangement may be presented as proof of inflexibility; her insistence upon electoral participation as evidence of personal ambition; her popularity as a source of instability. Once such descriptions circulate widely, subsequent disagreement may be interpreted as confirmation of an established defect, even when the disagreement concerns a substantive question deserving independent examination. Repetition supplies the appearance of corroboration, while the original basis of the allegation recedes from consideration. A political movement’s absence from negotiations may then encourage speculation about its seriousness, capacity, or willingness to cooperate, and that speculation may subsequently be invoked to justify its continued absence. Exclusion encourages doubt about credibility, while that doubt provides a retrospective justification for exclusion. What requires explanation is presented as though it had already been explained. Such a process does not establish that every omission from negotiations results from propaganda or that Machado’s absence was deliberately engineered through a campaign of discrediting. It reveals how an arrangement may obtain an appearance of justification from consequences partly produced by the arrangement itself.
The constitutional discrepancy introduces a more fundamental inversion. Rodríguez’s participation is treated as an established feature of the transition because she exercises governmental power and enjoys Washington’s recognition, while Machado’s political admissibility remains subject to discussion. Yet the source and duration of Rodríguez’s presidential authority have not been constitutionally resolved, whereas the electoral records supporting González’s claim have undergone independent examination. The two positions do not carry identical constitutional significance, and neither recognition nor control of governmental institutions can make them equivalent. The danger lies in permitting the continued exercise of power to acquire the appearance of rightful authority while those who question its legitimacy are required to establish their own political qualifications. Those whose authority requires constitutional justification assume the position of judging the admissibility of those who defend an electoral mandate. Public support may survive this arrangement without securing corresponding representation in the negotiations. A movement need not lose its supporters to suffer political disadvantage if those responsible for determining the course of the transition treat its support as insufficient grounds for participation. The judgment of citizens is then measured against the preferences of the negotiating authorities rather than the legitimacy of those authorities being examined against the decisions of the electorate.
The language of stability can reinforce this reversal. The restoration of courts, electoral institutions, civil liberties, and ordinary economic activity requires time and cooperation. These are substantive requirements, not merely rhetorical conveniences. On October 26, Rubio warned that attempts to derail the transition would seriously harm Venezuela, and he expressly included the interim authorities among those whose failure to cooperate could jeopardize the process. His warning did not establish that Machado was obstructing the transition. It reflected Washington’s determination to preserve the sequence of institutional reforms it had adopted.[7] The constitutional question concerns the criteria by which compliance with that sequence is distinguished from legitimate disagreement about its purposes or consequences. A demand for earlier elections may conflict with Washington’s preferred timetable without necessarily threatening the objective of credible elections. Conversely, adherence to the timetable does not establish that the electoral mandate previously denied effect has been constitutionally addressed. The necessity of institutional reconstruction may explain the postponement of a new vote, but it cannot itself resolve what should become of the choice already expressed by the electorate.
A future presidential election may offer a means of restoring democratic authority if the conditions for a credible contest can be established. Machado herself has advocated a new electoral timetable.[13] Yet the possible merits of another election do not explain what became of González’s electoral mandate. If the result of 2024 is treated as inconsequential merely because another election is contemplated, the obstruction of the earlier decision may have succeeded in depriving that decision of practical effect. Recognition of González’s electoral claim does not settle every constitutional question concerning a delayed assumption of presidential functions, and the legal consequences of the intervening years require examination. Neither does the passage of time automatically extinguish the electoral evidence or justify the refusal to honor it. A subsequent election could establish a new mandate, but it would not retrospectively validate the denial of the previous one. The question of constitutional title cannot be disposed of simply by replacing the occasion on which the electorate was permitted to choose.
Political discrediting need not arise from a coordinated campaign to produce consequential effects. Economic interests, diplomatic objectives, institutional considerations, and personal rivalries may influence negotiations without establishing that their participants share a concealed purpose. Political adversaries may have reasons to diminish a rival’s influence; commentators may repeat conjecture because it supplies an appealing explanation for uncertain events; and audiences may accept familiar accusations without examining their original basis. These activities can reinforce one another without coordination. A deliberate campaign would require evidence concerning its participants, communications, resources, and objectives. Yet uncertainty about the origin of an allegation does not settle the separate question of its consequences. A narrative may benefit interests that did not originate it, just as a participant may exploit an existing controversy without having produced it. The distinction between a beneficiary and an originator prevents the attribution of motives without evidence while leaving the political consequences available for examination.
The Trump administration’s responsibility must be assessed through the decisions it has undertaken and the leverage it continues to exercise. Its recognition of Rodríguez, its commitments to the interim authorities, its commercial arrangements, and its proposed sequence of political reforms are exercises of American governmental power with consequences for Venezuela.[1] Their practical justification may rest upon considerations of stability, security, economic recovery, or diplomatic feasibility. None independently determines the constitutional legitimacy of the Venezuelan authorities with whom Washington has chosen to cooperate. The same evidentiary discipline applies to Machado’s criticism of those arrangements, her demands concerning electoral timing, and her relationship with American political figures. Disagreement with an economic or diplomatic agreement does not establish a defect of character, just as public support does not exempt a political leader from responsibility for her statements or decisions. The examination of governmental authority and the examination of political conduct must remain directed toward their respective subjects. Responsibility follows the exercise of authority; the validity of an allegation follows the evidence supporting it.
The conditions under which citizens form political judgments are already being shaped before another election is held. Access to public communication, recognition of political participants, the composition of negotiations, and the credibility assigned to competing movements may affect the alternatives that citizens are eventually permitted to consider. An election conducted after these conditions have changed may still permit a genuine contest, but its integrity cannot be assessed solely by reference to the procedures followed on election day. Citizens may properly withdraw support because they have examined new evidence, changed their expectations, or reached different conclusions about political conduct. Such reconsideration is indispensable to independent judgment. But public confidence may also be weakened by accusations whose circulation exceeds their evidentiary foundation. When the institutions responsible for determining the electoral arrangements possess disputed constitutional authority of their own, the consequences extend beyond the reputation of a political figure. The resulting process may establish not only the conditions under which citizens choose, but also the terms under which an earlier choice is to be recognized, reconsidered, or disregarded.
Venezuela’s present uncertainty cannot be resolved by confusing the exercise of power with constitutional title or by treating prospective arrangements as a substitute for decisions already made. The Trump administration possesses considerable influence over the course of the transition, but neither its intentions nor its ultimate capacity to accomplish its stated objectives can be inferred completely from its announcements. Rodríguez exercises governmental power, yet the continuation of her interim presidency does not settle its constitutional foundation. González possesses a substantial electoral claim grounded in the independently examined results of 2024, but he has not been permitted to assume the office for which the evidence indicates he was elected. Machado defends that claim while remaining subject to political judgment concerning her own conduct and aspirations. These positions cannot be made equivalent merely because their occupants participate, or seek to participate, in the same political controversy. The composition of the negotiations establishes who presently takes part in them; it does not determine who possesses constitutional title or who deserves the confidence of the electorate.
The injury that propaganda can inflict upon political life is not confined to the reputation of the person against whom it is directed. Its more enduring consequence lies in the possibility that citizens will be deprived of the means to distinguish an established fact from an insinuation, an institutional decision from a personal judgment, or the exercise of governmental power from the constitutional authority that should justify it. Doubt is indispensable to independent thought when it invites examination. It becomes an instrument of subordination when it is cultivated to prevent examination from reaching its proper object. The electoral decision of 2024 has already been denied effect, and the constitutional consequences of that denial remain unresolved. Whether Machado ultimately retains, enlarges, or loses public confidence is a question Venezuelans must be free to determine. The further danger is that the continuing denial of an electoral mandate may come to be accepted as a legitimate condition of political life, while those who defend that mandate are made to answer for their credibility before authorities whose own title remains in question.
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Endnotes
[1] Congressional Research Service. Venezuela’s Post-Maduro Political Transition and U.S. Policy. Report R49186, August 13, 2026. Documents the American military operation, the administration’s support for Rodríguez rather than González, the phased transition, and the composition of negotiations.
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2026-08-13_R49186_ea00ffd3c8b895af067dbff6339aeff2e659a1b9.html
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[2] The Carter Center. Final Report: Observation of the 2024 Presidential Election in Venezuela. February 17, 2025. Independent examination of electoral conditions, official results, and opposition polling-station records.
https://www.cartercenter.org/publication/final-report-observation-of-the-2024-presidential-election-in-venezuela
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[3] Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, with Constitutional Amendment No. 1, approved February 15, 2009. Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, No. 5.908 Extraordinario, February 19, 2009. Articles 228, 230, 231, 233, 234, and 239. Article 230 retains the six-year presidential term as amended, while eliminating the former limitation on reelection. Official gazette reproduced by the Superintendencia de las Instituciones del Sector Bancario (SUDEBAN).
Click to access GO5908.pdf
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[4] Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Sala Constitucional. Sentencia n.º 00001, expediente 2026-00001, January 3, 2026. Constitutional interpretation concerning the temporary exercise of presidential functions by Vice President Delcy Rodríguez. Decision discussed and reproduced by Acceso a la Justicia. See also EFE, “El Gobierno Trump espera que Delcy Rodríguez deje vacante la Presidencia de Venezuela en 2027,” October 26, 2026, reporting the succession proposal described by a senior State Department official.
https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-sc-ordena-que-delcy-rodriguez-presidencia-de-la-republica
EFE report on the proposed succession procedure:
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[5] U.S. Department of State. A Statement on U.S.-Venezuela Relations, March 5, 2026. See also Ambassador Michael G. Kozak’s letter of March 10, 2026, incorporated into the United States’ Statement of Interest filed March 11, 2026, in Stansell v. FARC, No. 16-mc-00405 (S.D.N.Y.), Docket 621. The court filing and attached State Department communication appear in a seven-page package subsequently submitted to the Foreign Agents Registration Act archive by The Cormac Group LLC, registration No. 7406, on March 16, 2026. The archive submission is not itself a State Department filing.
State Department announcement, preserved reproduction:
Click to access department-of-state-statement-on-united-states-venezuela-relations.pdf
Court documents and attached State Department communication:
Click to access 7406-Informational-Materials-20260316-1.pdf
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[6] Inter-Parliamentary Union. Human Rights of Parliamentarians: Venezuela. Parliamentary documentation of Machado’s 2023 opposition primary victory, her disqualification from the 2024 presidential election, and the selection of González Urrutia as the opposition candidate.
https://www.ipu.org/file/20428/download
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[7] U.S. Department of State. Marco Rubio, Secretary of State. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Venezuela. Remarks via teleconference, October 26, 2026. Addresses Machado’s return, electoral-system reform, the transitional timetable, and the administration’s expectations of the interim authorities. The original State Department webpage could not be opened directly during verification; an accessible reproduction is provided below. An October 26 EFE report separately attributes to a senior State Department official the proposed sequence of institutional reform, presidential vacancy, and elections within six months.
Transcript reproduced by Public Technologies:
https://pubt.io/view/C62F7FC9E17FECBC842DFC0702B25A755E1EE755
Original State Department publication address:
https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/10/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-on-venezuela
EFE report (Spanish) on the proposed succession timetable:
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[8] Associated Press. Venezuela’s opposition leader Machado returns after months in exile, as doubts over democracy deepen. October 25, 2026. Reporting on Machado’s return, the public reception, and the unsettled political arrangements.
https://apnews.com/article/e6eff0c2ff962fd9b0f87270b24ef567
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[9] El Impulso. Delcy Rodríguez al ser consultada sobre el regreso de María Corina Machado: “La política no es un show”. October 26, 2026. Contemporary reporting concerning Rodríguez’s remarks.
https://www.elimpulso.com/2026/10/26/video-delcy-rodriguez-al-ser-consultada-sobre-el-regreso-de-maria-corina-machado-la-politica-no-es-un-show-26oct
El Estímulo. Aumentos, elecciones, el estilo Rubio y un mensaje a la “neófita”: el discurso de Delcy Rodríguez. October 29, 2026. Reproduces Rodríguez’s references to experience, knowledge, and political novices.
https://elestimulo.com/venezuela/2026-10-29/discurso-de-delcy
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[10] ANSA. Machado dispuesta a reunirse con Delcy Rodríguez en Caracas. October 26, 2026. Reports Claudia Macero’s statements concerning Machado’s willingness to negotiate openly with Rodríguez or other participants.
https://www.ansalatina.com/amp/americalatina/noticia/latinoamerica/2026/10/26/machado-dispuesta-a-reunirse-con-delcy-rodriguez-en-caracas_be9bf587-436d-4a7e-96c2-2ab813515b3c.html
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[11] CNN. One World: Transcript, January 6, 2026. Reproduces Machado’s January 5 Fox News statement describing Rodríguez as one of the principal architects of torture, persecution, corruption, and narcotrafficking.
https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ow/date/2026-01-06/segment/01
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[12] United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. A/HRC/63/57, issued August 17, 2026, and published September 2026. Findings concerning the continuity of repressive institutions, human rights violations, and the absence of adequate accountability. See also the Mission’s detailed Spanish-language study “La continuidad del aparato represivo del Estado,” A/HRC/63/CRP.5, September 17, 2026, concerning the persistence of repressive institutions; it is distinct from A/HRC/63/CRP.4 on colectivos.
United Nations document:
https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/63/57
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, research collection:
https://knowledgegateway.ohchr.org/research-guides/commissions-of-inquiry/b78raisscwsodvosktf3l3v1
Detailed UN findings in Spanish (A/HRC/63/CRP.5):
Click to access a-hrc-63-crp-5.pdf
Full Spanish-language reproduction:
Click to access a-hrc-63-crp-5.pdf
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[13] Reuters. Rubio says Venezuela’s electoral infrastructure must be replaced before a vote. October 26, 2026. Reports the administration’s position on electoral reform, the timing of future elections, and Machado’s proposals for a new vote.
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/rubio-says-venezuelas-electoral-infrastructure-must-be-replaced-before-vote-2026-10-26
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Tags:constitutional authority, Delcy Rodríguez, Democratic Judgment, donald-trump, Edmundo González Urrutia, Electoral Legitimacy, Manufactured Doubt, Maria Corina Machado, Political Propaganda, The Uses of Doubt, Venezuela's Political Transition
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