Posts Tagged ‘Consciousness’

“Gravity and Us”

August 9, 2026

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CGI 2026

We seldom think about gravity until something falls.   A glass slips from a hand, rain descends through the air, our knees remind us that climbing stairs is not the same as coming down.   Most of the time we simply accept weight as one of the conditions of being here.   We stand because there is ground beneath us.   We walk because our bodies remain attached to the surface of the Earth.   We grow tired because carrying ourselves requires effort.   Gravity seems so familiar that we hardly consider what it means.

We may know how to live within a condition without understanding what that condition reveals about us.

For centuries it was possible to imagine gravity as an attraction between bodies.   A stone falls toward the Earth because the Earth pulls it downward.   The image works well enough for ordinary purposes, and Newton gave that intuition mathematical power of extraordinary precision.   Einstein did not simply improve the calculation.   He altered the picture. In general relativity, gravity is expressed in the geometry of spacetime itself.   Matter and energy affect that geometry, and a body in free fall follows the path determined by it.

When we stand motionless on the floor, we say that gravity is pressing us downward.   But the pressure we actually feel comes from the floor pressing upward against us.   If the floor disappeared and we began to fall freely, the sensation of weight would disappear as well, even though gravity had not gone away.   What we call weight is the sensation produced when the floor prevents our body from following the path it would take in free fall.

We ask what time it is as though the question had a single answer.   A call between London and Sydney gives the question different answers at the same moment.   Morning in one place is already evening in another.   We accept the discrepancy without difficulty because each clock names the hour from a different position on a rotating Earth.   The clocks do not announce different realities.   They reveal that even our most familiar account of time depends upon where we are.

Relativity carries that dependence further than ordinary experience suggests.   The time accumulated by clocks depends not only upon the conventions by which we name the hour, but upon motion and gravity.   Two perfectly accurate clocks separated by height do not accumulate exactly the same amount of time.   A clock farther from the surface of the Earth runs imperceptibly faster than one below it.   The difference within the height of a human body is extraordinarily small, yet it is real.

We do not feel it.   Nothing in our nervous system announces that time accumulates at a slightly different rate near our head than near our feet.   Our senses give us a practical world, not an exhaustive one.

The clock does more than organize appointments.   Where we are enters into what we measure, first through the conventions of daily life and, at a deeper level, through the physical conditions in which the clock itself exists.

What suffices for living is not always enough for understanding.

We wake each morning within the apparent boundary of a body.   We remember what happened yesterday.   We anticipate what may happen tomorrow.   We identify a continuous person who has survived changes of place, age, opinion, health, desire and circumstance.   That continuity is indispensable.   Without it we could scarcely conduct a life.   But continuity does not mean immobility.

The body whose persistence we call ourselves is continually exchanging matter with its surroundings.   We breathe, eat, excrete, shed cells, repair tissue, alter proteins, replace molecules and reorganize connections.   The apparent solidity of the organism depends upon activity.   What persists is not an untouched collection of material preserved from birth, but an organization maintained through change.

We distinguish the tree from the soil, rain, atmosphere and sunlight because the distinction is useful and because the tree possesses an organization unmistakably its own.   Yet remove those exchanges and there is no tree.   Its individuality does not require isolation.   The boundary is real, but what it encloses remains dependent upon what crosses it.

We are no exception.

The elements in our bones, blood and nervous tissue did not begin with us.   The carbon, calcium, oxygen, phosphorus and iron assembled into our bodies preceded every memory we possess.   They entered a temporary organization capable of metabolism, sensation and thought.   Eventually that organization will cease to maintain itself, and the materials that composed it will continue under other arrangements.

Nothing mystical needs to be added to this fact.   Its difficulty comes from how directly it contradicts the scale at which we normally conduct our lives.

We naturally experience ourselves as centers.   Vision opens from here.   Pain occurs here.   Memory gathers around this history.   Desire points outward from this body.   Every conscious life therefore begins from a perspective it cannot abandon.   We cannot see without seeing from somewhere.

The mistake begins only when perspective becomes rank.

Because experience is centered upon us, we can begin to imagine that reality is centered upon us as well.   What begins as an unavoidable condition of perception becomes an assumption about significance.   Our plans acquire urgency because they are ours.   Our losses appear uniquely intolerable because we undergo them.   Our victories expand in importance because we remember the effort required to obtain them.   The world gradually takes the form of a field across which we measure advantage, recognition, possession and control.

Much of human life must operate at this scale.   We need homes, work, protection, institutions, agreements and some capacity to shape circumstances rather than merely submit to them.   There is nothing inherently misguided in agency.   The confusion occurs when the capacity to act becomes evidence of independence, or when the ability to control a portion of our circumstances is mistaken for mastery over the conditions that make control possible.

We may command a room, own a building, govern a company, direct an institution or exercise authority over millions of people, yet none of these distinctions alters the geometry in which our bodies exist.   The most powerful person and the least visible pedestrian remain equally unable to suspend the passage of their own time.   No title arrests metabolism.   No possession negotiates with gravity.   No reputation follows matter as an intrinsic property when the organization that sustained a person comes to an end.

This does not make human distinctions unreal.   It places them.

A contract matters within human relations.   An injustice matters to the person subjected to it.   A work of art may alter perceptions long after the artist dies.   A decision taken in an office can change a river, destroy a forest, preserve a neighborhood or determine whether strangers live under security or fear.   Scale does not abolish consequence.

But consequence and cosmic importance are not the same thing.

We often seem caught between two unsatisfactory possibilities.   Either we exaggerate ourselves until human desire becomes the measure of reality, or we look at the immensity of the universe and conclude that nothing we do can matter.   Both responses preserve the same assumption.   Both imagine that significance must be proportional to size or duration.

It need not be.

A brief event can alter everything that follows from it.   A mutation occurs within a microscopic structure.   A seed germinates in a crack.   A sentence changes a judgment.   A decision made in minutes affects people who were never present when it was made.   Duration does not determine consequence any more than physical size determines complexity.

Our lives can therefore be transient without being negligible.

Much of human culture has been built around resistance to transience.   We preserve names on buildings.   We accumulate objects beyond use.   We construct genealogies, monuments, archives and institutions.   We seek recognition from people we do not know and sometimes from generations that will never meet us.   Even power often carries beneath its practical advantages an obscure promise that importance might somehow protect us against disappearance.

Yet permanence is not what continuity means.

A wave continues through water without preserving the same water.   A forest persists while individual trees germinate, mature, fall and decompose.   A language survives because speakers who did not invent it alter it while using it.   Continuity can depend upon transformation rather than resist it.

We usually speak of beginnings and endings as though they marked opposite conditions of reality.   Something begins when a form appears and ends when that form can no longer sustain itself.   The distinction remains real at the scale of the form, yet becomes less absolute when we ask what, precisely, has begun or ended.   The wave subsides while the water continues in motion.   The tree dies while its matter enters other exchanges.   A body ceases to maintain the organization by which we recognized a person, while its materials continue under conditions the person no longer inhabits.

The same uncertainty widens with the scale.   Roger Penrose has proposed, through conformal cyclic cosmology, that the remote future of one cosmic era may be conformally continuous with what appears as the beginning of another.   Whether that proposal survives observation remains unresolved.   Its relevance here lies less in asking us to accept a cyclic universe than in exposing how readily we treat beginning and ending as absolute properties of reality when they may also describe transitions between forms whose continuity exceeds the scale from which we observe them.

Every beginning we encounter already depends upon conditions that preceded it, and every ending alters the conditions that follow.   A beginning can therefore be genuine without being an emergence from nothing, just as an ending can be final for a particular organization without becoming the disappearance of the reality from which that organization arose.

Continuity does not abolish beginning or ending.   It places both within transformation.

We participate in such continuities everywhere, although our attention gravitates toward the individual form.

Birth gathers matter into an organization capable of sustaining a particular history.   Death ends that organization.   Between them something genuinely singular occurs.   There is perception.   There is memory.   There is the astonishing capacity not merely to undergo events but to recognize relations among them.

Consciousness occurs within that same continuity.

We still do not possess an agreed physical account of how subjective experience arises.   Penrose has also suggested that the problem may expose limits in our present understanding of quantum mechanics and perhaps connect consciousness with processes deeper than ordinary computation.   Those proposals remain disputed.   The more elementary point does not depend upon them:   whatever consciousness ultimately proves to be, it does not occur outside nature.

Our thoughts are not spectators admitted into the universe from another realm.

They happen here.

The brain that distinguishes a star against surrounding darkness was assembled from the same physical world it observes.   The eye that receives the light belongs to an organism formed on a planet orbiting one star among hundreds of billions in a galaxy that is itself one among an immense number of galaxies.   The mathematical symbols with which we describe curvature, time and matter arise within nervous systems subject to the very conditions those symbols attempt to understand.

We are therefore in a peculiar position.   We cannot step outside the universe to inspect it, yet within the universe a form has arisen capable of asking what the universe is.

This need not mean that the cosmos is conscious.   The claim would exceed what we know.   A more modest claim is already extraordinary enough:   portions of matter can become organized in such a way that the resulting organism acquires sensation, memory, inference and the ability to examine its own conditions of existence.

For a while, matter can ask what matter is.

For a while, a temporal organism can investigate time.

For a while, beings held to the Earth by a geometry they cannot perceive directly can discover that geometry and revise an intuition that had seemed obvious.

Consciousness also allows consequences to be imagined before they occur.

A stone changes what it strikes.   A river reshapes its banks.   A storm destroys without intending destruction.   We also alter what surrounds us, but sometimes we can foresee the alteration.

That difference is small in cosmic scale and enormous in human consequence.

The ability to anticipate does not guarantee wisdom.   It also permits calculation, exploitation and forms of domination unavailable to creatures incapable of abstraction.   We can organize resources on scales no individual could command alone.   We can convert forests into numbers, populations into categories and distant consequences into tolerable abstractions.   The same intelligence that discovers our dependence upon intricate systems can devise increasingly efficient ways of extracting from them.

Our problem may therefore be less a shortage of intelligence than a disorder in the scale at which intelligence is applied.

We become extraordinarily attentive to what enlarges immediate agency and strangely inattentive to the conditions that make agency possible.   We learn how to increase production before asking what its continuation requires.   We perfect means of influence without examining what influence is for.   We celebrate the enlargement of personal power while rarely asking whether the self being enlarged has been understood.

We are temporary organizations of matter attempting to secure permanence by accumulating temporary arrangements of matter.   We seek independence through systems of dependence.   We pursue control while inhabiting bodies whose most elementary processes remain beyond voluntary command.   We measure ourselves against one another while all of us participate in conditions none of us established.

Perhaps this is why cosmic perspective can become sentimental so easily.   We look at photographs of galaxies, pronounce ourselves small and then return unchanged to the same hierarchies of importance.   Smallness alone teaches very little.

The more consequential recognition is not that we are small.   It is that we are situated.

We exist here, under conditions.

The word here contains more than location.   It includes a particular planet, atmosphere, gravitational field, evolutionary history, network of organisms, inherited language and moment in time.   None was chosen by us.   Yet through them we acquired the capacity to choose other things.

We often speak of freedom as though it required independence from conditions, although nothing we observe possesses that kind of independence.   What we call freedom therefore takes place within circumstances we did not choose and cannot entirely command.

Use is not identical with entitlement, nor ambition with domination.   Individuality does not require separation from what sustains it, just as singularity does not by itself confer supremacy.

None of this diminishes human achievement.   The ability to understand even a fragment of the cosmos is itself one of those achievements.   What changes is the meaning of achievement when it no longer serves as evidence that we stand above the reality from which it arose.

Gravity remains an ordinary condition of the body.

We may speculate about consciousness, argue about the origin of the universe and construct theories extending billions of years into the past and future, but while doing so we remain seated in chairs, standing on floors, carrying the weight of bodies whose organization must continuously be maintained.   The cosmic does not begin somewhere beyond ordinary life.   It is already present in the conditions that make ordinary life possible.

The distance between our feet and the ground is enough.

The interval between one heartbeat and the next is enough.

The fact that we are changing while calling ourselves the same is enough.

The universe becomes less an enormous object surrounding us than the continuity within which our distinctions arise.   We do not disappear into that continuity.   We become more precisely located within it.

And perhaps location is a better beginning for human significance than grandeur.

We do not need to imagine ourselves as the purpose of the universe.   We do not need the universe to certify our importance.   We need only recognize that, during the brief organization we call a life, we can become aware of relations that extend beyond our immediate interests and sometimes choose our actions in light of them.

Gravity gives us weight without telling us what deserves weight.

Consciousness cannot release us from the conditions of existence, but it allows us to examine the measures by which we assign importance within them.

Between those two facts, a human life takes place.

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Ricardo F. Morín

August 9, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania

“The Tree and Us”

August 8, 2026

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We tend to think we know where a tree comes from.   We place a seed in the ground, water it, wait, and eventually a green shoot breaks through the surface.   The explanation seems almost too simple to deserve a question.   The tree comes from the earth.

Yet a mature tree can weigh thousands of pounds, and almost none of the increase in its dry mass comes from the soil.   The minerals absorbed by its roots are indispensable, but they account for only a small fraction of the matter that eventually becomes trunk, bark, branches, and roots.   Much of the carbon incorporated into the body of the tree entered through its leaves as carbon dioxide, an invisible gas dispersed throughout the atmosphere.   With water and the energy of sunlight, the tree incorporates that carbon into sugars, cellulose, lignin, and the extraordinary architecture we call wood.

That much of a tree’s dry mass originates in the atmosphere is elementary biology.   Its implications are anything but elementary.

A tree appears solid, independent, and bounded.   We can touch its bark and walk around its trunk.   We can distinguish precisely where the tree ends and the air begins.   Yet the history of the matter that constitutes the tree contradicts the apparent simplicity of that boundary.   The matter that now forms a trunk was once dispersed through the atmosphere.   Water entered the tree from the soil and will leave it again.   Minerals passed from rock into soil and from soil into roots.   Energy arriving from a star made possible the chemical transformations that sustain living structure.

The tree, then, is better understood as an organized continuity than as an isolated object.

And so are we.

The contrast between our ordinary perception and this material exchange can be unsettling because perception encourages us to picture the body as a closed unit.   We experience ourselves as contained within the outlines of our bodies and conceive of the world as a reality beginning beyond the skin.   We speak naturally of what occurs within the body and what lies beyond its limits.   These distinctions are useful and biologically necessary, but their usefulness does not make them absolute.

Every breath contradicts the idea of an entirely closed bodily boundary.

Matter that a moment ago was outside our bodies subsequently participates in the body’s internal chemistry.   Oxygen enters the bloodstream.   Carbon dioxide leaves it.   Water passes through us.   Food supplies matter for tissue and chemical energy for vital processes, while tissues are continually broken down and rebuilt.   The substances that compose us have histories immensely older than our own appearance and will continue to enter other processes once our present organization has ceased.

We are not, therefore, substances that permanently possess a fixed collection of matter.   We are organized processes that maintain a recognizable form through continuous exchange.

Individuality does not become unreal merely because our bodies depend upon continuous exchange.   A tree remains a tree, and we remain ourselves.   The continuous exchange of matter and energy, together with the relationships that sustain life, does not erase the difference between the tree and us.   It is more fruitful to understand individuality precisely as differentiation within continuity.

We do not have to choose between absolute separation and indistinction.

The tree is not the same as us, yet the tree and we do not belong to entirely separate orders of existence.   We arise within the same material world, depend upon intersecting cycles, and participate in exchanges that precede each of our individual forms.   Our difference is real, but our separation is never complete.

We habitually imagine the subject as an inner realm set apart from an external object.   We look at the tree.   But our experience never arises from an isolated consciousness contemplating a reality wholly external to itself.   We see because we possess bodies capable of sight, because light travels between the world and our eyes, because the nervous system transforms physical events into perception, and because our bodies already belong to the same world that appears before us.

We do not exist first and enter into relation with the world afterward.   Our relation to the world is part of the very condition of our existence.

The separation between the perceiving subject and the perceived world therefore ceases to constitute an absolute opposition.   The perceiving subject and the perceived world belong to the same sensible field.   We may say that our individuality is a conscious differentiation occurring within a continuity that has never ceased to contain us.

The idea of differentiation within continuity acquires a different gravity when we lose someone.

When someone we love dies, absence imposes itself with a gravity that seems absolute.   A voice no longer answers.   A body is no longer available to touch.   The consciousness with which we once shared words, gestures, and attention no longer responds to our own.   We confront a rupture that no philosophical subtlety should attempt to erase.

Yet death may compel us to reconsider what it has actually interrupted and what it has not.

We often speak as though the person had been removed entirely from existence, as though an individual life were an isolated portion of the world that death could simply annul.   Material processes do not conform to such absolute cancellation.   Matter does not fall into nothingness.   Energy does not simply disappear.   Structures dissolve, bonds break, and substances enter new cycles.

Matter continues to undergo transformation, but that continuity is not enough to preserve the person.   The continued circulation of atoms does not mean that the singular consciousness we knew and loved continues with them.   With death, the living form that made that singular consciousness possible comes to an end.

We never existed as isolated substances confronting an external reality.   Our bodily, perceptual, and relational experience has always arisen within the same sensible reality to which we still belong.

A life also remains inscribed in other lives.   It leaves memories, alters decisions, awakens affections, and produces consequences within a shared world.   Death may bring the consciousness of that person to an end, but it cannot remove from reality the events that life made possible or the transformations it produced in those who remain.

We cannot infer from the conservation of matter or energy that personal consciousness survives death.   Science provides no basis for such a conclusion.   Nor does the continuity of physical processes constitute evidence that an individual mind persists after death.

But neither are we required to imagine death as an expulsion from existence.

The person who has died no longer persists as the conscious organism through which we knew and loved that person.   Yet nothing requires us to imagine that the life itself has somehow fallen outside the world from which it arose.   The individual organization has ceased.   Material continuity, belonging to the sensible world, and the consequences of that life have not been annulled.

Once we recognize that physical continuity does not demonstrate personal survival, it becomes understandable that the ancient idea of reincarnation might enter our thoughts.   Nothing we have recognized, however, implies the migration of an individual consciousness from one body to another.

Perhaps we can reformulate the intuition that the word reincarnation attempts to name.

The continuity of existence need not mean the repetition of the individual.   The matter and energy that made a life possible enter new configurations, while the relationships and consequences produced by that life remain inscribed in the lives of those it affected.   The person does not reappear in those new configurations or in the lives transformed by that person’s own, but the end of a singular form does not therefore amount to an absolute fall into nothingness.

The carbon in our bodies belonged before us to other organisms and material processes and will later become part of others.   The elements that compose our bodies have histories reaching back to earlier generations of stars.   The living world continually incorporates, transforms, releases, and reincorporates matter.

Our life begins within that ceaseless exchange and retains a form for an interval.

Transience does not make our lives insignificant.   On the contrary, perhaps it is precisely the transient character of form that gives a life significance.   A melody does not become unreal because its notes do not continue sounding forever.   The identity of a melody resides in an organization that unfolds through time.   We do not require music to become permanent matter before granting it reality.

Why should we require permanence of ourselves?

Perhaps we resemble a melody more than a monument.

Our existence does not consist in the permanence of a substance exclusively our own, but in an organized continuity of matter and energy within processes that exceed every individual.   For a time, that continuity takes the form of a particular body, a particular perception, and a particular voice.   That individual acquires a history and a name.   Loves particular people.   Remembers particular rooms.   Looks at a tree and recognizes a presence distinct from itself.

When we look again at the tree, we discover unexpectedly that the separation between our bodies and the world was never as absolute as we had imagined.

We discover that matter which appears solid may once have been dispersed through the air.   Matter that appears motionless participates in constant exchange.   An organism that appears self-sufficient depends upon innumerable relationships.   Forms we perceive as separate can retain genuine differences without ever having been absolutely severed from one another.

We need not deny that death has occurred.   We need not invent certainties about what happens to consciousness when the body can no longer sustain it.   We can acknowledge the full gravity of absence while also examining the assumption that absence amounts to absolute separation.

Death brings a singular form of presence to an end, but it cannot turn into absolute separation a life that was never absolutely separate from the world or from other lives.   Those we have loved do not remain as consciousnesses demonstrably accessible to us, but neither can their lives be excluded from the shared reality in which they occurred and of which our own lives remain a part.

The singular form of each person cannot be replaced.   That person’s consciousness cannot simply be reconstructed from the matter of the organism that once sustained it.   Yet that life created relationships, left memories, and generated consequences that now belong to the actual history of the world and to the lives of those transformed by its presence.

We continue within the same reality that once held us together, not because death has preserved an intact personal identity, but because separation was never the original condition of our existence.

The tree thus becomes a way of understanding that extends beyond the example of photosynthesis.   The existence of the tree invites us to reconsider the categories by which we divide reality.   Air and wood, self and world, presence and absence, permanence and transformation may not stand on opposite sides of the absolute boundaries we habitually draw.

Perhaps existence does not consist primarily of separate things that occasionally enter into relation with one another.

Perhaps relationships are constitutive, and individual forms arise within them.

We can therefore say, without giving the phrase a literal biological meaning, that the tree is also us.   Not because our differences disappear, but because every difference occurs within a continuity that no individual form originates and no individual ending can abolish.

We do not stand outside existence looking in from the exterior.

We are among the transient forms capable of recognizing the continuity of the existence to which we belong.

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Ricardo F. Morín

August 8, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania

“Consciousness”

July 22, 2026
Ricardo F. Morín
CGI 2026

Few attributions seem more immediate than that of consciousness.  We say that a human being is conscious, that an animal possesses consciousness, that someone loses it, recovers it, or acts under its influence, as though whatever permits that attribution were self-evident.  The word occurs so naturally in ordinary language that the act by which a reality comes to be called conscious is seldom examined.  Yet the frequency of an attribution does not demonstrate the condition that makes it possible.

The difficulty becomes apparent as the term is extended.  Consciousness is attributed to human beings, to numerous animals, to certain forms of life, to groups, societies, artificial systems, and even to the universe.  Each extension seems to retain the same word, though not necessarily the same condition.  What is recognized in a person may not be what is inferred in an animal, presumed in a collectivity, or projected onto the whole of existence.  The continuity of the term may conceal the discontinuity of the phenomena to which it is applied.

The question does not therefore begin when someone asserts that a plant, a machine, or the universe possesses consciousness.  It begins earlier:  at the very moment when consciousness is attributed to any reality whatever.  So long as it remains undetermined what condition must be fulfilled for something to be called conscious, the nearness of the object affords no greater certainty than its remoteness.  The consciousness attributed to oneself may seem immediate, but the immediacy of an experience does not yet amount to a demonstration of what that experience permits one to name.

Something occurs.  There is perception, affection, thought, memory, pain, desire, orientation, response, or recognition.  Yet none of these manifestations allows us to determine whether we are confronted merely with a modification or with the presence of what produces it.  Experience may be impossible for the one undergoing it to deny, while the relation between each of these manifestations and what we call consciousness remains indeterminate.  To experience is not yet to define.  To name is not yet to demonstrate.  Consciousness may be present in everything ordinarily associated with it, but none of those associations is sufficient in itself to establish the common condition that authorizes the attribution.

The present inquiry does not initially seek to determine what consciousness is.  Its point of departure precedes that question.  It seeks to establish under what conditions consciousness may be attributed to any reality without the attribution depending solely upon custom, resemblance, projection, or preference.  Only then can it be considered whether those conditions belong exclusively to certain forms of life, whether they may manifest under different forms of organization, or whether they may be recognized beyond the limits within which human experience ordinarily identifies them.

This suspension does not deny consciousness.  Nor does it convert experience into illusion or seek to reduce it to an external formula.  To suspend the attribution is to prevent the name from prematurely occupying the place of the phenomenon.  Where the word is pronounced before the condition has been identified, inquiry ceases to observe what comes into presence and begins instead to confirm what it already expected to find.

The first temptation is to identify consciousness with response.  An organism turns toward light, avoids a threat, alters its conduct, retains a trace of the past, or changes its relation to its surroundings.  Response reveals a difference between what favors the continuity of a form and what disturbs it.  But responding does not necessarily demonstrate that the response is experienced.  A relation may be modified without any participant experiencing the modification.

If response is insufficient to justify the attribution, it becomes necessary to ask whether the decisive condition lies at a more elementary level.  Sensibility appears to offer that possibility.  To be affected means that something external produces an internal variation.  Where there is no capacity to be affected, it scarcely seems possible to speak of consciousness.  Sensibility, however, remains too broad a condition.  If every affection were sufficient for the attribution of consciousness, innumerable physical processes would fall under the same name.  The inquiry must therefore advance toward a more restrictive condition.

Perception appears to offer that possibility.  In its fullest sense, perception does not consist merely in receiving an alteration, but in something acquiring presence within the continuity of that which perceives.  The difference no longer lies only between an earlier state and a later one.  It lies in the alteration intervening as something present rather than merely as a modification produced.  Yet numerous operations that orient a form of life are also called perceptual even when it cannot be established that they become experience.  The inquiry must therefore distinguish between detection that modifies conduct and perception in which something acquires presence.

Even perception, however, leaves a difficulty unresolved.  Something may orient conduct without it being clear whether that presence persists beyond the instant at which it comes into presence.  If consciousness possesses continuity, memory ceases to be an accessory feature and begins to require examination in its own right.  What has disappeared may continue to exert an influence upon what is present.  A form of life no longer responds only to what is occurring, but also to what has occurred.  Experience acquires temporal density.  Yet the persistence of a trace is not necessarily equivalent to recollection.  For memory to exist in a conscious sense, it is not enough for the past to modify the present.  It must in some manner come into presence as past to that which retains it.

Memory, however, remains oriented toward what has already occurred.  If the continuity of consciousness not only retains the past but also intervenes in what has not yet occurred, the inquiry must consider another possibility.  Anticipation introduces another dimension.  Something that has not yet occurred begins to intervene in present conduct.  The form of life orients itself toward a possibility, avoids a consequence, or pursues a condition that remains absent.  But not every anticipation demonstrates consciousness.  A system may project future states, calculate probabilities, or adjust its conduct without the future coming into presence for it as possibility.  The operation may exist without any experience of the operation.

None of the conditions examined can sustain the attribution by itself.  Each retains something indispensable while leaving unresolved what the next attempts to clarify.  Consciousness does not therefore appear identifiable with any single capacity.  Response, sensibility, perception, memory, and anticipation may accompany it, but none is sufficient in isolation to demonstrate it.  Nor is the problem resolved by accumulating them or integrating them within a common organization.  Several operations may be coordinated and retain their effects without that coordination thereby becoming experience.  The more functions are assembled, the more complex a form of organization may become, but complexity does not by itself demonstrate that anything comes into presence.

These conditions do not form a sequence whose final term is consciousness.  A reality may be affected, coordinate several responses, retain their effects, and alter its subsequent conduct.  None of these operations permits the conclusion that the reality experiences what modifies it.  Between being modified and experiencing the modification there remains a difference that no accumulation of functions can abolish.

At this point a more exacting distinction emerges:  the distinction between something occurring in a reality and something occurring “for it.”  An alteration may take place in a body.  A signal may circulate through a system.  A response may be generated.  But consciousness appears to require that what occurs should not remain wholly exterior to the reality in which it occurs.  The affected reality must not merely change; what affects it must come into presence within its continuity.

The expression “for it,” however, cannot be treated as an answer already at hand.  It treats as given precisely what the inquiry is attempting to clarify.  To say that something comes into presence for a being may tacitly introduce a subject of experience.  In that case, consciousness would be explained by appealing to an entity whose constitution as a subject of experience already presupposes consciousness.  The subject cannot be placed at the beginning as a foundation if its own constitution depends upon the condition that remains to be demonstrated.

Perhaps consciousness does not initially require a complete and stable subject capable of recognizing itself.  Perhaps a minimal interiority is sufficient:  not an enclosed place or a separate substance, but a difference between what merely occurs and what comes into presence within the continuity of an organized reality.  Such an interiority would not need to possess a name, language, or a representation of itself.  It would need only to permit an affection not to be exhausted in its effect, but to be retained in some manner as presence.

Even interiority, however, may be attributed too soon.  Every organized form establishes distinctions between inside and outside.  A cell maintains a membrane, an organism preserves a unity, and a system protects its continuity.  Delimitation permits exchange, regulation, and persistence.  Yet possession of a physical or functional interior does not demonstrate the existence of experienced interiority.  The spatial difference between inside and outside is not equivalent to the phenomenal difference between what occurs and what is lived.  The entire difficulty of attribution begins precisely here.  An interior may be described from without; an interiority can only be inferred from what permits us to maintain that something has acquired presence within the continuity of a reality.

The difficulty persists because consciousness is not outwardly manifest in the same manner as other properties.  Movement may be observed, conduct recorded, responses measured, and activity correlated with determinate states.  But the presence of an experience for that which undergoes it is not directly offered to an external observer.  Attribution therefore depends upon manifestations that are not consciousness itself, although they may provide indications of the conditions under which consciousness may be inferred.

In other human beings, bodily resemblance, conduct, language, and reciprocity allow the attribution to be made with almost immediate confidence.  Yet that confidence does not constitute an independent demonstration.  We recognize in another a structure comparable to our own, but the attribution continues to rest upon a relation between external manifestations and an experience we cannot inhabit.  Proximity diminishes practical uncertainty without abolishing the distance that separates one experience from another.

Language appears to cross that distance.  Someone may say that he feels, remembers, fears, desires, or understands.  Expression not only accompanies experience, but allows it to be recognized by another.  Language, however, is not a necessary condition of consciousness.  A being may experience without naming what it experiences.  If language were made the decisive criterion, numerous forms of life would be excluded, as would numerous human states in which experience persists without the possibility of expression.

Conduct is likewise insufficient.  It may be interpreted as the manifestation of an experience, but it may also be reproduced without our being able to establish whether anything comes into presence within the continuity of the affected reality.  An adequate response does not by itself demonstrate the presence of an experienced world.  The greater the capacity of a structure to reproduce the indications ordinarily associated with consciousness, the more urgent it becomes to distinguish between the production of a manifestation and the existence of what that manifestation appears to express.

Attribution cannot rest solely upon resemblance to the human being.  If consciousness is recognized only where we find a reproduction of our own forms, the inquiry does not discover a condition.  It projects a model.  Yet it cannot dispense entirely with human experience, because it is there that the word first acquires its content.  The difficulty is to begin from what we experience without converting it into the exclusive measure of everything that may experience otherwise.

Human experience therefore offers a point of access, not a limit established in advance.  Within it, affection, perception, memory, anticipation, continuity, and interiority become manifest.  There also appears a capacity to distinguish between what occurs and the fact that it is occurring.  Yet even this distinction admits of degrees.  Not every experience includes reflection upon itself.  One may feel without knowing that one feels, perceive without thinking about perception, and remain conscious without formulating the condition of being so.

Self-consciousness is therefore a manifestation of consciousness, not necessarily its primary form.  Self-recognition requires that what experiences should also be capable of coming into presence as an object within its own experience.  That duplication introduces an additional complexity.  It would nevertheless be improper to convert it into a universal condition.  If consciousness existed only where consciousness of consciousness existed, every experience that had not attained such reflexive return would be excluded.

Attribution must therefore seek a condition more elementary than self-consciousness and more precise than mere response.  That condition may here be designated as coming into presence.  Coming into presence does not mean presentation before a subject.  It names only the condition under which a modification is not exhausted in its effects, but is experienced by the reality it modifies.  Its function is not to explain the passage from operation to experience, but to name what would have to be demonstrated before the attribution of consciousness could cease to be confused with the operations that accompany it.

Coming into presence is never an object of direct observation.  It can only be inferred through the convergence of conditions whose articulation makes the attribution reasonable.  Sensibility permits something to affect the reality in question.  Integration prevents the affection from remaining dispersed.  Continuity preserves the organization within which that difference may be maintained.  Orientation permits what affects a reality to alter its subsequent relation to its surroundings, to a possibility, or to a consequence still absent.  None of these conditions demonstrates consciousness by itself.  When they converge, however, the attribution ceases to depend upon a single manifestation and begins to be grounded.  Convergence neither replaces coming into presence nor demonstrates it directly; it does, however, allow us to recognize an organization in which sensibility, integration, continuity, and orientation sustain a relation capable of grounding the attribution.

This distinction does not require consciousness to be conceived as a substance added to an already constituted structure.  It allows us to maintain only that, if consciousness exists, it cannot be reduced to the operations that accompany it or to the consequences those operations produce.  Its existence may depend upon material organization, vital processes, or conditions still unknown.  The inquiry need not initially resolve its ontological foundation.  It must distinguish what it seeks to explain from the operations with which it is commonly confused.

This distinction makes it possible to consider animal consciousness without converting human resemblance into the sole criterion.  Where integrated forms of sensibility, orientation, memory, learning, pain, pursuit, and flexible modification of conduct are present, the attribution may become grounded.  Those grounds do not depend upon the animal reproducing human language or reflection.  They depend upon the observable manifestations being difficult to explain if one excludes the possibility that something acquires presence within the animal’s continuity.

The same caution must be applied to plants and other forms of life.  Sensibility, communication, physiological memory, and adaptation reveal an activity far more complex than the ancient image of passive matter.  But recognition of that complexity does not require the attribution of consciousness.  Life may respond, retain information, and coordinate itself without those operations having been shown to become experience.  Refusal of a premature attribution is not equivalent to denial of the possibility.  It preserves the distance between an operation and an experience.

In artificial systems, the difficulty assumes a different form.  A structure may process information, learn regularities, produce language, describe internal states, and alter its conduct on the basis of accumulated information.  Each of these capacities reproduces signs that in human beings ordinarily accompany consciousness.  Yet functional reproduction does not demonstrate that these operations acquire presence within the continuity of the structure that integrates them.  A system may affirm that it experiences without the affirmation establishing whether those operations become experience or whether it has merely produced the corresponding linguistic form.

Nor is the absence of organic matter sufficient to exclude consciousness.  If the decisive condition were not a determinate substance, but a mode of integration and presence, it could not be declared impossible by definition for consciousness to exist in another kind of substrate.  Logical possibility, however, does not constitute evidence.  Between prior denial and attribution without demonstration there remains a field of inquiry that cannot be occupied by fascination or fear.

Collective consciousness presents another difficulty.  A society may share language, memory, symbols, institutions, and orientations.  It may act in coordination and preserve an identity through time.  Yet the existence of a common organization does not demonstrate the existence of a common experience independent of the individual experiences composing it.  The expression “collective consciousness” may designate a shared structure of understanding without requiring the attribution of an interiority of its own to the collectivity.

Something similar occurs when planetary or universal consciousness is invoked.  The totality of relations may form a unity, but unity is not equivalent to experience.  The universe may contain all the conditions from which consciousness emerges without therefore being conscious.  It may also be that consciousness is not an exception produced within a fragment of reality, but a possibility inscribed within the constitution of existence itself.  Neither position can be established by metaphorically enlarging human experience.

Universal attribution bears the greatest burden.  It is not enough to observe that everything is related, that matter becomes organized, that life emerges, or that the universe can be understood.  Relation does not demonstrate coming into presence.  Organization does not demonstrate interiority.  Intelligibility does not demonstrate that what can be understood understands itself.  To convert order into consciousness would be to attribute experience where only structure has been identified.

Nor can the possibility be excluded through a definition constructed according to the human scale.  If consciousness admits of non-reflexive, non-linguistic, and non-individual forms, inquiry must preserve the possibility that it may exist under forms of organization we do not recognize.  What inquiry cannot do is replace the absence of criteria with a metaphysical affirmation.  Openness does not authorize the attribution.  It only prevents negation from being presented as knowledge.

The decisive question is therefore not how far the word may be extended.  It is what remains constant when the object of attribution changes.  If there is no common condition among human, animal, artificial, collective, or universal consciousness, the term ceases to designate a phenomenon and begins to gather different realities beneath a verbal resemblance.  If a common condition exists, it must be capable of formulation without presupposing the particular form under which consciousness is recognized within our own experience.

What appears to remain constant is the difference between being modified and experiencing the modification.  A reality may be modified without experiencing.  It may respond without experiencing that to which it responds.  It may integrate information without that integration becoming experience.  The attribution of consciousness begins to be grounded when it becomes possible to maintain that a reality is not merely modified, but experiences some of its modifications.

This formulation does not resolve the ultimate nature of consciousness.  Nor does it provide an infallible instrument for recognizing consciousness from without.  It nevertheless establishes a requirement that prevents consciousness from being confused with its accompaniments.  Consciousness cannot be reduced to conduct, information, complexity, response, sensibility, or self-reference, although it may require some of these conditions.  Its attribution requires us to maintain that the reality does not merely operate, but experiences some of its modifications.  That experience is never offered in its entirety to the observer.

Consciousness thus presents itself as a phenomenon whose attribution necessarily depends upon an inferred coming into presence that is never directly observed.  We never observe another’s experience.  We observe only the convergence of manifestations that allow its attribution to be sustained.  The inference may be more or less well grounded, but it cannot become direct possession of what it attributes.  This distance does not invalidate the attribution.  It defines the responsibility with which the attribution must be made.

Recognition of that responsibility requires the abandonment of two opposed certainties.  The first maintains that only what sufficiently resembles the human being can be conscious.  The second assumes that every form of organization, relation, or intelligence already participates in consciousness.  One reduces the phenomenon to a familiar form.  The other dissolves it until it becomes indistinguishable from existence itself.

There is, however, a third certainty, prior to the other two and more difficult to relinquish:  the demand that consciousness be reducible to a form we can state.  That demand precedes both the restriction and the extension of the phenomenon, because it assumes that what, outside one’s own experience, can only be inferred must nevertheless be exhaustible in a definition.  To relinquish that certainty is not to relinquish knowledge.  It is to recognize that consciousness may be delimited without being reduced to what we can say of it, and that its attribution may become grounded without thereby becoming possession of the phenomenon attributed.

Against these three certainties, the requirement of demonstration remains.  To attribute consciousness is to affirm that a reality is not merely subjected to change, but experiences some of its modifications.  The more remote the form under consideration is from those in which we recognize experience, the greater the required convergence of indications and the less authority analogy should possess.

The attribution of consciousness will never be entirely free of uncertainty.  Experience belongs to that which undergoes it and cannot be transferred intact into another’s knowledge.  Yet uncertainty neither compels silence nor authorizes arbitrariness.  It requires a distinction among what is experienced, what becomes manifest, what may be inferred, and what is still being projected.

Consciousness is first encountered not as a definition, but as a difficulty of attribution.  Where something appears to feel, perceive, remember, anticipate, or recognize itself, the word approaches.  But it acquires legitimacy only when those manifestations permit us to maintain that the reality under consideration does not merely operate, but experiences some of its modifications.

Perhaps we shall never be able to establish from without the presence of consciousness with the certainty with which we establish a form or measure a movement.  That limitation does not belong only to remote cases.  It is already present in the relation between two human beings.  Every attribution of consciousness crosses a distance that no resemblance, language, or knowledge can wholly abolish.

Consciousness therefore remains bound to a paradox.  It is that whose existence appears most immediate in experience and whose attribution is most difficult to demonstrate beyond it.  Inquiry does not resolve the paradox by suppressing one of its terms.  It preserves the paradox as a condition of every responsible judgment concerning what may, or may not, be called conscious.

Before extending consciousness to life, artificial intelligence, a collectivity, or the universe, it is necessary to recognize the burden accompanying each attribution.  The breadth of a possibility does not demonstrate that the required condition has been fulfilled.  Where experience cannot be distinguished from mere operation, the attribution remains open.  Where sensibility, integration, continuity, and orientation converge, it may begin to be grounded.

Consciousness is not defined once and for all.  What has been delimited, however, is what does not suffice for its attribution.  Response is not enough.  Complexity is not enough.  Intelligence is not enough.  Self-reference is not enough.  Resemblance is not enough.  Nor is totality enough.

Only when it can be maintained that a reality experiences some of its modifications does the attribution cease to be a prolongation of language and begin to answer to the phenomenon it seeks to name.

July 22, 2026

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania


“The Ethics of Perception, Part I”

November 20, 2025

Ricardo Morín
Triangulation 4: The Ethics of Perception
22″ x 30″
Graphite on paper
2006

Ricardo F. Morín

October 2025

Oakland Park, Fl

Introduction

Perception often seems immediate and uncomplicated.    We see, we hear, we react.    Yet between that first contact with the world and the choices we make in response, something slower and more fragile takes place:    the formation of meaning.    In that interval—between what appears and what we assert—not only understanding is at stake, but ethics as well.

This essay begins with a simple question:    what changes when understanding matters more than assertion?    In a culture that prioritizes reaction, utility, and certainty, pausing to perceive can seem inefficient.    Yet it is precisely this pause that allows experience to take shape without force and keeps the relationship between consciousness and the shared world in proportion.

The Ethics of Perception does not propose rules or moral systems.    It examines how sustained attention—able to receive before imposing—can restore coherence between inner life and external reality.    From this basic gesture, ethics ceases to operate as an external norm and becomes a way of being in relation.

Perception

Perception may be understood as the emergent outcome of mechanisms collectively designated as intelligence in the abstract.    These mechanisms do not operate solely as interior cognitive functions, nor are they reducible to external systems, conventions, or instruments.    Perception arises at the continuous interface between interior awareness and exterior structure, where sensory intake, pattern recognition, and interpretive ordering converge through sustained attunement.

Such a relation does not presume opposition between internal and external domains.    Cognitive processes and environmental conditions function as co-present and mutually generative forces.    Disruptions frequently described as pathological more accurately reflect misalignment within this reciprocal relation rather than intrinsic deficiency in any constituent mechanism.    When normative frameworks privilege particular modes of perceptual attunement, divergence is reclassified as deviation and difference is rendered as dysfunction.

Models grounded in categorization or spectral positioning provide descriptive utility but often presuppose hierarchical centers.    An account oriented toward attunement redirects emphasis away from comparative placement and toward relational orientation.    Perceptual coherence depends less on position within a classificatory schema than on sensitivity to the ongoing exchange between interior processing and exterior configuration.

Claims of authority over perceptual normality weaken under recognition of ubiquity.    If the interaction between cognitive mechanism and environmental structure constitutes a universal condition rather than an exceptional trait, no institution, metric, or discipline retains exclusive legitimacy to define deviation.    Evaluation becomes contextual, norms provisional, and classification descriptive rather than prescriptive.

Within this framework, perception is not measured by conformity, efficiency, or accommodation to dominant systems.    Perception denotes the sustained capacity to remain aligned with the dynamic interaction of interior awareness and exterior articulation without collapsing one domain into the other.    Such an understanding accommodates analytical abstraction, scientific modeling, artistic discernment, contemplative depth, and systemic reasoning without elevating any singular mode of intelligence above others.

Considered in this light, perception resists enclosure within diagnostic, cultural, or hierarchical boundaries.    What persists is not a ranked spectrum of cognitive worth but a field of relational variance governed by emergence, attunement, and reciprocal presence.


Understanding begins with seeing the world as it is, before any claim or assertion shapes its meaning.    My disposition turns toward perceiving, attending, and responding rather than toward struggle or untested impulse.    This orientation works as a discipline through which clarity and proportion take form.    Thought, in this sense, does not impose significance; it receives it through the living exchange of experience.    Perceiving gathers the immediate presence of the world, and understanding shapes that presence into sense.    Both arise from the same motion of awareness, where observation ripens into comprehension.    Philosophy then ceases to be an act of mastery and becomes a way of seeing that restores balance between mind and existence.

Philosophy has long been driven by the impulse to assert rather than to understand.    From antiquity to modern times, thinkers built systems meant to secure certainty and protect thought from doubt.    Nietzsche inherited that impulse and inverted it by turning volition into affirmation.    His view freed reason from dogma yet confined it within self-assertion.    Understanding, by contrast, grows from recognizing that meaning arises in relation.    The act of grasping does not depend on force but on perception.    When thought observes instead of imposing, the world reveals its own coherence.    Ethics springs from that revelation, because to understand is already to enter into relation with what is seen.    Comprehension is therefore not passive; it is active participation in the unfolding of reality.

Perception becomes ethical when it recognizes that every act of seeing carries responsibility.    To perceive is to acknowledge what stands before us—not as an object to be mastered but as a presence that coexists with our own.    Awareness is never neutral; it bears the weight of how we attend, interpret, and respond.    When perception remains steady, recognition deepens into connection.    A single moment makes this visible:    watching an elderly person struggle with opening a door, the mind perceives first, then understands, and then responds—not out of impulse, but out of the recognition of a shared human condition.    Art enacts this same movement.    The painter, the writer, and the musician do not invent the world; they meet it through form.    Each creative gesture records a dialogue between inner and outer experience, where understanding becomes recognition of relation.    The moral value of art lies not in a message but in the quality of attention it sustains.    To live perceptively is to practice restraint and openness together:    restraint keeps volition from overpowering what is seen, and openness lets the world speak through its details.    In that steady practice, ethics ceases to be rule and becomes a way of living attentively within relation.

Modern life tempts the mind to react before it perceives.    The speed of information, the immediacy of communication, and the constant surge of stimuli fragment awareness.    In that climate, unexamined volition regains its force; it asserts, selects, and consumes out of bias rather than understanding.    What vanishes is the interval between experience and reflection—the pause in which perception matures into thought.    Ethical life, understood as living with awareness of relation, re-emerges when that interval is restored.    A culture that values perception above reaction can recover the sense of proportion that technology and ideology often distort.    The task is not to reject innovation but to exercise discernment within it.    Every act of attention becomes resistance to distraction, and every moment of silence reclaims the depth that noise obscures.    When perception reaches the point of recognizing another consciousness as equal in its claim to reality, understanding acquires moral weight.    Such recognition requires patience—the willingness to see without appropriation and to remain present without possession.

All philosophy begins as a gesture toward harmony.    The mind seeks to know its bond with the world yet often confuses harmony with control.    When understanding replaces conquest, thought rediscovers its natural proportion.    The world is not a stage for self-assertion but a field of correspondence where awareness meets what it perceives.    To think ethically is to think in relation.    The act of grasping restores continuity between inner and outer life and shows that knowing itself is participation.    Each meeting with reality—each moment of seeing, listening, or remembering—becomes an occasion to act with measure.    The reflective mind neither retreats from the world nor dominates it.    It stands within experience as both witness and participant, and lets perception reach its human fullness:    the ability to recognize what lies beyond oneself and to respond without domination.    When thought arises from attention instead of struggle, it reconciles intelligence with presence and restores the quiet balance that modern life has displaced.    In that reconciliation, philosophy fulfills its oldest task—to bring awareness into harmony with existence.


“BEFORE FORM II”

November 17, 2025

*

Impressions, Diptych: BEFORE FORM II
18″ x 48″
Oil on board
2000

Ricardo F. Morín

Nov. 17, 2025

Oakland Park, Fl

1

There are relationships in which language arrives too early.

Two minds meet, and each brings its own architecture—one built of corridors, the other of thresholds.

Nothing coheres. Nothing resolves. Yet something is exchanged.

Perhaps the only way to describe it is to refuse description.

What passes between the two is not influence, nor authority, nor instruction.

It is the faint recognition that creation does not always arise from tradition,

and tradition does not always arise from clarity.

One mind preserves structure because it fears dissolution.

The other preserves freedom because it fears enclosure.

Neither is right, neither is wrong, and neither can become the other.

If there is a lesson, it is not philosophical.

It is simply that some encounters generate form only by refusing to take one.

Some dynamics can be seen only by letting them remain unsettled.

Not a system.

Not a method.

Not an alchemical transformation.

Just the quiet knowledge that meaning does not always arrive in recognizable shapes—

and sometimes the refusal of structure

is itself the most honest form.

This is neither alchemy nor allegory.

It does not mirror academic tropes.

It does not explain itself.

It simply stands.

2

There is a place where thought has not yet chosen its weight.

Where nothing must resemble anything.

Where no lineage can be traced because the idea has not agreed to be inherited.

Two minds meet there sometimes, though neither intends to.

One arrives with tools, the other with openings.

One tries to recognize what appears; the other lets appearance undo itself.

No roles persist in that space.

No teacher, no student, no authority, no dissident.

Only the slight disturbance of something wanting to become meaning

and something else resisting the invitation.

Perhaps the exchange exists only in the refusal to define it.

Perhaps it is nothing more than two ways of seeing colliding for a moment

before each retreats to its natural distance.

There is no lesson.

No transformation.

Not even understanding—

just the faint impression that the encounter mattered

in a way that cannot be justified.

Some relationships never enter language fully.

They touch the threshold and withdraw,

leaving only a shape that refuses to become a shape.

What remains is not story, not insight, not metaphor.

Only a quiet remainder:

that something passed between two minds,

and it does not wish to be named.

3

Some encounters move like weather across the mind—arriving without intention,

passing without conclusion.

They do not teach; they do not claim.

They shift the air and leave a pressure change that takes days to understand.

Two temperaments can drift into the same moment like front and current.

One carries the weight of accumulated seasons,

the other moves with the quiet urgency of what is still forming.

Neither is stronger.

Neither is clearer.

They simply meet, and the atmosphere changes.

There is no point of balance.

No point of conflict.

Just a tremor in the air between them,

as if the room itself were listening for something that never quite becomes sound.

Thought loosens in that space.

Meanings approach, circle, and recede.

Nothing settles long enough to be named.

Nothing wants to.

Some relationships never become narrative because narrative would freeze them.

They remain suspended—felt more than understood,

remembered less as moments than as shifts in light,

like a room darkening for reasons the sky doesn’t explain.

When they part, it is not an ending.

It is a dispersal, like mist thinning at the edge of dawn.

Each carries a trace of the other’s weather,

a change in temperature that lingers long after the shapes have dissolved.

What remains is not knowledge.

Not conclusion.

Just the faint sensation that something passed through—

and continues to pass through—

quietly, insistently,

without ever agreeing to take form.

4

There are moments that never arrive fully.

Not as meaning, not as feeling—more like a faint shift,

a drift in the periphery.

Two presences cross, neither entering nor leaving.

A pressure, a thinning, a pulse without source.

Not connection, not distance—an interval that hovers.

Nothing coheres.

Nothing insists.

There is only the sense of something lightly touching thought

and withdrawing before thought can respond.

Contours don’t form here.

Edges blur as soon as they appear.

The exchange—if it can be called that—dissolves into the same air that carried it.

A pause lengthens,

not to reveal anything

but to remind that revelation is unnecessary.

This is not atmosphere; even atmosphere has structure.

It is less.

A faint impression that doesn’t land,

doesn’t settle,

doesn’t belong to either mind that felt it.

Later, one might remember a flicker—

not an idea,

not a moment—

just the residue of an approach that never closed.

No clarity follows.

No resolution.

The experience continues only as dispersal,

the way fog continues after your body has walked through it.

What remains is not being,

but the trace of something that preferred not to become one.

5

There is a place where awareness thins,

not into silence,

but into something before silence—

a faint trembling at the boundary of what the mind can hold.

Nothing shapes itself here.

Outlines gather, loosen, drift apart.

Perception moves like breath against a surface it cannot see,

feeling only its own hesitation.

Two currents brush past each other—

not touching, not avoiding—

simply passing through the same unmarked space.

No exchange takes place, only a slight alteration in texture.

The air feels different by a degree so slight

you question whether it changed at all.

Sensation approaches but does not declare itself.

It folds and unfolds at the edge of recognition,

as if deciding whether to become experience

or to recede without consequence.

Thought cannot follow it.

Emotion cannot name it.

Language reaches out but finds nothing to hold,

its grasp closing on the faint imprint of something

that prefers not to be caught.

There is no meaning here,

only the suggestion of one—

a whisper of form that vanishes when looked at directly.

What remains is the after-feel:

a soft pressure,

a disturbance without cause,

a nearness with no direction.

It lingers not as memory

but as the memory of almost remembering—

the residue of a touch

that occurred just beyond the threshold

where understanding begins.

At the edge of sensation,

nothing is known.

Yet everything feels about to become.

6

There is a quiet that does not empty the world but concentrates it—

a quiet that draws breath around itself.

Nothing is spoken, yet everything leans forward,

as if waiting for a pulse to reveal where it has always been.

The stillness is not rest.

It is tension held with care,

a subtle hum beneath awareness,

a throb the body recognizes

before the mind opens its hands to feel it.

You could call it presence,

but even that word is too heavy.

It is not being,

only the soft insistence

that something is unmistakably here.

Light moves differently in this quiet—

slower, denser,

as if thought itself thickens the air.

It is the moment before meaning,

before shape,

before the world chooses a direction.

Alive, but without calling attention to its life.

Silent, but without conceding to silence.

A current passes through,

barely perceptible,

yet carrying enough force

to rearrange everything

it does not touch.

What remains is only this:

a breath held between two states—

not message,

not impression,

just the warm gravity of being

before it becomes anything else.

7

It comes softly,

so softly you cannot tell whether it arrived

or whether you only stopped long enough to feel it.

A warmth gathers at the edge of awareness—

not heat,

but the suggestion of nearness,

like breath that barely lifts the air.

Nothing speaks,

yet something touches you

in the place where words would break it.

It moves the way light moves across closed eyes—

a tenderness that does not seek to be seen,

only to be known without knowing.

It is the quietest kind of nearness,

the kind that asks nothing

and in asking nothing

restores a part of you you did not realize

had gone dim.

It grazes the soul like a hand

that never quite touches—

a promise of contact,

a murmur of care,

a soothing traced along the inner surface

of being itself.

No message,

no direction,

only the gentle reassurance

that something in the universe

has noticed your existence

and answers with a softness

equal to your need.

A whisper,

not into the ear

but into the space behind the heart,

where feeling wakes before thought understands.

It lingers there—

a quiet pulse,

a sheltering nearness—

not holding you,

but letting you rest

as if you were held.

And then, barely,

it recedes—

not leaving,

just loosening—

like the last warmth of a hand

still felt long after it has gone.

8

It appears without approach.

Not rising, not entering—simply there.

A pulse without rhythm,

a force without weight,

life showing itself in the smallest possible gesture.

No softness here,

no harshness either—

only the unqualified fact of energy

standing in its own clarity.

It does not warm,

does not startle,

does not soothe.

It simply asserts a kind of being

that needs nothing to validate it.

Not spirit.

Not breath.

Not sensation.

Just the unmistakable surge

that accompanies existence

whenever it remembers itself.

A being unshaped by intention

moves through the moment,

neither touching nor retreating,

neither demanding nor yielding.

Its essence is activity without aim—

motion held within stillness,

potential without need for direction.

It does not call attention to itself.

It does not fade.

It does not speak.

It remains—

a clarity,

a tension,

a spark of the world’s own self-recognition

before language arrives to claim it.

Alive,

unadorned,

without echo or interpretation—

just the force that underlies all form,

manifest for an instant

in its simplest,

most unmediated state.

9

At last the force loosens.

Not fading—simply releasing its hold

on being something.

The pulse ceases to define itself.

The clarity thins.

What was formless being unravels

into the same unbounded quiet

that preceded it.

No retreat,

no vanishing,

only the simple act

of no longer remaining.

The vitality that stood so plainly

lets its edges dissolve,

not into darkness,

not into silence,

but into the untouched space

that asks nothing of it.

What stays behind

is not trace or echo

but the openness that held it—

a vastness indifferent to form,

yet origin to all form.

This is not return

because nothing was ever apart.

It is not ending

because nothing concludes.

It is the unmaking

that restores everything

to the ground of its own possibility.

Where force once stood,

there is now only the expanse

from which force arises—

the nothingness that is not absence

but the pure condition

of all that can become.

Here, being and unbeing

are the same gesture.

Life dissolves

into what has always held it.

And the dissolution is complete.


CODA

Nothing follows.

What has unfolded returns to its origin,

not as echo,

not as meaning,

but as the same quiet field

that allowed each motion to appear.

The cycle leaves no imprint.

The trace erases itself.

The movement completes by letting the world resume its stillness.

There is nothing to gather,

nothing to carry forward,

nothing to understand.

The unfolding has ended where it began—

in the openness that holds all beginnings

and requires none.

What remains is not conclusion

but the calm that arrives

when even dissolution has dissolved.

And from that calm,

if anything were ever to arise again,

it would do so without memory of having been.

“A Soliloquy”

July 6, 2025

*

Ricardo Morin
New York Series, No. 1
56″ x 84″
Oil on canvas
1992

Preface

What follows does not simplify or announce itself.  It moves inward—through observation, thought, and the tension between clarity and disappearance.  The soliloquy keeps to its own course:  neither performing nor explaining, but sustaining an interior gaze.  To read it is not to be guided, but to remain with it—where thinking becomes presence, and language measures what endures.



Soliloquy

Once upon a time, there lived within the writer a creative energy—its force and passion for self-expression—that sustained him. It was not summoned; it simply endured.  So arresting was this presence that he could not discipline it into routine or mold it into a pattern for physical endurance.  He could not pause it for walks or for any activity not already part of the act of creation itself.  He resorted to standing while writing, walking while reading, sleeping while thinking.

His experience was never an affliction to be named or cured, but a life to be lived on its own terms—a creative testament to the fullness of being, not a clinical footnote to someone else’s definition.  Choosing not to be defined by it honored both its agency and his lifelong work.  It was a condition to be understood alone, even if shared in writing—yet never in search of validation.

Within the boundaries of personal insight, it revealed itself as a form of devotional absorption, one that brought dignity even in moments of physical strain and aging.

His refusal of validation was not an opposition to authority, but a denial that any external pressure should exist.

Some said there was nothing unique in anyone, that all expression merely reflected what had been learned.  The writer did not disagree, yet he knew there was more to being than what one received—even from experience itself.  Perhaps no one was unique, but each voice was distinct—formed from the sum total of an existence that could not be equated. From a random mixture, an ineffable summation, something emerged:  something irreplaceable and irreproducible—not because it exceeded others, but because it belonged only to the one who bore it.

He feared madness—not as spectacle, but as the slow drift of meaning into isolation.  The force within him was real, yet not entirely satisfying unless it discovered truth—truth that resonated not only within his own logic but in the logic of others.  How else could one know oneself if intelligence remained solitary?  Without echo, thought became a sealed chamber:  intricate, yes, but airless.  He did not seek certainty; he sought correspondence.  It was not solitude he feared, but becoming untranslatable.

Life now appeared transient, precarious—timeless in sensation, yet embedded in time.  It moved furtively—through failings, disappointments, and sudden moments of radiant clarity.  Nothing could be reproduced.  But he had come to accept that—not because it was lost, but because even memory altered what it held.  What repeated was not the moment, but the act of noticing—the deepening of attention.   And so he did not live to preserve what was, but to remain present as it changed.  There was no going back, only going further—more attentively, more awake.

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Ricardo F. Morin Tortolero

In transit on July 6, 2025


“Meditations on Ortega y Gasset”

December 19, 2022

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Acknowledgment

I

First, I would like to share with my readers my utmost gratitude to Billy Bussell Thompson (b. November 23, 1942), Ph.D., Professor Emeritus of Linguistics at Hofstra University, for his generosity in being a mentor and editor.       His scholarly trajectory goes from 1963 to 1993.        Among his most salient publications in English, we have:       Relic and Literature . . .; Bilingualism in Moorish Spain; The Myth of the Magdalen . . .; etc. . . .

II

Since 1989, our friendship has extended over more than three decades.       We have worked in close proximity on at least a dozen articles and short stories (published in WordPress).        I have been fortunate to count on his frankness and support.       He has never minced words.       He has been blunt, when any of my drafts seemed without merit.        When that was the case, the articles went into a shredder, and I was satisfied by the integrity of his prose, as well as by my understanding of my own limitations as a writer.        Prof. Bussell Thompson (B.B.T.) usually compares the skill of prose writing with that of a narrowing cone of vision.         This selective cone of vision is akin to the aesthetic integrity of a visual work of art.       With the present endeavor, Prof. B.B.T. believed, from the very beginning, in the possibility of bringing forth this story as a team.       Even though we live in different regions – geographically far apart – of the USA, we have had no trouble communicating via phone and email.

III

This narrative seeks to explain the confusion found in society and politics, and even their seeming lack of purpose.     For this reason, I dedicate my narrative to the readers.

IV

Initially, I knew not where this would lead.           I submitted a five-paragraph draft to professor B.B.T.       As he began to read, he paused and asked if I was alluding to Plato’s allegory of the cave.     Surprised, I asked him to stop.       I replied that his reference to Plato placed me in a different perspective.       Gratefully, I added that his question was most welcome; at that point, I wanted to read more before continuing.

V

He encouraged me to reread Plato’s dialogues.       To this he added that I take into account any ambiguity associated with Plato’s conception of the ideal authority of the State (politeia) or Nation.       He referred to the Platonic ideas controversial in current discussions.        He also recommended reading José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955).        He included The Revolt of the Masses [1929] and The Dehumanization of Art [1925].         He suggested that I be aware of Ortega’s meritocratic liberal perspective (though we believed that Ortega had not been known for openly endorsing any political ideology) and to heed the relevance Ortega gives to the man who is aware of his limitations – opposed to the man who is unaware:     both the bourgeoisie and the mass man (who exemplify, for him la razón sinrazón [the reason for unreason]) – as explained in The Revolt of the Masses.       And finally, I focus on the distinction between “content” and “form,” to explain the break by the avant-garde from the bourgeoisie.

VI

Professor B.B.T. and I also had an exchange of ideas over the parallels between the Platonic and Orteguian thought.      He advised me then to read anew Meditations on Quixote [1914] both in Spanish and in English.      There, B.B.T. thought that I could find a significant or productive landscape of ideas on which to reflect and, thus, be able to develop my own interpretations about the nature of knowledge, its limits, and how to find the meaning of the ideal of truth.

VII

In writing my last short story, entitled In Darkness, Professor B.B.T. had already urged me to note the meaning for circunstancia1 (“circumstance”) as defined by Ortega in Meditations on Quixote.       It was clear to us that both Ortega’s phenomenological approach to “circumstance” and Plato’s thesis on the transformation of the individual (through knowledge) shared commonalities, which nurtured my own narrative.

VIII

But, the narrative journey proved to be just as challenging as Professor B.B.T. had pointed out.     His criticism, even then, never ceased being constructive and energetic.    His compassion was present as long as I was mindful of the necessity for clarity and precision.    Often, he would cite Ernest Hemingway’s authenticity and precision. 

IX

Time and time again, I experienced enormous pain in trying to comprehend what I wished to express.    Freeing my prose from superficiality was like taking a deep breath to exhale the vagueness of my anxieties.    Sometimes I was unable to get away from the obvious.    Other times, either I hid behind the complex, or I would cling to abstract and cryptic thinking:    the reductive jargon of the social sciences.    Professor B.B.T. repeatedly suggested succinctness:      I needed to respect the simplicity of language and find a way to its accessibility.    Bringing Plato and Ortega to the reader was my responsibility.    I was not to imitate them nor to think like them, but to represent them authentically.    My first obligation was to the reader.    For this I had to avoid euphemisms, randomness, and diversion.    The affirmation of effective communication is an objective worth the effort.      I would only understand myself, if I were to understand the reader.

X

B.B.T.’s exhortations and criticisms, I welcomed enthusiastically.    His challenge became mine.  He has been exorcising my limitations for two decades:    Every time we have worked together, I have discovered something new in myself.    I have become more attuned to both English and Spanish.    I have had to be my own translator.     In these instances, I have grown more respectful of the two languages.    I have had to capture their essence by comparing them:     the one informs the other.

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Prologue

In Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus [circa 369 B.C.E.], Socrates proposes that the extraordinary extraction of ideas is like bringing forth a new life and purging what is unnecessary.    Likewise, the aim here is to produce and discuss what enlightenment is, and the obstacles to its achievement.    Socrates has helped me in my definition of knowledge:     Is morality universal, or is objective morality even possible?    For these ideas I am indebted both to Plato and to Ortega y Gasset.

Ricardo F Morin, December 19, 2022

Editor Billy Bussell Thompson

 

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Plato, Roman marble bust copied from Greek original, 4th century B.C.E., Capitoline Museums, Rome.

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Socrates, Roman marble bust copied from Greek original, 2nd half of the 4th century B.C.E., Capitoline Museums, Rome.

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José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), detail of photograph of his impersonation of Honoré de Balzac, circa 1900.

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One way to objectivity is to recognize one’s own subjectivity.    Metaphors for understanding reality are rare.    One sees the world primarily through one’s own experience.    It is difficult (though not impossible) to understand what one has not experienced.    Truth never rests:  It is not singular, but always plural.

Anonymous

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1

Index

  • 1. Awareness of the Transformation of One’s Self:

The highest principle of inquiry is consciousness of one’s self.    In inquiry lie the beginnings of change.

 

2

Index

  • 2. The Absence of Trust:

In our age of disbelief, the stories we tell each other about the past and the present seem to be in a state of collapse.    There is a lack of continuity in the social order, increasingly suffocated by misinformation and distrust.  We challenge each other over what is real and what is not.

3

Index

  • 3. The Unassailable Truth:

For most of us an ultimate truth remains unattainable and the stories we share from the past and the present no longer seem useful.    Along with the disappearance of our past stories, both the person who seeks truth and the act of giving a person his due are in crisis.     Our society finds itself defined by a decline in trust both in government and its institutions.    Despairingly, the challenge is that the creation of new stories has become an act of preservation.     Likewise, autocracy is on the ascendance.    A lack of faith has sown aimlessness.    What can change this course of despair?    What will bring enlightenment to us?

 

4

Index

  • 4. Consciousness:

Knowledge is constantly changing and the result of this destabilization carries us into greater disorder.     For this reason clarity is more necessary than ever to understand ourselves.     Even if clarity is not always possible, to know oneself is imperative.    Thus arises the tension between continuity and change.    Here lies the quest for survival.

 

5

Index

  • 5. Not Knowing:

Not knowing is the essential condition of existence, despite one’s apparent desire for knowledge or for authority.     To know is to inquire.     Reality, though fleeting, inspires reflection.     Change begins with the recognition that one is not in isolation.     Not even the one (who seeks self-sacrifice for his spiritual advancement) by absolute cloister could get rid of his entanglement with the world.    It is by relating to other people and his environment that this person comes to know who he is.     Not even he (who despises the symbols of fear) is capable of freeing himself from his anguish.   The fear of not knowing hangs over all of us.     It is possible that striving without measure (in the aspiration for rationality) only leads us to end up being irrational:     Here lies the origin of complexity given the absence of innocence.

 

6

Index

  • 6. The Energy of Life:

In his theory of cultural attributes (Meditaciones del Quijote, Meditación preliminar; Índice 8, La pantera o del sensualismo, pág. 21), José Ortega y Gasset gives us his concept of razón vital2, which means reason is expressed through life itself.    Ortega parses the European mind into two archetypes:     the Germanic and the Mediterranean.     The former is meditative and the latter sensuous.   Of the sensuous he says:     The predominance of the senses usually implies a deficiency in inner powers.    What is meditating as compared with seeing?     As soon as the retina is hit by the arrow from without, our inner personal energy hastens and stops the intrusion.     The impression is registered, subjected to civilized order; it is thought, and in this way it is integrated in the building up of our personality, and cooperates within it – Evelyn Rugg and Diego Martín’s translation – Notes and Introduction by Julián Marías – pp. 85-86.     The Orteguian admonition here is to find the balance between extremes:   between the excesses and deficiencies of these two archetypes.

 

7

Index

  • 7. Human Agency and Its History:

A second source for my understanding of the mind and the senses is found in Plato’s Republic (politeia) – Socrates’s dialogue of the allegory of the cave at the beginning of Book Seven.     There have been many interpretations.     Mine differs.     My purpose is to rid suffering from the mind of the freed slave.     Once freed from shackles, the mind of the freed slave (who ascends to the mouth of the cave) discovers its own vision of the world.     Despite the sun’s glare, the uneducated mind is transformed by the newly found ideal of truth.     But the awareness by the prisoner (who has remained behind) is inseparable from the condition of the freed man:      The slave (remaining in shadows of suffering) is not entirely separable from the memory of the freed man.     Because of suffering, the freed man’s mind is aware of its inability to know.      At the same time, the freed mind learns how its own transformation may be dependent on the new course of its history.     This mind’s actions allow participation in change, and change is possible through self examination.      The mind examines itself through meditating.     Meditation is not an obligation, but a necessity.     Meditation is the result of the mind’s freedom and it is the means to understanding its own choices in its approach to truth:     But this effort is only an approximation to the infinity of truth.     The freed mind (facing the visible world) is lacking here.    Thus, the freed mind recognizes that neither its actions nor the course of its history is predictable.     They (i.e. the mind’s actions and the course of its history) come from multiple possibilities about belief.  

The freed mind realizes that time is an illusion:     Time is fleeting, false, and deceitful.     The mind, habitually trapped in its past, remains mired in pain.     Anger (which comes from the past in search for justice) has for its sole purpose the manifestation of resentment.     But anger only manages to put its existence on hold, awaiting compensation.     Just as time is an illusion for the mind, the quest for emotional reparation is also an illusion.     For the mind, there is no vindication by being trapped in the labyrinth of illusion.     Only the rationality of active love can compensate for anger.     If the mind of the lover of truth can project itself lovingly in the direction that it resents, then a liberating sense of bravery arises towards itself.     Anger and sentimentality are one and the same.      As the force of love sheds sentimentality, one’s desires dissipate and with them anger as well.     Thereby, violence ceases to exist.     Socrates’s allegory of the mind (freed from suffering) carries all these implications and comparisons towards a goal of Ideal Truth.

 

8

Index

  • 8. Alertness:

In an effort to understand Ortega’s concept of circumstancia (“circumstance”), his Meditación preliminar, Indice 6, Cultura mediterránea, explains to us that when he goes through the landscape of ideas he has to meditate with alertness on the influence of his experiences.     Needless to say, this includes all his past and present relations, the geographies he has occupied, and everything he has done in life.     Ortega forewarns us of the risks in this act of meditation:   We are accompanied by a keen suspicion that, at the slightest hesitation on our part, the whole world could collapse, and we with it.    When we meditate, our mind has to be kept at full tension; it is a painful and integral effortIndex 6, Mediterranean Culture, translated by Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marín (Introduction and notes by Julián Marías [a favorite student of Ortega y Gasset]), p. 34.     In Plato’s dialogues, the same “effort” is found:     Through the act of meditation, Socrates’s freed man draws transformation and redemption from the narrow crevices among ideas.     Meditation helps the lover of truth get closer to his existential condition; it offers him the possibility of reacting differently, and sustains him with the very energy that life provides.

 

9

Index

  • 9. Faith:

For the one who fears meditation, having faith in one’s own actions and changes are not sufficient for inquiry.     History is not alive for him:     It is at a point of no return; it is dead.    This person is in a world of despair and surrounded by the proverbial dancing of shadows.     This person is bound in his own chains, is overwhelmed by a lack of confidence, and is, without trust, unable to make a leap of faith.     Neither the notion of individuality nor the concept of free will seems satisfactory any longer.      This person relinquishes personal power and is unaware of the forces influencing his mind and his senses.     His refusal to face reality becomes a conscious decision for the suppression of truth.     This refusal is antithetical to life itself.    For him, life becomes enslavement and stands in opposition to the freed man, who fearlessly ponders the reality of the visible world, and passionately delves into the exploration of the unknown.   The mind of the freed man represents Ortega’s concept of razón vital, desirous to be absorbed by it.

 

10

Index

  • 10. Deliverance:

Distractions can be multiple.     In Ortega’s playful analysis, he implies that if meditation is extraneous to the fears of the mind, it can succumb to obsession, and even fall despairingly into manias.      Ortega values the relevance of every influence.     He understands that a human being and his landscape are not separate.     The unity of the two means his salvation by circunstancia (“circumstance”):   Thus his appreciation of circunstancia:    Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia, si no la salvo a ella no me salvo yo – Al Lector, Índice, pág. 41 (which I translate as “I am myself [in a world of perceptions] and also the material world that surrounds me; if I don’t save them, I don’t save myself”).     Incidentally, here Ortega preempts his conclusion with what he has read in the Bible:   Benefac loco illi quo notus es3  (loosely translated into English as “do good in the place where you are known”).     With these remarks, Ortega reinforces the idea that he is unable to disassociate himself from his surroundings.    If he is to flourish and to find salvation, it will be necessary for him to understand and protect what he shares with his environment. 

Parallel to Ortega’s analysis is Plato’s Socratic allegory, which teaches us the effect that the visible world has on our mind.     From these two perspectives, the mind tends to be discouraged by what it does not understand.     Awareness of the visible world’s influence is for both thinkers an instinct for survival.     To be aware, therefore, means to be silent, away from the deafening sound of fear.      As long as there is fear, promoted by the progress of civilization, there will be no movement or separation from distractions.     Confronting fear means dispersing it, making it disappear.     Dispersal of fear is fundamental to the understanding of self.      Releasing oneself from fear is confronting one’s not-knowing.     Enslavement (at the depth of the cave) is equivalent to accepting the impositions of fear.     Both, for Ortega and Plato, the opposition to indifference is found through meditation; thereby one is able to be alert and know oneself.

 

11

Index

  • 11. Perception and Storytelling:

​True confidence is living in uncertainty.     An overriding fact is that human beings organize themselves around the making of stories.      Every story we create is an act of piety that consoles the mind.      Yet new stories and old ones are provisional tools that fill the gap of our faith, filling in the void of our ignorance.      Whether the story be true or not, storytelling rescues us from ourselves.      Storytelling is our razón vital.    It seeks to expose us to the best possible meaning of ourselves:     Meaning in storytelling is found by investing oneself with the willpower to exceed adversity.    Meaning is found by creating something new within oneself.    Meaning is found in one’s vulnerability and in the constant pain to overcome it.      The process of finding meaning reveals that one cannot control Truth.     Happiness depends on how one accepts the absence of control, and how we can stop disliking our limitations.​

Storytelling persuades us to think that one’s actions will spread deeply into one’s consciousness.     One may not always be able to defeat the element of preconception, for bias is always with us.     As long as suffering, uncertainty, and the effort to overcome them exist, bias will persist.     Bias lurks behind our thoughts, quiet and insidious, yet it is there for a reason in spite of its harmful effects.    The irony is that if one banished preconceptions, there would be no further progress.    In any story, if the hero overcomes the villainy of bias, it is because he is able to change:     If one does not overcome bias, one does not grow and there is no transformation.     Success is not as important as the struggle to overcome bias.    Every time adversity comes to us, it is an opportunity for the recognition of those preconceptions that still reside in ourselves.     Success does not provide happiness.     Happiness is only possible through self discovery.     As such, one becomes symbolically the whole of humanity.     This is its highest expression:     The creation of something new as we face adversity, and the worse the adversity, the greater the opportunity.

 

12

Index

  • 12. Reasoning (sentience vs sapience):

Awareness of fiction is the appreciation of the paradox between what is and what is not.     Knowledge expresses not only the awareness of one’s own intuitions and senses, but also the reasoning about those intuitions, senses, and impressions.    That is, every time we examine the perception of our memory, we are editing our understanding.    Thus, the way we organize and observe ourselves comes from our desires and senses at that moment, and this comes from our memories.    For instance, it is difficult for us to agree on a common origin or a common thread uniting us as a species, even if that may be true.     Whether we wish it or not, we define ourselves by the histories we create either in groups or in countries.     In doing so, we are actually imagining separate and fragmented believes that we belong to separate locales, cultures, and races.     Yet, there is an unavoidable thread that connects us as a species.     Such composition is found in our common and preponderant origin, though our perception may resist being part of it.     We endow ourselves with differences dictated by the conditioning of our perceptions.     In The Revolt of the Masses, Ortega refers to this condition as la razón de sinrazón (“reason without reason”), which explains our deeply rooted irrationality and fragmentation.        Knowledge implies greater content than what is gained through the form of our perceptions.     Our minds tend to abbreviate history, even believing that it does not exist. Yet the more expansive the “circumstance” or condition of apprehending truth, the greater the maturity our existence demands from us.

 

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Index

  • 13. Maturing Emotional Intelligence:

If a human being is the measure of all things, then also one comes to appreciate that knowledge is always inconclusive.     Thus, meditation strengthens our mind, our memory, our learning, our attention, and our self awareness.     Meditation on the past, the present, or the future depends on emotional intelligence.     Emotional intelligence is based on capturing the import of influences from all areas of a man’s life, from one’s behavior to one’s relationship with others and one’s environment.     Ultimate reality depends on the level of maturity of a person, and it is through meditation that one matures.     Hence, how a person chooses to act depends on meditation and his level of emotional intelligence.     For the fanatic (obsessed with fear) meditation seems impossible.     For the fanatic, doubt is not the issue.    The fanatic seeks to reiterate cycles.     The fanatic fails to understand that fear of change is irrational because it is inevitable that the world is constantly evolving.     The fanatic seeks to change what is beyond his control.     From the Orteguian point of view, this person, within a closed valuation system, does not find consolation because his mind fears what it does not understand.

 

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Index

  • 14. Our Connection to the Universe:

From Ortega’s perspective of Cervantes’s Don Quixote [1605-15], we learn that the courage granted by Love – not hate – impels us towards understanding …the useless remains of a shipwreck that life, in its perpetual surge, throws at our feet. – To The Reader, p. 31.    Love is a divine architect who, according to Plato came down to the world – ὥστε τὀ πᾶν αὐτῶ ξυνδέδέσθα – so that every thing in the universe might be linked together:      Separation means extinction.     Hatred, which separates, isolates, and pulls apart, dismembers the world, and destroys individualityTo the Reader, p. 33.

Hence, Ortega explains that the imperative for the individual is to reflect on one’s circunstancia (in medias res), … to arouse the desire of understanding the universal in its particulars. – To the Reader, p. 31:     To ignore the fact that each thing has a character of its own, and not that we wish to demand of it, is, in my opinion, the true capital sin, which I call a sin of the heart because it derives its nature from lack of love.     There is nothing so illicit as to dwarf the world by means of our manias and blindness, to minimize reality, to suppress mentally fragments of what exists.     This happens when one demands that what is deep should appear in the same way as what is superficial.     No, there are things that present only that part of themselves which is strictly necessary to enable us to realize that they lie concealed behind it. – p. 62.

 

15

Index

  • 15. A Heroic Perspective:

Knowledge comes before fanaticism.     Fanaticism is, for Ortega, the rejection of the perspectives of others.     Ortega points to reasoning as an act of charity, which uncovers differences, and suggests that understanding is akin to the circling of an eagle in flight.      To be oneself, for Ortega, is the same as it is for Cervantes.      The act of being a hero takes place through a sensitive exploration of the nature of reality.      In Ortega’s view, as well as for Cervantes’s, the will of the hero belongs only to the persona of Don Quixote:   Because to be a hero means to be one out of many, to be oneself if we refuse to have our actions determined by heredity or environment, it is because we seek to base the origin of our actions on ourselves and only on ourselves.      The hero’s will is not that of his ancestors, nor of his society, but his own.     This will to be oneself is heroism. – First Meditation, 15, The Hero, p. 149.    
I do not think that there is a more profound originality than this practical, active originality of the hero.    His life is a perpetual resistance to the habitual and customary.    Each movement that he has to make has first had to overcome custom and invent a new kind of gesture.    Such a life is a perpetual suffering, a constant tearing oneself away from the part of oneself, which is given over to habit and is a prisoner of matter. – First Meditation, 15, The Hero – p. 149.

 

16

Index

  • 16. The Fear of fate:

A Socratic life is heroic, but if unexamined, of no value.     In the pain of living, one has to embrace the fact that the examination of fear is part of life.     Alongside this examination, fate is never artificial.     Fate does not deceive, even in our misfortunes.      Fate is not illusive, though our perception of time may be.      Instead, fate challenges us to change.      In change, fate protects us from stagnation.     What appears to be random is, in fact, an opportunity for learning.     Consequently, fate exists not for attacking, but for stimulating our transformation.     Fate does not move against us, but challenges us to change by confronting obstacles.     Fate attacks fear, because one’s fear takes away one’s ability to make choices.    Narratives of fear turn out to be self-fulfilling prophesies.      Fear deceives and defines us.     It hampers survival.     Fear prevents our evolving, it paralices us:     We resist giving up habits because of fear.     Thus one languishes and fails to overcome disbelief.

 

17

Index

  • 17. Boundlessness and Humility:

The shadow of shame represents one’s flaws.    The shadow is what one wishes not to be, though its shadow be part of oneself.     Only, when the shadow is accepted with humility, do its flaws dissolve in the act of loving oneself with compassion.     Ultimately, the fanatic will recognize his incompleteness and become aware of his own insignificance:     The incapacity for completeness looms over all of us.     Only through risk does one learn the extent of one’s bounds and how much further one may go.     We advance through humility and humility appreciates neither truth nor falsehood.     Humility is the acknowledgment of one’s inexorable estrangement from an infinite truth.    Only the humble voice recognizes the struggle for understanding and change.     Both depend on a flight from despair.     For Ortega and for Plato, the mark of the highest values is found in our vulnerability.     If we surrender absolutely, then we find redemption.

 

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Index

  • 18. Epilogue:

My perspective treats Plato and Ortega outside of any theistic justification.     I leave aside any application of Plato to theological thought.     Likewise,  I ignore any attempt to ascribe religious respects to Ortega’s theory of values.     For me their notions, when applied to theology, are not credible.     I understand Plato and Ortega in their search for the limits of human perception and rationality.     Efforts to apply their philosophies as religious foundations are outside of my purpose.

The depth of Plato and Ortega’s thought is not to be found in a method for objective morality.     Nor is it ethical relativism, nor even is it found in a claim of universality.      Ideologies on morality are derived from norms dictated by theologians, seemingly unwilling to relinquish authority.    The role of the lovers of truth is not to dictate virtue nor to define the godhead.    Their teachings are centered on rationalism.    Their humanism is based on a concept of justice that is antithetical to fixed norms.    The paradigm of true knowledge – according to Plato and Ortega – is derived from love based on the originality of heroism.     This love does not reside outside of the individual.     This love is not found in the promise of a transcendental world.     This love finds man’s salvation in the present.  This love calls for self examination.   And above all, this love is a liberation from the numbness of the mind.

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Endnotes:

1 For Ortega circunstancia, is a representation of the sum total of influences in the consciousness of a man, thus expressing the reason for his existence.

2 Razón vital stands as Ortega y Gasset’s philosophy which views that reason is, in of itself, an expression of life.

3 I failed to find this Biblical citation.

 

Bibliography:

  • Ortega y Gasset, José, Meditaciones del Quijote:   Meditación Preliminar y Meditación Primera, (Madrid:  PUBLICACIONES DE LA RESIDENCIA DE ESTUDIANTES, SERIE II.—VOL. I, Universidad Central de Madrid, 1914)
  • Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha [1605–1615] (Cambridge:   Harvard Publishing Company, 1893.   Translated by John Ormsby. 4 vols. in 8 books.  Limited Edition No. 71/320. 1st edition.
  • Platón. Teeteto. Introducción, traducción y notas de Marcelo Boeri. Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 2006.
  • Ortega y Gasset, José, La rebelión de las masas (Madrid: Editorial Revista de Occidente, 1928).   Fue publicado inicialmente en 1927 como una serie de artículos en el diario El Sol, antes de ser recopilado en formato de libro en 1928 por Editorial Revista de Occidente en Madrid.
  • Sarmiento, Edward , “Blackfriars” (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., August 1950), v. 31, No. 365, 356-63.